Opinion
No. 04-17-00504-CV
04-11-2018
CUANTO ANTES MEJOR, L.L.C. and M.E. Phillip, Appellants v. EOG RESOURCES, INC., Appellee
MEMORANDUM OPINION
From the 81st Judicial District Court, Karnes County, Texas
Trial Court No. 15-12-00277-CVK
Honorable Donna S. Rayes, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice REVERSED AND RENDERED
Appellants Cuanto Antes Mejor, L.L.C. and M.E. Phillip appeal a summary judgment granted in favor of EOG Resources, Inc. awarding EOG possession and superior title to an undivided 39/252 interest in a 44.8-acre tract of land located in Karnes County, Texas. Appellants contend the trial court erred in granting EOG's motion for summary judgment, denying their motion for partial summary judgment, and sustaining EOG's objections to certain summary judgment evidence. We reverse the trial court's judgment and render judgment that Cuanto Antes Mejor, L.L.C. is awarded possession and superior title to the undivided 39/252 interest in the 44.8-acre tract.
BACKGROUND
In 1916, a tract of land was partitioned into two tracts: (1) a 6.46-acre tract which was then owned by Robert Goode; and (2) a 44.8-acre tract of land which was then jointly owned by nine individuals. A partition deed was filed in the deed records containing a metes and bounds description of both tracts of land.
Three of the joint owners of the 44.8-acre tract of land were siblings: Nolie Anderson, Marshall Anderson, and Herbert Anderson. Nolie Anderson was the maiden name of Nolie Chew. When Marshall and Herbert died, Nolie inherited their interests. Dora Daniel is Nolie's only heir.
In assessing taxes against Nolie's undivided interest in the 44.8-acre tract of land, the taxing entities described Nolie's interest as 7 acres "AB 219 TR 8 J NESBIT." In 2003, the taxing entities sued Nolie and Dora to recover delinquent taxes. Certified copies of the tax records documenting the delinquent taxes were filed in the lawsuit. On December 16, 2004, the trial court signed a foreclosure judgment allowing the taxing entities to foreclose on Nolie's and Dora's undivided interest in the 44.8-acre tract of land which the foreclosure judgment described as "Tract 8, being 7 acres, more or less, J. Nesbit Survey, Abstract 219, Karnes County, Texas. (Acct. #RC5354 and 10130100000000)."
In May of 2005, the sheriff sold the property at a foreclosure sale to the Karnes City Independent School District as trustee for all the taxing entities. A Sheriff's Tax Deed was signed on June 27, 2005, and recorded in the deed records. The Sheriff's Tax Deed references the foreclosure judgment and the cause number of the foreclosure lawsuit and contains the same property description as the foreclosure judgment except it omits the account numbers.
M.E. Phillip subsequently purchased the property from the taxing entities. The Tax Resale Deed documenting the conveyance contains the same property description as the Sheriff's Tax Deed and also references the foreclosure judgment and cause number of the foreclosure lawsuit. Phillip later conveyed the property to Cuanto Antes Mejor, L.L.C.
On December 4, 2009, EOG filed an application for the appointment of a receiver for the mineral interests in the 44.8-acre tract of land. EOG alleged it owned an undivided leasehold interest in the 44.8-acre tract and wanted to explore and develop the tract. EOG also alleged it made diligent but unsuccessful efforts since 2008 to locate the defendant owners of the tract. Therefore, EOG requested that the court appoint a receiver for the undivided mineral interests owned by the defendants and grant the receiver the authority to negotiate a lease with EOG, manage the mineral interests, render the mineral interests for taxation purposes, and pay any taxes as they become due on the mineral interests. The trial court signed an order in the receivership lawsuit on March 29, 2010, granting EOG's request and appointing a receiver for the undivided mineral interests. That same day, the receiver signed an oil and gas mineral lease allowing EOG to explore and develop the 44.8-acre tract of land.
