Opinion
7:02-CV-094-R.
January 13, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Came on to be considered the papers and pleadings filed in this action and the Court finds and orders as follows:
This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by an inmate confined in the Connally Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice in Kenedy, Texas. McWilliams was charged with five counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child under fourteen years of age. Ex parte McWilliams, App. No 50,041-01 at pp. 15-20. He entered a plea of not guilty and was tried by jury in the 89th District Court of Wichita County, Cause No. 35,138-C. Id. at p. 21. McWilliams was found guilty and sentenced to fifty-years confinement on each count. Id. at pp. 21-25. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal and McWilliams' petition for discretionary review was refused. McWilliams v. State, 2-99-200-CR (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. ref'd); McWilliams v. State, PDR No. 0007-01 (Tex, Crim. App. 2001). He filed two state applications for habeas relief without success. Ex parte McWilliams, App. No 50,041-01; Ex parte McWilliams, App. No 50,041-02.
McWilliams' second state application for habeas relief was dismissed for abuse of the writ. Ex parte McWilliams, App. No 50,041-02 at cover.
In support of the instant petition, McWilliams presents the following grounds for relief:
1. At the time of his arrest, he was intoxicated and high on marijuana and was therefore unable to discern proper conduct of himself;
2. There was no mention of weapons or threats in any report or statement, therefore, the offense cannot be aggravated;
3. There was insufficient evidence to support a finding of guilt;
4. The indictment was invalid because there were multiple charges on the same indictment number;
5. He was wrongfully convicted pursuant to an allegation made in court that was not charged in the indictment;
6. The original outcry witness was substituted with an improper party at trial;
7. He was precluded from presenting favorable evidence at trial because the prosecution stated it was irrelevant;
8. His statement was involuntary and given only after a promise of help from police and the statement was improperly admitted at trial as a confession;
9. Ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to object to the faulty indictment, and;
10. A juror wrongfully possessed and used a cell phone during deliberations.Petition ¶¶ 12.A-D and attachment thereto.
On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA" or "the Act"), Pub.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, under which we now have a heightened standard of review in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Title I of the Act substantially changed the way federal courts handle such actions. The AEDPA applies to all federal petitions for habeas corpus filed on or after its effective date. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997). Petitioner filed the instant petition after the effective date of the AEDPA Therefore, Title I of the Act applies to his petition.
The AEDPA provides in pertinent part:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in a State court proceeding.28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2004).
Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ of habeas corpus if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the United States Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently from the United States Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000); Chambers v. Johnson, 218 F.3d 360, 363 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1002, 121 S.Ct. 508 (2000). Under § 2254(d)(2), the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if the state court (1) unreasonably applies the correct legal rule to the facts of a particular case or (2) it unreasonably extends a legal principle from Supreme Court precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply. Williams, 529 U.S. at 407, 120 S.Ct. at 1520. The standard for determining whether a state court's application was unreasonable is an objective one. This standard of review applies to all federal habeas corpus petitions which, like the instant case, were filed after April 24, 1996, provided that they were adjudicated on the merits in state court. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997). Resolution on the merits in the habeas corpus context is a term of art that refers to the state court's disposition of the case on substantive rather than procedural grounds. Green v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 1115, 1121 (5th Cir. 1997).
