Opinion
21-CV-10689 (LTS) 21-CV-10690 (LTS)
02-28-2022
MICHAEL E. MEGGINSON, Plaintiff, v. CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT STUKES; CHIEF OF OSIU GLOVER; CHIEF LEMON; OFFICER STAGGERS, SECURITY CORRECTIONAL OFFICER; NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendants. MICHAEL E. MEGGINSON, Plaintiff, v. CHIEF STUKES; CHIEF GLOVER; DEPT. GREEN; DEPT. PHILLIPS; CAPT. CAMBELL; NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendants.
ORDER TO AMEND
Laura Taylor Swain, Chief United States District Judge
Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Rikers Island, brings these two pro se actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants unlawfully held him in segregation beyond his release date. By orders dated February 8, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff's requests to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court consolidates the two complaints and grants Plaintiff leave to file a consolidated amended 1 complaint in the case bearing the lower case number, 21-CV-10689, that covers and clarifies all of the claims he wishes to assert in his two actions, within sixty days of the date of this order.
Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner's IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest, ” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits - to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
The Supreme Court has held that, under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. 2 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, ” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
On December 14, 2021, the Court received the two complaints from Plaintiff, who identifies himself as both a pretrial detainee and a “parole violator detainee.” (ECF 1:21-CV-10689, 2, at 2.) In the first complaint, 21-CV-10689, Plaintiff sues Chief Stukes, identified as “Chief of Department”; Chief Glover, identified as “Chief of OSIU”; Chief Lemon; Security Officer Staggers, identified as a “segregation advocate and security staff”; and the New York City Department of Correction (DOC). (Id. at 1-3.) Plaintiff alleges that the events giving rise to his claims occurred on December 3 and 6, 2021, and he makes the following assertions. On November 15, 2021, he arrived at the George R. Vierno Center (GRVC) “RHU Mental Health Box” to serve a 20-day “box term” for unspecified conduct. (Id. at 4.) Although Plaintiff's actual box term concluded on Sunday, December 5, 2021, he should have been released on Friday, December 3, 2021, because “[DOC] security always states that ‘no one leaves the box on weekends or holidays.'” (Id.) Stukes, Glover, and Lemon, however, directed security to hold Plaintiff in the box “with no set release date.” (Id.) Plaintiff spoke to the Office of Mental Health (OMH) staff, but “even they [were] confused on why [he was] still in the RHU without reason.” (Id.) Since his confinement in RHU, Plaintiff has not received “law library, religious services, social services, and one hour outdoor recreation.” (Id.) He holds Stukes, Glover, and Lemon “responsible for [his] unlawful confinement, ” and believes that Staggers is “in kahoots [sic] with Chief Stukes and the rest of the department.” (Id.) Plaintiff seeks money damages. 3
In the second complaint, 21-CV-10690, Plaintiff again asserts that he was unlawfully confined in RHU beyond his release date. He again sues Chief Stukes, Chief Glover, and DOC, along with three new defendants - Deputy Green, Deputy Phillips, and Captain Cambell. Plaintiff alleges that the events giving rise to his claims occurred on December 3 and 7, 2021, and further alleges the following. On November 15, 2021, he arrived in GRVC RHU to serve a 20-day confinement. After Thanksgiving, he asked Green, Phillips, and Staggers “if [his] release was guaranteed without any issues from Chief Glover or Stukes.” (ECF 1:21-CV-10690, 2, at 3.) On November 30, 2021, Phillips along with Correction Officer Ford, stopped at Plaintiff's cell and informed him that he had two pending tickets, which Plaintiff “found was f[al]se” because Captain Ramos from his housing area had called the disciplinary office and found out that he had no pending infractions. (Id.) Plaintiff “owe [sic] no more segregation time in the RHU, ” and the GRVC security staff and deputies “are in kahoots [sic] with Chief Stukes as well as Chief Glover.” (Id.) Defendants have violated Plaintiff's rights by unlawfully confining him in the RHU segregation unit and depriving him of “law library services, one hour recreational services, religious services, and social services.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff seeks money damages.
