Opinion
Case No. 04-cv-4250-JPG.
May 25, 2005
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the motion of defendant Michael Belleville ("Belleville") to dismiss this case for lack of venue pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) or, in the alternative, to transfer this case to a proper venue (Doc. 8). Plaintiffs Martha Meeker and Matthew Meeker (the "Meekers"), co-executors of the estate of Don Meeker, deceased, have responded to the motion (Doc. 11).
I. Background
This is a breach of contract action based on a promissory note purportedly signed by Belleville in which he promises to pay Don Meeker $200,000 plus interest, along with costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred to collect on the note. The note provides that Belleville shall pay the money to Don Meeker at Don Meeker's office in Hidalgo, Illinois, which is located in Jasper County, Illinois. The note further provides that it was "made and signed at Hidalgo, Illinois, Crooked Creek Township, Jasper County, Illinois."
When Don Meeker passed away, his estate sought to collect on the overdue note and filed a lawsuit in the Illinois Circuit Court in Jasper County, Illinois. Belleville removed the case to this Court, relying on diversity jurisdiction; Belleville is a citizen of Texas and Don Meeker was a lifelong citizen of Illinois.
Belleville now asks the Court to dismiss or transfer this case because the plaintiffs should have brought it in Texas. He argues that Belleville and Don Meeker were residents of Texas when he executed the promissory note, that the promissory note relates to a piece of land in Texas and that many relevant witnesses are located in Texas. The Meekers argue that this case was properly brought in Illinois.
II. Venue Standards
Motions for transfer of venue or for dismissal for improper venue are governed by the standards set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404 and 1406. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 (1988); Willis v. Caterpillar Inc., 199 F.3d 902, 905 n. 4 (7th Cir. 1999). To determine which of these statutes governs a particular situation, the Court must determine whether venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Section 1404 governs transfer when venue is proper; § 1406 governs transfer or dismissal when venue is improper. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 634 (1964); Hapaniewski v. City of Chicago Heights, 883 F.2d 576, 579 (7th Cir. 1989). The defendant has the burden of showing that venue is improper. Granader v. Peachtree Lane Assocs. (In re Peachtree Lane Assocs.), 150 F.3d 788, 794 (7th Cir. 1998).
Section 1404 reads in pertinent part:
(a) For the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
Section 1406 reads in pertinent part:
(a) The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
The general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, provides that actions asserting diversity as the sole basis for federal jurisdiction may only be brought in
(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.
§ 1391(a).
Belleville argues that venue is only proper in Texas, where he resides, under § 1391(a)(1). The Meekers argue that venue is also proper in Illinois under § 1391(a)(2) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to this breach of contract action occurred in Illinois. Neither party argues that § 1391(a)(3) applies.
The Court notes that the case cited by the Meekers, Curran v. Kwon, 153 F.3d 481, 487 (7th Cir. 1998), is not applicable to this case because it deals with the choice of applicable law, which is not at issue at this time, not with the proper venue.
III. Analysis
A. Propriety of Venue
Belleville has not established that the Southern District of Illinois is an improper venue for this action; he has failed to show that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to this action did not occur in this judicial district. The Court takes judicial notice that Jasper County, Illinois, is within the Southern District of Illinois. It appears from the terms of the promissory note that it was executed in Jasper County and that payment of the note was anticipated to occur, but allegedly did not occur, in Jasper County. Belleville has not presented any evidence or argument showing otherwise. The Court finds that the making and the alleged non-performance of the promissory note in this judicial district constitutes a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to this breach of contract action. That Belleville and Don Meeker may have resided in Texas when the promissory note was made, that the note was executed in relation to real property in Texas and that witnesses may reside in Texas does not diminish the substantial nature of the events or omissions that occurred in the Southern District of Illinois. For these reasons, the Court finds that venue is proper in this district under § 1391(a)(2) and that dismissal or transfer for improper venue is not warranted under § 1406(a).
B. Convenience and Interest of Justice
To the extent that Belleville's motion may be read to request a transfer of venue for the convenience of the parties and in the interests of justice, the Court also finds that Belleville has not carried his burden. Under § 1404(a), a district court may transfer a civil action to any other district where the action might have been brought originally "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice." The decision to transfer a case is left to the discretion of the district court. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964); Cote v. Wadel, 796 F.2d 981, 985 (7th Cir. 1986); see Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955). There is no question that the Meekers could have brought this action in Texas under § 1391(a)(1) because Belleville resides there. Therefore, the only question is whether convenience and justice weigh in favor of transfer.
In deciding a § 1404(a) motion to transfer, the Court should consider a number of casespecific factors such as the convenience of the potential transferee forum to the parties and witnesses, the fairness of the transfer in light of any forum selection clause and the parties' relative bargaining power, and the interests of justice in general. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29-30; see Coffey v. Van Dorn Iron Works, 796 F.2d 217, 219 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 622). "The movant . . . has the burden of establishing, by reference to particular circumstances, that the transferee forum is clearly more convenient," Coffey, 796 F.2d at 219-20, and the Court must give some weight in favor of the forum in which the plaintiff chose to file the complaint, Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., Inc., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1989); Macedo v. Boeing Co., 693 F.2d 683, 688 (7th Cir. 1982). Even if the circumstances indicate that a transfer would be clearly more convenient to the parties and witnesses, a court may still refuse to transfer the case if it is not in the interest of justice. Coffey, 796 F.2d at 220; Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 625. "Factors traditionally considered in an `interest of justice' analysis relate to the efficient administration of the court system." Coffey, 796 F.2d at 221.
In light of the particular circumstances of this case, the Court finds that Belleville has not met his burden of establishing that Texas is clearly more convenient to the parties and witnesses than the Southern District of Illinois and that a transfer is in the interest of justice.
The Court notes that Belleville currently resides in Texas and the Meekers currently reside in Illinois. It would be equally as inconvenient to the parties to travel to the preferred forum of the opposing side. As for the witnesses, Belleville alleges generally that it would be more convenient for "many witnesses" if the Court transferred the case to Texas but he makes no attempt to explain the significance of these witnesses to the case as a whole. If the witnesses' testimony would be on a minor issue, and if more important witnesses were located in Illinois, the factor could weigh against a Texas forum. In any case, giving weight to the fact that the Meekers selected Illinois as their preferred forum, the Court finds that Belleville has not established that a Texas forum would be clearly more convenient to the parties and the witnesses.
The Court also finds that it is not in the interest of justice to transfer this case to Texas. Belleville points to the promissory note's connection to Texas real estate. Although courts in Texas certainly have an interest in deciding cases involving land in their jurisdiction, the land appears to be only of tangential concern in this case, that is, only as background to establish the circumstances surrounding the promissory note. Indeed, land is not mentioned at all in the note itself. Furthermore, Illinois has a strong interest in deciding cases involving commercial papers executed and performed within its borders. For these reasons, the Court finds that it is not in the interest of justice to transfer this case to a Texas forum.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Belleville's motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to transfer this case pursuant to either 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) or § 1404(a) (Doc. 8).
IT IS SO ORDERED.