Opinion
Docket No.: CJ16-133
09-27-2016
Re: Sonya L. Melton-Parson v. Demetrius N. Melton
Sonya L. Melton-Parson
2804 Waverly Way, Apt. 6
Norfolk, Virginia 23504 Brian C. Christian, Esq.
1200 Sparrow Road
Chesapeake, Virginia 23325 Romy L. Radin, Esq.
2200 Colonial Avenue, Suite 6
Norfolk, Virginia 23517 Dear Parties:
Today the Court rules on an Appeal filed by Respondent Demetrius Melton ("Mother") regarding an order entered by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court for the City of Norfolk granting visitation to Petitioner Sonya Melton-Parson ("Grandmother"), maternal grandmother of D.A.M. ("Child"). The issues before the Court are (1) the appropriate standard for determining visitation rights of a statutorily interested non-parent regarding a minor child where the fit custodial parent objects and the non-custodial parent is silent, and (2) whether Grandmother, based on the facts and evidence presented in this case, satisfied that standard. The Court (1) holds that the appropriate standard for determining visitation rights of a fit non-parent with a minor child—over the objection of a fit custodial parent and the silence of a non-custodial parent—is whether the minor child would suffer actual harm without visitation by the non-parent and, if so, whether non-parent visitation is in the best interests of the child, and (2) finds that Grandmother failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that her lack of visitation would result in actual harm to Child. The Court therefore GRANTS Mother's motion to strike, DENIES Grandmother's petition for visitation, and dismisses the case.
Background
Child is an eleven-year-old boy who is in the fifth grade. He is a well-adjusted child and an excellent student, although he has periodically experienced minor behavioral issues at school. He lives with Mother in Norfolk, Virginia. Mother is a single parent, and Child has never met his father. There is no evidence of parental abuse or neglect, although Grandmother disapproves of Mother's use of corporal punishment. All evidence indicates that Mother is mentally, physically, and morally fit, and that she is capable of meeting Child's financial, educational, moral, and social needs.
Ironically, Mother testified at the Hearing that she believes corporal punishment is effective—in part because she found it effective when Grandmother implemented corporal punishment on her as a child. As there is no allegation that Mother is an unfit parent—and Grandmother only seeks visitation—the Court takes no position regarding the appropriateness of Mother's use of corporal punishment.
Grandmother lives within a short walking distance of Mother's house and clearly has a strong relationship with Child. Grandmother has always maintained regular contact with Child, and Grandmother lived with Mother and Child for the first three years of Child's life, during which time she reportedly contributed significantly to his upbringing. All evidence indicates that Child has benefitted, and would continue to benefit, from visitation with Grandmother. Grandmother undoubtedly loves Child, and there is no evidence that future visitation would adversely affect Mother's parental relationship with Child or his health or emotional development.
Mother and Grandmother have not always gotten along, and their relationship has been particularly contentious over the past several years. There have been disputes between the parties regarding how often Grandmother is allowed to visit Child, with Grandmother concerned that the visits are too infrequent and granted only when Mother needs someone to watch Child. Grandmother petitioned the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court for the City of Norfolk for visitation with Child. The juvenile court granted the petition and ordered visitation every Wednesday evening and every other weekend. Mother subsequently appealed the juvenile court's decision.
A hearing was held on September 8, 2016 (the "Hearing"). Grandmother called as witnesses two of her children, i.e., Mother's siblings, who testified that Grandmother has a good relationship with Child and that there are "issues" between Grandmother and Mother. Grandmother called no expert witnesses. At the conclusion of Petitioner/Appellee Grandmother's case, counsel for Respondent/Appellant Mother moved the Court to strike Grandmother's evidence, which motion the Court took under advisement. Mother then presented evidence, after which she renewed her motion to strike. The Court again took the motion under advisement. At the conclusion of the evidence, Child's guardian ad litem (the "GAL") recommended that the Court grant Grandmother's visitation petition.
