Opinion
12-13-2016
In the Matter of the MENTAL HYGIENE LEGAL SERVICE, Petitioner(s), v. Anita DANIELS, in Her Official Capacity as Acting Director of Bronx Psychiatric Center, Respondent(s).
Mental Hygiene Legal Service, for petitioner. New York State Office of the Attorney, for respondent.
Mental Hygiene Legal Service, for petitioner.
New York State Office of the Attorney, for respondent.
BEN R. BARBATO, J. In this Article 78 Proceeding, petitioner seeks to compel respondent to comply with Mental Hygiene Law (MHL) § 9.31(b). Petitioner contends that despite the clear language of the foregoing statute—requiring that respondent in a special proceeding pursuant to MHL § 9.31(a), provide a copy of a patient's record, as defined by MHL § 9.01, 14 NYCRR 501.2(a), and MHL § 33.16(1) —respondent fails to provide a complete copy of the aforementioned record prior to each and every one of the foregoing hearings. Based on the foregoing, petitioner avers that respondent has failed to perform a duty enjoined upon it by law. Respondent opposes the instant petition and cross-moves for its dismissal. Specifically, respondent contends that because petitioner has not suffered, inter alia, injury by the foregoing alleged conduct, petitioner lacks standing to bring this proceeding such that dismissal is warranted pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(3). Additionally, respondent asserts that dismissal is further warranted pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7) inasmuch as MHL § 9.31(b) does not require the broad disclosure alleged by respondent, such that the petition fails to state a cause of action. For this latter reason, respondent contends that even if the petition is not dismissed it must nevertheless be denied.
For the reasons that follow hereinafter, the petition is granted and the cross-motion is denied.
According to the petition, in cases arising pursuant to MHL § 9.31(a), respondent, a psychiatric facility, has consistently failed to provide certain records prior to the hearing prescribed by MHL § 9.31(a) as required by MHL § 9.31(b). Specifically, petitioner alleges that when a patient has been involuntarily committed to a psychiatric hospital, like respondent's, or when such hospital determines that a patient ought to remain involuntarily hospitalized, MHL § 9.31(a) requires that respondent request a hearing to determine whether such patient ought to be hospitalized and/or whether once hospitalized, such patient ought to remain in the hospital against his/her will. Once respondent files notice requesting a hearing, MHL § 9.31(b) requires that respondent provide "a record of the patient to the supreme court ... [and that a] copy of such ... record shall also be given the mental hygiene legal service," the petitioner herein.
Pursuant to MHL § 47.01(a), petitioner "shall provide legal assistance to patients or residents of a facility as defined in section 1.03 of this chapter, or any other place or facility which is required to have an operating certificate pursuant to article sixteen or thirty-one of this chapter, and to persons alleged to be in need of care and treatment in such facilities or places, and to persons entitled to such legal assistance as provided by article ten of this chapter." More specifically, pursuant to MHL § 47.03(c), petitioner is charged with providing "legal services and assistance to patients or residents and their families related to the admission, retention, and care and treatment of such persons, to provide legal services and assistance to subjects of a petition or patients subject to section 9.60 of this chapter, and to inform patients or residents, their families and, in proper cases, others interested in the patients' or residents' welfare of the availability of other legal resources which may be of assistance in matters not directly related to the admission, retention, and care and treatment of such patients or residents." More broadly, petitioner is charged with the duty "[t]o initiate and take any legal action deemed necessary to safeguard the right of any patient or resident to protection from abuse or mistreatment, which may include investigation into any such allegations of abuse or mistreatment of any such patient or resident." (MHL § 47.03 ).
MHL § 9.01 defines "record of a patient" as "consist[ing] of admission, transfer or retention papers and orders, and accompanying data required by this article and by the regulations of the commissioner." The forgoing regulations state that "[c]ase record, clinical record, medical record, or patient record means clinical record as such term is defined in section 33.16 of the Mental Hygiene Law, whether created or maintained in writing or electronically" (14 NYCRR 501.2 [a] ). MHL § 33.16 in turn, defines "clinical record" as "any information concerning or relating to the examination or treatment of an identifiable patient or client maintained or possessed by a facility which has treated or is treating such patient or client."