On December 9, 2015, Cuanto Antes Mejor, L.L.C. and M.E. Phillip filed the underlying lawsuit against EOG asserting a trespass to try title claim. While the lawsuit was pending, Dora signed a quitclaim deed conveying all of her interest, if any, in the 44.8-acre tract of land to EOG. The parties then filed competing motions for summary judgment each alleging ownership of the undivided interest in the 44.8-acre tract of land previously owned by Nolie and inherited by Dora. Cuanto Antes and Phillip alleged they owned the undivided interest based on foreclosure sale and resale. EOG contended the foreclosure judgment and tax deeds were void because they contained an insufficient property description; therefore, EOG asserted it owned superior title based on the quitclaim deed from Dora. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of EOG and awarded EOG possession and superior title to "an undivided 39/252 interest in 44.8 acres of land located in Karnes County, Texas." Cuanto Antes and Phillip appeal.
There does not appear to be any dispute that an undivided 39/252 interest accurately describes the interest Dora inherited from Nolie.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"We review the grant of [a] summary judgment de novo." Katy Venture, Ltd. v. Cremona Bistro Corp., 469 S.W.3d 160, 163 (Tex. 2015). To prevail on a traditional motion for summary judgment, the movant must show "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the [movant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). We take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, resolve all conflicts in the evidence in the nonmovant's favor, and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant's favor. Katy Venture, Ltd., 469 S.W.3d at 163. Because the parties filed competing motions for summary judgment, and the trial court granted EOG's motion and denied the appellants' motion, we "determine all questions presented, and if the trial court erred, render the judgment the trial court should have rendered." Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v. Emmett, 459 S.W.3d 578, 583 (Tex. 2015).
VOID JUDGMENT AND COLLATERAL ATTACK
In their first issue, appellants contend the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in EOG's favor because EOG's challenge to the foreclosure judgment is an improper collateral attack. The appellants assert a collateral attack would only be permitted if the court that rendered the foreclosure judgment was without jurisdiction. Because they contend EOG could not collaterally attack the foreclosure judgment, the appellants assert in their second and third issues that EOG's challenge to the validity of the tax sale and the foreclosure judgment is barred by: (1) EOG's failure to comply with the deposit requirements of section 34.08(a)(1) of the Texas Tax Code; and (2) the limitations period set forth in section 33.54(a)(1) of the Texas Tax Code. In support of their position, the appellants cite several cases that predate the Texas Supreme Court's decision in AIC Mgmt. v. Crews, 246 S.W.3d 640 (2008), and this court's decision in Sec. State Bank & Trust v. Bexar Cty., 387 S.W.3d 715 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. denied). This court's analysis of the appellants' issues is guided by these decisions.
Section 34.08(a)(1) provides that "[a] person may not commence an action that challenges the validity of a tax sale under this chapter unless the person deposits into the registry of the court an amount equal to the amount of the delinquent taxes, penalties, and interest specified in the judgment of foreclosure obtained against the property plus all costs of the tax sale." TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 34.08(a)(1) (West 2015).
Section 33.54(a)(1) provides that "an action relating to the title to property may not be maintained against the purchaser of the property at a tax sale unless the action is commenced before the first anniversary of the date that the deed executed to the purchaser at the tax sale is filed of record." TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.54(a)(1) (West 2015).
A. AIC Mgmt. v. Crews
In AIC Mgmt., a 24.36-acre tract of land was partitioned into an 8.51-acre tract and a 15.85-acre tract. 246 S.W.3d at 641. The partition deed conveyed the 8.51-acre tract to Emma Crews, Valda Crews, and Eva Fay Gross, collectively referred to as the "Crewses." Id. "An exhibit to the partition deed described the Crewses' property by metes and bounds within the 'T.S. Roberts Survey, Abstract No. 659, Harris County, Texas.'" Id. at 632. "In March 1989, the City of Houston sued the Crewses for unpaid ad valorem taxes for the years 1960 to 1989 on what the City described as a six-acre portion of the 8.51-acre tract." Id. Harris County was joined as a party, but the other local taxing authority was not. Id.
