Opinion
December 23, 1997
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Carol Huff, J.).
While the parties' separation agreement was silent as to whether petitioner could prepay the mortgage, the mortgage agreement contained a clause permitting prepayment, thus rebutting the presumption that prepayment was not permitted ( see, Matter of Arthur v. Burkich, 131 A.D.2d 105, 106). Furthermore, reading the separation agreement and the mortgage together as parts of a single transaction, we find that the parties intended that the mortgage was to secure only the outstanding principal and interest thereon, and that the other debts were to remain unsecured. Accordingly, petitioner was entitled to a satisfaction of the mortgage upon his tender of the principal and the interest due through the date of tender ( see, Three Bros. Estates v. Guli, 205 A.D.2d 525; compare, Matter of Jeffrey Towers v. Straus, 31 A.D.2d 319, affd 26 N.Y.2d 812). We have considered the parties' remaining contentions for affirmative relief and find them to be without merit.
Concur — Murphy, P.J., Milonas, Wallach, Rubin and Mazzarelli, JJ.