Opinion
2022-SC-0442-MR
09-28-2023
Joseph MEREDITH, Appellant v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Shannon Renee Dupree, Karen Shuff Maurer, Frankfort, Assistant Public Advocate. COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Daniel J. Cameron, Attorney General of Kentucky, Joseph A. Beckett, Assistant Attorney General.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Shannon Renee Dupree, Karen Shuff Maurer, Frankfort, Assistant Public Advocate.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Daniel J. Cameron, Attorney General of Kentucky, Joseph A. Beckett, Assistant Attorney General.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE BISIG Joseph Meredith was convicted by a Hardin Circuit Court jury of murder, abuse of a corpse, being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Meredith was sentenced to seventy years in prison consistent with the jury's recommendation and he now appeals as a matter of right. After review, we affirm the judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 12, 2022, Joseph Meredith shot and killed Angela Kerr. Approximately one month prior to her death, Meredith met Kerr through a mutual friend. Kerr was kicked out of her residence and searching for a ride and place to stay. At some point, Meredith offered to allow Kerr to stay at his residence. Kerr stayed with Meredith, on and off, for a month leading up to her death. During this time, Meredith and Kerr, along with other individuals staying in the basement of the residence, often used drugs together – namely methamphetamine.
According to Meredith's trial testimony, he and Kerr maintained a romantic relationship, but Kerr continued to have contact and exchange messages with men who she was romantically involved with in the past. One of Kerr's past boyfriends was Quentin Stevenson. Stevenson testified that before Kerr met Meredith, Kerr was his girlfriend, but she left him because she wanted Stevenson to stop selling drugs. Stevenson maintained that Meredith wanted a physical relationship with Kerr, but Kerr refused his advances.
Stevenson did not like Meredith, and in a number of messages to Kerr, Stevenson made threats against Meredith. Stevenson also stated that Kerr sent him messages stating she wanted to leave Meredith's residence because he was requesting sex. Stevenson felt like Meredith was forcing Kerr to be in a relationship with him. Meredith eventually saw the messages between Stevenson and Kerr, along with messages Kerr exchanged with others.
On March 7, 2022, Meredith and Kerr argued about the text messages Kerr sent to Stevenson. Meredith was mad because Kerr was talking to a guy who threatened to kill him. Kerr left the residence with one of Meredith's friends, and Meredith even gave the friend money to take care of Kerr in case she needed anything. During this time when Kerr was not living with Meredith, they talked on the phone and tried to reconcile the situation. A few days later, Kerr returned to the residence at Meredith's invitation.
On the evening of March 11 and into March 12, Meredith, Kerr, and other individuals in the residence returned to their pattern of using methamphetamine. Meredith testified that after getting high, he walked throughout the residence and looked around outside because he feared for his safety, Kerr's safety, and the safety of others at the residence. He also testified that after getting high, Kerr wanted to leave the residence and began packing her things. Meredith testified that Kerr was also using a laptop to message people, but she would stop any time he entered the room, which made him suspicious. In the early morning hours of March 12, Meredith, while holding a .22 caliber revolver, again confronted Kerr about the past messages she exchanged with Stevenson by showing her screenshots he saved on his phone. An argument, and eventually a struggle, ensued. According to Meredith, Kerr got mad, lunged at him, bit him and tried to take the gun, but she could not. Meredith shot Kerr in the abdomen. According to Meredith, Kerr screamed at him, and he lost control. He stepped back and fired the remaining four bullets, hitting Kerr twice in the armpit and shoulder area and once in the chin and neck area. Kerr sustained four gunshot wounds and died.
While there were other individuals next door in the basement, they apparently did not hear any of the gunshots. Meredith cut off the clothing from Kerr's dead body and had sex with her. He video-recorded the encounter on his cell phone. Over Meredith's repeated objections, the trial court allowed the Commonwealth to play a portion of one of the three videos extracted from Meredith's cell phone. After having sex with Kerr's body, Meredith attempted to drag Kerr out of his apartment, but he was unsuccessful. Meredith then wrapped Kerr's body in blankets, left her in the doorway outside the basement, and fled into the woods behind the house. Eventually, other occupants of the residence noticed Kerr's body and called the police. Around 11:00 a.m. on March 12 an officer located Meredith not far from the house and the woods where he had fled. Meredith told police he was the one they had been looking for. Police found the revolver used to shoot Kerr in Meredith's pocket.
