Opinion
13 CV 8164 (VB)
11-21-2014
CHARLES MELCHNER and LILLIAN MELCHNER, Plaintiffs, v. TOWN OF CARMEL, FRANK DELCAMPO, CONNIE MUNDAY, KENNETH SCHMITT, NORMAN MARINO, CARMINE DIBATTISTA, FRANK LOMBARDI, RICHARD O'KEEFE, SUSAN MCDONOUGH, ROBERT RAVALLO, DORIS STAHL, MICHAEL CARNAZZA, JAMES MAXWELL, WILLIAM B. SPAIN, JR., CHARLES COMPTON SPAIN, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION :
Plaintiffs Charles and Lillian Melchner (collectively, the "Melchners") bring this action against defendants the Town of Carmel (the "Town"); Town Officials Frank Delcampo, Connie Munday, Kenneth Schmitt, Norman Marino, Carmine DiBattista, Frank Lombardi, Richard O'Keefe, Susan McDonough, Robert Ravallo, Doris Stahl, and Michael Carnazza (collectively with the Town, the "Town Defendants"); James Maxwell; William B. Spain, Jr.; and Charles Compton Spain. (Doc. #27).
Town Defendants, Mr. Maxwell, and Mr. William Spain move to dismiss the amended complaint. (Docs. ## 33, 40, 45). For the following reasons, defendants' motions are GRANTED.
Defendant Charles Compton Spain did not move to dismiss, and instead filed an answer to the amended complaint. (Doc. #32). --------
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.
BACKGROUND
For purposes of ruling on these motions to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the amended complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the Melchners.
The Melchners own and operate the Mahopac Marina (the "Marina"), which provides recreational access to Lake Mahopac and sells, stores, and repairs boats. The Melchners maintain that over a fifteen year period, the Town brought four civil and three criminal suits against them, alleging various violations of the Town's Zoning Code (the "Zoning Code") relating to construction and maintenance of the Marina.
In 2008 and 2009, the Town pursued its last actions against the Melchners. Specifically, on September 3, 2008, the Town brought criminal charges against the Melchners alleging four violations of the Zoning Code. And on June 30, 2009, the Town commenced a civil action and moved preliminarily to enjoin the Melchners from using the Marina.
The Melchners now bring this action, alleging (i) deprivations of their constitutional rights to freedom of speech and property guaranteed by the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, (ii) selective enforcement in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (iii) state law claims for tortious inference with business relationships, breach of contract, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Town Defendants move to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, all Section 1983 claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. Mr. Maxwell and Mr. William Spain move to dismiss for the same reason.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court evaluates the sufficiency of the complaint under the "two-pronged approach" announced by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). First, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements," are not entitled to the assumption of truth and are thus not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Id. at 678; Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir. 2010). Second, "[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint must meet a standard of "plausibility." Id. at 678; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id.
In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in the complaint." DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
II. Section 1983 Claims
The statute of limitations applicable to a Section 1983 claim accruing in New York is three years. Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002). "While state law supplies the statute of limitations for claims under § 1983, federal law determines when a federal claim accrues. The claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the harm." Van Wormer v. City of Rensselaer, 293 Fed App'x 783, 783 (2d Cir. 2008).
In Section 1983 actions, federal courts borrow not only the state's limitation period, but also its tolling rules. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 486 (1980). The Melchners contend the Court should borrow New York's continuing violation doctrine and find their Section 1983 claims for unconstitutional retaliation, taking, deprivation of substantive due process, and selective enforcement constitute continuing violations, tolling the three-year statute of limitations.
"The doctrine of continuing harm precludes a statute of limitations defense where the plaintiff suffers a continuing harm." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Serio, 2000 WL 554221, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the doctrine, a continuous policy of discrimination will toll the running of the statute of limitations until the "last discriminatory act in furtherance of it." Washington v. Cnty. of Rockland, 373 F.3d 310, 317 (2d Cir. 2004).
The Court need not decide if the continuing violation doctrine is applicable, because even if it were, the last discriminatory act in furtherance of defendants' alleged deprivations occurred on June 30, 2009, when the Town commenced the 2009 civil action. It matters not that the 2008 criminal action and 2009 civil action are allegedly still pending, because a federal claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the harm. The latest the Melchners knew or had reason to know defendants allegedly retaliated against them for their protected speech, deprived them of the Marina's economically beneficial use, arbitrarily deprived them of their valid property interest, and selectively enforced the Zoning Code against them for impermissible reasons was when the Town commenced its last suit against them on June 30, 2009. Applying the applicable three-year statute of limitations, the last possible date on which any Section 1983 claim could have been brought was June 30, 2012. The instant action was commenced on November 15, 2013. As such, the Melchners' Section 1983 claims are time-barred.
Having dismissed the Melchners' federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
CONCLUSION
Defendants' motions to dismiss are GRANTED.
The Clerk is instructed to terminate the pending motions. (Docs. ##33, 40, 45).
The Court will schedule an initial conference as to the remaining defendant, Charles Compton Spain. Dated: November 21, 2014
White Plains, NY
SO ORDERED:
/s/_________
Vincent L. Briccetti
United States District Judge