Petitioner contends that when a hearing is requested pursuant to MHL § 9.31(a), it is respondent's custom and practice to provide petitioner with portions of a patient's clinical record, namely, "admission, transfer or retention application papers and orders," rather than "the patient's complete clinical record (medical chart)," as required by MHL § 9.31(b). The medical chart usually consist of one or two binders and is usually hundreds of double-sided pages in length. Although respondent does not provide petitioner with a complete copy of the medical chart, it nevertheless offers a complete copy of the same into evidence, which copy it brings to court on the date of the hearing.
Based on the foregoing, petitioner contends that in failing to provide it with a complete copy of a patient's medical chart, as defined by MHL § 9.01, § 33.16(1), and 12 NYCRR 501.2(a) in any proceeding requiring a hearing pursuant to MHL § 9.31(a), petitioner has failed to abide by MHL § 9.32(b). Petitioner contends that the foregoing is particularly egregious since respondent always seeks to enter the complete medical chart into evidence at a hearing, thus depriving respondent of an opportunity to review, make objections, if any, and prepare an appeal. Accordingly, pursuant to CPLR 7801(1), petitioner seeks to have this Court order and compel respondent to abide by MHL § 9.31(b) in all future proceedings pursuant to MHL § 9.31(a).
Petitioner's petition is granted insofar as it establishes that in failing to provide respondent with a complete copy of a patient's medical chart in any proceeding pursuant to MHL § 9.31(a), respondent is violating the clear language and legislative intent of MHL § 9.31(b), which when read together with MHL § 9.01, § 33.16(1), and 12 NYCRR 501.2(a) requires that respondent provide copies of the entire chart not just portions thereof prior to hearing. While allowing petitioner unrestricted access to the foregoing chart is arguably the pragmatic equivalent of providing copies of the medical chart, MHL § 9.31(b) does not prescribe or authorize such act in lieu of the exchange mandated therein.
CPLR § 7801 provides a mechanism for judicial review of determinations made by, inter alia, government agencies. Significantly, a writ of mandamus ensures that a corporation, be it public or private, "keep within the limits of [its] lawful powers, and [serves] to correct and punish abuses of their franchises" (Gray v. Canisius Coll. of Buffalo, 76 A.D.2d 30, 33, 430 N.Y.S.2d 163 [4th Dept.1980] [internal quotation marks omitted] ). On an application pursuant to CPL § 7801(1), the relevant inquiry is "whether the body or officer failed to perform a duty enjoined upon it by law." Thus, while an Article 78 proceeding may not be used to challenge the validity of a statute, a writ of mandamus is a remedy available when it is alleged that respondent failed to abide by valid and lawful legislation and when petitioner establishes a clear right to the relief requested (Council of City of New York v. Bloomberg, 6 N.Y.3d 380, 388, 813 N.Y.S.2d 3, 846 N.E.2d 433 [2006] ; County of Fulton v. State, 76 N.Y.2d 675, 678, 563 N.Y.S.2d 33, 564 N.E.2d 643 [1990] ). The proponent of such relief meets the foregoing burden when it establishes that the law with which compliance is sought is ministerial rather than discretionary and that the compliance with the law mandates the action petitioner seeks to enjoin upon respondent (Brusco v. Braun, 84 N.Y.2d 674, 679, 621 N.Y.S.2d 291, 645 N.E.2d 724 [1994] ["Thus, the dispositive question on this appeal is whether respondent Braun retains any discretion to withhold a judgment pursuant to RPAPL 732(3) when a petition proper in form and substance demonstrates grounds for relief and the supporting papers establish proper service on the tenant. We hold that he does not."]; County of Fulton, at 678, 563 N.Y.S.2d 33, 564 N.E.2d 643 [Court found that duty imposed upon respondent