Opinion
C. A. 1:24-532-MGL-SVH
06-20-2024
John Francis Medaglia, III, Plaintiff, v. Shawn Middleton and New Ellenton Police Dept., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER
Shiva V. Hodges United States Magistrate Judge
John Francis Medaglia, III (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, alleges that on September 22, 2023, he was wrongfully arrested while exercising his Constitutional rights at City Hall, in New Ellenton, Aiken County, South Carolina, by taking photographs and/or recordings in the lobby of the building. Plaintiff sues Shawn Middleton (“Middleton”), former chief of police in New Ellenton, and New Ellenton Police Department (“NEPD”). NEPD seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's claims.
Middleton, who Plaintiff alleges arrested him [see ECF No. 27], has not made an appearance in this case.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this case on February 1, 2024, asserting that his First and Fourth Amendment rights have been violated and asserting claims for wrongful imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress under South Carolina law. [ECF No. 1]. This matter is before the court on NEPD's motion to dismiss. [ECF No. 20]. Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Plaintiff of the dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to NEPD's motion. [ECF No. 24]. Having been briefed [ECF No. 30, 31], the motion is ripe for disposition. Also pending before the court is Plaintiff's motion to amend/correct the complaint. [ECF No. 27].
The court construes Plaintiff's claim for wrongful imprisonment to be one for false imprisonment arising under South Carolina law. See, e.g., L. v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 629 S.E.2d 642, 651 (S.C. 2006).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this matter has been referred to the undersigned for all pretrial proceedings. After carefully considering the record, the undersigned grants Plaintiff's motion to amend and recommends the district judge grant in part and deny in part NEPD's motion to dismiss. I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff alleges in his original complaint as follows:
On 9-22-23, around 1 pm, I was recording in the public areas of the city hall and was subsequently arrested by the defendant for expressing my first amendment rights and forcefully took my belongings after doing so injuring my ribs in the process[.]
I ask the court grant $500,000 in punitive damages for my broken tripod and being forcefully detained 3 separate times and wrongful imprisonment and for violations of my first and fourth amendment and intentional infliction of emotion distress.[ECF No. 1 at 5 (errors in original, minor edits made)].
In Plaintiff's motion to amend/correct the complaint, he asserts as follows:
1. I propose to amend the original complaint by substituting the defendant “New Ellenton Police Department” with “The City of New Ellenton” to accurately reflect the proper party in interest.
2. Additionally, I propose to further amend the complaint by adding factual allegations regarding the presence of a no cell phone sign outside the reception desk in the lobby of the Town Hall, which is unconstitutional on its face. These additional facts are relevant to demonstrating the violation of my constitutional rights as alleged in the complaint.
3. Furthermore, I propose to amend the complaint to include an additional factual allegation that I was arrested for disorderly conduct for swearing, which is a constitutionally protected activity. This amendment is necessary to fully articulate the violation of my First Amendment rights as part of the claims asserted in the complaint.
4. Moreover, I propose to amend the complaint to include a further factual allegation that the defendant expressed to me that the lobby of the town hall was a restricted area and there was a no recording policy within that part of the building. This amendment is relevant to establishing the context in which my constitutional rights were allegedly violated.
5. Additionally, I propose to further amend the complaint by adding a factual allegation that I informed the former chief that all I was doing was expressing my First Amendment rights in a public place by recording in the public lobby. Despite this, after detaining me the first time, he proceeded to say, ‘‘you want a lawsuit, you get a lawsuit,” and subsequently arrested me again after displaying full knowledge that I was just recording the public signs and history.[ECF No. 27].
II. Discussion
A. Standard on Motion to Dismiss
To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The court is “not required to accept as true the legal conclusions set forth in a plaintiff's complaint.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999). Indeed, “[t]he presence of a few conclusory legal terms does not insulate a complaint from dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when the facts alleged in the complaint cannot support” the legal conclusion. Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 577 (4th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, in analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court may consider “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs. Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). When a federal court is evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Standard on Motion to Amend
Leave to amend should be freely granted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), and amendments are generally accepted absent futility, undue prejudice, or bad faith. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Matrix Capital Mgmt. Fund, LP v. BearingPoint, Inc., 576 F.3d 172, 193 (4th Cir. 2009). The court can deny a motion to amend a complaint “if amending the complaint would be futile, that is, ‘if the proposed amended complaint fails to satisfy the requirements of the federal rules.”‘ United States ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
C. Analysis
As a preliminary matter, the parties agree that NEPD should be dismissed from this case and that the City of New Ellenton (“the City”) should be substituted. [See, e.g., ECF No. 27, ECF No. 29 at 1]. However, NEPD argues that even if the City is substituted for NEPD, “[t]he Complaint currently of record in the Court does not state a claim for which relief can be granted” and, even if Plaintiff additional allegations were “incorporated into a proper amended complaint,” such allegations “would not give rise to a cause of action against the municipal entity for a violation of constitutional rights.” [ECF No. 31].
Turning to the causes of action asserted by Plaintiff against NEPD, now the City, Plaintiff alleges violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights, claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an aggrieved party must sufficiently allege that he was injured by “the deprivation of any [of his or her] rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [United States] Constitution and laws” by a “person” acting “under color of state law.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see generally 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1230 (3d ed. 2014).
Additionally, a plaintiff must allege a causal connection or affirmative link between the conduct of which he complains and the official sued. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (providing that a plaintiff in a § 1983 action must plead that the defendant, through his own individual actions, violated the constitution); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72 (1976) (holding a § 1983 plaintiff must show that he suffered a specific injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant, and an affirmative link between the injury and that conduct). The doctrine of supervisory liability is generally inapplicable to § 1983 suits, such that an employer or supervisor is not liable for the acts of his employees, absent an official policy or custom that results in an illegal action. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Fisher v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Authority, 690 F.2d 1133, 1142-43 (4th Cir. 1982).