Positions of the Parties
Grandmother seeks court-ordered visitation with Child based on, inter alia, her substantial involvement in Child's life since his birth and Mother's refusal to voluntarily grant her additional visitation. Grandmother avers that the Court should apply the best-interests-of-the-child standard. Grandmother further contends that the more stringent standard pronounced in Williams v. Williams—the case on which Mother relies—applies only when the child's family is intact. Here, Child is not part of an intact family: Mother is a single parent, and Child's father has never been part of Child's life.
Grandmother filed her petition and participated in the Hearing pro se. Her legal argument was conveyed via the GAL.
Mother argues that any visitation by Grandmother should be on Mother's terms and not court-ordered. Mother contends that the correct standard for the Court to apply is the two-part test outlined in Williams. There, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the Virginia Court of Appeals' holding that visitation with a non-parent should be granted over the objection of fit parents only if (1) the absence of visitation would cause actual harm to the child's health or welfare and (2) visitation would be in the best interests of the child. Mother asserts that Grandmother is unable to satisfy the Williams test.
Of note, testimony from Grandmother's witnesses indicated that Mother has threatened—in light of this litigation—to preclude future visitation if Mother prevails.
The GAL—like Grandmother—argues that Williams is inapposite because it applies only to intact families and that the proper standard to apply here is what is in the best interests of Child. She contends that visitation with Grandmother is in Child's best interests. She further avers that, even if the Williams standard were appropriate, the absence of visitation by Grandmother "will impact [Child's] development and his ability to maintain healthy relationships in the future," thereby providing the requisite actual harm. GAL Report 3 (Sept. 7, 2016). The GAL recommends that Grandmother "be granted specific visitation, at least one day a week and every other weekend." Id.
Analysis
Legal Standard
A circuit court reviews the decision of a juvenile and domestic relations district court de novo. Williams v. Williams, 24 Va. App. 778, 781, 485 S.E.2d 651, 652 (1997), judgment aff'd as modified, 256 Va. 19, 22, 501 S.E.2d 417, 418 (1998).
On appeal, a circuit court has only the powers and authority granted to the juvenile and domestic relations district court. Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-296(I) (2015 Repl. Vol.). The statutory provisions regarding visitation of minor children, however, apply equally in the circuit court on appeal and in the juvenile and domestic relations district court from which the appeal arose. Id. § 20-124.2 (2016 Repl. Vol.).
"There is no common law right of visitation for grandparents in Virginia." Williams, 24 Va. App. at 781, 485 S.E.2d at 652.
Child visitation determinations between fit parents are made consistent with the best interests of the child. Va. Code § 20-124.2.B; see also M.E.D. v. J.P.M., 3 Va. App. 391, 397, 350 S.E.2d 215, 219 (1986) (applying the best-interests-of-the-child standard).
Individuals with a "legitimate interest" in the welfare of a minor child, as defined by statute to include grandparents, are within the scope of a court's power to award visitation. Va. Code § 20-124.1.
The "liberty interest . . . of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court." Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). "As a result, the statutory best-interests test 'unconstitutionally infringes on that fundamental parental right' if it authorizes a court to 'disregard and overturn any decision by a fit custodial parent concerning visitation whenever a third party affected by the decision files a visitation petition, based solely on the judge's determination of the child's best interests.'" Griffin v. Griffin, 41 Va. App. 77, 82, 581 S.E.2d 899, 901-02 (2003) (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67).
"[T]here is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children . . . . Accordingly, so long as a parent is fit, there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children." Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69 (citations omitted).
Recognizing the fundamental right of child rearing, whenever a statutorily interested non-parent petitions for visitation with a minor child without the support of a parent, Virginia requires that the non-parent prove that actual harm to the child's health or welfare will result without the requested visitation before the court will consider whether visitation is in the best interests of the child. Williams, 24 Va. App. at 784, 485 S.E.2d at 654 (involving parents united in opposing the non-parent's visitation); Griffin, 41 Va. App. at 82-83, 581 S.E.2d at 902 (involving one parent opposing the non-parent's visitation and one silent parent).
Discussion
The Court has considered the pleadings, evidence and oral argument presented at the Hearing, the GAL's report and recommendations, and applicable authorities. The Court now rules on the matters before it.
The Court reviews the visitation determination of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court for the City of Norfolk de novo. Based on the evidence presented at the Hearing— and considering the GAL's report and recommendations—the Court assumes without deciding that visitation by Grandmother is in Child's best interests.