Meredith was indicted for Kerr's murder, abuse of a corpse, possessing a handgun as a convicted felon, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. During trial, Meredith presented a combination defense of self-defense, voluntary intoxication, and involuntary intoxication. Despite his request, the trial court declined to give the jury an extreme emotional disturbance (EED) instruction, concluding that the trial testimony did not support such an instruction.
ANALYSIS
Meredith now appeals as a matter of right and argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the Commonwealth to show a video he recorded of himself engaging in sex acts with the deceased victim, and the trial court erred by failing to give an EED instruction.
I. The trial court properly admitted a limited portion of the abuse of a corpse video.
Meredith argues that the trial court erred by allowing the Commonwealth to play a video clip that he recorded of himself engaging in sex acts with Kerr's body. He argues that the prejudicial impact of the video outweighed its probative value and that the video inflamed the jury. Prior to trial, Meredith filed a motion in limine to exclude the videos and made numerous objections to their admission, therefore his allegation of error is preserved. We review evidentiary issues for an abuse of discretion, Clark v. Commonwealth , 567 S.W.3d 565, 576 (Ky. 2019), which requires this Court to consider whether the trial court's decision was "arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles." Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).
On July 20, 2022, Meredith filed a motion in limine to exclude video of him engaging in sexual acts with Kerr's body and certain photographs of the deceased victim taken at the crime scene and during the autopsy. In his motion, Meredith objected to the introduction of the evidence and claimed that the evidence was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. He also requested a hearing to determine the admissibility of the evidence.
During a pre-trial conference on July 26, 2022, Meredith offered to stipulate to the existence and contents of the videos. The Commonwealth explained that Meredith recorded three videos: a five second video, a twenty-eight second video, and a one minute and thirty-nine second video. The Commonwealth expressed its intent to play the one minute and thirty-nine second video for the jury because the Commonwealth opined that the video best depicted the elements necessary to prove the abuse of a corpse offense, such as the sexual acts, who they were perpetrated by, the victim, and the victim's deceased status. As for the autopsy photos, the Commonwealth further explained that there were 108 photos and the Commonwealth only intended to seek admission of 14 photos, which would not be unnecessarily cumulative. In response, Meredith recognized the trial court's discretion in admitting evidence and again offered to stipulate to the existence of the video and its contents, arguing that playing the video for the jury would scar them. The trial court noted that the Commonwealth did not have to accept the offer to stipulate and agreed to watch the video to determine its admissibility.
On August 1, 2022, the trial court ruled that the Commonwealth could play the video for the jury because it depicted the necessary elements of the abuse of a corpse: the deceased victim, abuse, and the identity of the perpetrator. However, the trial court ruled that playing the entire one minute and thirty-nine second video was inappropriate because the extended length would make the video more prejudicial. Meredith reiterated his original position on this issue and further indicated that playing the audio from the video was unnecessary. On August 3, 2022, the Commonwealth proposed a twenty-eight second clip from the one minute and thirty-nine second video to the trial court and, after further review, the trial court agreed that the portion of the video could be played for the jury. At this time, Meredith again offered a stipulation, but the Commonwealth declined, and Meredith made an ongoing objection to the video being played for the jury.
The Commonwealth began to respond to Meredith's position. At this point, the video abruptly ended, and we were unable to locate the next portion, if any, of the hearing in the video record.
The twenty-eight second video excerpt was played for the jury. The clip included audio of Meredith saying "yeah, I'm putting it on her." Later, during Meredith's testimony, the Commonwealth asked about his comment, and he essentially stated that if that was what the Commonwealth said was said, he would take the Commonwealth's word for it. Over objection, the Commonwealth was permitted to play the audio from the video clip again. Meredith was ultimately convicted for abusing a corpse.
