Opinion
C.A. No. 00-351 L.
December 12, 2000.
Report and Recommendation
This matter is before the Court on the application of the pro se petitioner, Rafael Medina, for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner stands convicted of second degree murder, and is serving a thirty year sentence, fifteen to serve at the ACI with fifteen suspended. The Attorney General of the State of Rhode Island, having been designated a party respondent to the instant application, has timely filed an answer to the petition.
This matter has been referred to me pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) for a Report and Recommendation. Upon consideration of petitioner's allegations and admissions, of respondent's answer thereto, of respondent's production of a partial trial court transcript, and of the applicable law, I recommend that the instant application be denied and dismissed. I have determined that a hearing is not necessary.
Background
On January 29, 1996, a Providence County Superior Court jury convicted the petitioner, Rafael Medina, of second degree murder for stabbing to death a fellow participant in a street brawl. Following his conviction, petitioner timely appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. There he contended that (1)the trial judge improperly denied his motion for a new trial under Rhode Island Rules of Criminal Procedure 33, since he failed to articulate sufficiently the grounds upon which he relied; (2) the trial judge abused his discretion in allowing the prosecution to impeach the petitioner on a prior drug conviction pursuant to Rhode Island Rules of Evidence 609 and then failed to give an immediate cautionary instruction; and (3) the trial judge impermissibly refused to allow defense counsel to cross examine a witness concerning the witness' alcohol consumption earlier on the day of the murder. Finding no reversible error, the supreme court affirmed his conviction. See State v. Medina, 747 A.2d 448 (R.I. 2000).
Petitioner now seeks to challenge his conviction in this federal forum, by filing the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner here asserts, as a basis for relief, the same grounds that he presented to the Rhode Island Supreme Court in his direct appeal.
Discussion
Applications for federal habeas relief can only be granted when the petitioner is in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (a). If there are not questions of federal constitutional law raised in the petition, there are no grounds available to grant federal habeas relief.
In habeas petitions, federal courts do not sit to review questions of state law. Johnson v. Cain, 215 F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129, 102 S.Ct. 1558 (1982). Federal courts have no power to revise judgements made on questions of state law. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447, 85 S.Ct. 564, 567 (1965). In order for a state prisoner to establish that he is entitled to federal relief, the decision of the last state court to which the petitioner presented his claims must fairly appear to rest on primarily issues of federal law or to be interwoven with federal law. Colemen v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2557 (1991).
Here, as a basis for federal habeas relief, petitioner asserts the following three grounds: (1) the trial judge failed to properly articulate the grounds for denying petitioner's motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rhode Island Rules of Criminal Procedure; (2) the trial judge abused his discretion when he permitted evidence of a prior conviction to impeach petitioner's credibility, pursuant to Rhode Island Rules of Evidence 609 and then failed to give an immediate cautionary instruction; and (3) the trial judge impermissibly refused to allow defense counsel to cross examine a witness, Miguel Carides, concerning Carides' consumption of alcohol earlier on the day of the murder.
Petitioner's three grounds for habeas relief fail, as they were based on the Rhode Island Supreme Court's application and interpretation of state law. I will briefly explain.
A. Petitioner's First Asserted Ground: The trial judge failed to properly articulate the grounds for denying petitioner's motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rhode Island Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Petitioner, in his application, bases his first ground for relief on the allegation that the trial judge failed to properly articulate the grounds on which he decided the petitioner's motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rhode Island Rules of Criminal Procedure. This ground fails to provide a basis for federal habeas relief, since it is based on an issue of state law and not federal law.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed this issue and explained that the trial judge, in ruling on the petitioner's motion for a new trial, sufficiently explained the grounds on which the decision was based, pursuant to Rhode Island law. State v. Medina, 747 A.2d at 449. Because the trial judge correctly referred to the standards he was bound to apply in such a motion and cited sufficient evidence on which he based his ruling, the supreme court found no error. Id. Accordingly, the supreme court rejected petitioner's contention.
In Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480 (1991), the United States Supreme Court "reemphasize[d] that it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court determinations of state law questions." The instant claim that the trial judge failed to articulate the grounds for denying petitioner's motion for a new trial pursuant to R.I. R.Crim.P. 33 is based purely on state law and fails to demonstrate that the petitioner is in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (a). Accordingly, this asserted ground fails to provide a basis for federal habeas relief.
B. Petitioner's Second Asserted Ground: The trial judge abused his discretion when he permitted evidence of a prior conviction to impeach petitioner's credibility, pursuant to RI. Rules of Evidence 609, and then failed to give an immediate cautionary instruction,
As a second ground for relief, petitioner asserts that the trial judge abused his discretion when he admitted evidence of a prior conviction to impeach the defendant's credibility, pursuant to R.I. Rules of Evidence 609, and then failed to give an immediate cautionary instruction. This ground also fails to qualify for federal habeas relief, since it is based on an issue of state law and not federal law.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed this issue and explained that any conviction, under Rule 609 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, can be used for impeachment purposes, unless its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. State v. Medina, 747 A.2d at 449. In contrast to its federal rule counterpart, Rule 609 of the Rhode Island Rules provides that the prior conviction need not involve dishonesty, false statement or a felony to be admissible. Id. Here, the supreme court held that allowing Medina's prior conviction into evidence for impeachment purposes was proper under Rhode Island law. Id.
With respect to petitioner's assertion that the trial judge erred in failing to give an immediate cautionary instruction following the disclosure to the jury that he had a prior conviction, the Rhode Island Supreme Court also rejected this contention. Id. at 450. The supreme court found that since Medina s own lawyer elicited the existence of a prior conviction during the direct examination of the defendant and since neither side requested an immediate limiting instruction, the trial court was not required, pursuant to state law, to give such an immediate cautionary instruction so long as the trial court properly charged the jury on this issue. Id. The supreme court then found that the trial court properly charged the jury with respect to this issue and accordingly, rejected this contention as a basis for relief. Id.
Since federal court do not sit to review questions of state law, and since the instant grounds asserted by the petitioner rest upon the application of state law, they fail to qualify for federal habeas relief. It is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court determinations of state law questions. Petitioner thus has again failed to demonstrate that he is in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States" and that he is entitled to federal habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (a)
C. Petitioner's Third Asserted Ground: The trial judge impermissibly refused to allow defense counsel to cross examine Miguel Carides concerning Mr. Carides' consumption of alcohol earlier on the day of the murder.
As his third and final ground for relief, petitioner asserts that the trial judge impermissibly refused to allow defense counsel to cross examine one of the eyewitnesses, Miguel Carides, concerning Mr. Carides' alleged consumption of alcohol earlier on the day of the murder. This ground also fails to qualify for federal habeas relief.
In the trial court proceeding, the defense counsel asked Mr. Carides one question about his alleged consumption of alcohol earlier on the day of the murder. State v. Medina, 747 A.2d at 450. Trial Transcript of Miguel Carides, p. 319. The prosecution objected, and the trial judge sustained the objection. State v. Medina, 747 A.2d at 450. Petitioner here challenges that ruling, alleging that it was in error. Petitioner, however, presented this claim to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. The supreme court held that Medina waived any right to present the issue on an appeal, and accordingly rejected his contentions. Id.
Pursuant to Rhode Island law, in order to preserve this issue for appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, following the trial judge's ruling on the objection, defense counsel was required to make an offer of proof outside the presence of the jury, articulate the reasons why the court should reconsider its ruling, and argue why the rule of Handy v. Geary., 105 R.I. 419, 252 A.2d 435 (R.I. 1969), as it has been applied in criminal cases in State v. Amaral, 109 R.I. 379, 386, 285 A.2d 783, 787 (R.I. 1972), should not be followed, and request to voir dire of the witness outside the presence of the jury. This defense counsel did not do. The supreme court held that petitioner can not argue on appeal for the first time that the trial judge committed error in refusing to allow defense counsel to ask this one question. State v. Medina, 747 A.2d at 450; See e.g. State v. Bettencourt, 723 A.2d 1101, 1107 (R.I. 1999) (holding that allegations of error committed at trial are considered waived if they were not effectively raised at trial, despite their articulation on appeal). Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that Medina, pursuant to Rhode Island law, waived any right to challenge this issue on appeal.
