Opinion
# 2013-049-031 Claim No. 114230 Motion No. M-83153 Cross-Motion No. CM-83254
06-18-2013
MEDINA v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
Synopsis
In a claim alleging that an inmate's medical records were wrongfully provided by DOCS to the Office of the Attorney General in connection with an Article 78 proceeding, the Court denied claimant's summary judgement motion and granted defendant's summary judgment cross-motion dismissing the claim.
Case information
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+ ¦UID: ¦2013-049-031 ¦ +-----------------------------+-----------------------------------------------¦ ¦Claimant(s): ¦ANTHONY MEDINA ¦ +-----------------------------+-----------------------------------------------¦ ¦Claimant short name: ¦MEDINA ¦ +-----------------------------+-----------------------------------------------¦ ¦Footnote (claimant name) : ¦ ¦ +-----------------------------+-----------------------------------------------¦ ¦Defendant(s): ¦THE STATE OF NEW YORK ¦ +-----------------------------+-----------------------------------------------¦ ¦Footnote (defendant name) : ¦ ¦ +-----------------------------+-----------------------------------------------¦ ¦Third-party claimant(s): ¦ ¦ +-----------------------------+-----------------------------------------------¦ ¦Third-party defendant(s): ¦ ¦ +-----------------------------+-----------------------------------------------¦ ¦Claim number(s): ¦114230 ¦ +-----------------------------+-----------------------------------------------¦ ¦Motion number(s): ¦M-83153 ¦ +-----------------------------+-----------------------------------------------¦ ¦Cross-motion number(s): ¦CM-83254 ¦ +-----------------------------+-----------------------------------------------¦ ¦Judge: ¦DAVID A. WEINSTEIN ¦ +-----------------------------+-----------------------------------------------¦ ¦Claimant's attorney: ¦Anthony Medina, Pro Se ¦ +-----------------------------+-----------------------------------------------¦ ¦ ¦Eric T. Schneiderman, New York State Attorney ¦ ¦Defendant's attorney: ¦General ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦By: Aaron J. Marcus, Assistant Attorney General¦ +-----------------------------+-----------------------------------------------¦ ¦Third-party defendant's ¦ ¦ ¦attorney: ¦ ¦ +-----------------------------+-----------------------------------------------¦ ¦Signature date: ¦June 18, 2013 ¦ +-----------------------------+-----------------------------------------------¦ ¦City: ¦Albany ¦ +-----------------------------+-----------------------------------------------¦ ¦Comments: ¦ ¦ +-----------------------------+-----------------------------------------------¦ ¦Official citation: ¦ ¦ +-----------------------------+-----------------------------------------------¦ ¦Appellate results: ¦ ¦ +-----------------------------+-----------------------------------------------¦ ¦See also (multicaptioned ¦ ¦ ¦case) ¦ ¦ +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Decision
By claim filed September 13, 2007, pro se inmate Anthony Medina alleges that medical staff at Southport Correctional Facility ("Southport") wrongly disclosed his confidential medical information by providing it to the Office of the Attorney General ("OAG" or "Attorney General") in the course of litigation without claimant's authorization. Medina maintains that such disclosure was not related to the matter at issue in the underlying suit, and violated his physician-patient privilege (Claim ¶ 6). The matter is now before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment.
The claim has its genesis in a petition filed by claimant under Article 78 of the CPLR in New York State Supreme Court, Chemung County on June 7, 2007 (the "Article 78 petition" or "Chemung County proceeding"). That petition alleged that staff at Southport, where Medina was then incarcerated, were not providing him with adequate medical treatment for a broken ankle, and had failed to accommodate his disability (arthritis of the spine and said ankle injury). According to the current claim, during the Chemung County proceeding a nurse at Southport released claimant's medical records to OAG, which was made apparent to him when he received the State's answering papers. Medina avers that the documents provided to the Attorney General contained privileged material, as well as information "unrelated or irrelevant to the allegations in the petition" (Claim ¶ 6).
Shortly after filing the claim, Medina moved for summary judgment, and the State cross-moved to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211. Medina relied on Davidson v State of New York (3 AD3d 623 [3d Dept 2004]), in which the Appellate Division found that a Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS") regulation governing release of prisoner medical records, 7 NYCRR § 5.24(b), did not permit disclosure of such records to an assistant attorney general without court order, and that claimant was entitled to damages for such breach. In particular, the Davidson court found that although claimant "by commencing a medical malpractice claim, placed in issue those portions of his medical records that are material and relevant to the alleged malpractice . . . the release of records at issue here included medical records that were unrelated to the malpractice claim" (Davidson, 3 AD3d at 624).
By Chapter 62 of the Laws of 2011, DOCS was merged with the Department of Parole to create the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS"). Since the events at issue occurred pre-merger, the term DOCS is used in this opinion except where DOCCS is the entity specifically referenced (as in the text of current statutes).