Meredith argues that the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice and, as a result, the trial court should have prohibited the Commonwealth from playing the video under Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 403. Generally, "[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible" unless otherwise excluded by the law or our rules of evidence. KRE 402. " ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." KRE 401. Evidence is relevant in a criminal case if it tends to prove or disprove an element of the offense. Little v. Commonwealth , 272 S.W.3d 180, 187 (Ky. 2008) (citing Harris v. Commonwealth, 134 S.W.3d 603, 607 (Ky. 2004) ).
Here, the video clip constituted direct evidence of Meredith's abuse of Kerr's corpse, and we reiterate that Meredith recorded the video of his own actions. "A person is guilty of abuse of a corpse when except as authorized by law he intentionally treats a corpse in a way that would outrage ordinary family sensibilities ." Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 525.120 (emphasis added). Therefore, the jury was tasked with making the factual determination of whether Meredith treated Kerr's corpse in a way that would outrage ordinary family sensibilities. Playing the audio, which included Meredith's comment "yeah, I'm putting it on her," provided context for the video and also supports that his actions "would outrage ordinary family sensibilities." KRS 525.120. As such, the video evidence depicting a crime Meredith was charged with was relevant to the jury's determination of whether Meredith's acts satisfied the elements of the crime. Notably, the precise language of the applicable statute requires a showing of outrageous behavior.
Despite the video's clear relevance, all evidence is nevertheless subject to the balancing test of KRE 403. Hall v. Commonwealth, 468 S.W.3d 814, 823 (Ky. 2015). "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice ...." KRE 403. "A proper balancing under KRE 403 requires that a trial court consider three factors: the probative worth of the evidence, the probability that the evidence will cause undue prejudice, and whether the harmful effects substantially outweigh the probative worth." Yates v. Commonwealth , 430 S.W.3d 883, 897 (Ky. 2014) (citing Barnett v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 98, 100 (Ky. 1998) ).
The probative value of the video clip cannot be denied. "The ‘probative value’ or ‘probative worth’ of evidence is a measure of how much the evidence tends to make the fact it is introduced to prove more or less probable." Hall , 468 S.W.3d at 823. The video clip undoubtedly made the facts of the crime more probable and, in fact, undeniable. However, the video clip was undoubtedly prejudicial to Meredith.
While there is no Kentucky caselaw discussing the admission of this type of video depicting abuse of a corpse, we find similarities with cases involving the admission of pornographic videos and images. Caselaw discusses videos and images, but the principles and rationale are nonetheless applicable to gruesome materials regardless of the type of media. Generally, "a photograph, otherwise admissible , does not become inadmissible simply because it is gruesome." Hall , 468 S.W.3d at 823 (quoting Funk v. Commonwealth , 842 S.W.2d 476, 479 (Ky. 1992) ). A trial court must always weigh the probative value of a gruesome video "against the harmful effects that might flow from its admission to determine whether the [video] should be excluded notwithstanding the general rule." Id.
Meredith cites Hall , where the defendant shot and killed his two neighbors and "[t]he facts surrounding the shootings were largely undisputed ...." Id. at 817. In fact, the defendant admitted to police that he shot the victims. Id. at 818. The Commonwealth sought to introduce twenty-eight crime scene and autopsy photos. The Court explained that "[w]hen there is already overwhelming evidence tending to prove a particular fact, any additional evidence introduced to prove the same fact necessarily has lower probative worth, regardless of how much persuasive force it might otherwise have by itself." Id. at 824. Additionally, in considering the admissibility of gruesome visual media, "the trial court should consider whether evidentiary alternatives would sufficiently prove the fact at issue without a comparable risk of prejudice." Id. (citations omitted).
Ultimately the Hall Court concluded that the probative value of many of the gruesome photos was low, namely because there was no material dispute of the facts and "there was more than enough alternative evidence—including the less gruesome photos, extensive lay and expert witness testimony, and the crime scene video—to easily prove the same facts beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 825. Meredith relies on Hall to argue that there was other evidence of what the video would show, such as the prosecutor's description of the video in the Commonwealth's opening statement, and a detective's testimony explaining that he "unfortunately" had to watch the video and expressing how "awful" it was. Meredith also points to his offer to stipulate to the existence and contents of the video.