Pursuant to Rhode Island law, whenever the consumption of alcoholic beverages is raised, before evidence of drinking intoxicants may be presented to the jury, the trial judge must conduct a preliminary hearing on this issue with the jury absent. If the trial judge finds that evidence on the issue of intoxication is such that different minds can naturally and fairly come to different conclusions on that issue, he shall admit the evidence of drinking under proper instructions for ultimate determination of such questions by the jury. On the other hand, if the trial judge finds such evidence to be insufficient to prove intoxication, he shall not allow it into evidence. State v. Amaral, 109 R.I. 379, 386, 285 A.2d 783, 787 (R.I. 1972); See also Handy v. Geary, 105 R.I. 419, 252 A.2d 435 (R.I. 1969)
The supreme court based its ruling on state law in reaching its decision with respect to this ground asserted by the petitioner. Since the state court did not consider the alleged error as one of a constitutional dimension, this federal court can not reach the merits of this asserted ground. In order for a state prisoner to establish that he is entitled to federal relief, the decision of the last state court to which the petitioner presented his claims must fairly appear to rest on primarily issues of federal law or be interwoven with federal law. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. at 735, 111 S.Ct. at 2557. Here, there are no issues of federal law. Accordingly, petitioner's instant ground fails to qualify for federal habeas relief
Assuming, arguendo, that petitioner did properly present this issue to the state courts and therefore, this court, petitioner's claim would most likely rest on an issue of a constitutional dimension, namely, the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause.
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of the accused in a criminal prosecution "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. Amend. VI. The right of confrontation, which is secured for defendants in state as well as federal criminal proceedings, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065 (1965), "means more than being allowed to confront the witness physically. "Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110 (1974). Indeed, "the main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross examination." Id. at 315-316.
However, the trial judge retains wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross examination based on concerns about, inter alia, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or not relevant. Delaware v. Van Ardsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431 (1986). The "confrontation clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross examination, not cross examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 295 (1985).
Here, an assertion that the petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers was violated is simply without merit. The only witness in which the petitioner complains of, or, more specifically, the only question that petitioner complains of, concerned Miguel Carides' alleged consumption of alcohol earlier on the day of the murder. Defense counsel, without laying any foundation, tendered the question during the cross examination of Mr. Carides. Miguel Carides' Trial Transcript p. 319. The state promptly objected, and the trial judge sustained the state's objection with respect to this one question. Id. Thereafter, defense counsel made no offer of proof and failed to request a voir dire of the witness outside the jury's presence. Id.
A witness' testimony should be subject to cross examination if it is clearly probative of the witness' cognitive ability to recognize and identify an offender. Henderson v. DeTella, 97 F.3d 942, 949 (7th Cir. 1996). However, inquiry into the witness' alcohol consumption is permissible only if it relates to the cognitive abilities of the witness at the time of the offense. See e.g. id. (emphasis added). Here, the proposed question concerned the consumption of alcohol earlier on the day of the murder. This line of questioning was simply not relevant to the witness' ability to identify the petitioner at the time of the murder.
To find that the petitioner's right to confront his witnesses was violated based on the refusal of the trial judge to allow this one question to Mr. Carides, without more, simply does not rise to the level of a Sixth Amendment violation. The Confrontation Clause does not give defense counsel a fishing license to conduct a limitless cross examination. The trial judge retains wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on such cross examination based on concerns about, inter alia, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or not relevant. Delaware v. Van Ardsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431 (1986). Accordingly, even if the instant ground had been properly before this court, it would not provide a basis for federal habeas relief
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, I recommend that the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be denied and dismissed. Any objection to this Report and Recommendation must be specific and must be filed with the Clerk of Court within ten days of its receipt. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Local Rule 32. Failure to file timely, specific objections to this report constitutes waiver of both the right to review by the district court and the right to appeal the district court's decision. United States v. Valencia-Copete, 792 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Park Motor Mart. Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 616 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1980).