With respect to visitation petitions, Virginia appellate courts have provided a fairly detailed analytical framework, both for visitation between parents and for visitation between parents and non-parents. The Court relies upon this framework.
A. On the Facts Presented, the Proper Test for Visitation is the Williams "Actual Harm" Test.
As an initial matter, Grandmother is a statutory "person with a legitimate interest" for purposes of seeking court-ordered visitation. Va. Code § 20-124.1 (2016 Repl. Vol.). Although child visitation determinations between fit parents are based on the best interests of the child, non-parents are not vested with "the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody and control of their children," which arises out of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Griffin v. Griffin, 41 Va. App. 77, 82, 581 S.E.2d 899, 901 (2003) (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000)).
The rights of non-parents in visitation determinations were addressed directly in the seminal case of Williams v. Williams, 24 Va. App. 778, 784, 485 S.E.2d 651, 654 (1997), judgment aff'd as modified, 256 Va. 19, 501 S.E.2d 417 (1998). In Williams, fit grandparents sought court-ordered visitation over the united objection of fit parents, who were part of an intact family. Id. at 780-81, 485 S.E.2d at 652. The Virginia Court of Appeals held that the right to parental autonomy in child rearing is a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 783, 485 S.E.2d at 654. The court went on to hold that state interference with this right therefore must be justified by a compelling state interest, which it defined as one which is "for the purpose of protecting the child's health or welfare." Id. (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)). Applying this principle to Virginia's custody and visitation statute, the court acknowledged the statutory requirement to "give due regard to the primacy of the parent-child relationship" rather than to simply evaluate the best interests of the child. Id. at 784, 485 S.E.2d at 654 (quoting Va. Code § 20-124.2). The court held that "[f]or the constitutional requirement to be satisfied, before visitation can be ordered over the objection of the child's parents, a court must find an actual harm to the child's health or welfare without such visitation." Id. at 784-85, 485 S.E.2d at 654. In summary, a court can grant non-parent visitation over the parents' objections only if (1) the absence of visitation would cause actual harm to the child's health or welfare and (2) visitation would be in the best interests of the child. Id. The court also made clear that the non-parent must first demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, actual harm before a court will evaluate the best interests of the child. Id. at 785, 485 S.E.2d at 654.
As discussed supra, Williams involved an intact family and the united objection of fit parents to non-parent visitation. After Williams, courts clarified the appropriate standard for cases in which the family was not intact and/or the desires of the parents concerning non-parent visitation differed. In Dotson v. Hylton, the Virginia Court of Appeals held that the best-interests-of-the-child standard—and not the Williams actual-harm standard—applied where one parent supported visitation by the child's paternal grandmother and the other did not. 29 Va. App. 635, 638, 513 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1999); see also Yopp v. Hodges, 43 Va. App. 427, 438, 598 S.E.2d 760, 765 (2004) (applying the best-interests standard when the parents disagreed over grandparent visitation). The parents had divorced when their child was four years old, and a few years later the father was sentenced to ten years in the state penitentiary. Dotson, 29 Va. App. at 637, 513 S.E.2d at 902. The mother moved for sole custody. Id. The father did not object, but requested reasonable visitation for both himself and his mother. Id. at 637-38, 513 S.E.2d at 902. The mother objected, which resulted in the grandmother filing a visitation petition. Id. at 638, 513 S.E.2d at 902. The trial court awarded visitation, finding that denial of such visitation would not be in the best interests of the child. Id. at 638, 513 S.E.d2d at 903. The mother appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not applying the Williams actual-harm standard. Id. The appellate court distinguished Williams, noting that in Williams "both parents objected to visitation by the grandparents, and the family was intact." Id. The court then explained the court's holding in Williams as follows:
To grant visitation to the grandparents, over both parents' objection, the trial court had to find that withholding visitation would be detrimental to the child before it applied the best interests standard. The [Virginia Supreme] Court [in Williams] stressed that "the child's family is intact." The factual predicate in Williams was a unified family.Id. (quoting Williams v. Williams, 256 Va. 19, 20, 501 S.E.2d 417, 417 (1998)). The court went on to hold that "[w]hen only one parent objects to a grandparent's visitation and the other parent requests it, the trial court is not required to follow the standard enumerated in Williams." Id. at 639, 513 S.E.2d at 903. The court ultimately decided that Williams is not controlling when the parents disagree regarding non-parent visitation; rather, the best-interests-of-the-child standard applies. Id. at 638-39, 513 S.E.2d at 903; cf. Griffin, 41 Va. App at 84, 581 S.E.2d at 902 (applying the Williams standard because the court "was not asked to referee between one parent's request that visitation be granted to a non-parent and the other parent's objection to it" but, rather, "[t]he only contest [was] between a parent and a non-parent").