Subsequent to Davidson but prior to the commencement of this action, DOCS amended the relevant regulation to permit prison officials to disclose medical records to the Attorney General "[f]or the purpose of providing legal services on behalf of the State, its agencies, officials, employees and persons described in Correction Law § 24-a." Moreover, the regulation now explicitly disclaims any intent to create a private right of action for a violation thereof.
Section 24-a covers individuals who provide health care services in a DOCCS facility.
In its 2008 ruling on the parties' cross-motions (Medina v State of New York, UID No. 2008-045-020 [Ct Cl, Lopez-Summa, J., May 13, 2008] ["May 13 Dec."]), the Court found that, in light of the amendment to the regulation, the disclosure "was not a violation of the current requirements specified by 7 NYCRR § 5.24(b)." Thus, to the extent the claim could be read as alleging a cause of action under that regulation, it was dismissed. The Court also held, however, that a claim would nonetheless be stated if "the release of claimant's medical records" to the OAG was not "material and relevant to the underlying action."
Since the parties' submissions did not contain either the Article 78 petition or the medical records at issue, the Court found that it could not determine whether this standard was met in the present matter, and therefore denied the parties' cross motions. The Court subsequently denied a motion by claimant to reargue, upon submission of the Article 78 petition and other documents relevant thereto, because it did not include a complete and legible set of the relevant medical records provided to the Attorney General (Medina v State of New York, UID No. 2008-045-034 [Ct Cl, Lopez-Summa, J., Oct. 16, 2008]).
The case was essentially dormant following that decision, until claimant filed the present motion for summary judgment. Claimant supports his application with his own affidavit and voluminous documentary exhibits, including his Article 78 petition and the medical records he claims were wrongly produced during that proceeding.
In his affidavit, Medina concedes that he placed his medical records at issue, and waived any claim to physician-patient privilege, by bringing the Article 78 proceeding (see Medina Aff. ¶ 9 ["I do not dispute that by commencing the Article 78 proceeding I placed my medical records at issue and waived the physician-patient privilege"]; id. ¶ 18 ["By initiating the Article 78 proceeding, I admit to placing my medical records at issue . . ."]). He nonetheless contends that "defendant" was required to get claimant's authorization before it turned his medical records over to the attorney representing it in the litigation (i.e., the New York Attorney General). He also argues that the amendment to 7 NYCRR § 5.24 referenced above is unconstitutional and at odds with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") and "federal guidelines governing the release of medical records" (Medina Aff. ¶ 10).
Although claimant's moving papers repeatedly allege misconduct by "defendant," the defendant in this case is the State of New York. But Medina does not allege that the State disclosed his records to anyone. Rather, he contends that one arm of the State (DOCS) disclosed his confidential records to another (OAG).
In particular, claimant maintains that certain portions of the records released to the OAG were not "relevant and material" to the Chemung County proceeding (id. ¶ 11). To the extent the documents contained both relevant and irrelevant information, Medina argues that they should have been "properly redacted" to ensure that only the relevant information was released (id. ¶ 14). In particular, he says that the documents provided to the Attorney General included "HIV/AIDS information" - a reference to an HIV test he had undergone - which was not germane to his case and was disclosed in violation of Public Health Law § 2780(9). Claimant also lists other information contained in his record that he believes to have been irrelevant to his Article 78 petition, including references to a tetanus test, an ingrown toenail, a slip and fall incident, a hand injury and a refusal to stay in the hospital (under circumstances not disclosed in the record) (Medina Aff. ¶ 13).
The document indicates that the test was negative.
The State has responded by cross-moving for summary judgment dismissing the claim. The application is supported by an affirmation by Assistant Attorney General Aaron Marcus, to which is appended documents concerning the Article 78 proceeding and the medical records provided to OAG in that case. Defendant also submits a copy of DOCS Division of Health Services Policy No. 4.10 "Access, Release/ Disclosure and Amendment of Health Record Information," in effect at the time of the Article 78 proceeding. The policy states that patient authorization is "normally not required" before medical information can be turned over to the OAG, since "[t]he facility has the legal right to defend itself in an action" (Marcus Aff., Ex. 6).
Defendant further asserts that, even if disclosure of medical records unrelated to a pending legal matter to the Attorney General could give rise to a valid cause of action, that did not occur here because "[e]very page in which the supposedly extraneous material appears, also contains information related to the Article 78 proceeding . . . ." (Marcus. Aff. ¶ 13). Thus, the unrelated information is "merely incidental" to the records at issue. Moreover, the State asserts that it is "highly impractical" to give the task of redacting such information to medical personnel (id. ¶ 17).
In reply, claimant does not contest defendant's assertion that the information Medina cites as irrelevant to his Article 78 proceeding is contained in documents that also include relevant information. He argues, however, that so long as any information not placed at issue by the Article 78 proceeding was included in the materials turned over to OAG, the State has committed an actionable wrong (Reply Aff. ¶ 7). The reply brief also withdraws any claim for emotional injury, such as a claim for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress (id. ¶ 11).
Discussion
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate where the matter before the Court involves "only questions of law," and the parties have not identified any disputed issues of material fact (O'Hara v Del Bello, 47 NY2d 363, 366 [1979]). Here, the parties do not disagree regarding any factual questions; both agree on the precise documents provided by Southport medical staff to the Attorney General, as well as the contents of the Article 78 petition, which is contained in its entirety in the record before me.
Moreover, while second motions for summary judgment will generally not be entertained absent newly discovered evidence or other sufficient cause (see Farm Family Cas. Ins. Co. v Brady Farms, Inc., 87 AD3d 1324, 1326 [4th Dept 2011]), that principle should not bar consideration of the cross motions here. Defendant's prior motion was for dismissal for failure to state a claim, and thus its present motion does not violate the rule against successive summary judgment applications. And since defendant's motion is properly before me, so too is the question of whether a review of the record warrants a grant of summary judgment for Medina, regardless of whether his motion was properly brought (see CPLR 3212[b] ["[i]f it shall appear that any party other than the moving party is entitled to summary judgment", court may grant such relief without need for a cross-motion]).
I turn, therefore, to the merits of the applications before me.
Both parties agree that claimant placed his medical condition at issue in his Article 78 proceeding, and that the documents provided by the prison to the Attorney General contain information relevant to that suit, as well as portions that did not concern the conditions placed at issue in that case, including the negative results of Medina's HIV test.
The parties are also in accord that, as held in the prior summary judgment ruling in this action, no cause of action challenging these disclosures is created by the governing DOCS regulation. Indeed, the disclosure at issue here is specifically permitted by that regulation, which allows DOCS staff to provide the attorney general with medical records "[f]or the purpose of providing legal services" (7 NYCRR § 5.24[b]).
Nonetheless, the earlier decision of this Court held that claimant has a potential damages claim if "the release of claimant's medical records" was not "material and relevant" to the underlying action (May 13 Dec. at 4). I am bound by that decision under the "law of the case" doctrine, which generally provides that "a court should not ordinarily reconsider, disturb or overrule an order in the same action of another court of co-ordinate jurisdiction" (People v Evans, 94 NY2d 499, 504 [2000][citation omitted]).
For that reason, I make no determination as to whether other decisions of the Court of Claims can be read to be at odds with the prior ruling in this case, or how any such divergence of opinion should be resolved (see Rivera v State of New York, UID No. 2013-010-016 [Ct Cl, Ruderman, J., Mar. 27, 2013] [allegation that medical information was provided by DOCS to Attorney General fails to state a claim in light of amendment to 7 NYCRR § 5.24]; Winter v State of New York, UID No. 2013-015-404 [Ct Cl, Collins, J., Feb. 26, 2013] [same]); Davis v State of New York, UID No. 2007-044-559 [Ct Cl, Schaewe, J., Aug.7, 2007] [cause of action for provision of prisoner's medical records to Attorney General "without merit" in light of amendment to regulation]).
The parties disagree, however, as to the appropriate construction to be given the Court's earlier ruling. As noted above, claimant reads this decision as allowing him to prevail on a damages claim so long as there is any extraneous, irrelevant piece of information anywhere in the medical records provided to the OAG. Defendant contends, in contrast, that the records released to the OAG do not run afoul of the Court's standard, since every page thereof either directly correlates to the subject matter of the Article 78 proceeding; contains notations "incidental to records that directly correlate to such subject matter"; or "demonstrate[s] the claimant's unwillingness to participate in offered treatment," which in itself is relevant to the Article 78 petition (Marcus Aff. ¶ 15).
Since the prior decision in this matter is the only ruling following the amendment to 7 NYCRR § 5.24 to allow a claim to proceed on such basis, there is no caselaw addressing this point precisely. A consideration of the potential implication of claimant's position, however, makes clear why the Court's prior decision cannot be read so broadly.
In this action, Medina does not allege that DOCS publicly disclosed his medical information; rather, it provided his records to the attorney representing DOCS in a suit Medina initiated, for the specific purpose of defending itself against such litigation. If claimant's reading were adopted, prison medical personnel would be required to cull and redact medical records based on whether every line and notation thereon is relevant to pending litigation (although that is itself a legal question), without any assistance from the counsel working on the case. Vesting such a determination in the hands of a doctor or nurse would leave those employees caught between the Scylla of a damages action if they provided too many details, and the Charybdis of potential sanctions if they withheld any potentially relevant detail (see CPLR 3126 [Court may impose penalties when a party "wilfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed"]). Requiring medical employees to sort through records in this manner, before those records are even subject to attorney review, would be at odds with New York's discovery rules, which are intended to be "liberally construed" so as to "require disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist [in the] preparation for trial" (Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406 [1968]). The notion at the core of claimant's argument - that an employee who errs on the side of inclusiveness in presenting his or her attorney with potentially discoverable documents may render the State liable for damages - is wholly inconsistent with this principle. The appropriate entity for making decisions about relevance is not the prison medical staff, but the attorney defending the case.
The difficulty of making such judgments is manifest in Medina's own arguments as to which details could not be disclosed to the Attorney General without rendering the State liable. He cites, among other things, a slip and fall incident, the refusal of a hospital stay and an ingrown toenail (see supra p.6). The State might well wish to explore at a deposition (or hearing), given the broad standard for disclosure, how any other medical condition suffered by claimant impacted his ankle injury, or how his refusal to undergo a hospital stay related to the medical care he received. In any event, whether an attorney might wish to explore such a line of inquiry is a question for counsel, and one which a doctor or nurse is ill-suited to answer.
In sum, while the prior decision of this Court, binding upon me in this action, holds that a cause of action may arise from the provision of confidential medical documents to the OAG which are wholly unrelated to the underlying action, I do not find that this ruling can be read to require redaction of otherwise relevant medical records by prison medical professionals before they can be shared with OAG.
Claimant also alleges that the disclosure of the fact that the prison administered an HIV test to him (which produced a negative result) violated the bar on disclosure of HIV-related information, set forth in Public Health Law § 2782. That provision states that "[n]o person who obtains confidential HIV related information in the course of providing any health or social service or pursuant to a release of confidential HIV related information may disclose. . . such information," except in the case of certain delineated exceptions. The definition of "confidential HIV related information" includes whether an individual had been given an HIV test (see Public Health Law § 2780[7]).
That statute, however, specifically allows DOCCS employees to release such information "in accordance with paragraph (a) of subdivision two of section twenty-seven hundred eighty-six of this article, to the extent the employee or agent is authorized to access records containing such information in order to carry out the department's functions, powers and duties with respect to the protected individual . . ." (Public Health Law § 2782[1][1]). Section 2786 allows DOCCS to promulgate regulations governing disclosure of HIV information, in consultation with the Department of Health (see Public Health Law § 2786[2][a][4]). The relevant regulation issued pursuant to this section, 7 NYCRR § 7.5, allows such information to be shared with the Attorney General when "access is reasonably necessary in the course of providing legal services and when reasonably necessary for supervision, monitoring, administration or provision of services" (7 NYCRR § 7.5[b][7]). For reasons set forth above, it is reasonably necessary for the provision of legal services that DOCS should provide medical records to the Attorney General when they are potentially relevant to the litigation, and the Attorney General is best placed to determine whether and where redaction is appropriate. The HIV test was disclosed on a referral form appended to a consultation report addressing Medina's back and ankle injuries. Thus, the document as a whole was clearly related to the subject matter of the Article 78 proceeding, and its submission to OAG was reasonably necessary for the provision of legal services.
Medina makes various other arguments, but these are all without merit. In particular, he contends that to the extent DOCS regulations allowed for disclosure of the information at issue, they conflict with federal law, citing 45 CFR 164.512. That regulation governs privacy of individual health information under HIPAA. But there is no private right of action for violation of HIPAA, even assuming that the provision of documents by a state agency to its attorney in the course of litigation would run afoul thereof (see Warren Pearl Const. Corp. v Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 639 F Supp 2d 371, 377 [SD NY 2009] [collecting cases]). To the extent Medina is arguing that State confidentiality rules are preempted by federal law, and therefore barred under the Supremacy Clause, I am without jurisdiction to decide such questions (see Chapman v State of New York, 193 Misc 2d 216, 219 [Ct Cl 2002] [Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction to rule on constitutionality of statutes]; Zimmerman v State of New York, 116 Misc 2d 521, 526 [Ct Cl 1982] [same]).
In light of the foregoing, claimant's motion No. M-83153 for summary judgment is denied, defendant's cross motion No. CM-83254 for summary judgment is granted, and claim No. 114230 is dismissed in its entirety.
SO ORDERED.
June 18, 2013
Albany, New York
DAVID A. WEINSTEIN
Judge of the Court of Claims
Papers Considered:
M-83153
1. Claimant's Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment, Affidavit in Support of Claimant Motion for Summary Judgment, and annexed exhibits.
2. Claimant's Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendant's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, and annexed exhibits.
CM-83254
1. Defendant's Notice of Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, Affirmation in Opposition to Claimant's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and annexed exhibits.
2. Claimant's Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendant's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, and annexed exhibits.