Opinion
A24A0001
06-21-2024
MERITAGE HOMES OF GEORGIA, INC. v. JONES et al.
Joshua Adam Scoggins, Cumming, Joseph Paul Mitchell, for Appellant. Brian E. Daughdrill, Appellee.
Joshua Adam Scoggins, Cumming, Joseph Paul Mitchell, for Appellant.
Brian E. Daughdrill, Appellee.
Barnes, Presiding Judge.
The appellant has filed in this appeal a motion seeking remand of the case, representing that the parties have reached an agreement whereby their disputes will be resolved. According to the motion, the appellees agree to such disposition.
This appeal concerns four lower court cases.
[1] 1. Given the pending consent motion, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for the parties to effectuate their agreement. See Petty v. Petty, 227 Ga. 521, 521-522 (1), 181 S.E.2d 859 (1971) (reversing the trial court’s judgment and remanding for the parties’ "agreement [to] be filed in order to permit the agreed disposition of the case"); Clouthier v. Med. Center of Central Ga., 359 Ga. App. 669, 670, 859 S.E.2d 827 (2021) (reversing the trial court judgment and remanding the case "for the parties to effectuate their agreement"); Dougherty County School System v. Grossman, 113 Ga. App. 825, 825, 149 S.E.2d 920 (1966) (reversing judgments "for the purpose of effecting a settlement of the cases and ending the litigation," where both appellant and appellee requested such appellate outcome); Lee v. Barron, 108 Ga. App. 473, 473, 133 S.E.2d 256 (1963) (reversing, "for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the cases," the trial court’s judgment in accordance with the parties’ request and without the appellate court’s consideration of the merits of the appeal; explaining that it "appear[ed] to be advisable for jurisdiction to be revested in the trial court in order that judgments or other procedures may be entered to consummate the settlement reached between the parties"); Barnett v. Moss, 98 Ga. App. 581, 581, 106 S.E.2d 60 (1958) (reversing for the parties "to carry out [their] compromise agreement"); see also Charter HR v. Perry, 320 Ga. App. 315, 315, 739 S.E.2d 770 (2013) (reversing superior court’s judgment and remanding the case, where the parties filed a consent motion to allow them to seek the State Board of Workers’ Compensation’s approval of a settlement agreement).
[2] 2. We note that the consent motion additionally requests this Court to direct the trial court to enter on remand a specified "Consent Judgment." The proffered "Consent Judgment" contains various findings of fact and particular conclusions of law.
For instance, the proffered "Consent Judgment" includes language that the "Petitioners have been made whole" and thus "lack standing" because any injury "has been ameliorated"; and that certain legal documents at issue - identified as an "Annexation and Rezoning Decision," a "Site Plan Approval," and an "LDP Approval" - are "valid and enforceable, both procedurally and on their merits."
[3] As explained above, under the instant procedural posture, an appellate court may reverse the trial court’s judgment "for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the case[ ]," but such relief is "without consideration by [the appellate] court of the merits of the appeal[ ]." Lee, 108 Ga. App. at 473, 133 S.E.2d 256. See Barnett, 98 Ga. App. at 581, 106 S.E.2d 60 ("In view of the consent settlement filed with this court by consent of counsel for all parties, this court has authority, without looking into the record, to re- verse the judgment to carry out said compromise agreement[.]") (emphasis supplied); see also Charter HR, 320 Ga. App. at 315, 739 S.E.2d 770 ("[T]his Court, without looking into the record, will reverse the judgment of the court below so as to carry out the [parties’] compromise.") (emphasis supplied). Accordingly, we decline the request for this Court to direct the trial court to enter on remand the specified "Consent Judgment."
See generally Franklyn Gesner Fine Paintings v. Ketcham, 259 Ga. 3, 4 (6) (a), 375 S.E.2d 848 (1989) ("The legal effect of the reversal of a judgment on appeal is to nullify the judgment below and place the parties in the same position in which they were before judgment.") (citation and punctuation omitted).
[4] Notwithstanding, here, as has been done in similarly situated cases, "jurisdiction [is] revested in the trial court in order that judgments or other procedures may be entered to consummate the settlement[s] reached between the parties." Lee, 108 Ga. App. at 473, 133 S.E.2d 256. Beyond that, however, we express no view on the merits of any issue raised in the underlying cases, and we intimate no opinion as to any future factual findings or legal conclusions that may be included in any orders entered by the trial court on remand. See Lee, 108 Ga. App. at 473, 133 S.E.2d 256; Barnett, 98 Ga. App. at 581, 106 S.E.2d 60.
See generally Walker v. Estate of Mays, 2.79 Ga. 652, 653 (1), 619 S.E.2d 679 (2005) ("[L]itigants cannot under any circumstances dictate the procedural … rules of this Court.") (citations and punctuation omitted).
See also generally Pfeiffer v. Ga. Dept. of Transp., 275 Ga. 827, 829 (2), 573 S.E.2d 389 (2002) ('[O]ur appellate courts are courts for the correction of errors of law committed in the trial court. Routinely, this Court refuses to review issues not raised in the trial court[.]") (footnote omitted); I. A. Group, Ltd. Co. v. RMNANDCO, Inc., 336 Ga. App. 461, 464 (3), n. 6, 784 S.E.2d 823 (2016) (declining to consider substantive issues raised on appeal, and thus ‘‘leav[ing] them for the trial court to address in the first instance should they be raised [on remand]").
Judgment reversed and case remanded.
Gobeil and Pipkin, JJ., concur.