Subsequent decisions dealt with visitation petitions where the custodial parent objected to non-parent visitation and the other parent was absent or silent. In these cases, the courts made it clear that the notion of an "intact" family is not limited to a traditional, nuclear family; nor does it exclude single parents. Those courts identified the relevant issue in the Williams analysis as whether at least one of the parents affirmatively supports the requested non-parent visitation, i.e., whether there is a conflict between participating biological parents that implicates the fundamental right of child rearing. In Surles v. Mayer, the parties had a child together but never married. 48 Va. App. 146, 156, 628 S.E.2d 563, 568 (2006). They lived together for several years, and the plaintiff acted as the primary father figure for the mother's other child from a prior relationship. Id. After the parties separated, in addition to custody disputes concerning their biological child, the plaintiff also sought visitation with the non-biological child based on the parental role he had previously played in the child's life. Id. at 157, 628 S.E.2d at 568. The mother objected, and the child's biological father, although alive, had not been involved in the child's life and did not participate in the visitation proceedings. Id. at 156, 628 S.E.2d at 568. The plaintiff argued that the Williams test did not apply because his visitation was not over the objection of both parents. Id. at 168, 628 S.E.2d at 573. In response, the Virginia Court of Appeals first noted that it previously had "held that the actual harm standard does not apply where one parent objects to the third party's request for visitation, but the other parent affirmatively requests that the third party be allowed visitation." Id. at 168, 628 S.E.2d at 575 (citing Yopp, 43 Va. App. at 438, 598 S.E.2d at 765; Dotson, 29 Va. App. at 639, 513 S.E.2d at 903). It then stated the following:
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that "where the third party possesses, through a valid consent order, joint legal custody of the child and sole physical custody of the child, the 'actual harm' standard is likewise inapplicable." Surles v. Mayer, 48 Va. App. 146, 168, 628 S.E.2d 563, 574 (2006).
We have never held, however, that, if a biological parent fails to voice an objection to visitation, that failure to object amounts to acquiescence in the third-party's petition for visitation. Indeed, in Griffin, we held that the "actual harm" standard was applicable where the biological father, who merely "appeared and testified that he paid child support, but did not intend to foster a relationship with the child," did not actually "request that visitation be awarded to [the third party]." Griffin, 41 Va. App. at 80, 83-84, 581 S.E.2d at 900, 902. Similarly, here, [the] biological father did not "request that visitation be awarded to [defendant]." Id. Although [the biological father] did not appear at the hearing and voice a formal objection to visitation, we decline to hold that a biological parent's silence is the functional equivalent of that parent's affirmative consent.Id. at 168-69, 628 S.E.2d at 574.
These subsequent cases illuminate the implicit logic of the Williams opinion. Given the primacy of parental rights, it is unsurprising that non-parents seeking visitation rights with a minor over a unified parental objection face the most stringent standard. Where one parent supports the non-parent's visitation request and the other parent opposes it, however, a lesser standard applies. This is not to denigrate non-intact families or because the non-parent has a greater legal interest in a non-intact family scenario; rather, the less rigorous best-interests-of-the-child standard applies because that standard recognizes the supreme rights of both parents—whose positions are in conflict. To apply the actual-harm standard when the parents' desires conflict would effectively elevate the rights of the objecting parent over those of the supporting parent. Applying this reasoning to situations where one parent objects to visitation and the other parent is absent or silent, the sacrosanct rights of the objecting parent dictate that the more stringent actual-harm standard be applied.