This case is readily distinguishable from Hall because here, Meredith disputes some of the facts surrounding the shooting and the evidentiary alternatives Meredith points to are insufficient. Statements made during opening statements are not evidence. Tackett v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.3d 20, 30 (Ky. 2014). Therefore, the Commonwealth's description of the video in its opening statement could not have been considered by the jury when determining whether Meredith abused a corpse. Further, the detective's commentary on having to watch the video is hardly a comparable substitute to seeing an actual video of a charged crime being committed. Meredith's assertion regarding the sufficiency of these evidentiary alternatives lacks merit, and these alternatives simply do not qualify as "overwhelming evidence tending to prove a particular fact ...." Hall, 468 S.W.3d at 824.
In Helton v. Commonwealth, 595 S.W.3d 128, 130 (Ky. 2020), a jury convicted the defendant of five counts of possession of matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor. The defendant sought to prevent the Commonwealth from playing the pornographic videos for the jury, arguing that the only issue was who accessed the videos, not what the videos contained. Id. at 132. The trial court reviewed the videos and ruled that the Commonwealth could show the briefest portion of the videos possible to establish the necessary elements of the offense. Id. at 133. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request to stipulate to the existence of child pornography and by instead allowing the Commonwealth to introduce portions of the videos, emphasizing that the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice. Id. at 132.
This Court explained that many prior cases emphasize the importance of the KRE 403 balancing test, and specifically "demonstrate that the probative value of child pornography images can outweigh the danger of undue prejudice, depending on the unique facts of the case." Id. at 134. See Payne v. Commonwealth, 623 S.W.2d 867, 878 (Ky. 1981) ; Little, 272 S.W.3d at 180. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the videos were highly probative of the fact that they contained child pornography. Helton, 595 S.W.3d at 136. The names of the videos or the fact that law enforcement may have flagged a video as child pornography in its database are not conclusive proof that the video contains child pornography—that is a factual question for the jury to resolve. Id.
Here, the parties point to no other evidence of what the video depicted, what acts were perpetrated upon Kerr's corpse, or who any perpetrator may have been. A judge must consider the photos "within the full evidentiary context of the case, giving due regard to other evidence admitted ... to ascertain each item's ... probative worth for purposes of weighing that value against the risk of prejudice posed by the evidence." Hall , 468 S.W.3d at 824. The trial court did just that by reviewing the proffered videos. While the nature of the video clip itself was inherently prejudicial, the danger of undue prejudice did not outweigh the probative value of the video. The trial court expressly limited the evidence to reduce prejudicial impact. To wit, the trial court allowed the Commonwealth to play the video, but only the smallest portion necessary to establish the necessary elements of the offense. In total, the jury saw only twenty-eight seconds out of over two minutes of video footage the Commonwealth possessed. This limitation reduced not only the cumulative effect of the video, but the potential for undue prejudice and any harmful effects. We also reiterate that the crime of abuse of a corpse requires the actions to "outrage ordinary family sensibilities." KRS 525.120. Therefore, the necessity of some degree of startling evidence is built into the statute through its elements.
Further, neither the trial court nor the Commonwealth was obligated to accept Meredith's offer to stipulate to the existence and contents of the videos, or his offer to show still photos taken from the videos. The Helton Court also recognized federal caselaw that highlights that "courts are in near-uniform agreement that the admission of child pornography images or videos is appropriate, even where the defendant has stipulated, or offered to stipulate, that those images or videos contained child pornography." Helton , 595 S.W.3d at 135. See United States v. Cunningham, 694 F.3d 372, 391 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 153 (2d Cir. 2009) ; United States v. Schene, 543 F.3d 627, 643 (10th Cir. 2008) ; United States v. Ganoe, 538 F.3d 1117, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2008) ; United States v. Morales-Aldahondo, 524 F.3d 115, 120 (1st Cir. 2008) ; United States v. Sewell, 457 F.3d 841, 844 (8th Cir. 2006) ; United States v. Dodds, 347 F.3d 893, 898-99 (11th Cir. 2003) ). Importantly, the Court also noted that "[a] trial judge does not accept or deny one party's offer to stipulate. Rather, a stipulation must be reached between the parties, not one party and the trial judge." Helton, 595 S.W.3d at 136.