by law was not discretionary because, "the duty of respondent District is established by ECL 15–2115, which provides that land owned or acquired by the State for river regulating districts shall be assessed and taxed in the same manner as state lands subject to taxation and that the assessments shall be paid by the river regulating district and that compliance with the law requires the result urged by petitioner" [internal quotation marks omitted] ). While distinguishing between discretionary and ministerial acts is difficult, the general rule is that " discretionary or quasi-judicial acts involve[ ] the exercise of reasoned judgment which could typically produce different acceptable results, where a ministerial act envisions direct adherence to a governing rule standard with a compulsory result" [internal quotation marks omitted]; Tango by Tango v. Tulevech, 61 N.Y.2d 34, 41, 471 N.Y.S.2d 73, 459 N.E.2d 182 [1983] ; Verizon New York, Inc. v. Vil. of Athens, 43 A.D.3d 526, 528, 840 N.Y.S.2d 484 [3d Dept.2007] )
Applying well-settled law regarding statutory construction, what a law requires and whether the duty imposed by it are compulsory and bereft of discretion is best determined by looking at the law's plain language. After all,
[i]t is fundamental that a court, in interpreting a statute, should attempt to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. As the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof. As we have stated: In construing statutes,
it is a well-established rule that resort must be had to the natural signification of the words employed, and if they have a definite meaning, which involves no absurdity or contradiction, there is no room for construction and courts have no right to add to or take away from that meaning
( Majewski v. Broadalbin–Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 N.Y.2d 577, 583, 673 N.Y.S.2d 966, 696 N.E.2d 978 [1998] [internal citations and quotation marks omitted].).
Here, a reading of MHL § 9.31(b) establishes that prior to a hearing pursuant to MHL § 9.31(a), respondent must exchange "a record of the patient to the supreme court ... [and that a] copy of such ... record shall also be given the mental hygiene legal service." Moreover, MHL § 9.01 defines "record of a patient" as "consist[ing] of admission, transfer or retention papers and orders, and accompanying data required by this article and by the regulations of the commissioner," and thereunder, "case record, clinical record, medical record, or patient record means clinical record as such term is defined in section 33.16 of the Mental Hygiene Law, whether created or maintained in writing or electronically" (14 NYCRR 501.2 [a] ). MHL § 33.16 defines "clinical record" as "any information concerning or relating to the examination or treatment of an identifiable patient or client maintained or possessed by a facility which has treated or is treating such patient or client." Based on the foregoing, the plain language of the forgoing statutes and rule require that respondent provide petitioner with a complete medical chart prior to a hearing, not just portions thereof. Accordingly, the petition establishes that the duty imposed by MHL § 9.31(b) is compulsory rather than discretionary and mandates the action—disclosure—sought by petitioner (Brusco, at 679, 621 N.Y.S.2d 291, 645 N.E.2d 724 ; County of Fulton, at 678, 563 N.Y.S.2d 33, 564 N.E.2d 643 ; Tango by Tango, at 41, 471 N.Y.S.2d 73, 459 N.E.2d 182 ; Verizon New York, Inc., at 528, 840 N.Y.S.2d 484 ). Accordingly, contrary to respondent's assertion, petitioner establishes a clear right to the relief requested thereby warranting the granting of the petition (Council of City of New York, at 388, 813 N.Y.S.2d 3, 846 N.E.2d 433 ; County of Fulton, at 678, 563 N.Y.S.2d 33, 564 N.E.2d 643 ). Nothing asserted by respondent—as will be discussed more fully below—warrants denial, let alone dismissal of the petition.
