Opinion
Case No. 1:02-cv-00099 DAK
April 9, 2004
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL OF THE COMMISSION'S DENIAL OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Plaintiff George Mellinger, filed this action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision denying his application for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under the Social Security Act. This matter came before Magistrate Judge Brooke Wells pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) from a referral by Judge Dale Kimball. The Court has carefully reviewed the pleadings and finds oral argument would not be helpful. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the conclusion of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and the decision of the Commission. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Mr. Mellinger's appeal be denied.
See 42 U.S.C. § 401-433.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Review of the Commissioner's decision is limited to determining whether substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the factual findings, and whether the correct legal standards were applied. Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion". Evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence or if it constitutes mere conclusion. The court may neither re-weigh the evidence nor substitute its discretion for that of the Commissioner. Where the evidence as a whole can support either the agency's decision or an award of benefits, the agency's decision must be affirmed.
See Castellano v. Secretary of Health Human Services, 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1992); Hamilton v. Secretary of Health Human Services, 961 F.2d 1495, 1497-98 (10 Cir. 1992); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1981).
See Hamilton, 961 F.2d at 1498.
See Musgrave v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10th Cir. 1992).
See Hinkle v. Apfel, 132 F.3d 1349, 1351 (10th Cir. 1997); Kelly v. Chater, 62 F.3d 335, 337 (10th Cir. 1995).
See Ellison v, Sullivan, 929 F.2d 534, 536 (10th Cir. 1990).
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed for DIB on May 3, 2001, alleging an inability to work since October 5, 1999, as a result of high blood pressure and residual effects from mental impairments. These mental impairments include attention deficit disorder (ADD) and dysthymia. (Tr. 122, 181). After his claim was denied at the initial and reconsideration levels of administrative review, Plaintiff requested and was granted a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on March 2S, 2002. (Tr. 23-101).At the hearing, Mr. Mellinger testified about his past experiences, usual daily activities since leaving his previous employment and the medical problems he had encountered that limited certain activities. (Tr. 30-80). Plaintiff's wife, Yvonne Mellinger, also testified about the difficulties her husband faced because of limitations caused by medical ailments. (Tr. 80-94). Finally, Dr. Kristy Farnsworth, the Vocational Expert provided testimony about Plaintiff's skills, past work experience and prospects for future employment. (Tr. 94-100).
On April 19, 2002, the ALJ denied Plaintiff's claim finding that he was not disabled because he retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform a range of semiskilled sedentary work that had low stress, low concentration, minimal interaction with coworkers and supervisors. (Tr. 15). Such work also included approximately two absences per month.Id.
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's subsequent request for review making the ALJ's April 19, 2002 decision the Commissioner's final decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Tr. 4-5). Mr. Mellinger now appeals from the final decision. He argues that the ALJ erred at steps three and five of the required sequential evaluation. Specifically, Mr. Mellinger alleges that the ALJ "should have retained a medical expert to evaluate the varied medical reports . . ., and that the Commissioner has failed to meet her burden of proof that he is capable of performing work as it is found in the national economy." Pl.'s Br. at 9.
FACTUAL AND MEDICAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was 56 years old when he first claimed he was disabled (October 5, 1999) and was 58 years old on the date of the Commissioner's final decision. (Tr. 7-19, 122). Plaintiff graduated from high school, college and earned a Master's Degree of Social Science in Public Administration. (Tr. 145, 245-46). He has also worked on a Doctoral Degree in 1997 and another Master's Degree in Special Education in the Fall of 2001. (Tr. 48-49, 212, 245-46). Plaintiff worked for approximately 25 years as a welfare case worker, Medicaid caseworker and support coordinator for the State of Utah. (Tr. 126, 168, 188, 245-46). Mr. Mellinger claims he was disabled due to the residual effects from hypertension, ADD and dysthymia. (Tr. 181). He began receiving long-term disability benefits in November 1999. (Tr. 201, 245, 259).Dennis R. Peterson, Mr. Mellinger's treating physician, has treated Plaintiff since approximately May 1996 for a variety of health problems including, inter alia, hypertension and bipolar disorder. (Tr. 206, 211-13). In January 1998, Dr. Peterson diagnosed Plaintiff with ADD. (Tr. 210). Dr. Peterson reported that Plaintiff tolerated Dexedrine well and showed "[n]o further signs of paranoid symptoms and [had] fairly good broad functioning." Id. However, if Plaintiff failed to take his medications he became "easily distracted and poorly productive." Id. In August of 1998, Dr. Peterson reported that Plaintiff "feels somewhat down but is not profoundly depressed." (Tr. 109).