Additionally, a prosecutor is "permitted to prove its case by competent evidence of its own choosing, and the defendant may not stipulate away the parts of the case that he does not want the jury to see." Pollini v. Commonwealth, 172 S.W.3d 418, 424 (Ky. 2005) (citations omitted). And an authenticated video best characterizes the activity that occurred, particularly in light of the charged offense and in comparison to still photos taken from the videos. In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a portion of the video footage.
II. The trial court properly declined to instruct the jury on Extreme Emotional Disturbance.
Next, Meredith claims that the trial court erred in declining his request to give the jury an EED instruction. Because Meredith specifically requested an EED instruction, this issue is preserved. "We review a trial court's rulings regarding instructions for an abuse of discretion." Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 258, 274 (Ky. 2006) (citing Johnson v. Commonwealth, 134 S.W.3d 563, 569-70 (Ky. 2004) ). "The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles." English , 993 S.W.2d at 945.
At trial, Amy Zetina, who was visiting Meredith's neighbor, Alan Crabtree, testified that on the evening and morning of March 11 and 12, 2022, she, Meredith, and Crabtree all did drugs. Meredith stopped by Crabtree's apartment several times after they had done drugs and, according to Zetina, Meredith acted scared and was trembling and sweating.
Quentin Stevenson, who was incarcerated at the time of his testimony, testified that he had been dating Kerr for three or four months and was distressed that she was with Meredith. Stevenson threatened to shoot Meredith in the face in a message to Kerr on March 7, 2022, five days before Kerr's murder. Meredith testified that the initial threat from Stevenson concerned him, but that he was also concerned that Kerr was involved with and messaging Stevenson given the threat Stevenson made. Because he feared for his own safety, Meredith got a gun.
While irrelevant to our analysis of Meredith's state of mind leading up to the murder, Meredith notes in his brief that while walking out of the courtroom after his testimony, Stevenson threatened to stab and kill Meredith if they ended up at the same prison.
While the parties discussed jury instructions with the trial court, Meredith requested an EED instruction. Importantly, Meredith did not specifically identify a triggering event. The Commonwealth objected, noting the length of time between what it "presumed" to be the triggering event (Meredith finding Kerr's text messages five days before) and the killing. The trial court declined to give an EED instruction, finding no triggering event. The trial court reasoned that if the triggering event was Meredith seeing Kerr's messages, that happened five days before and the messages indicated that another person, not Kerr, wanted to hurt Meredith. Based on Meredith's testimony, there was no nexus between the supposed triggering event and the killing. Although the trial court declined to provide an EED instruction, the trial court agreed to give both self-defense and intoxication instructions.
On appeal, Meredith argues that the evidence and series of events in this case supported an EED instruction. Generally, the trial court has "a duty to instruct the jury on the whole law of the case." Daniel v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.3d 626, 644 (Ky. 2020). This obligation extends to lesser-included offenses and affirmative defenses but is dependent upon there being sufficient evidence to warrant the giving of an instruction. Turner v. Commonwealth, 544 S.W.3d 610, 625 (Ky. 2018). EED is defined by this Court as follows:
Extreme emotional disturbance is a temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome one's judgment, and to cause one to act uncontrollably from the impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil or malicious purposes. It is not a mental disease in itself, and an enraged, inflamed, or disturbed emotional state does not constitute an extreme emotional disturbance unless there is a reasonable explanation or excuse therefor, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation
under circumstances as defendant believed them to be.
McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464, 468-69 (Ky. 1986).