In rejecting respondent's position, that MHL § 9.31(b) requires an exchange of the complete patient chart rather than merely making it available to said patient or his/counsel, the court's holding is buttressed by a reading of CPLR § 3120, which governs disclosure in all civil actions in this State. Notably, unlike CPLR § 3120(1)(i), which allows a party to satisfy its document disclosure obligation by "produc[ing] and permit[ing] the party seeking discovery ... to inspect, copy, test or photograph any designated documents or any things which are in the possession, custody or control of the party or person served," MHL 9.31(b) requires that respondent "forward forthwith a copy of such ... record of the patient to the supreme court ... [and] the mental hygiene legal service." Clearly, had the legislature intended to have respondent satisfy the disclosure mandate of MHL § 9.31(a) by merely making a complete copy of the patient chart available to petitioner, such authorizing language—as it appears within CPLR § 3120(1)(I) —would have been expressly included within MHL § 9.31(a).
Respondent's Cross
Motion for Dismissal
Dismissal for Lack of Standing
Respondent's cross-motion seeking dismissal of the instant petition on grounds that petitioner lacks standing is denied. While it is true that petitioner does not have individual standing to bring this action, it nevertheless has organizational standing insofar as it establishes (1) that respondent has failed to and is likely to continue to eschew compliance with MHL § 9.31(b) in failing to provide petitioner with complete copies of the medical chart; and (2) that those whom the statute seeks to protect—petitioner's clients in proceedings pursuant to MHL § 9.31(a) —will not seek judicial intervention and, thus, a remedy.
It is well settled that in order to initiate suit, a party must have legal standing to bring an action. On the issue of legal standing the test was initially one focusing on the existence of a legal right, described as follows:
[t]he court has no inherent power to right a wrong unless thereby the civil, property, or personal rights of the plaintiff in the action or the petitioner in the proceeding are affected. The rights affected must be personal as distinguished from the rights in common with the great body of people
(Schieffelin v. Komfort, 212 N.Y. 520, 530, 106 N.E. 675 [1914]. Over time the threshold inquiry has evolved so that now the relevant inquiry is whether the proponent of an action has sustained injury in fact (Society of Plastics Industry, Inc. v. County of Suffolk, 77 N.Y.2d 761, 772, 570 N.Y.S.2d 778, 573 N.E.2d 1034 [1991]. Under the injury in fact analysis, standing exists when the plaintiff has sustained actual injury, meaning that he/she has an actual legal stake in the matter being litigated (id. ). In order to establish standing, not only must a plaintiff demonstrate injury in fact, meaning actual harm, but he must also establish that the injury alleged falls within certain zones of interest protected by law (Friedman, at 700, 879 N.Y.S.2d 156 [Court dismissed individual petitioner's claim when she would not suffer direct harm from action at issue.); Caprer v. Nussbaum, 36 A.D.3d 176, 183, 825 N.Y.S.2d 55 [2d Dept.2006] ). Generally, an injury is within the requisite zone of interest if the injury sustained falls within the ambit of "concerns sought to be promoted or protected by the statutory provision or recognized common-law relationship pursuant to which a defendant has acted." (Caprer, at 183, 825 N.Y.S.2d 55 ). In other words, the injury alleged must be of the kind sought to be prevented by the law that the proponent alleges was violated. Specifically,
a party must show that the in-fact injury of which it complains (its aggrievement, or the adverse effect upon it) falls within the "zone of interests," or concerns, sought to be promoted or protected by the statutory provision under which the agency has acted
(Society of Plastics Indus., at 773, 570 N.Y.S.2d 778, 573 N.E.2d 1034 ).
Because "[w]hether a person seeking relief is a proper party to request an adjudication is an aspect of justiciability which, when challenged, must be considered at the outset of any litigation" (id. at 769, 570 N.Y.S.2d 778, 573 N.E.2d 1034 ), whether standing exists is a threshold matter to be resolved at the outset of any litigation (id. ; Caprer, at 182, 825 N.Y.S.2d 55 ), and when standing is lacking the "pathway to the courthouse is blocked" (Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki, 100 N.Y.2d 801, 812, 766 N.Y.S.2d 654, 798 N.E.2d 1047 [2003] ).