Plaintiff does not allege in either complaint when he was released from segregation.
DISCUSSION
A. Consolidation of the two cases
Plaintiff brings essentially the same claim in the two complaints: that Defendants unlawfully held him in segregation at GRVC RHU beyond his December 3, 2021, release date. Under Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court may consolidate civil actions pending in the same court if the actions “involve a common question of law or fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a)(2). When actions are consolidated, they are “join[ed] together . . . without . . . los[ing] their independent character.” Hall v. Hall, 138 S.Ct. 1118, 1124-25 (2018).“The proper 4 solution to the problems created by the existence of two or more cases involving the same parties and issues, simultaneously pending in the same court [is] to consolidate them under Rule 42(a).” Miller v. USPS, 729 F.2d 1033, 1036 (2d Cir. 1984). “In assessing whether consolidation is appropriate . . ., a district court should consider both equity and judicial economy.” Id. “A district court can consolidate related cases under [Rule 42(a)] sua sponte.” Devlin v. Transp. Commc'ns Int'l Union, 175 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. 1999).
Because these actions involve common issues of law and fact as well as some of the same Defendants, both equity and judicial economy support the consolidation of these cases. The Clerk of Court is therefore directed to consolidate these cases. All further papers filed or submitted for filing, including any amended complaint filed by Plaintiff, will be docketed in the lead action under case number 21-CV-10689. Plaintiff should note that, although the higher-numbered case, 21-CV-10690, remains open for administrative purposes, no further action is necessary on that docket for the case to proceed.
B. Due Process Claims
The Court construes Plaintiff's allegations as asserting claims, arising under the Fourteenth Amendment, that Defendants placed him in administrative segregation in violation of his rights to substantive and procedural due process.
Because a pretrial detainee has not been convicted of any crime and therefore cannot be punished, “in assessing whether restrictions on pretrial detainees comport with substantive due process, ‘[a] court must decide whether the [restriction] is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.'” Almighty Supreme Born Allah v. Milling, 876 F.3d 48, 55 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979)) (alterations in original), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 49 (2018). “Absent a 5 showing of an expressed intent to punish, the determination whether a condition is imposed for a legitimate purpose or for the purpose of punishment ‘generally will turn on whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it].'” Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175, 188 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 538) (brackets in original). If the conditions are “incident[s] of a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective, ” they do not violate the Due Process Clause even if they “may on [their] face appear to be punishment.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 539 n.20.
The two threshold questions in any claim for the denial of procedural due process are whether the plaintiff possessed a liberty or property interest and, if so, what process was due before plaintiff could be deprived of that interest. Green v. Bauvi, 46 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982)). A pretrial detainee generally has a liberty interest in not being placed in administrative segregation. See Benjamin, 264 F.3d at 190. For pretrial detainees, the process that is due turns on whether the conditions were imposed for punitive or administrative reasons. A prisoner placed in administrative segregation must receive notice of why he is being placed there and an opportunity to respond. Proctor v. LeClair, 846 F.3d 597, 609 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 476 (1983)). Once an inmate has been confined to administrative segregation, officials must engage in “some sort of periodic review” to assess whether the inmate remains a security risk. Id. (quoting Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477 n.9).
If the conditions were imposed for punitive reasons, however, the process due is that set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). Under Wolff, “an inmate is entitled to advance written notice of the charges against him; a hearing affording him a reasonable opportunity to 6 call witnesses and present documentary evidence; a fair and impartial hearing officer; and a written statement of the disposition, including the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary actions taken.” Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d 57, 69 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-67). Assistance in presenting a defense is also guaranteed. See Eng v. Coughlin, 858 F.2d 889, 897 (2d Cir. 1998) (Although there is no right to counsel in disciplinary proceedings, “[p]rison authorities have a constitutional obligation to provide assistance to an inmate in marshaling evidence and presenting a defense when he is faced with disciplinary charges.”).
Plaintiff alleges that his rights were violated when he was held in administrative segregation without a reason beyond his December 3, 2021, release date. He further alleges that, while he was held in administrative segregation, he was deprived of law library, outdoor recreation, religious services, and social services. Plaintiff's assertions thus suggest that he is attempting to assert due process claims against Defendants.