To summarize, to be entitled to an EED instruction, Meredith must prove there was a sudden and uninterrupted triggering event, he was extremely emotionally disturbed as a result, and he acted under the influence of that disturbance. An EED jury instruction "must be supported by ‘some definite, non-speculative evidence.’ " Padgett v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Ky. 2010) (quoting Holland v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 792, 807 (Ky. 2003) ). The reasonableness of a claim of EED is evaluated subjectively from the defendant's point of view. Holland v. Commonwealth, 466 S.W.3d 493, 503 (Ky. 2015) (citing Spears v. Commonwealth, 30 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Ky. 2000) ).
An EED defense requires a triggering event that provokes the disturbance, and this Court has held that the triggering event may include "the cumulative impact of a series of related events." Fields v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 355, 359 (Ky. 2001) (citation omitted). While a triggering event does not have to immediately precede a criminal act, it must be sudden and uninterrupted. Keeling v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 248, 265 (Ky. 2012).
Although Meredith did not specifically identify a triggering event when requesting an EED instruction, one possible triggering event was him finding Kerr's messages with Stevenson, which included Stevenson's threats against Meredith. "No definite time frame between the triggering event and the killing is required, so long as the EED remains uninterrupted." Spears, 30 S.W.3d at 155. The time frame here is five days, beginning when Meredith discovered the messages Kerr exchanged with Stevenson and initially confronted her about them. As a result of the threatening messages, Meredith obtained a gun because he was scared. He wanted the gun to protect himself, but also to protect Kerr and his other family members living at the residence. He added that Kerr had also received threats to her life from other people. During this five-day period, Meredith testified that he also would perform security checks around his residence, checking doors, looking outside, and even using night vision binoculars to make sure there were no threats.
After Meredith initially confronted Kerr, she left his residence for a few days. According to Meredith, Kerr was mad at Meredith for reading her messages and Meredith was mad at Kerr for messaging someone who threatened to kill him. Meredith's testimony established that he experienced several emotions in the five-day span leading up to Kerr's death, including being panicked and nervous, and specifically being annoyed and mad at Kerr.
"Because one's emotional response to a situation may dissipate over time, a subsidiary inquiry arises as to whether there intervened between the provocation and the resulting homicide a cooling-off period of sufficient duration that the provocation should no longer be regarded as ‘adequate.’ " Fields, 44 S.W.3d at 359 (citation omitted). Between finding out about the messages and killing Kerr, Meredith gave his friend money to take care of Kerr if she needed anything during the period of a few days when she did not stay with Meredith, spoke with her on the phone to try to reconcile their relationship, and got a gun not only to protect himself but to protect Kerr from the people that were supposedly coming after her. His concern for Kerr and attempt to reconcile indicates a cooling off period, or at the very least belies his argument that he was so enraged that his emotions overcame his judgment and led him to kill Kerr.
In Luna v. Commonwealth, 460 S.W.3d 851 (Ky. 2015), Luna and Hendrickson, the victim, had a tumultuous relationship. At trial, Luna testified that Hendrickson stabbed him in the leg and while he treated his wound, Hendrickson became enraged over things she found in Luna's cell phone. Id. at 883. Hendrickson struck Luna in the face, bloodying his nose, and grabbed him by his hair. While he cleaned himself up, Hendrickson began setting a fire in the trailer. Id. According to Luna, Hendrickson then grabbed a gun and attempted to fire at him, but the gun did not fire. Id. Luna came toward her, and they struggled for the gun when it went off again, but the gun did not fire. Id. Luna testified that "all [he] could think of ‘was not being with [his] kids, [and] them growing up without their dad.’ " Id. As they continued to struggle, Luna grabbed a nearby whiskey bottle and as Hendrickson yelled ‘I'm going to kill you,’ the gun went off again. Id. Luna hit Hendrickson in the back of the head with the whiskey bottle, killing her. Id.