Upon a finding of state court compliance with the "contrary to" clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), federal courts give deference to the state court's findings unless such findings violate the "unreasonable application" clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Chambers, 218 F.3d at 363. The "unreasonable application" clause concerns only questions of fact. Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1039, 121 S.Ct. 2001 (2001). The resolution of factual issues by the state court are afforded a presumption of correctness and will not be disturbed unless the habeas petitioner rebuts the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 550, 101 S.Ct. 764, 771 (1981). Absent such evidence, the presumption of correctness is applied provided that the state court findings are evidenced in writing, issued after a hearing on the merits and are fairly supported by the record. E.g., Burden v. Zant, 498 U.S. 433, 111 S.Ct. 862, 864 (1991); Williams v. Scott, 35 F.3d 159, 161 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1137, 115 S.Ct. 959 (1995); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
As a threshold matter, Respondent has raised the issue of procedural bar as to several of McWilliams' grounds for habeas relief, Federal courts may not review a state court decision that rests on an adequate and independent state procedural default unless the habeas petitioner shows (1) cause for the default and actual prejudice resulting from the alleged violation of federal law or (2) demonstrates that the failure to consider his federal claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. E.g. Smith v. Johnson, 216 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 2000); Pitts v. Anderson, 122 F.3d 275, 279 (5th Cir. 1997); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 1043 (1989). "[T]he fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is confined to cases of actual innocence, where the petitioner shows, as a factual matter, that he did not commit the crime of conviction." Smith v. Johnson, 216 F.3d at 524 (quoting Fairman v. Anderson, 188 F.3d 635, 644 (5th Cir. 1999)). When the last state court to review a claim clearly and expressly states that its judgment rests on a procedural bar, the procedural default doctrine generally bars federal review. Id.; Lowe v. Scott, 48 F.3d 873, 875 (5th Cir. 1995).
A review of the state records in the case at bar reflects that McWilliams failed to present claims number 4, 9 10 above in his first art. 11.07 application challenging this conviction or on direct appeal. Ex parte McWilliams, App. No. 50,041-01 pp. 8-9 12; McWilliams v. State, 2-99-200-CR (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. ref'd). His second state habeas application was dismissed by the Court of Criminal Appeals pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, art 11.07 § 4. Ex parte McWilliams, App. No. 50,041-02 at cover. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure art. 11.07 § 4 embodies the state habeas abuse-of-the-writ doctrine. The statute provides as follows:
Sec. 4. (a) If a subsequent application for writ of habeas corpus is filed after final disposition of an initial application challenging the same conviction, a court may not consider the merits of or grant relief based on the subsequent application unless the application contains sufficient specific facts establishing that:
(1) the current claims and issues have not been and could not have been presented previously in an original application or in a previously considered application filed under this article because the factual or legal basis for the claim was unavailable on the date the applicant filed the previous application; or
(2) by a preponderance of the evidence, but for a violation of the United States Constitution no rational juror could have found the applicant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
(b) For purposes of Subsection (a)(1), a legal basis of a claim is unavailable on or before a date described by Subsection (a)(1) if the legal basis was not recognized by and could not have been reasonably formulated from a final decision of the United States Supreme Court, a court of appeals of the United States, or a court of appellate jurisdiction of this state on or before that date.
(c) For purposes of Subsection (a)(1), a factual basis of a claim is unavailable on or before a date described by Subsection (a)(1) if the factual basis was not ascertainable through the exercise of reasonable diligence on or before that date.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Art 11.07 § 4 (West 2001). The Texas abuse-of-the-writ doctrine "represents an adequate state procedural bar for the purposes of federal habeas review." Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 423 (5th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 523 U.S. 1139, 118 S.Ct. 1845 (1998); accord Fearance v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633, 642 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1153, 115 S.Ct. 2603 (1995). When, as in the case at bar, a petitioner presents a ground for relief to the state courts for the first time in a petition that is dismissed for abuse-of-the-writ, the federal court is precluded from reviewing the claim absent a showing of cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice. Smith v. Johnson, 216 F.3d at 523-24. McWilliams has made no such showing. Thus, grounds for relief number 4, 9 10 above are procedurally barred.
The Court notes that Respondent has asked for dismissal of grounds 4, 7, 9 10 as procedurally barred. Respondent has used different numbers for several grounds for relief as compared to the numbering used by Petitioner. The Court has followed Petitioner's numbering on his grounds for relief. Therefore, Petitioner's grounds for relief number 4, 9 10 are procedurally barred rather than numbers 4, 7, 9 10 as suggested by Respondent.
In his first ground for habeas relief, McWilliams states that he was arrested while intoxicated and high on marijuana and was therefore unable to properly conduct himself. Although somewhat unclear, this appears to be a challenge to the validity of McWilliams' arrest. See Petition, "Argument of Facts" at p. l. As such, this claim must fail. McWilliams does not allege the lack of a warrant for his arrest and he does not attack the validity of any warrant for his arrest. His statement that he was intoxicated and high on drugs at the time of his arrest simply is not a cognizable ground for habeas corpus relief.
