Opinion
March 9, 1998
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Dowd, J.).
Ordered that the appeal from the order dated December 12, 1996, is dismissed, as that order was superseded by the order dated June 26, 1997, made upon reargument; and it is further,
Ordered that the order dated June 26, 1997, is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, upon reargument the respondent's motion to dismiss the complaint is denied, the order dated December 12, 1996, is vacated, and the complaint is reinstated.
It is well settled that on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the allegations set forth in the complaint must be accepted as true and given the benefit of every possible favorable inference (Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87-88; Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 43 N.Y.2d 268, 275; Rovello v. Orofino Realty Co., 40 N.Y.2d 633, 634; Russo Sec. v. Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein, Wolf, Schlissel Sazaer, 243 A.D.2d 552; Bovino v. Village of Wappingers Falls, 215 A.D.2d 619). When measured against these standards, we find that the causes of action alleged in the complaint were sufficiently stated, and therefore the respondent's motion to dismiss should have been denied (see, Bovino v. Village of Wappingers Falls, supra; cf., Sopesis Constr. v. Solomon, 199 A.D.2d 491, 492).
Miller, J. P., Ritter, Thompson and Pizzuto, JJ., concur.