The tax-suit petition described the property as follows:
Tract 12 being 6.0 acres out of T.S. Roberts Survey Abstract 659 situated in Harris County, Texas, as shown in file number J659372 of the deed and plat records of Harris County, Texas.Id. "The file number corresponded to the Harris County clerk's file number for the partition deed." Id. The final judgment in the tax suit, which did not reference the partition deed, ordered the City and County to recover against the Crewses "for taxes and other fees levied on 'TR 12 AB 659 T.S. Roberts situated in Harris County' and further order[ed] the constable to seize and sell the property to satisfy the judgment." Id. When no bidders appeared at the public auction, the property was sold to the City through a 1991 constable's deed which referenced the tax suit and judgment by cause number and described the property being conveyed as all of the Crewses' estate, right, title, and interest to the property described as:
TR 12 AB 659 T.S. Roberts * situated in Harris County, Texas.Id. AIC subsequently purchased the land from the City, and the 1997 constable's deed conveying the property to AIC referenced the tax suit and judgment and described the property as "'all of the state [sic], right, title and interest' in 'TR 12 AB 659 T.S. Roberts* situated in Harris County, Texas' that the City had acquired under the 1991 constable's deed." Id.
Three years after AIC acquired the property, the City filed a condemnation suit on the entire 24.36-acre tract. Id. In the condemnation proceeding, "both the Crewses and AIC claimed ownership of the 8.51-acre tract." Id. "The Crewses moved for summary judgment, contending they still held title under the 1984 partition deed because the property descriptions in both the constable deeds were ... insufficient to convey title." Id. The trial court granted the Crewses' motion, voided the constable's deeds, and declared the Crewses to be the property's owners. Id. The court of appeals affirmed, and the Texas Supreme Court granted AIC's petition for review "to consider the sufficiency of the property descriptions contained in the constable's deeds." Id. at 643.
Before examining the sufficiency of the description, the Texas Supreme Court first noted the standard by which the sufficiency of property descriptions should be measured, asserting:
To be valid, a conveyance of real property must contain a sufficient description of the property to be conveyed. A property description is sufficient if the writing furnishes within itself, or by reference to some other existing writing, the means or data by which the particular land to be conveyed may be identified with reasonable certainty. Like any other conveyance of property , a judgment for foreclosure of
a tax lien upon real estate which fails to describe a definite tract of land is void. A tax judgment's property description must be sufficiently particular to allow a party to locate the specific land being identified.Id. at 645 (emphasis added; internal citations omitted).
Applying this standard, the court noted the Tract 12 reference in the constable's deeds was a reference to the numbered tax tracts the Harris County Appraisal District ("HCAD") used to divide property for tax purposes. Id. The court then concluded, "Without information from HCAD about how the tax tracts were drawn in 1989, we cannot determine whether the conveyance of all of the Crewses' interest in 'Tract 12' was sufficient to allow identification of the property." Id. at 646. The court noted the property description in the constable's deeds had to be read in light of the 1989 tax judgment and underlying petition, and if HCAD "records still in existence from 1989 could identify the tract and where it overlapped the Crewses' property, the description would be sufficient." Id. at 648. The court cautioned the essential elements of a property description may not be supplied by extrinsic evidence but only from the four corners of the deed and existing writings referenced in the deed. Id. However, because the property descriptions in the constable's deeds referred to "Tract 12," the deeds contained an explicit reference to existing writings like the tax tract maps within the HCAD records. Id. Because the record did not conclusively establish the property descriptions in the constable's deeds were insufficient, the cause was remanded to the trial court to determine "[i]f HCAD records show the 1989 version of Tract 12 clearly drawn on a map or described by metes and bounds." Id. at 649.
In support of its decision in AIC Mgmt., the court cited Willoughby v. Jones, 251 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. 1952). The court noted that in Willoughby, the tax judgment contained incomplete descriptions, but the petition filed in the tax suit "identified the property by referencing three deeds in the property's chain of title." AIC Mgmt., 246 S.W.3d at 647 (citing Willoughby, 251 S.W.2d at 511). In Willoughby, the court held "the property [that] the tax judgment intended to describe was ascertainable" "[d]ue to the close correlation between the property descriptions in the three deeds and the description in the tax judgment." Id. The court noted, "The Willoughby decision highlights the Court's willingness to read property descriptions in tax judgments alongside the property descriptions in related petitions and judgment rolls to identify the property conveyed, thus avoiding the inequity of erasing otherwise valid tax judgments at the public's expense." Id. However, the court reiterated its fundamental policy "that a judgment's property description must be sufficient to allow location of the particular land conveyed." Id.