In June 1999, Dr. Peterson reported that Plaintiff was "[f]unctioning fairly well amongst a great deal of work related stress." (Tr. 206). Plaintiff moved back to the central office after working at home and reported having a hard time with distractions. Id. Mr. Mellinger told Dr. Peterson that he had been placed on administrative review. Id. Dr. Peterson recommended that Plaintiff be given a "quiet nondistracting area in which to work" and provided Plaintiff's employer with a letter stating Mr. Mellinger had ADD "in partial remission." (Tr. 206-07). In the letter, Dr. Peterson opined that if given the appropriate work environment Mr. Mellinger would be productive.Id.
In October of 1999, Plaintiff visited Dr. Peterson with an exacerbation of previously controlled hypertension, marked fatigue and weakness. (Tr. 205). Dr. Peterson attributed these changes in large part to "sever stresses involving his work place changes." Id. Plaintiff received a termination notice from his employer and reported being "significantly suicidal." (Tr. 204). Dr. Peterson recommended Plaintiff "avoid the stress of the work place for the next 10 days." Id. On October 15, 1999, Dr. Peterson received a report that Plaintiff had been doing well but "shockingly refused to show up to work." (Tr. 204). This report however was dismissed as very suspect given the unsuccessful attempts to contact its alleged author, Mrs. Ricks, because this report came at a time when Plaintiff was "again over-using his Dexadrine." Id. Dr. Peterson reduced his dosage and prescribed another medication.Id. On October 29, 1999, Dr. Peterson noted that Plaintiff continued to have "Dexedrine toxicity manifesting . . . paranoia" and reported problems at home with his family. (Tr. 203).
On January 20, 2000, Elaine Clark, Ph.D., performed a neuropsychological evaluation of Plaintiff after a referral by Plaintiff's treating physician Dr. Peterson. (Tr. 245). Plaintiff complained about various ailments including the inability to work under his previous supervisor. Id. Dr. Clark noted that Plaintiff was pleasant, cooperative and had a global assessment of functioning score (GAP) of 60. She also noted that although Dr. Peterson had rendered a prior mental diagnoses and prescribed medications, the present evaluation showed no "clear indication" of suffering from ADD and Bipolar Affective Disorder (BAD). (Tr. 250). Dr. Clark opined that given "proper treatment [Plaintiff] should have a good prognosis." Id. Dr. Clark further opined that based on the records and Mr. Mellinger's self-report, there is no reason why he could not work as a "support coordinator for the State of Utah;" although he was likely to have difficulty with his previous position because of his "paranoid thoughts about his supervisor and co-workers." Id.
The global assessment of functioning or GAF is used by health professionals to "[c]onsider psychological, social and occupational function on a hypothetical continuum of mental health-illness." American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders p. 34 (4th ed. 2000) (referred to as DSM-IV-TR).
The DSM-IV-TR published by the American Psychiatric Association defines a GAF between 51 and 60 as indicating "[m]oderate symptoms (e.g., flat affect and circumstantial speech, occasional panic attacks) OR moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning." DSM-IV-TR p. 34 (emphasis omitted). A GAF between 61 and 70 indicates "[s]ome mild symptoms (e.g., depressed mood and mild insomnia) OR some difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., occasional truancy or theft within the household), but generally functioning pretty well, has some meaningful interpersonal relationships." Id. (emphasis omitted).
