Opinion
No. 48/47.
12-01-1920
MEEK v. MEEK.
Suit by Sarah W. Meek against John Meek for divorce. Decree nisi for petitioner. T. W. Randall, of Paterson, for petitioner.
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Suit by Sarah W. Meek against John Meek for divorce. Decree nisi for petitioner.
T. W. Randall, of Paterson, for petitioner.
WALKER, Ch. This is a case of divorce for desertion. The special master reports that he is of opinion that all the material facts charged in the petition are true, and that a decree for divorce should be made in the cause pursuant to the prayer of the petition. To this I agree, if certain letters written by the defendant, and which were received in evidence, are sufficiently corroborated. In Foote v. Foote, 71 N. J. Eq. 273, 280, 65 Atl. 205, the Court of Errors and Appeals held that corroboration may be found in defendant's letters. But in Williams v. Williams, 81 N. J. Eq. 17, 85 Atl. 611, I held that, under the rule that a divorce will not be granted upon the uncorroborated testimony of a party to the suit, the petitioner's testimony that a certain letter of the defendant was written by him is insufficient to establish it as an element in the proofs, unless the fact that the letter is in the handwriting of the defendant is corroborated. This meant that the defendant's handwriting had to be corroborated by a witness other than the petitioner. Subsequently the case of Orens v. Orens, 88 N. J. Eq. 29, 102 Atl. 436, was decided, in that case it was held that the corroboration of a petitioner's testimony, required by law in order that a divorce may be granted, need not be testimony given by another or other witnesses to all of the same identical facts to the minutest particulars, but only their giving such facts in evidence already testified to by petitioner, or such circumstances tending to establish them, as render petitioner's testimony so much more probable as to be legally acceptable, and which serve to empower the judge to accept the truth of the petitioner's whole story; that corroborative testimony of other witnesses is not always required in divorce proceedings, but circumstances shown by expressions and conduct of a defendant, together with letters of the parties, are, in some circumstances, sufficient. And another subsequently decided case is Rogers v. Rogers, 89 N. J. Eq. 1, 104 Atl. 32, in which it was decided that corroboration need not be the testimony of witnesses, but may be furnished by surrounding circumstances adequately established. See, also, Parmly v. Parmly, 90 N. J. Eq. 490, 106 Atl. 456; also Robinson v. Robinson, 83 N. J. Eq. 150, 90 Atl. 311, affirmed on other grounds, but without criticism of the doctrine of corroboration, 84 N. J. Eq. 201, 93 Atl. 699. This doctrine, however is subject to the rule requiring the best evidence ofwhich the nature of the case is susceptible. Lasker v. Lasker, 110 Atl. 27.
Prom the foregoing it will appear that I took decidedly too narrow a view of the question of corroboration with reference to the establishment of the handwriting or signature of the defendant testified to by the petitioner in a divorce suit; and I now unhesitatingly declare that the corroboration of the testimony of a petition, required by law in order that a divorce may be granted, need not be that given by another or other witnesses, but may be furnished by surrounding circumstances adequately established; and if the petitioner's testimony be thus corroborated, her statement as to defendant's handwriting or signature is sufficiently proved to become legal evidence.
In the case sub judice the only witness who testifies to the defendant's handwriting is the petitioner. She is, however, corroborated on other points by the testimony of witnesses and by surrounding circumstances, and therefore her testimony generally is sufficiently corroborated to make her statement legal evidence of the letters. On the whole case, including the letters, the petitioner is entitled to a decree nisi, which will be granted.