Opinion
No. 05-09-00180-CV
Opinion issued July 23, 2010.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1, Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 001-2632-2008.
Before Justices MORRIS, FITZGERALD, and FRANCIS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This appeal arises from a lawsuit for damages brought by Lowell Merritt against Terry Douglas, a justice of the peace who presided over several civil cases initiated by Merritt. In response to Merritt's lawsuit, Douglas filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting judicial and official immunity. The trial court granted Douglas's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Merritt's lawsuit. Merritt, representing himself without an attorney, appeals from the trial court's dismissal. We affirm the trial court's order.
Because the parties are well-acquainted with the facts and procedural history of the case, we do not recite them in detail here. It is sufficient to note that Merritt filed this lawsuit asserting multiple causes of action after Douglas granted summary judgments in three civil cases Merritt had filed in justice court. The underlying cases were Merritt v. Andrews, No. 02-1-CV-08-00047, Merritt v. Slayton, No. 02-1-CV-08-00048, and Merritt v. Vance, No. 02-1-CV-08-00049. In addition to the summary judgments, Douglas later signed an order for sanctions against Merritt in the Vance suit. Merritt asserts that Douglas should not have heard the summary judgment motions or signed any orders in the cases after Merritt filed a motion to recuse Douglas. In his plea to the jurisdiction, Douglas asserted he was entitled to judicial immunity because all of Merritt's claims involved actions taken and decisions made by Douglas in his capacity as a justice of the peace.
A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea designed to defeat a cause of action irrespective of whether the claims asserted have merit. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). Its purpose is not to force the plaintiff to preview the merits of his case but to establish a reason why the merits of his claims should not be reached. Id. We review de novo the issue of whether the trial court has jurisdiction to determine the subject matter of an action. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002).
Although Merritt's appellate brief attempts to raise several issues, he presents only one argument specifically addressing whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over his lawsuit against Douglas. He contends the trial court's dismissal was improper because he asserted a claim under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Merritt's contention has no merit. Judges are absolutely immune from liability for judicial acts that are not performed in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, no matter how erroneous the act or how evil the motive. See Turner v. Pruitt, 342 S.W.2d 422, 423 (Tex. 1961); Delcourt v. Silverman, 919 S.W.2d 777, 781 (Tex. App.-Hous. [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied). Moreover, it has been long held that the common law immunity for judges acting within their judicial jurisdiction is not abrogated by section 1983. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967). The immunity applies even when a judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly because of the paramount public interest that judges be at liberty to perform their judicial duties with independence. Id. at 554. Accordingly, Merritt has not shown the trial court erred in granting Douglas's plea to the jurisdiction. We resolve this issue against him.
Merritt's appellate brief also contains several issues that do not directly challenge the trial court's ruling on the plea to the jurisdiction. Merritt contends that the trial judge who ruled on the plea should have been disqualified because "she expressed her personal interest in the subject matter and became personally interested in the outcome of the case." Merritt's entire argument under this issue is "Disqualification of a Judge is mandatory according to Case Law when an Interest However small in the Outcome of a Case, and may be raised at any time, even on appeal or in a collateral attack on the judgment per Case Law:" This conclusory statement is followed by a series of case citations. Appellant does not cite us to the record for any factual support for his contentions nor does he offer any discussion on how the cited law applies to the facts of this case. Our appellate briefing rules require an appellant to state concisely his complaint along with a clear argument on its merits supported by appropriate citations to the record and legal authority. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). Because Merritt has failed to comply with the briefing requirements, he has waived this issue on appeal. See Fredonia State Bank v. Gen Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1994); Thedford v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 3 S.W.3d 609, 615-16 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, pet. denied).
To the extent Merritt refers to his appendix for support for his contentions, we note that many of these documents are not part of our record and thus we may not consider them on appeal. See Cantu v. Horany, 195 S.W.3d 867, 870 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
The brief before us is Merritt's "Amended Brief" filed on March 30, 2009. He filed his amended brief after we granted Douglas's motion to strike Merritt's original brief and reply brief for multiple briefing deficiencies.
Merritt also complains about various rulings Douglas made in the justice court cases after Merritt had filed a motion to recuse. As noted above, these matters involve the merits underlying the causes of action Merritt has brought against Douglas and, as such, are not properly before us in an appeal from a plea to the jurisdiction. See Bland Indep. Sch. Dist., 34 S.W.3d at 554.
Finally, Merritt challenges several orders signed by Judge Richard Mays after Merritt's lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the plea to the jurisdiction. Merritt claims that because Mays "Had Not Kept Up with his Oath of Office Requirements," all of his orders are void. On appeal, we indulge in every presumption in favor of the regularity of the proceedings and documents in the trial court, and the burden is squarely placed on the party challenging the proceeding to overcome this burden. See Murphy v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 199 S.W.3d 441, 444 (Tex. App.-Hous. [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). Thus, Merritt must make a prima facie showing that Judge Mays did not take the required oaths before we will consider the issue on the merits. Id. Merritt has failed to meet his burden. The only "evidence" he has presented is a copy of an oath of office Mays purportedly signed on July 1, 1999. This document appears in the appendix to his appellate brief. As previously noted, this document is not properly before us and we may not consider it on appeal. Cantu, 195 S.W.3d at 870. Moreover, Merritt has not shown how the post-dismissal orders probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1. The orders have no effect on whether the trial court erred in granting Douglas's plea to the jurisdiction. We resolve this issue against Merritt.
The order granting the plea to the jurisdiction was signed by Judge Corinne Mason. After the order was signed, Merritt filed a motion to recuse and disqualify Judge Mason. Judge Mason signed an order recusing herself and requesting the presiding judge of the First Administrative Region to assign a judge to hear the case. Judge Mays then signed an order denying Merritt's "Motion to reinstate Hearing Due to Fatal Errors" and addressing Merritt's request to be found indigent for court costs purposes. Judge Mays signed a second order that denied Merritt's motion to void all orders of Judge Mays and Judge Mason and reinstate his lawsuit and denied his request for a jury trial as moot.
Because the issues raised by Merritt do not demonstrate that the trial court reversibly erred in granting the plea to the jurisdiction, we affirm the trial court's order.