Generally, a person can only assert claims on his or her own behalf and as such cannot generally assert claims on behalf of another (Society of Plastics Indus., at 773, 570 N.Y.S.2d 778, 573 N.E.2d 1034 ; Caprer, at 182, 825 N.Y.S.2d 55 ). However, prevailing law recognizes at least two circumstances under which a person has standing to maintain an action on behalf of another. First, a person has third-party standing to maintain an action when the party suing has suffered an injury in fact and seeks to assert the constitutional rights of another (New York County
Lawyers' Ass'n v. State, 294 A.D.2d 69, 74, 742 N.Y.S.2d 16 [1st Dept.2002] ). Specifically, third-party standing exists when a party demonstrates
(1) the presence of some substantial relationship between the party asserting the claim
and the rightholder, (2) the impossibility of the rightholder asserting his own rights, and (3) the need to avoid a dilution of the parties' constitutional rights
(id. at 75, 742 N.Y.S.2d 16 ). Second, a party can establish organizational standing when it establishes that absent the suit brought by the organization, the actions by the party against whom relief is sought would otherwise be exempt from judicial review (Grant v. Cuomo, 130 A.D.2d 154, 159, 518 N.Y.S.2d 105 [1st Dept.1987], affd. 73 N.Y.2d 820, 537 N.Y.S.2d 115, 534 N.E.2d 32 [1988] ). Accordingly, the proponent of organizational standing need not establish injury in fact but must merely establish that a party has failed to comply with a statute and that the those whom the statute seeks to protect will not seek judicial intervention and, thus, a remedy (id. ). In Grant, where organizational plaintiffs sued, inter alia, the City and State asserting that defendants violated their obligations to provide protective and preventive services under the Child Protective Services Act of 1973 and the Child Welfare Reform Act of 1979, the Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiffs had established organizational standing because
[a]s the defendants correctly argue, the claim of the organizational plaintiffs to have suffered an injury by way of an added burden on their resources is presented in general terms only. On the other hand, we cannot ignore the obvious fact that if organizations of this kind are denied standing, the practical effect would be to exempt from judicial review the failure of the defendants, here conceded, to comply with their statutory obligations. Manifestly, the abused children are not themselves able to seek a judicial remedy, nor is it likely that parents or caretakers, the objects of the claims of abuse or maltreatment, would undertake to secure a remedy. Given the obvious reality that the protection of abused or maltreated children is a central concern of our society, and given the historic relationship of organizations concerned with the care and protection of children to the goals sought to be achieved by the relevant statute, we are persuaded that Special Term was justified in denying the motion to dismiss as to the organizational plaintiffs
(id. at 108 ).
CPLR § 3211(a)(3) authorizes the dismissal of an action when "the party asserting a cause of action has not legal capacity to sue." While not explicitly stated in the statute a motion to dismiss for lack of standing is properly considered a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR § 3211 (a)(3) ( Friedman v. Town Clerk of Town of Hempstead, 62 A.D.3d 699, 699, 879 N.Y.S.2d 156 [2d Dept.2009] [Motion pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(3) granted when petitioners lacked standing to sue.); Hirschfeld v. Hogan, 60 A.D.3d 728, 729, 874 N.Y.S.2d 585 [2d Dept.2009] ).