On February 20, 2000, Coady Schueler, Psy.D., evaluated Plaintiff. Dr. Schueler diagnosed Mr. Mellinger with bipolar disorder, delusional disorder, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Dr. Schueler assessed Plaintiff a GAF of 35. (Tr. 230).
A GAF between 31 and 40 indicates "[s]ome impairment in reality testing or communication (e.g., speech is at times illogical, obscure, or irrelevant) OR major impairment in several areas, such as work or school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or mood." DSM-IV-TR p. 34; see supra fn. 10.
Later that same month on February 29, 2000, Christopher Wehl, Ph.D., reviewed Plaintiff's records and opined he had ADHD along with other disorders but concluded he did not have an impairment that met or equaled an impairment in the Listing of Impairments (Listings). (Tr. 235-42). Dr. Wehl noted that Plaintiff's paranoia stemmed "partially from over-concern about actual relational problems on the job" and serious concerns remained about "Dexedrine overuse and toxicity contributing to his "paranoia."' (Tr. 233).
See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1.
From approximately June 2000 through September 2001 Plaintiff sought counseling from Jerry Sandberg, Ph.D. (Tr. 292-319). Dr. Sandberg initially diagnosed dysthymia and a possible delusional disorder and assessed a GAF of 60. (Tr. 319). Plaintiff reported that in May 2001 he had been accepted at the University of Utah for a Master's Degree in Education with teacher certification. (Tr. 297, 302). On July 18, 2001, Dr. Sandberg reported that Plaintiff was a "totally normal appearing 57 year old" but had dysthymia. (Tr. 296). Although Plaintiff claimed he had ADD, Dr. Sandberg noted the diagnosis was unsubstantiated.Id.
See supra fn. 10.
From October 2000 until approximately April 2001 and at Dr. Sandberg's referral, Plaintiff sought treatment from Geral Lazar, M.D. for mental impairments. (Tr. 256-60). In October, Dr. Lazar diagnosed delusional disorder, ADHD and assessed a GAF of 55. (Tr. 258). By November of 2000, Dr. Lazar reported that Plaintiff was "back to BO/85%" of normal. (Tr. 257). Dr. Lazar also noted that there was no need for Plaintiff to return to see him although Plaintiff did return in February of 2001 complaining of increased anger and irritability. Id.
See fn. 10 supra.
In August 2001, Rebecca Dalisay, M.D., a Disability Determination Services (DDS) psychiatrist, reviewed Plaintiff's records and opined he had dysthymia, an anxiety disorder and a possible paranoid delusional disorder, but he did not have an impairment that met or equaled a Listing. (Tr. 329-32). Dr. Dalisay further opined that Plaintiff was capable of performing simple tasks involving one — and two-step instructions where public contact was minimal. (Tr. 322). On November 28, 2001, Manya Atiya, M.D., a second DDS psychiatrist reviewed Plaintiff's records and concurred with Dr. Dalisay's opinions. (Tr. 322, 329).
During the same time period that Plaintiff underwent evaluations, treatment and counseling with the professionals mentioned supra, Plaintiff occasionally received treatment from Dr. Peterson, Plaintiff's primary care physician. Plaintiff's condition varied but he was doing "fairly well" in December 2000 and Dr. Peterson reported that Plaintiff had normal neurological functioning in March, 2001 and had "markedly improved emotionally" in August 2001. (Tr. 280-85). In December 2001, shortly after Plaintiff's current DIB application was denied, Plaintiff complained of a serious degradation in his condition. (Tr. 348). On February 12, 2002, Dr. Peterson completed a Work Capacity Evaluation that consisted of questions and boxes assessing Plaintiff's characteristics. (Tr. 352-54). This evaluation had a scale that included categories such as none, slight, moderate, marked, extreme or unknown. In response to questions and an evaluation performed by Dr. Peterson he would check what he felt was the appropriate box. Plaintiff did quite poorly in this evaluation with moderate, marked and extreme limitations.Id.
