METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. DENT

Full title: METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY Plaintiff, v. VALERIE McNAIR DENT…

Court: United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

Date published: Feb 3, 2003

CAUSE NO. 3:01-CV-0772-K (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2003)

Opinion

CAUSE NO. 3:01-CV-0772-K

February 3, 2003

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ED KINKEADE, United States District Judge.

Before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants Defendant Valerie McNair Dent's motion and denies Plaintiff Metropolitan Life Insurance Company's ("Met Life") motion.

I. Background

The facts in this case are undisputed. Met Life issued a life insurance policy to the United States Office of Personnel Management ("OPM") pursuant to the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act ("FEGLIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 8701-16. James McNair was covered under the policy while employed by the U.S. Postal Service. His three children, including Ms. Dent, were named beneficiaries. Mr. McNair died on November 24, 1995; however, his life insurance coverage ended 30 days after he resigned from the Postal Service in August, 1995. Shortly after Mr. McNair's death, Ms. Dent submitted a claim for death benefits, and Met Life paid Ms. Dent $27,432.19. On May 22, 1996, Met Life, thorough its administrative office, sent a letter to Ms. Dent notifying her that the payment made to her was an error and demanding that she repay the full amount. Met Life repeated its demand for repayment on several occasions, but waited until April 23, 2001 to file suit.

II. Applicable Statute of Limitations

Ms. Dent argues that summary judgment is appropriate because Met Life has asserted state law claims that are governed by the Texas statute of limitations, which expired no later than four years after Met Life learned that it inadvertently paid Ms. Dent. Met Life counters its claims should be governed by the statute of limitations in the forum with the most significant relationship to its claims because its allegations against Ms. Dent arise under a federal statute. Met Life further argues that its home state of New York has the most significant relationship and that this suit is consequently governed by a six-year statute of limitations. Met Life is mistaken.

Whether Met Life's claims arise under federal or state law is irrelevant. Even if Met Life is correct in arguing that its claims arise under FEGLIA, the Texas statute of limitations applies. Met Life concedes that FEGLIA contains no statute of limitations provision, and it is well settled that:

When federal law contains no limitation period applicable to a federal cause of action, federal courts are to apply the forum state's limitation period applicable to the state cause of action that bears the closest substantive resemblance to the federal cause of action.

Vigman v. Community Nat'l Bank Trust Co., 635 F.2d 455, 459 (5^th Cir. 1981). It is equally clear that if Met Life's claims are state law in nature they are governed by the Texas limitations period. Vaught v. Shawo Denko K.K., 107 F.3d 1137, 1145 (5^th Cir. 1997).

To support its position that the Court should apply the most significant relationship test to determine which state's limitations apply, Met Life relies on Held v. Manufacturer's Hanover Leasing Corp., 912 F.2d 1197 (10^th Cir. 1980). While it is true that the Tenth Circuit adopted § 142 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws as the means for determining which state's statute of limitations applies when the federal statute does not prescribe a limitations period, the court also recognized that the Fifth Circuit follows the bright-line rule that the applicable limitations period is that of the analogous statute of limitations for the forum state. Id. at 1202. Met Life's contention that most of the actions underlying this suit occurred in New York is, therefore, irrelevant. Binding precedent requires this Court to apply the Texas statute of limitations.

III. Texas Statute of Limitations

Met Life asserts three causes of action in its complaint: breach of contract, conversion, and unjust enrichment. Breach of contract claims in Texas are governed by the four-year limitation in Civ. Prac. Rem. Code § 16.004. Hoover v. Gregory, 835 S.W.2d 668, 677 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1992, writ denied); Kansa Reinsurance Co. v. Congressional Mortgage Corp., 20 F.3d 1362, 1369 (5^th Cir. 1994). Conversion and unjust enrichment, on the other hand are governed by the two-year limitation period in § 16.003. HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 885 (Texas 1998) (unjust enrichment). Met Life learned that it inadvertently paid Ms. Dent no later than May 22, 1996, when it sent her a letter demanding repayment. Met Life then waited nearly five years before bringing this action. Consequently, all of its claims are barred by limitations.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is DENIED as moot. Judgment will be entered that Metropolitan Life Insurance Company take nothing on its claims in this case.

SO ORDERED.