Summary
In Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baker (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 316, 15 OBR 444, 473 N.E.2d 827, the court stated that proximate cause is normally a question of fact.
Summary of this case from Seimon v. Becton Dickinson Co.Opinion
No. 84-648
Decided December 31, 1984.
Negligence — Determination of proximate cause for jury, when — Negligence per se does not equal liability per se.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Ashland County.
This is an appeal from the decision of the court of appeals which reversed the trial court's granting of summary judgment to plaintiff.
On the morning of October 8, 1980, defendant-appellee, Wilma E. Baker, was driving a school bus northbound on State Route 511 in Ashland County on behalf of her employer, the Hillsdale Local School District. The weather was clear on that day and the pavement was dry. Defendant stated by way of deposition and affidavit that she had turned on the flashing school bus lights and stopped the bus in order to discharge a student, one April Stevens. At that time, defendant observed an automobile approaching in the opposite (southbound) direction from approximately four hundred fifty "steps" down the road. Defendant opened the bus door, and, according to defendant, the student immediately exited the bus and proceeded to cross the road to where her mother was waiting in the driveway. Defendant further stated that she made a hand signal across her body to indicate to the student that she should cross the road, because defendant was sure that there was plenty of time for the student to cross. As the student was crossing the road, defendant noticed that the oncoming car was not slowing down, whereupon she beeped the bus horn in order to warn the approaching driver of the student. Nevertheless, the car struck the student before she was able to completely cross the road.
Plaintiff-appellant, Merchants Mutual Insurance Company, is the insurer of the driver of the oncoming car, Donna Starkey. The record indicates that plaintiff's insured either pled guilty or no contest to a violation of R.C. 4511.75(A). Plaintiff settled the claim of the student in the amount of $22,500, and thereafter filed this action for contribution against the defendant bus driver in the court of common pleas, pursuant to R.C. 2307.31 and 2307.32.
R.C. 4511.75(A) provides as follows:
"The driver of a vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley upon meeting or overtaking from either direction any school bus stopped for the purpose of receiving or discharging any school child * * * shall stop at least ten feet from the front or rear of the school bus and shall not proceed until such school bus resumes motion, or until signaled by the school bus driver to proceed."
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment with supporting evidentiary materials concerning the issues of negligence and proximate cause. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment while denying defendant's motion. The court's judgment entry stated: "* * * [T]he only issue remaining for determination is the relative percentages of contribution pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Section 2307.31 and the issue of the amount of damages if disputed."
The cause was then tried before a jury. At the close of the trial, the court instructed the jury that their only duty was to find the percentage of negligence of both parties in arriving at their verdict. The jury returned a verdict apportioning forty percent of the negligence to plaintiff's insured and sixty percent to defendant. Therefore, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $13,500.
Upon appeal, the court of appeals in a split decision reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause for a new trial. While holding that the defendant breached a legal duty to the victim under Ohio Adm. Code 3301-83-06(F) and (G), the appellate court concluded that this breach did not establish proximate cause of the accident and injury as a matter of law. The court of appeals reasoned that "[t]he jury was entitled to determine whether the violation of the [Ohio] Administrative Code [by defendant] was a direct and proximate cause of the accident and injuries, notwithstanding the negligent intervening cause of the automobile driver violating R.C. 4511.75(A)." The court of appeals further held that summary judgment was improper because there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant signaled plaintiff's insured to proceed past the school bus.
Ohio Adm. Code 3301-83-06 reads in part:
"(F) Before receiving and discharging pupils on the highway, the bus shall be driven to the right side of the paved or traveled portion of the roadway and brought to a full stop.
"(G) The bus driver shall be the only operator of the service entrance door. The door shall not be opened to load or unload pupils until traffic has cleared the bus or come to a complete stop in all directions."
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Messrs. Brown, Bemiller, Murray McIntyre and Mr. William T. McIntyre, for appellant.
Mr. William C. Ailes, for appellee.
Appellant contends that the trial court properly adjudicated the issue of proximate causation, even though such an issue is usually a question of fact for the jury, because the appellee school bus driver violated the specific requirements of Ohio Adm. Code 3301-83-06, which resulted in the type of accident that the provisions are designed to avoid.
Appellee argues that there are material issues of fact upon which reasonable minds could differ, and that, therefore, the issues of proximate causation should have been left to the jury to determine.
In affirming the court of appeal's reversal of the case sub judice, we find that this action is controlled by our prior pronouncement in the second paragraph of the syllabus in Cascone v. Herb Kay Co. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 155:
"Where the facts are such that reasonable minds could differ as to whether the intervening cause was a conscious and responsible agency which could or should have eliminated the hazard, whether the intervening act or cause constituted a concurrent or superseding cause, and whether the intervening cause was reasonably foreseeable by the original party guilty of negligence, present questions for submission to a jury which generally may not be resolved by summary judgment. ( Mudrich v. Standard Oil Co., 153 Ohio St. 31 [41 O.O. 117], approved and followed.)"
The trial court apparently placed undue weight on the fact that appellee was negligent per se in violating the relevant Ohio Administrative Code provisions. Negligence per se does not equal liability per se. Simply because the law may presume negligence from a person's violation of a statute or rule does not mean that the law presumes that such negligence was the proximate cause of the harm inflicted. See 39 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d (1959) 525-528, Negligence, Section 26. Moreover, the trial court's determination seems to ignore the fact that appellant's insured could also be viewed as negligent per se in violating R.C. 4511.75(A).
In a case such as this, where reasonable minds could differ as to whose acts or omissions constitute the proximate cause of the accident, such determination is better left for the jury.
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is hereby affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
CELEBREZZE, C.J., W. BROWN, SWEENEY, LOCHER, HOLMES, C. BROWN and J.P. CELEBREZZE, JJ., concur.