Here, the Court agrees with respondent and finds that petitioner lacks individual standing because MHL § 9.31(b) and its disclosure mandate is patently intended to protect the rights of patients in proceedings pursuant to MHL § 9.31(a) by ensuring that they are provided with the very records which generally form the basis of any application under MHL § 9.31(a). Indeed, it is hard to fathom how such patients could challenge involuntary confinement without a complete copy of the respective patient's chart. Thus, any injury for the failure to provide the foregoing chart befalls the patient and not petitioner.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, on this record, it is clear that petitioner has organizational standing to bring and maintain this action. As noted above, the proponent of organizational standing need not establish injury in fact and need only demonstrate that a party has failed to comply with a statute and that those whom the statute seeks to protect will not seek judicial intervention and, thus, a remedy (Grant, at 159, 518 N.Y.S.2d 105 ). Here, as discussed above, it is clear that MHL § 9.31(b) requires broad and comprehensive disclosure, requiring that respondent provide patients and their counsel a complete copy of said patient's medical chart. It is also clear, that respondent has and continues to refuse to abide by the clear unequivocal mandate of the foregoing statute. Additionally, since pursuant to MHL § 47.01(a), petitioner is charged with providing legal assistance to patients and is required "[t]o initiate and take any legal action deemed necessary to safeguard the right of any patient or resident to protection from abuse or mistreatment, which may include investigation into any such allegations of abuse or mistreatment of any such patient or resident." (MHL § 47.03 ), petitioner is obligated to protect the interests of such patients in proceedings pursuant to MHL § 9.31(a). This petition, of course, is an extension of that duty. More importantly, like the court in Grant, this Court concludes that the patients who petitioner represents—many of whom are alleged to be afflicted by psychiatric injuries—have not and will not initiate a proceeding such as this one to compel respondent to comply with MHL § 9.31(b).
Dismissal for Failure to State a Cause of Action
Respondent's cross-motion to dismiss the petition on grounds that it fails to state a cause of action is denied. Taking all allegations in the petition as true and upon a reading of the relevant case law and statutes, the petition establishes that respondent has and continues to violate the clear mandate prescribed by MHL § 9.31(b), requiring respondent to provide petitioner, in all cases pursuant to MHL § 9.31(a), with a complete copy of the respective patient's medical chart. Accordingly, the petition does state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR § 7801(1).
On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) all allegations in the complaint are deemed to be true (Sokoloff v. Harriman Estates Dev. Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 409, 414, 729 N.Y.S.2d 425, 754 N.E.2d 184 [2001] ; Cron v. Hargro Fabrics, 91 N.Y.2d 362, 366, 670 N.Y.S.2d 973, 694 N.E.2d 56 [1998] ). All reasonable inferences which can be drawn from the complaint and the allegations therein stated shall be resolved in favor of the plaintiff (Cron, at 366, 670 N.Y.S.2d 973, 694 N.E.2d 56. In opposition to such a motion a plaintiff may submit affidavits to remedy defects in the complaint (id. ). The court's role when analyzing the complaint in the context of a motion to dismiss, is to determine whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (Sokoloff v. Harriman Estates Development Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 409, 414, 729 N.Y.S.2d 425, 754 N.E.2d 184 [2001] ). In fact, the law mandates that the court's inquiry be not limited solely to deciding whether plaintiff has pleaded the cause of action intended, but instead, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has stated any cognizable cause of action (Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 88, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972, 638 N.E.2d 511 [1994] ["(T)he criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he has stated one."] ).
In an Article 78 Proceeding, when confronted with a motion to dismiss the petition pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7), all allegations in the petition are deemed to be true and where the allegations are ambiguous, they are resolved in petitioner's favor (Castro v. Schriro, 140 A.D.3d 644, 34 N.Y.S.3d 44 [1st Dept.2016] ).
Here, as discussed at length above, the petition establishes that in failing to provide respondent with a complete copy of a patient's medical chart in any proceeding pursuant to MHL § 9.31(a), respondent violates the clear language and intent of MHL § 9.31(b), which when read together with MHL § 9.01, § 33.16(1), and 12 NYCRR 501.2(a) requires that respondent provide copies of the entire chart not just portions thereof prior to hearing. Accordingly , the petition states a cause of action. It is hereby
ORDERED that upon service of a copy of this Decision and Order with Notice of Entry, respondent be hereby ordered, in any action brought pursuant to MHL § 9.31(a), to provide petitioner with a complete copy of a respective patient's medical chart prior to a hearing as prescribed by MHL § 9.31(b). It is further
ORDERED that petitioner serve a copy of this Order with Notice of Entry upon all parties within thirty days (30) hereof.