B. Sec. State Bank & Trust v. Bexar County
In Sec. State Bank & Trust, a bank filed a petition seeking to vacate a tax sale of property as void. 397 S.W.3d 715, 718 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. denied). Like the appellants in the instant case, the taxing authorities asserted the lawsuit was barred by limitations under section 33.54 of the Texas Tax Code and the failure to comply with the section 34.08 deposit requirements. Id. The trial court held the suit was barred by limitations, and the Bank appealed to this court. Id. at 719.
In analyzing whether the bank's challenge to the tax sale was proper, we noted "a void judgment may be collaterally attacked." Id. at 723. We also noted, "A collateral attack may be brought against a void judgment at any time; it need not be brought within a definite time period after the judgment's rendition." Id. Concluding that the bank's assertions in the lawsuit established that the tax judgment and tax sale were void, we held the bank's suit was a proper collateral attack, and was not barred by the Tax Code provisions. Id. at 724.
C. Whether Collateral Attack is Permissible Depends on Sufficiency of Property Description
Although the appellants contend a collateral attack on a foreclosure judgment is only proper if the trial court entering the judgment lacked jurisdiction, this court recognized in Sec. State Bank & Trust, that a void judgment can be collaterally attacked at any time. 397 S.W.3d at 723. Furthermore, the Texas Supreme Court noted in AIC Mgmt., that "a judgment for foreclosure of a tax lien upon real estate which fails to describe a definite tract of land is void." 246 S.W.3d at 645; see also Stephens Cty., Tex. v. Eaton, No. 11-13-00280-CV, 2015 WL 730096, at *4 (Tex. App.—Eastland Feb. 12, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("A judgment for foreclosure of a tax lien that fails to describe a definite tract of land is void.") Hanzel v. Herring, 80 S.W.3d 167, 172 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (holding where property description in sheriff's deed is inadequate, the instrument is void under the statute of frauds). Therefore, if the foreclosure judgment and tax deeds relied upon by the appellants in the instant case contain an insufficient property description, the foreclosure judgment and tax deeds are void and can be collaterally attacked. See Sec. State Bank & Trust, 397 S.W.3d at 723. And, such a collateral attack would not be affected by the limitations or deposit provisions in the Texas Tax Code. Id. at 724; see also Johnson v. Liberty Cty., No. 09-15-00410-CV, 2016 WL 4040143, at *10 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 28, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding time limitation and restrictions in the Tax Code are not applicable when the tax deed is void); Hays v. Butler, 295 S.W.3d 53, 58 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (holding tax judgment was void because it failed to describe a definite tract of land and limitations under Tax Code did not bar lawsuit asserting tax judgment was void). If, however, the property description is sufficient, the foreclosure judgment and tax deeds are not void, and the limitations provision in the Texas Tax Code would preclude EOG from challenging the validity of the foreclosure judgment.
"Texas law does not require courts to scrutinize the proceedings of a judicial sale with a view to defeat them; instead, 'every reasonable intendment will be made in their favor, so as to secure, it if can be done consistent with legal rules, the object they were intended to accomplish.'" AIC Mgmt., 246 S.W.3d at 645 (quoting Hermann v. Likens, 39 S.W. 282, 284 (Tex. 1897)). The appellants contend that the property description in the foreclosure judgment and tax deeds was sufficient because the undivided interest in the 44.8-acre tract of land was the only property Nolie and Dora owned in Karnes County, Texas. The Texas Supreme Court recognized the law supporting this argument in AIC Mgmt.