The Court explained that Luna's narrative did not describe a temporary state of mind so enraged or disturbed as to overcome his judgment. Id. If anything, Luna had complete control over his judgment because he stated that all he could think about was dying and his children growing up fatherless. Id. at 883-84. The Court continued:
[t]o prevent this outcome, Luna makes a decision, visceral perhaps, to fight back and get Hendrickson off of him and calmed down. In no way does this fall within the scope of extreme emotional disturbance. Accordingly, Luna did not present sufficient evidence to warrant an instruction on extreme emotional distress. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Id. at 884. Like in Luna, while Meredith's testimony regarding the events leading to the murder may have supported a self-defense theory, it did not support EED. At no point did Meredith describe "his own temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome his judgment." Id. at 883. He explained that Kerr lunged at him, bit him, and tried to wrestle the gun away from him. His response to her actions aligns with someone acting in self-defense, not under an extreme emotional disturbance. Meredith failed to establish that he was extremely disturbed, much less that he acted under the influence of any disturbance in killing Kerr.
Meredith points to Holland v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 792, 807 (Ky. 2003), in which this Court explained that while the facts of the case did not compel a finding that the defendant was acting under EED when she shot her victims, "the evidence permitted a jury to conclude that she did so." In that case, the defendant, who suffered from a personality disorder and attempted suicide twice that year, was confronted with a host of physically and emotionally challenging occurrences, including discovering her lover in bed with his ex-wife, her lover assaulting her, and her lover abandoning her as she recovered from back surgery. Id. at 807-08. The defendant ultimately shot and killed her lover and his ex-wife and argued on appeal that the trial court erred by declining to give an EED instruction. Id. at 800. The Court reasoned that any one of these, or the cumulative effect of this series of events, could have led to a jury reasonably concluding that the defendant's state of EED remained uninterrupted through the shooting. Id. at 808. Meredith fearing for his own safety given the threats made by Stevenson and being mad or annoyed with Kerr for exchanging messages with Stevenson and other men do not rise to the level of the physical and emotional precursors for an EED instruction like in Holland. Here, the evidence would not have permitted a jury to conclude that Meredith acted under EED when he shot and killed Kerr. Meredith found the messages five days prior to shooting Kerr and confronted her about the messages at that time, just as he confronted her with the messages on the day of the murder. If discovering the messages induced a "temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome one's judgment, and to cause one to act uncontrollably from the impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance ..." McClellan, 715 S.W.2d at 468, it is unclear why Meredith was not overtaken by those emotions when he initially confronted Kerr, especially considering he possessed the gun at that time. "While what constitutes the triggering event may be broadly construed, its impact on the defendant is not. The event must be so dramatic as to render the mind temporarily uncontrollable and provoke ‘an explosion of violence.’ " Luna , 460 S.W.3d at 883 (citation omitted).
It is difficult to perceive how Stevenson threatening Meredith's life, for no other reason than Meredith's involvement with Kerr, would cause Meredith to kill Kerr. If anything, Meredith killing Kerr would pose an even greater threat to his own life given Stevenson's prior threats. Additionally, once Meredith discovered the messages between Stevenson and Kerr, there was a period of time where Kerr left Meredith's residence. He testified that he allowed her to come back to his residence out of fear for Kerr's safety because, according to Meredith, Kerr had also received threats against her life. These behaviors are counterintuitive – Meredith was scared and nervous because he received threats due to his involvement with Kerr, yet he let her come stay with him again and specifically attributed part of his fear to the threats Kerr personally received.
In Downs v. Commonwealth, 620 S.W.3d 604, 613 (Ky. 2020), this Court explained that
[a] decision to give or to decline to give a particular jury instruction inherently requires complete familiarity with the factual and evidentiary subtleties of the case that are best understood by the judge overseeing the trial from the bench in the courtroom. Because such decisions are necessarily based upon the evidence presented at the trial, the trial judge's superior view of that evidence warrants a measure of deference from appellate courts that is reflected in the abuse of discretion standard.
(Citations omitted). The trial court is best positioned to determine which instructions are warranted given the developments of the trial and the evidence presented. As such, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to give an EED instruction. Simply put, there is insufficient testimony that Meredith's state of mind was "so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome [the defendant's] judgment, and to cause [him] to act uncontrollably from [an] impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil or malicious purposes." Padgett, 312 S.W.3d at 341 (citation omitted).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Hardin Circuit Court.
All sitting. All concur.