The Court grants Plaintiff leave to submit an amended complaint alleging further facts showing that he was placed in administrative segregation without due process. In the amended complaint, Plaintiff should name as defendants those individuals who were personally and directly involved in violating his rights, alleging facts showing how each defendant violated his rights, particularly those that suggest that the defendants placed him in administrative segregation without due process. Plaintiff should state whether he received any notice concerning his continuing segregation beyond his release date and whether he was given an opportunity to address the matter. The amended complaint should name all of the defendants and include all of the claims Plaintiff wishes to pursue regarding the administrative segregation incident. 7
As explained in the following section of this order, Plaintiff should name the City of New York, rather than the New York City Department of Correction (DOC) as defendant for any claims he wishes to pursue against the DOC.
C. New York City Department of Correction
Plaintiff's claims against the New York City Department of Correction (DOC) must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F.Supp.2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”).
In light of Plaintiff's pro se status and clear intention to assert claims against the City of New York, the Court construes the complaint as asserting claims against the City of New York, and directs the Clerk of Court to amend the caption of this action to replace the DOC with the City of New York. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. This amendment is without prejudice to any defenses the City of New York may wish to assert.
D. Municipal Liability
When a plaintiff sues a municipality such as the City of New York under Section 1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of the municipality's employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff's rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government may be liable under this section [1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects' a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes' a person ‘to be subjected' to such deprivation.”) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011). In other words, to state a Section 1983 claim against a municipality, the plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) the 8 existence of a municipal policy, custom, or practice, and (2) that the policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012); Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff alleges that correction officials violated his rights by holding him in segregation beyond his release date. He does not allege that any City of New York policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of his constitutional rights. The Court therefore grants Plaintiff leave to amend any claims he wishes to bring against the City of New York to state facts, consistent with these legal principles, suggesting that the City is liable for any constitutional harm suffered by Plaintiff.
LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts that could support a viable claim, the Court grants Plaintiff sixty days' leave to submit an amended complaint detailing his due process claims. 9
First, Plaintiff must name as the defendants in the caption and in the statement of claim all of those individuals he alleges were involved in the deprivation of his federal rights. If Plaintiff does not know the name of a defendant, he may refer to that individual as “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” in both the caption and the body of the amended complaint. Second, in the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
The caption is located on the front page of the complaint. Each individual defendant must be named in the caption. Plaintiff may attach additional pages if there is not enough space to list all of the defendants in the caption. If Plaintiff needs to attach an additional page to list all defendants, he should write “see attached list” on the first page of the amended complaint. Any defendants named in the caption must also be discussed in Plaintiff's statement of claim.
The naming of John Doe defendants does not toll the three-year statute of limitations period governing this action and Plaintiff is responsible for ascertaining the true identity of any “John Doe” defendants and amending his complaint to include the identity of any “John Doe” defendants before the statute of limitations period expires. Should Plaintiff seek to add a new claim or party after the statute of limitations period has expired, he must meet the requirements of Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.10
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated his federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief. It should cover all of the claims that he intended to bring in his two lawsuits.
Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint filed under docket number 21-CV-10689 and no further filings will be permitted under docket number 21-CV-10690, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaints must be repeated in the amended complaint and filed under docket number 21-CV-10689.
CONCLUSION
The Court consolidates the two actions under case numbers 21-CV-10689 and 21-CV-10690. All further papers filed or submitted for filing will be docketed in the lead action under case number 21-CV-10689.
The Court further dismisses Plaintiff's claims against the New York City Department of Correction and construes them as claims asserted against the City of New York. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Clerk of Court is directed to add the City of New York as a Defendant under Fed.R.Civ.P. 21.
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within sixty days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint, ” and label the document with docket number 21-CV-10689 (LTS). An Amended Civil Rights Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the actions under case numbers 21-CV-10689 and 21-CV-10690 will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 11
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff and note service on the docket.
SO ORDERED. 12