In AIC Mgmt., AIC argued the property description in the constable deeds was sufficient because the deeds conveyed "all of the prior owner's interest" in the described property. 246 S.W.3d at 648. The constable deed referenced the tax suit and resulting judgment by cause number and described the property being conveyed as "all of the estate, right, title and interest which the said Emma Crews, Valda Crews, and Eva Fay Gross had on the 5th day of February 1991, or at any time afterwards, in and to [the property described as] TR 12 AB 659 T S Roberts* situated in Harris County, Texas." 246 S.W.3d at 642. The court noted, "We have held that deeds in which the property is described as simply 'my property' are sufficient when extrinsic evidence shows that the party owns only one tract of land answering the description. In such an instance, the stated ownership of the property is itself a matter of description." Id. Applying the law, the court held:
In this case, the Crewses conveyed all of their interest in "TR 12," but the record does not demonstrate how Tract 12 was configured at the time. If the trial court were to find that in 1989 HCAD designated the entire 24-acre tract as Tract 12, we agree with AIC that it would be entitled to all of the Crewses' interest in the 8.51-acre Tract One. But if HCAD identified Tract 12 at the time of the 1989 tax judgment as something less, be it three acres, six acres, or something else, then AIC would be entitled to the part of Tract 12 that overlapped with the 8.51-acre Tract One, and the Crewses would retain whatever land remains.Id. at 649. Therefore, the Texas Supreme Court held the property description coupled with the constable deed's reference to selling all of the Crewses' interest could be a sufficient description depending on the HCAD records. See id.
In an earlier decision, the court stated the same legal principle as follows: "When the grantor is stated to be the owner of the property to be conveyed and it is proved that the grantor owns only a single tract answering the description, the land is identified with reasonable certainty." Kmiec v. Reagan, 556 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1977); see also Walker Barnebey Co. v. Schmidt, 374 S.W.2d 277, 279 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1963, no writ) ("When there is a recital of ownership and the public records show that the party charged owns a tract and only one tract which answers the description in the memorandum, the description is adequate."). Therefore, whether the property description is sufficient in the instant case depends on: (1) whether the Sheriff's Tax Deed contains a sufficient recital of Nolie and Dora's ownership; and (2) whether extrinsic evidence showed Nolie owned only one tract of land answering the description.
In its post-submission letter brief, EOG acknowledges "the body of law that a defective property description notwithstanding, a conveyance will be enforced when evidence shows that the defectively described property was the only property that the grantor owned in a particular county." EOG asserts, however, that "this body of law is distinguishable because the case at bar is a tax foreclosure suit." Given that the title dispute in AIC Mgmt. also arose as a result of a tax foreclosure suit, we disagree with EOG and conclude the body of law is applicable to the case at bar.
a. Recital of Ownership Interest
In this case, the Sheriff's Tax Deed refers to the judgment rendered in the tax suit cause number and states that the sheriff conveys to the taking entities "all of the estate, right, title and interest which the Defendants in such suit had ... in and to the following described land and premises, "TRACT 8, BEING 7 ACRES, MORE OR LESS, J. NESBIT SURVEY, ABSTRACT 219, KARNES COUNTY, TEXAS." The foreclosure judgment names Nolie and Dora as the defendants and states the defendants "were the owner(s) of record of the below described land or were claiming some right, title, or interest at the time of the institution of this suit and at this time." Based on the holding in AIC Mgmt., this was a sufficient recital of ownership.
b. Extrinsic Evidence of Ownership of Only One Tract
Having determined the Sheriff's Tax Deed contained a sufficient recital of Nolie and Dora's ownership, we must next consider whether the record contains extrinsic evidence showing that Nolie owned "only one tract of land answering the description." AIC Mgmt., 246 S.W.3d at 648. The appellants produced a supplemental affidavit from their expert, John W. Berry, stating, "The last page of the Partition Deed contains a Plat of the 6.46 acre tract and the 44.8 acre tract, which shows the location of said tracts in Abstract 219. My examination of the official deed and tax records in Karnes County, Texas determined that the sole and only property ever owned by Nolia Anderson and/or Nolie Chew in Karnes County , Texas was Nolia Anderson's share of the 44.8 acre tract described in the above mentioned 1916 Partition Deed and Report, which is described in the Karnes County tax records as "TR 8 being 7 acres, more or less, J. Nesbit Survey, Abstract 219, Karnes County, Texas (Acct. #RC5354 and 10130100000000)." The trial court's exclusion of this affidavit is raised as the appellants' sixth issue on appeal.