The Virginia Court of Appeals also has rejected an argument that a non-parent might qualify as a de facto parent to avoid the Williams actual-harm standard. In Stadter v. Siperko, the non-parent was involved in a cohabitating lesbian relationship with the mother for over five years, was present for the birth of the child, and continued living with the mother for a year and a half after the child's birth. 52 Va. App. 81, 86, 661 S.E.2d 494, 496 (2008). The child initially was given a hyphenated version of the parties' last names. Id. The non-parent shared parenting responsibilities and provided substantial financial support while cohabitating with the mother and the child, and she continued to provide financial support and physical care for the child after the parties separated. Id. The non-parent, relying on numerous decisions from other jurisdictions, argued that "the trial court should have applied the more favorable [best-interests-of-the-child] standard in her petition for visitation because she had a parent-like relationship with [the] child" and asserted that "where a biological parent actively has encouraged a parent-child relationship with a cohabiting partner who assumed parental responsibilities for a length of time sufficient to establish a bond with the child, the partner may assert the Fourteenth Amendment rights of a parent set forth in Troxel and Williams and is entitled to invoke the more favorable standard when seeking visitation." Id. at 90, 661 S.E.2d at 498. The court rejected this argument, holding that because "there already exists in Virginia a legal framework for the protection of the interests of a child who might suffer actual harm when separated from a person with a legitimate interest, as well as a mechanism to litigate fully the concerns of the person seeking visitation, we need not rewrite Virginia law to recognize the de facto parent doctrine in visitation." Id. at 92, 661 S.E.2d at 499; cf. Griffin, 41 Va. App. at 86, 581 S.E.2d at 903 (applying the Williams actual harm test where the husband erroneously thought he was the biological father, treated the child as his own, and participated in the child's early development for one and a half years).
Although Grandmother has not expressly asserted a de facto parent argument, the facts present in the case at bar arguably are analogous to those in Stadter.
Viewed together, the above cases stand for the following proposition: because a fit parent has a fundamental right to parental autonomy in child rearing, a statutorily interested non-parent is not entitled to visitation unless (1) at least one parent affirmatively supports such visitation, in which case the best-interests-of-the-child standard applies, or (2) the non-parent proves, by clear and convincing evidence, that the lack of visitation would cause actual harm to the child and, if such actual harm is proven, that the requested visitation is in the best interests of the child.
The Court recognizes that application of the Williams actual harm test also may be subject to parental waiver, but there are no facts in the instant case to support such waiver. See, e.g., Albert v. Ramirez, 45 Va. App. 799, 809, 613 S.E.2d 865, 869-70 (2005) (holding that the Williams test was inappropriate where mother sought to modify a consent custody/visitation order involving a non-parent).
The Court finds that (1) Mother is a fit parent, (2) Grandmother is a person with a legitimate interest in visiting Child, (3) Mother objects to Grandmother's petition for court-ordered visitation with Child, and (4) Child's father has not appeared in this proceeding and has expressed no opinion regarding Grandmother's petition for visitation. The facts underlying the case at bar are most analogous to those in Surles. As in that case, Child's parents are not together. His father presumably is alive but has never been part of Child's life. His father's failure to voice any opposition does not equate to agreement or even acquiescence to Grandmother's requested visitation. Hence, neither parent affirmatively supports the visitation petition, so there is no conflict between the parents' desires. The Court therefore finds that, under the facts present here, the Williams "actual harm" standard applies to protect Mother's constitutionally protected right to parental autonomy in raising Child.
B. Grandmother Failed to Prove, by Clear and Convincing Evidence, that Her Lack of Visitation Would Cause Actual Harm to Child.
