Opinion
A168160
01-24-2024
MARIDOL MENDONES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. 22CV018398.
We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) The facts are taken from Mendones's complaint. (Green Valley Landowners Assn. v. City of Vallejo (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 425, 429 (Green Valley)). We recite only those facts necessary to evaluate the dispositive issue before us, and we omit mention of another entity-the State of California-identified in the complaint's caption because it is not a party to this appeal. (See People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.)
PETROU, J.
In 2019, the Board of Registered Nursing revoked Maridol Mendones's registered nurse license; thereafter, she petitioned for a writ of mandate in Alameda County Superior Court. In 2021, Judge Frank Roesch denied the petition and entered judgment against her. We affirmed. (Mendones v. Board of Registered Nursing (Feb. 10, 2022, A162692) [nonpub. opn.].)
In late 2022, Mendones filed a lawsuit against Judge Roesch in his official capacity as an employee of the Alameda County Superior Court. The complaint alleged he erred by issuing various rulings in the prior case, including by denying her administrative writ petition and entering the judgment; it attached as exhibits the pertinent orders and the judgment. Among other things, the complaint sought an order reinstating her writ petition and assigning it to a bench officer other than Judge Roesch.
A retired judge from another county sustained Judge Roesch's demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend. As relevant here, the trial court concluded the judicial immunity doctrine barred the complaint because it challenged decisions Judge Roesch made in "the exercise of [his] judicial functions." The court also denied Mendones's request for leave to amend on the grounds that she had not identified any facts she could allege to avoid the doctrine. The court dismissed the action with prejudice.
Mendones appealed from the order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. That order is not appealable, but we construe the premature notice of appeal as having been taken from the judgment of dismissal. (Green Valley, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 431, fn. 5.) We deny Mendones's request for judicial notice of documents that are part of the appellate record. (Bravo Vending v. City of Rancho Mirage (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 383, 406, fn. 12.)
Based on our independent review, we conclude the doctrine of judicial immunity bars the complaint. (See Green Valley, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at pp. 431-432 [reciting standard of review].) "Judicial immunity bars civil actions against judges for acts they perform in the exercise of their judicial functions. [Citation.] The immunity applies to all judicial determinations, 'including those rendered in excess of the judge's jurisdiction, no matter how erroneous or even malicious or corrupt they may be,' except when the judge acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction." (Holt v. Brock (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 611, 620-621.) The complaint against Judge Roesch is based exclusively on rulings he issued while presiding over Menondes's petition for administrative writ review. As a result, the complaint is barred by the judicial immunity doctrine. (Soliz v. Williams (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 577, 585-586.)
Mendones offers no persuasive argument to the contrary. Her opening brief acknowledges the complaint's allegations are based on actions taken by Judge Roesch in his official capacity as a superior court judge, and it does not negate the applicability of the judicial immunity doctrine. Instead, she asserts he is not entitled to immunity under the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810, et seq.; Act). The Act, however, does not "override common-law judicial immunity." (Bocanegra v. Jakubowski (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 848, 857.) And her contention that Judge Roesch is not entitled to sovereign immunity is similarly unavailing. In her reply brief, Mendones argues "judicial immunity . . . is not an issue." This point is forfeited, and mistaken. (High Sierra Rural Alliance v. County of Plumas (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 102, 111, fn. 2.)
Next, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend because Mendones failed to identify new factual allegations that would overcome the judicial immunity doctrine. (See Green Valley, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at pp. 432, 443.) Having reached this conclusion, we need not reach the numerous other bases upon which the judgment may be affirmed. (Aubrie v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967 ["judgment must be affirmed 'if any one of the several grounds of demurrer is well taken' "].)
Disposition
The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. In the interests of justice, the parties are to bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
WE CONCUR: Fujisaki, Acting P.J., Rodriguez, J.