This description is the same description contained in the foreclosure judgment. The tax deeds delete the references to the account numbers but reference the foreclosure judgment and the tax suit cause number.
The only objections EOG made to the affidavit were that Berry was not qualified and the affidavit addressed purely matters of law. Whether a grantor owns only one tract of land; however, is not a question of law. Therefore, we need only consider whether the trial court erred in striking the affidavit based on EOG's objection that Berry was not qualified.
Expert testimony is admissible if (1) the expert is qualified, and (2) the testimony is relevant and based on a reliable foundation. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 204 S.W.3d 797, 800 (Tex. 2006); Marin Real Estate Partners, L.P. v. Vogt, 373 S.W.3d 57, 77 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet). The trial court's determination that these requirements are met is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 204 S.W.3d at 800; Marin Real Estate Partners, L.P., 373 S.W.3d at 77. A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 204 S.W.3d at 800; Marin Real Estate Partners, L.P., 373 S.W.3d at 77.
Trial courts must ensure that those who purport to be experts truly have expertise concerning the actual subject about which they are offering an opinion. In re Commitment of Bohannan, 388 S.W.3d 296, 305 (Tex. 2012). The test is whether the offering party has established that the expert has "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" regarding the specific issue before the court which would qualify the expert to give an opinion on that particular subject and the testimony assists the trier of fact. Id. Expert testimony assists the trier-of-fact when the expert's knowledge and experience on a relevant issue are beyond that of the average juror and the testimony helps the trier-of-fact understand the evidence or determine a fact issue. Id. at 304.
In this case, Berry's affidavit states that he is an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Texas and had practiced law in Karnes County, Texas for over 40 years. Berry further states his affidavit is based on his personal knowledge of the facts as derived from the official tax, deed and court records of Karnes County, Texas, and, in his practice, he has searched and reviewed those records on many occasions in the past. These statements qualify Berry to testify regarding his opinion that the records revealed Nolie only owned an interest in the one tract of land in Karnes County which was the property described in the partition deed. See ConocoPhillips Co. v. Ramirez, No. 04-15-00487-CV, 2017 WL 2457090, at *10-11 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 7, 2017, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (holding expert qualified based on experience detailed in affidavit); Beeler v. Fuqua, No. 09-03-344-CV, 2004 WL 1902535, at *3-4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 26, 2004, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding affidavit sufficient when affiant stated he was a licensed Texas attorney since 1981, had experience in the study of titles, and record contained documents supporting opinion); Kuhns v. Carnes, No. 03-97-00721-CV, 1999 WL 699809, at *4-5 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 10, 1999, pet. denied) (not designated for publication) (holding expert established he was qualified to give an expert opinion on title where affidavit stated he had practiced real estate law in Texas since 1981 and was familiar with examining titles to real property and with the procedures Texas attorneys use to examine titles).
The appellate record contains each of the documents Berry describes in his affidavit, including the Affidavit of Heirship establishing that Dora inherited the property from Nolie.
Because we hold Berry was qualified to testify that Nolie owned an interest in only one property in Karnes County, Texas, we also hold the appellants conclusively established their title because the Sheriff's Tax Deed conveyed all of Nolie's and Dora's interest in the only property Nolie owned in Karnes County, Texas. See AIC Mgmt., 246 S.W.3d at 648. As a result, the trial court erred in denying the appellants' motion for partial summary judgment, and we hold EOG's title claim was barred by the limitations period in the Texas Tax Code. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.54(a)(1) (West 2015).
CONCLUSION
Because appellants conclusively established the Sheriff's Tax Deed conveyed all of Nolie's and Dora's interest in the only property Nolie owned in Karnes County, Texas, the property was described with reasonable certainty, and the tax deeds are not void. As a result, EOG's challenge to the appellants' title is barred by limitations under section 33.54(a)(1) of the Texas Tax Code. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and render judgment awarding Cuanto Antes Mejor, L.L.C. possession and superior title to the undivided 39/252 interest in the 44.8-acre tract.
Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice