Opinion
C/A No. 4:19-2770-BHH-TER
07-06-2020
TRINIDAD MEDEROS, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, FCI EDGEFIELD, Respondent.
Report and Recommendation
The Petitioner, Trinidad Mederos, ("Petitioner/Mederos"), appearing pro se, filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on September 30, 2019. On January 3, 2019, the Respondent filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. (ECF No. 19). The undersigned issued an order filed January 7, 2019, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir.1975), advising the Petitioner of the motion and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately. (ECF No. 20). Mederos failed to file a response. Subsequent to a report and recommendation recommending dismissal pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Petitioner filed a response to the Respondent's motion. The matter was recommitted to address the merits. (ECF No. 27).
This habeas corpus case was automatically referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 73.02, DSC. Because this is a dispositive motion, this report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The moving party bears the burden of showing that summary judgment is proper. Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment is proper if the non-moving party fails to establish an essential element of any cause of action upon which the non-moving party has the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. 317. Once the moving party has brought into question whether there is a genuine dispute for trial on a material element of the non-moving party's claims, the non-moving party bears the burden of coming forward with specific facts which show a genuine dispute for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The non-moving party must come forward with enough evidence, beyond a mere scintilla, upon which the fact finder could reasonably find for it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1011 (4th Cir. 1991). However, the non-moving party may not rely on beliefs, conjecture, speculation, or conclusory allegations to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Barber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992). The evidence relied on must meet "the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at a trial on the merits." Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1993).
To show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (Rule 56(e) permits a proper summary judgment motion to be opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves). Rather, the party must present evidence supporting his or her position through "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with . . . affidavits, if any." Id. at 322; see also Cray Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Systems, Inc., 33 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 1994); Orsi v. Kickwood, 999 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1993); Local Rules 7.04, 7.05, D.S.C.
ARGUMENTS
Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution Edgefield (FCI Edgefield) in Edgefield, South Carolina. Petitioner filed his petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging a hearing before a disciplinary hearing officer ("DHO") which resulted in a loss of forty-one days of good-time credits as one of the sanctions.
In his petition, Petitioner argues as follows:
On or about July 11, 2018, Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) prison guard, K. Bolyard, was conducting random cell searches in "C" Unit at FCI Hazelton. Officer Bolyard proceeded to search cell #424 assigned to Petitioner and another inmate . . . Officer Bolyard ultimately discovered and seized marijuana from inside of the mattress on the bottom bunk. Petitioner was charged with possession of Drugs or Alcohol (Prohibited Act Code #113) and placed in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) pending disciplinary review. (Exhibit A Incident Report, dated July 12, 2018).
Prior to the disciplinary hearing Petitioner requested a staff representative and Spanish/English language interpreter because Petitioner does not speak/read English at functional levels. Petitioner was assigned correctional staff member J. Rivera as an interpreter, but no staff representative was provided for Petitioner as requested.
On July 26, 2018, Petitioner appeared before Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) D. Huff, with interpreter J. Rivera, in absence of any staff representative. At the hearing Petitioner attempted to explain that he wanted and needed a staff representative to investigate the fact that the (Petitioner) was assigned to the Top Bunk in cell #424 on the date of the incident. Moreover, that he (Petitioner) was not sleeping on the bottom bunk and did not know anything about the bottom bunk mattress or the marijuana (contraband) found in the mattress. (Exhibit-B, DHO Report, dated October 16, 2018.)
The assigned interpreter, J. Rivera, was obviously having a difficult time conveying Petitioner's statements to the DHO because of the looks on each staff member's face. Petitioner attempted to speak English directly to DHO Huff who either did not understand or did not want to hear Petitioner's side of the story.
Ultimately, the DHO adjudicated Petitioner guilty of violating the prohibited act of Possession of Drugs in violation of Code #113. The DHO sanctioned Petitioner by taking 41 days of Good Time Credits, 15 days disciplinary segregation (lock-up) and 180 days loss of privileges (commissary, phone, email). (See Exhibit-B, DHO Report, dated October 16, 2018.(ECF No. 1 at 7-10).
In his determination of Petitioner's guilt, the DHO relied on, among other evidence such as the officer's report, the alleged statements of Petitioner. In particular, a statement that Petitioner supposedly made at the DHO Hearing to the effect : "I sleep on the bottom bunk. I have had the mattress for 7 months. I didn't know it was in there." id. DHO Report, p. 2, V.
Contrary to the DHO's interpretation of Petitioner's statements at the DHO Hearing, Petitioner most definitely did not state that he slept on the bottom bunk where the contraband was found. The fact is, Petitioner did not sleep on the bottom bunk, and most significantly, the BOP and Hazelton prison officials had Petitioner officially assigned to the top bunk in cell #424. And this fact could have been verified by the DHO by simply reviewing SENTRY. . . .
The DHO blatantly violated Petitioner's Constitutional Rights during the disciplinary process by depriving Petitioner of a staff representative ...
Petitioner requests that the BOP dismiss the incident report, remove the added custody level points (5), and transfer him to a prison of the correct custody level for violating his due process rights.
As stated, the incident occurred on July 11, 2018, and Petitioner was provided with an incident report on July 12, 2018. (ECF No. 19-1 at 11). The incident report stated that an officer was doing a random search of a cell shared by Petitioner and one other inmate and that:
While searching the bottom bunk mattress I found the mattress had been cut open. Upon searching the opening I located a bag containing a green leafy substance that was in then (10) 2 in[ch] by 3 in[ch] bags. Pack of green leafy substance were sent to the lieutenant office to be tested. Lieutenant Doyle tested the green leafy substance using NIK test E, the green leafy substance tested positive for Marijuana.Id. at 11.
In his response to the motion for summary judgment filed with the district court subsequent to the report and recommendation, Petitioner argues that a "faulty translation" occurred during these proceedings. Petitioner claims that he asked "his staff representative to provide the SENTRY files for proof that he slept on the top bunk in cell #424" and that it is reasonable to assume that a mistranslation occurred when he told the translator that he slept on the top bunk which he asserts supports his contention of having no knowledge of the contraband in the lower bunk. (ECF No. 24-3 at 9 of 10).
In the petition, Petitioner admitted that he was issued an Incident Report ("Report")for the charges on or about July 12, 2018. Petitioner was advised of his rights, and the Notice of Discipline Hearing Before the DHO form indicates that Petitioner requested a staff representative and that the staff representative's name was Mr. Rivera. (ECF No. 19-1 at 17 of 34). Mr. Rivera also acted as his translator at the hearing. However, Petitioner argues that he was not assigned a staff representative to obtain evidence but only Mr. Rivera as a translator. The disciplinary hearing was held on July 26, 2018. Petitioner contends that J. Rivera translated that Petitioner stated he slept on the bottom bunk where the contraband was found, but Petitioner argues that was incorrect due to a translation error.
The DHO's order reveals that the "specific evidence relied upon to make this finding was the written report of Officer Bolyard." The DHO Officer Report stated as follows:
On Wednesday July 11, 2018, I Officer K. Bolyard was working as N-C unit officer. While doing a random cell search of cell 424 assigned to Inmates . . . and Mederos, Trinidad #5351-280. While searching the bottom bunk mattress I found the mattress had been cut open. Upon searching the opening I located a bag containing a green leafy substance that was in ten (10) 2 in. by 3 in, packs. Packs of green leafy substance were sent to the lieutenant office to be tested. Lieutenant Doyle tested the green leafy substance using NIK test E, the green leafy substance tested positive for Marijuana.
Your contention that you did not know it was there was considered but insufficient to excuse you from the offense. Since it is your responsibility to keep your areas free from all contraband you are solely responsible for the green leafy substance identified and marijuana discovered in our assigned mattress.
Therefore, based on the evidence outlined above, the DHO finds the greater weight of evidence to support that you committed the prohibited act Possession of drugs or alcohol
code 113.(ECF No. 19-1 at 31 of 34).
In the petition, Petitioner asserts that cell #424 was assigned to Petitioner and one other inmate. (ECF No. 1 at 7 of 12).
DISCUSSION ON MERITS
Petitioner alleges he was denied due process while Respondent argues that Petitioner was given advance written notice of the charges more than twenty-four hours before the DHO hearing, was offered the opportunity to present evidence in the form of documents or witnesses, and had the assistance of a staff representative, J. Rivera, as specifically requested by Petitioner. Respondent concedes that Petitioner exhausted his administrative remedies, and therefore the Court turns to the merits of the claims. (ECF No. 19 at 2 of 14).
The Supreme Court held that inmates are entitled to limited due process rights in prison disciplinary proceedings to the extent that a protected liberty interest is affected. Inmates have a protected liberty interest in the accumulation of good time credits. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Therefore, in prison disciplinary proceedings where a prisoner faces the possible loss of good conduct credits, he is entitled to certain due process protections. Id. These include advance written notice of the charges against him, a hearing, the right to call witnesses and present evidence when doing so is not inconsistent with institutional safety and correctional concerns, and a written decision. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-571. Furthermore, substantive due process is satisfied if the disciplinary hearing decision was based upon "some evidence." Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Institute v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985).
Here, Petitioner has not shown a violation of due process under Wolff, supra. Petitioner received a copy of the Incident Report which advised Petitioner of the charges; Petitioner was given notice of a disciplinary hearing wherein it was noted that he requested a staff representative, specifically Mr. Rivera, but did not request any witnesses (ECF No. 19-1 at 17 of 34); he was assigned Mr. Rivera as his staff representative who was also his translator (ECF No. 19-1); a hearing was held; the DHO report was delivered to Petitioner on November 1, 2018, outlining the evidence, the sanctions, the reason for the sanctions, and the appeal rights (ECF 19-1 at 30-32 of 34); Petitioner appealed the decision to the Regional level claiming he did not have a staff representative and that he did not admit to the prohibited act. The appeal was denied finding that there was a typographical error in section A of the notice where it stated that he waived his right to a staff representative because Section II Paragraph B cited the name of the staff representative that appeared at the hearing and translated for him. Further, it was found that there was no evidence to support his allegation that he did not admit to the prohibited act, and the DHO adequately explained the specific evidence relied on to find he committed the prohibited act, the evidence supports the DHO's finding, and the sanctions were appropriate (ECF 19-1). Petitioner appealed this ruling which was denied.
In his decision, the hearing officer relied upon the written report of Officer Bolyard. There is nothing in this case history which shows a violation of Wolff and its progeny. To sustain a conviction in an institutional setting, the fact-finder need only show that some evidence existed to support the decision. See Irvin v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 2009 WL 1811245 (D.S.C.2009) (citing Superintendent, Massachusetts Correction Institution v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445-456-457, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed. 2d 356 (1985)); see also Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Cil., Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (Agency's decisions are not to be second-guessed by federal courts unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute). This standard was clearly met in this case. Here, the DHO decision was based on the statement of the reporting officer, Officer Bolyard, and the testing confirmed the leafy material was marijuana.
While Petitioner disagrees with the DHO's findings, there was "some evidence" to support the decision. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correction Institution v. Hill Superindedent, supra. Therefore, Petitioner's claim that he was denied due process is without merit and should be dismissed.
Petitioner's contention that his due process rights were violated because his representative did not obtain available evidence showing that he was assigned the top bunk as opposed to the bottom bunk where the contraband was found, fails. Inmates are held responsible for contraband found in areas under their control. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has explained, "[c]onstructive possession provides 'some evidence' of guilt only when relatively few inmates have access to the area." McClung v. Shearin, 90 F. App'x 444, 446 (4th Cir. 2004) ("McClung I") (citing Broussard v. Johnson, 253 F.3d 874, 877 (5th Cir. 2001) ). Here, the drugs were found in the cell that Petitioner shared with one other inmate. Because the drugs were found in a cell that was the "exclusive domain" of Petitioner and his cellmate, the constructive possession rule provides "some evidence" of guilt, and that evidence is sufficient to sustain Petitioner's disciplinary hearing. McClung v. Hollingsworth, No. 06-6699, 2007 WL 1225946, at *3 (4th Cir. Apr. 26, 2007). Constructive possession is sufficient to satisfy the "some evidence" standard of Hill. See Hamilton v. O'Leary, 976 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.1992) (discussing how probabilities based upon inmate access to contraband may satisfy the "some evidence" standard); see also McClung v. Hollingsworth, 2007 WL 1225946 (4th Cir.Apr.26, 2007) (unpublished). Here, the record contains evidence that a prison guard discovered the contraband, marijuana, in Petitioner's cell which Petitioner shared with only one other inmate. Petitioner's assertion that he is innocent of this charge is not by itself sufficient to entitle him to federal habeas corpus relief. Rojas-Parra v. Warden, No. 13-1581, 2014 WL 2548352, at * 7 (D.S.C. June 6, 2014) (In the disciplinary context, court held a claim of actual innocence is not a basis for federal habeas corpus relief). Accordingly, there is some evidence supporting a finding that Petitioner constructively possessed the contraband. --------
In conclusion, there is no evidence of a due process violation in this action as Petitioner received all of the due process safeguards delineated in Wolff. Accordingly, it is recommended that Respondent's motion for summary judgment be granted and the petition dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above reasoning, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 19) be GRANTED and this claim dismissed.
Respectfully Submitted,
s/Thomas E. Rogers, III
Thomas E. Rogers, III
United States Magistrate Judge July 6 , 2020
Florence, South Carolina