To the extent that Plaintiff is asserting a claim against the City based on supervisory liability, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, municipalities are not liable under the theory of respondeat superior for unconstitutional conduct engaged in by their employees. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; see also, e.g., Todman v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, No. 23-1201, 2024 WL 2887403, at *11 (4th Cir. June 10, 2024) (“the City can be held liable only for action[s] pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature.”) (citation omitted)).
As argued by NEPD, and not addressed by Plaintiff, “[n]o claim lies against a municipality where the complaint fails to allege a custom or policy caused a violation of the United States Constitution.” [ECF No. 20 at 2]. This is true of Plaintiff's original complaint, where there is no allegation of a policy or custom. However, it appears that Plaintiff may be challenging two “policies or customs” the no cell phone sign in the lobby of City Hall, as well as the practice of no recordings being allowed, in his proposed amendments to his complaint. [See ECF No. 27].
Although “courts have upheld restrictions on the use of cell phones in government buildings,”Benzing v. North Carolina, C/A No. 3:17-000619-KDB-DCK, 2020 WL 3439558, at *6 (W.D. N.C. June 23, 2020) (footnote omitted)), aff'd sub nom. Benzing v. Treadway, 827 Fed.Appx. 350 (4th Cir. 2020), given Plaintiff's pro se status and early procedural posture of the case, the undersigned recommends that the district judge deny NEPD's motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff's claim grounded in the First Amendment, but not as to Plaintiff's claims grounded in the Fourth Amendment where Plaintiff has provided no allegations of a policy or custom in support of a Fourth Amendment claim.
Plaintiff's complaint, including proposed amendments, is devoid of any allegation of a policy or custom related to his allegedly unlawful detainment, personal injury, or seizure/damage of his property.
Turning to Plaintiff's remaining causes of action arising under South Carolina law, NEPD argues that a South Carolina governmental entity cannot be liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress or other intentional torts, but does not specifically address Plaintiff's claim for false imprisonment. [See ECF No. 20 at 4].
The South Carolina Torts Claims Act (“SCTCA”), SC Code Ann. § 15-78-10, et seq. is “the exclusive remedy for any tort committed by an employee of a governmental entity.” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-70(a). “The State, an agency, a political subdivision, and a governmental entity are liable for their torts in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, subject to the limitations upon liability and damages, and exemptions from liability and damages, contained” within the SCTCA. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-40. The SCTCA additionally provides a “governmental entity is not liable for the loss resulting from . . . employee conduct outside the scope of his official duties or which constitutes actual fraud, actual malice, intent to harm, or a crime involving moral turpitude.” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60(17); see also Id. at § 15-78-70(b). “[U]nder the SCTCA, for a given tort, either the governmental entity or the employee is liable but not both.” Newkirk v. Enzor, 240 F.Supp.3d 426, 436 (D.S.C. 2017).
NEPD is correct that the SCTCA does not allow a plaintiff to recover against a governmental entity for intentional infliction of emotional distress or for intentional torts. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60(17); § 15-78-30(f) (defining “loss” to mean “bodily injury, disease, death, or damage to tangible property, including lost wages and economic loss to the person who suffered the injury, disease, or death, pain and suffering, mental anguish, and any other element of actual damages recoverable in actions for negligence, but [ ] not [ ] the intentional infliction of emotional harm.”); Smith v. City of Charleston, 2007 WL 9735801, at * 5 (D.S.C. July 24, 2007) (“Recovery from governmental entities for intentional torts and intentional infliction of emotional distress is specifically barred by the Tort Claims Act.”).
Likewise, to the extent that Plaintiff is asserting a claim for kidnapping pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-910 [see ECF No. 1 at 3], this statute is a criminal statute which does not afford a private right of action to Plaintiff. See, e.g., Dennison v. Hayes, C/A No. 2:210-2877-RMG-MHC, 2022 WL 18135244, at *5 (D.S.C. Dec. 2, 2022) (“To extent that Plaintiff is attempting to bring a private cause of actions for alleged perjury (§ 16-9-10), forgery (§ 16-13-10), and/or kidnapping (§ 16-3-910) under South Carolina criminal statutes, he has alleged no facts to indicate that he may bring a private cause of action.”), report and recommendation adopted, C/A No. 2:21-CV-2877-RMG, 2023 WL 112755 (D.S.C. Jan. 5, 2023).
However, where the NEPD has not specifically addressed Plaintiff's claim for false imprisonment, the undersigned declines to do so as well. Therefore, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant NEPD's motion to dismiss in part, allowing Plaintiff's claims grounded in the First Amendment and for false imprisonment to proceed, as asserted against the City. III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned grants Plaintiff's motion to amend/correct complaint [ECF No. 27] and directs the clerk of court to file Plaintiff's original complaint and proposed amendments [ECF Nos. 1, 27] as one new docket entry. NEPD is dismissed from this action and the City of New Ellenton is named as a defendant. Additionally, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant in part and deny in part NEPD's motion to dismiss [ECF No. 20], allowing Plaintiffs claims for First Amendment violations and for false imprisonment to proceed against the City of New Ellenton.
NEPD objects, correctly, to Plaintiff's failure to submit a proposed amended complaint in conjunction with his motion to correct/amend his complaint. [See ECF No. 29]. However, given Plaintiffs pro se status, the court construes his filing to be additions Plaintiff seeks to add to his original complaint and will read Plaintiffs original complaint and proposed additions together as constituting Plaintiffs amended complaint.
NEPD informs the court that it withdraws its previously-submitted motion to dismiss. [See ECF No. 20 at 1, see also ECF No. 9].
IT IS SO ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).