As discussed supra, the Williams actual-harm standard is significantly more stringent than the best-interests-of-the-child standard. See, e.g., Griffin v. Griffin, 41 Va. App. 77, 84, 581 S.E.2d 899, 902 (2003). It is not sufficient for a Court to find that visitation with a non-parent would be "'better,' 'desirable,' or 'beneficial' for a child." Id. (quoting Williams v. Williams, 24 Va. App. 778, 784, 485 S.E.2d 651, 654 (1997), judgment aff'd as modified, 256 Va. 19, 501 S.E.2d 417 (1998)). It also is not enough that the potential loss of the non-parent relationship would cause the child emotional grief or sadness. Id. at 85-86, 581 S.E.2d at 903. Simply stated, loss of the non-parent relationship in and of itself is not what is meant by actual harm. Id. Rather, overcoming the fundamental right to parental autonomy in child rearing requires the petitioner to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that absence of the requested visitation would cause actual harm to the child's health or welfare." Williams, 24 Va. App. at 784-85, 485 S.E.2d at 654 (emphasis added).
Although psychological harm to the child resulting from the lack of visitation may be sufficient to satisfy the actual-harm standard, proof—especially by clear and convincing evidence—of some potential future effect generally requires expert testimony. For example, in O'Rourke v. Vuturo, the Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding of actual harm, which was based in part on the testimony of five expert witnesses. 49 Va. App. 139, 150, 638 S.E.2d 124, 129 (2006). Following a divorce from the child's mother, the plaintiff in O'Rourke sought visitation with the child because he had acted as the child's father, despite the fact that the child was the product of an extramarital affair. Id. at 145-46, 638 S.E.2d at 127. The plaintiff was listed as the child's father on her birth certificate and had represented to others that he was the father. Id. In short, he was the only father the child had ever known. Id. Two experts testified that the child had developed such a close bond with the plaintiff that separation would result in actual harm to the child's mental development. Id. at 149-50, 638 S.E.2d at 128-29. The experts testified that the child would develop "aggressive behavior and [have] trouble forming attachments later in her life." Id. The trial court found the expert testimony credible and relied on it to find that the child would suffer actual harm if the plaintiff was denied visitation. Id. at 150, 638 S.E.2d at 129.
Grandmother presented no evidence at the Hearing that demonstrated that Child's health or welfare would be jeopardized if visitation with Grandmother ceased. The evidence instead focused on Child's likely grief regarding the loss of emotional attachment he has with Grandmother. Although the GAL opined in her report that the lack of visitation by Grandmother "will impact [Child's] development and his ability to maintain healthy relationships in the future," this naked assertion neither qualifies as expert testimony nor is supported by the evidence offered at the Hearing. Based on the totality of the evidence presented, Child almost certainly will be adversely affected by the lack of Grandmother's visitation. That is not the test, however. Simply stated, Mother has the fundamental right to raise Child as she sees fit, which includes the power to exclude Grandmother from his life.
The Court finds, borrowing language from the Virginia Court of Appeals' opinion in Griffin, as follows:
The evidence in this case, at its best, goes no further than supporting the inference that the child would grieve the loss of the emotional attachment he has for [the non-parent] and "could be" emotionally hurt if visitation with [her] ended. While that might satisfy a trial court's "subjective notions of 'best interest of the child,'" it falls far short of satisfying by clear and convincing evidence the actual-harm test.Griffin, 41 Va. App. at 86, 581 S.E.2d at 903 (quoting Williams, 24 Va. App. at 785, 501 S.E.2d at 654).
Based on the evidence presented at the Hearing, a review of the documents submitted to the Court, and consideration of the GAL's report and recommendations, the Court finds that Grandmother failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Child would suffer actual harm without visitation with Grandmother.
Because the Court finds that Grandmother did not satisfy the Williams actual-harm standard, the Court need not analyze whether visitation with Grandmother would be in Child's best interests. --------
Conclusion
Because the Court finds that the Williams actual-harm standard applies, and that Grandmother has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that Child would suffer actual harm without visitation, the Court GRANTS Mother's motion to strike, DENIES Grandmother's petition for visitation, and dismisses the case. Accordingly, the April 11, 2016, order entered by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court for the City of Norfolk granting Grandmother visitation with Child is null and void.
Counsel for Mother is directed to prepare and circulate an Order consistent with this Opinion and submit it to the Court for filing within fourteen days. This matter is transferred to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court for the City of Norfolk for any further matters regarding visitation involving Child.
Sincerely,
/s/
David W. Lannetti
Circuit Court Judge DWL/ced