Opinion
C. A. 2:20-CV-02119-RMG-MGB
09-14-2021
Jason Medlyn, PETITIONER, v. Warden, F.C.I. Bennettsville, RESPONDENT.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Petitioner Jason Medlyn, appearing pro se, has filed a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging his guilty plea and conviction for being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) are invalid in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019). (Dkt. No. 1.) Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on March 25, 2021 (Dkt. No. 17), to which Petitioner responded on May 21, 2021 (Dkt. No. 23). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B), and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the assigned United States Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the petition and submit findings and recommendations to the United States District Judge. The undersigned recommends that Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment be granted.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is an inmate in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) at the Federal Correctional Institution in Bennettsville, South Carolina. Petitioner was sentenced on December 11, 2013, in the United States Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina to a term of imprisonment of 240 months, after pleading guilty to various firearms offenses specified in Counts One, Three, and Five. Relevant here, Count Five charged Petitioner with being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition on or about May 31, 2012, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924. (Dkt. No. 28 at 6.)
Count One charged Petitioner with conspiracy to possess firearms and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and Count Three charged Petitioner with possession of firearms in a school zone and aiding and abetting that offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(q), 924(a)(2). (Dkt. No. 28 at 4-5.)
After his petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was dismissed, Petitioner filed the instant § 2241 petition alleging his guilty plea and conviction for being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) are invalid in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019). (Dkt. No. 9 at 1.) In Rehaif, the Supreme Court held “that in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) . . . the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” 139 S.Ct. at 2200. Petitioner asserts that he did not know he belonged to a class of persons barred from possessing a firearm. (Dkt. No. 23 at 2.) He requests the court vacate his § 922(g) conviction and remand his case to the Eastern District of North Carolina for another plea hearing. (Dkt. No. 9 at 8.)
STANDARDS
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, this petition has been carefully reviewed pursuant to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings for the United States District Court, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, and other habeas corpus statutes.
The Rules Governing Section 2254 are applicable to habeas actions brought under § 2241. See Rule 1(b).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment: “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). As to the first of these determinations, a fact is deemed “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the disposition of the case under the applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257.
In determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 1080, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts that set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
Petitioner contends in this § 2241 petition that he was not apprised of essential elements of the offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) when pleading guilty, in violation of his due process rights as outlined in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019). (Dkt. No. 9 at 2.) In his response brief, Petitioner further asserts that the indictment failed to describe an essential element of the offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). (Dkt. No. 23 at 4.) Petitioner claims that he did not know he belonged to a class of persons barred from possessing a firearm. (Id. at 2.) For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned finds the Court lacks jurisdiction over the § 2241 Petition and recommends Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment be granted on this basis.
A. Savings Clause Test
A petitioner cannot challenge his federal conviction and sentence through § 2241 unless he can show under the “savings clause” of § 2255(e) that a § 2255 motion is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); see also Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 2010) (providing that if a federal prisoner brings a § 2241 petition that does not fall within the scope of the savings clause, the district court must dismiss the unauthorized habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that a petitioner must establish the following criteria to demonstrate that a § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of a prisoner's conviction:
(1) at the time of conviction, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of the conviction;
(2) subsequent to the prisoner's direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the substantive law changed such that the conduct of which the prisoner was convicted is deemed not to be criminal; and
(3) the prisoner cannot satisfy the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255 because the new rule is not one of constitutional law.In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333-34 (2000).
The undersigned recognizes that Respondent “disagrees with [the Court's] holding” in In re Jones. (Dkt. No. 17-1 at 6 n.2.) Regardless, In re Jones is binding law in this circuit, and Petitioner must satisfy this savings clause test to challenge his conviction here.
B. Analysis
Here, Petitioner claims that he meets the In re Jones savings clause test and points to the Supreme Court's decision in Rehaif as a substantive change in the law. But Rehaif clarified only the elements the Government would have had to prove at trial, had Petitioner exercised his right to a trial-it did not make the conduct for which Petitioner was convicted no longer criminal. See Rehaif, 139 S.Ct. at 220 (stating that in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2) “the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.”). While Respondent asserts that Rehaif did constitute a substantive change in law and Petitioner therefore satisfies the In re Jones savings clause test (Dkt. No. 17-1 at 6-8), the undersigned disagrees, for the below reasons.
As an initial matter, courts in this district have found Rehaif “irrelevant” when a defendant pleads guilty and does not go to trial, as Petitioner did here. Lewis v. Dobbs, No. CV 0:20-862-BHH, 2021 WL 389195, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 3, 2021) (finding “Petitioner fails to meet the second prong of the In re Jones test” where “Petitioner pleaded guilty” unlike the petitioner in Rehaif); see also Allen v. Dobbs, No. 1:20-CV-321-HMH-SVH, 2020 WL 907513, at *4 (D.S.C. Jan. 31, 2020) (“Post Rehaif, ‘[c]ourts considering § 2255 motions have declined to vacate a criminal defendant's sentence when he has pleaded guilty to the offense.'” (quoting United States v. Bain, No. 5:18-029-KKC-MAS-1, 2020 WL 406682, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 7, 2020)), adopted by 2020 WL 901407 (D.S.C. Feb. 25, 2020); see also Capalbo v. Antonelli, No. 1:19-CV-1946-TMC-SVH, 2020 WL 4588406 (D.S.C. March 30, 2020) (quoting the same).
Further, “[s]ince Rehaif, several courts within the Fourth Circuit have held that Rehaif did not change substantive law because the conduct for which the petitioner was convicted is still illegal.” Rhodes v. Dobbs, No. 1:20-CV-1725-JFA-SVH, 2021 WL 805503, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 3, 2021) (collecting district court cases in the Fourth Circuit finding § 2241 petitioners could not meet the second element of the In re Jones savings clause test based on Rehaif). While Petitioner cites the recent Fourth Circuit decisions Gary v. United States, 954 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2020), and Lockhart v. United States, 947 F.3d 187 (4th Cir. 2020), as support for his petition (Dkt. No. 23 at 2), his reliance is misguided because neither case establishes that Rehaif is a substantive change in the law that could satisfy the second element of the In re Jones savings clause test.
Further, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision in Gary in Greer, et al. v. United States, 141 S.Ct. 2090 (2021).
In short, Petitioner cannot satisfy the second element of the In re Jones savings clause test. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends this Court lacks jurisdiction over the § 2241 Petition and summary judgment should be granted on this basis.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 17) be GRANTED. IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).