Summary
In Mehr v. State, Fla. 1952, 59 So.2d 259, a conviction for grand larceny was reversed because of insufficient evidence, the State having failed to carry the burden of establishing misrepresentation beyond a reasonable doubt.
Summary of this case from Rosengarten v. StateOpinion
June 3, 1952.
Appeal from the Criminal Court of Record for Hillsborough County, L.A. Grayson, J.
Nichols Whitehurst, Clearwater, for appellant.
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and Reeves Bowen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
The appellant was convicted of grand larceny because of an occurrence shown by the state's evidence to have come about in a most uncommon way. The prosecuting witness, who was nearly eighty years of age, was married and living in the same house with his wife, though not on friendly terms. He conceived the idea of forming an alliance with some attractive, youngish woman for the purpose of operating a commercial enterprise, not to be unmingled with romance. To accomplish his purpose he advertised in a large daily newspaper: "PARTNER wanted in a small business. A middle aged unencumbered lady with or without experience. No money is required, but honesty and character are essential. Share 50-50 on profits." Appellant replied and was eventually accepted, although other correspondents were meanwhile interviewed. The man then, frankly, in writing, proposed to appellant that they go into business together, live together, become social as well as business partners. He proclaimed his virtues, but admitted that he smoked a pipe and took an occasional glass of beer.
Afterward, they had frequent meetings, but she resisted his efforts at cohabitation. He advanced her money now and then, and often paid the installments on her car.
Finally, according to the state's version, the appellant reported to her companion that the finance company was pressing her for money; and since she did not wish to lose the automobile and he did not propose to advance more funds to keep the payments current, a decision was reached to sell the car. So they drove to a used car dealer, whom appellant consulted regarding the amount of money the car would bring. The dealer told appellant he would pay her $1,295. Appellant and victim went to a bank where the man withdrew $600, the amount she said she owed on the vehicle, thence to the office of the finance company where the money was paid by him to discharge the indebtedness.
The appellant had agreed that upon sale to the dealer she would reimburse her companion, but after the settlement with the finance company, she explained that this reimbursement would have to wait until she could get her papers from Tallahassee.
Immediately after the visit to the finance company's office, the parties stopped at a tavern for refreshment and renewed their discussion about the establishment of some joint business venture. During their conversation appellant asked her ally for two nickels to buy newspapers so they might learn if any businesses were being advertised for sale.
That was the exit of appellant.
When the man finally succeeded in reaching her on the telephone to remonstrate with her about her unceremonious departure, she told him simply to see her lawyer.
The appellant testified that she made no promise of reimbursement; that the man paid her debt because he loved her; that she left him as she did because she then first learned he had a wife already.
Assuming that the state's version of the relationship and the final extraction of money from the man by the woman was true — the story was obviously believed by the jury — the question arises whether the transaction, even though infected with fraud, contained the elements of larceny.
One may be guilty of larceny who gets possession of the personal property of another "by means of fraud or trickery with the preconceived purpose to appropriate the property to his own use * * *" on the theory that the fraud vitiates consent of the owner who "is held to retain constructive possession * * * up to the time of conversion by the taker." Campbell v. State, 155 Fla. 359, 20 So.2d 127, 130.
We encounter difficulty in placing this case in the category of those where trickery may be substituted, so to speak, for asportation. Of course, the conduct of the woman, as it is reflected in the state's evidence, cannot be condoned from any ethical standard, but the question is its criminal character. She represented that the dealer would pay, not had paid, a certain amount for her car. If the fraud consisted of her lying about such an offer ever having been actually made, then we must consider the man's testimony that he heard the agent inquire of her, "`* * * twelve hundred ninety-five is the least you will take?'" and heard her answer in the affirmative. This stands alone because no one save the man testified for the state, and certainly it cannot be said that his story established the element of misrepresentation beyond a reasonable doubt. There was no testimony whatever that the offer to purchase the car was not in fact made.
Next, she never had her hands on the money. Instead, he, induced by her promises to repay him from the proceeds of the car, drew the six hundred dollars from his funds and himself delivered it to the creditor. Patently, he knew the money was not instantly forthcoming from the sale of the car, for he was riding around in it.
After the man had paid the finance company, appellant was still in possession of her car; but the man had an investment in it that could have been established easily. However, it would carry the principle announced in the cited case to an extreme we cannot approve to hold that her conduct, unconscionable as it may have been, constituted a theft of the amount by which the debt was reduced, or extinguished. We think that the double dealing became a basis for a claim against the appellant or the vehicle rather than a criminal act. It did not amount to obtaining possession by trickery, for in fact, appellant obtained no possession. The other phase of the concept of theft by trickery, namely, that the owner in such case will be held to retain constructive possession until the conversion, we find inappropriate here because we cannot determine when such constructive possession ever existed, or existing, ever ended by conversion.
We conclude that larceny was not proved; so we do not feel obliged to explore, discuss, or decide the other question.
Reversed.
SEBRING, C.J., and TERRELL and HOBSON, JJ., concur.