DISCUSSION
To determine whether an individual suffers from a disability under the regulations, the ALJ must conduct a sequential five-step evaluation. The burden of proof lies with the plaintiff as to steps one through three; at steps four and five the burden shifts to the commissioner.In the first two steps, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity, and whether the claimant has a "severe" impairment. If the claimant has satisfied the first two requirements, the evaluation moves on to step three, a determination of whether the claimant's impairments meet or equal a disability described in the Listing of Impairments ("Listings"). If the ALJ determines the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals the Listings, the ALJ must conclude the claimant is disabled. If the claimant does not meet a Listing, the evaluation moves on to steps four and five during which an assessment is made of the claimant's residual functional capacity. At step four, it is determined whether the claimant can perform their past work. If the claimant cannot, the evaluation moves to step five, where it is determined whether the claimant can perform other work. The claimant must be found disabled if there is no work that they cam perform. On the other hand, if there is work which claimant can perform, and such work is available in significant numbers within the national economy, the claimant is not disabled and not eligible for benefits.
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e) and 416,920(f).
In making the five step sequential evaluation of Mr. Mellinger's claim, the ALJ found at step one that Mr. Mellinger had not "engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of disability." (Tr. 17). At the second step, the ALJ concluded Mr. Mellinger's impairments were severe. Id. At step three, the ALJ found Mr. Mellinger's "medically determinable impairments do not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments." (Tr. 18). At step four, the ALJ found that due to his impairments Mr. Mellinger could not perform "any of his past relevant work." Id. At step five, the ALJ addressed Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC), which is the range of work activities Plaintiff can perform despite his impairments. The ALJ concluded that occupations exist in significant job numbers in the national economy that Claimant is capable of performing; therefore, Claimant is "not disabled" within the meaning of the act. Benefits were, therefore, denied.
The Listings describe impairments which are considered severe enough to prevent a person from doing any gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525.
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's findings at steps three and five.
A. Step Three Claim of Error
The ALJ found at step two that Claimant had "an impairment or a combination of impairments considered `severe' based on the requirements in the Regulations." (Tr. 17). At step three, the ALJ concluded these impairments, both singly or in combination, did not meet or equal a Listings impairment. (Tr. 18). Because a Listing impairment was not found, the ALJ moved to step four of the evaluation process. Plaintiff challenges the step three conclusion.
Plaintiff argues that at step three the ALJ "failed to consider the cumulative effects of Mr. Mellinger's combined impairments, which meet a medical equivalence of a Listing impairment." Pl.'s Br. at 19. The Court disagrees.
The ALJ specifically evaluated Plaintiff's mental impairments and determined that they did not meet or equal the requirements of the Listings. For example, the ALJ states [t]he Administrative Law Judge has specifically considered the criteria of Listings 12.04, 12.06 and 12.08." (Tr. 13). After considering these criteria the ALJ concluded that Mr. Mellinger "could equal a listing by demonstrating `extreme' functional limitation" in certain areas. Id. However, the ALJ found that based on the evidence "[C]laimant's degree of limitation" in the areas were moderate to mild and not extreme. Id. Furthermore, the ALJ opined that if Claimant had provided medical documentation that either an organic mental disorder, schizophrenia, paranoid disorder, or affective disorder lasted more than two years and "caused more than a minimal limitation of ability to do basic work" then Claimant would have met one of the requisite listings. Id. The evidence offered by Plaintiff failed to meet these criteria and therefore, the ALJ found that Mr. Mellinger did not meet a listing.
"For a claimant to show that his impairment matches a listing, it must meet all of the specified medical criteria. An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify." Sullivan v. Zebley et al., 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, this Court concludes the ALJ did appropriately consider the cumulative effects of Mr. Mellinger's impairments.
B. Step Five Claim of Error
Plaintiff next argues the ALJ erred at step five of the evaluation process. At step four of the evaluation, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Mellinger "is unable to perform any of his past relevant work." (Tr. 19). At step five of the sequential evaluation process, the burden shifted to the Commissioner to show the existence of a significant number of jobs in one or more occupations in the national economy that Mr. Mellinger can perform. This burden may be met through the testimony of a vocational expert. Consideration must also be given to the claimant's vocational factors and residual functional capacity. Vocational factors are the claimant's age, education and skills acquired from previous work.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly determined his residual functional capacity (RFC). See Pl.'s Br. at 13-17. RFC is what an individual can still do despite their physical and mental limitations.See 20 C.F.R. at § 416.945. The ALJ has a responsibility to decide Plaintiff's RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.946 (stating that, in cases before an ALJ, it is the ALJ's responsibility to determine a claimant's RFC).
The ALJ specifically found Plaintiff had severe dysthymia, ADD and an anxiety disorder. (Tr. 13). The ALJ reduced Plaintiff's RFC to sedentary work due to the fatigue cased by his mental impairments and the need for low stress, low concentration, typing no more than 30 to 40 words per minute and allowing for two missed days per month. (Tr. 15). The ALJ based his finding in part on the findings and opinions of the many doctors and professionals who worked with Plaintiff over the course of Plaintiff's physical and mental limitations. (Tr. 1215). For example, Rebecca Dalisay, M.D., a psychiatrist performed a RFC assessment and determined that Plaintiff was capable of performing simple tasks where public contact was minimal. (Tr. 332). Another psychiatrist, Dr. Manya Atiya concurred with Dr. Dalisay's opinions. (Tr. 322, 329). Based on the foregoing the Court concludes the ALJ properly determined Plaintiff's RFC.
Plaintiff also argues that Mr. Mellinger's advanced age under the Social Security regulations "warrants a finding of disabled. . . ." Pl.'s Br. at 16. The Court disagrees. In addition to considering the required five step sequential evaluation, the ALJ also considered Claimant's advanced age as defined under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(e). In evaluating Claimant's advanced age the ALJ relied in part on the testimony of the vocational expert (VE), DR. Kristy Farnsworth. (Tr. 94).
This section states in relevant part: "[w]e consider that at advanced age (age 55 or older) age significantly affects a person's ability to adjust to other work. We have special rules for persons of advanced age. . . . 20C.F.R. § 404.1563(e); see also § 404.1568(d)(4).
In response to the ALJ's first hypothetical, the VE testified Plaintiff possessed skills that are transferrable to other jobs which can be performed by Plaintiff despite his limitations. (Tr. 97). These skills include: numerical and verbal record keeping, an ability to provide information and influence others decisions, general office abilities and knowledge, basic keyboarding and typing, filing, proof reading and phone skills. Id. The VE opined that someone with Plaintiff's skills could work at the lower end of the skilled range and that there were approximately 325,000 jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. Id. These jobs include, information clerk, credit clerk and benefits clerk. Id. All of these positions took into account an individual with Plaintiff's limitations.
Based in part on the VE's testimony the ALJ found that "[C]laimant has transferable skills from skilled work previously performed." (Tr. 18). Such a finding is appropriate under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568, which requires the ALJ to consider the transferability of skills for individuals of advanced age. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568. Therefore, the Court finds the ALJ did properly consider Plaintiff's age in making its decision.
Despite the ALJ's finding of transferable skills, Plaintiff claims that even if he possessed these skills they required "complex intellectual tasks which Mr. Mellinger is unable to perform." Pl.'s Br. at 17. The Court disagrees. There is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's decision that Plaintiff could transfer certain skill to jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff is capable of performing. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err at step five in finding that occupations exist in significant job numbers in the national economy that Claimant is capable of performing.
C. Other Arguments
Plaintiff raises two other arguments on appeal. First, the "ALJ violated the treating physician rule [and] the ALJ failed to retain a medical expert to resolve medical discrepancies." Pl.'s Br. at 19. Second, Plaintiff alleges "the ALJ's negative credibility finding was not supported by the evidence." Id.
An ALJ is required to give controlling weight to a treating physician's opinion about a claimant's impairments, "including symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, and any physical or mental restrictions, if `it is well supported by clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and if it is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record.'"Bean v. Charter, 77 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotingCastellano v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 26 F.3d 1027, 1029 (10th Cir. 1994)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d). Credibility assessments, however, are the "province of the ALJ." Hamilton v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 961 F.2d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir. 1992). This Court "may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute [its] discretion for that of the [ALJ]." Kelley v. Chater 62 F.3d 335, 337 (10th Cir. 1995).
In this instance, the decision of the ALJ regarding the impairment evaluation was contingent upon a credibility assessment of the various doctors and professionals. Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ failed to give proper weight to his treating physician, Dr. Peterson. The Court disagrees. The ALJ did consider Dr. Peterson's opinions, but he specifically rejected some of his opinions because they were not supported by any objective medical findings. (Tr. 14-15). For example, the checkoff form completed by Dr. Peterson in February 2002 indicated the severity of Plaintiff's mental impairments were so severe and functionally disabling that they met the Listings. (Tr. 352-54). This form, however, was not substantiated by any other objective medical findings and was inconsistent with other medical evidence including Dr. Peterson's own prior progress notes. (Tr. 14-15). Upon review of the record, this Court concludes there is substantial evidence to support the decision of the ALJ to not give controlling weight to all of Dr. Peterson's opinions.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ should have retained a medical expert to resolve medical discrepancies. See Pl.'s Br. at 19. Specifically, Plaintiff cites to the GAF scores of 60 and 35 being so divergent that the ALJ should have sought additional opinions from medical experts. See Pl.'s Br. at ll. The Court disagrees.
The ALJ relied, in part, on the opinions from Dr. Clark, assessing a GAF of 60, Dr. Schueler, assessing a GAF of 35, Dr. Sandberg, indicating Plaintiff's current GAF was 60 and was as high as 70 in the past year and Dr. Lazar who assessed a GAF of 55. (Tr. 230, 250, 258, 319). The ALJ also relied on the opinions of Dr. Wehl, Dr. Dalisay, Dr. Atiya and Dr. Peterson. The ALJ did discuss the change in GAF scores noting that "less than a month later" after being assessed a GAF of 60 Plaintiff was assessed a GAF of 35 by Dr. Schueler. (Tr. 12). However, based on the opinions and assessments of the other doctors and professionals the ALJ discounted Dr. Schueler's GAF assessment. Based on the Court's review of the record there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's decision to not give considerable weight to Dr. Schueler's assessed GAF of 35. There is nothing to gain by having another doctor review the record as Plaintiff suggests, because the ALJ already had the opinions and assessments of eight doctors with the majority of them contradicting Dr. Schueler's assessment.
Finally, Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ's negative credibility finding was not supported by the evidence is without merit. The ALJ found that Plaintiff's allegations regarding his limitations were not totally credible. (Tr. 18). "The ALJ is entitled to rely on objective evidence in the record, such as Claimant's recount of his daily activities, in making his assessment." Hamilton, 961 F.2d at 1499. Plaintiff had severe impairments that caused moderate restrictions. However, in discounting Plaintiff's subjective claims of disabling pain the ALJ noted the positive response to treatment and the broad-range of daily activities in which Plaintiff engaged. Claimant is basically again asking this Court to reweigh the evidence, which is something this Court cannot do. Id. at 1498. After reviewing the record, this Court concludes that "substantial evidence supports the ALJ's credibility determinations, for the reasons stated in his opinion."Id. at 1499.
RECOMMENDATION
In viewing the record as a whole, there is substantial evidence supporting the decision of the ALJ and because credibility judgments are reserved for the ALJ, the Court recommends that the previous decision of the Commission remain undisturbed. Claimant's request for remand or modification should be denied.
Copies of the foregoing report and recommendation are being mailed to all parties who are hereby notified of their right to object. The parties must file any objection to the Report and Recommendation within ten days after receiving it. Failure to object may constitute a waiver of objections upon subsequent review.