In his second ground for relief, Petitioner argues that his conviction for "aggravated" sexual assault cannot stand because there was no mention of weapons or threats in any report or statement and, therefore, the offense cannot be "aggravated." Under Texas law at the time of his conviction, sexual assault was aggravated if the victim was under fourteen years of age. Texas Penal Code § 22.021(a)(1)(B) (a)(2)(B) (West 1999). McWilliams makes no argument that his victim was older than 14 at the time of the assaults. The record in this case establishes that the victim was younger than 14 years old at the time of the outcry and that the abuse had been ongoing for several years prior to the outcry. Statement of Facts, Volume 5, pp. 102-04, 112, 122 (hereinafter "SF Vol. ___ p. ___"). Therefore, McWilliams cannot prevail on this ground for relief.
Next, Petitioner claims that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of guilt because there was no evidence to show that he was the only person guilty of the offense. Petition, "Argument of Facts" at p. 1. In conclusory fashion, McWilliams states that "[t]here was no positive proof presented that even remotely indicated that [he] was guilty of said crime." Id. He presented his sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim as to one count in the indictment on direct appeal. The Second Court of Appeals in Forth Worth reviewed the evidence from McWilliams' trial and found it sufficient to support his conviction. McWilliams v. State, No. 2-99-200-CR slip op. at pp. 5-7 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. ref'd). McWilliams has failed to establish that this finding was contrary to federal law or unreasonable in light of the evidence presented at trail. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Moreover, the appeals court finding is fairly supported by the record. With regard to his conviction on the remaining four counts, the record in this case is rife with evidence to support the conviction. See Respondent's Answer with Brief in Support pp. 12-14. However, because the State of Texas permits sufficiency of the evidence charges to be raised only on direct appeal, McWilliams' attack on the sufficiency of the evidence as to any other count in the indictment against him is procedurally barred because he failed to present such claims on direct review. See West v. Johnson, 92 F.3d 1385, 1398 n. 18 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1242, 117 S.Ct. 1847 (1997). Thus, he is not entitled to habeas relief on this ground.
A state appellate court's determination that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction is entitled to great weight. Parker v. Procunier, 763 F.2d 665, 666 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 855, 106 S.Ct. 159 (1985).
In his ground for relief number 5, Petitioner claims that he was wrongfully convicted pursuant to an allegation made in court that was not charged in the indictment and that the indictment is, therefore, invalid. Petitioner has not identified a specific allegation which he claims was made in court that was not included in the indictment and for which he was convicted. To the extent, if any, that his challenge to the indictment is not procedurally barred, see Ex parte McWilliams, App No. 50,041-01 p. 8, such a challenge must fail.
It is well settled that "[t]he sufficiency of a state indictment is not a matter for federal habeas corpus relief unless it can be shown that the indictment is so defective that it deprives the state court of jurisdiction." McKay v. Collins, 12 F.3d 66, 68 (5th Cir.) (citing Branch v. Estelle, 631 F.2d 1229 (5th Cir. 1980)), reh'g granted in part sub nom., Williams v. Collins, 12 F.3d 70 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 854, 115 S.Ct. 157 (1994); see also Morlett v. Lynaugh, 851 F.2d 1521, 1523 (5th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 489 U.S. 1086, 109 S.Ct. 1546 (1989); Uresti v. Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1099, 1102 (5th Cir. 1987). An indictment is fatally defective in the context of a § 2254 proceeding only if no circumstances could exist under which a valid conviction could result from facts provable under the indictment; state law provides the reference point for determining whether an indictment is sufficient. Morlett v. Lynaugh, 851 F.2d at 1523; Johnson v. Estelle, 704 F.2d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1009, 104 S.Ct. 1006 (1984). When the question of sufficiency of an indictment has been presented to the state's highest court of appeals, consideration of the question is foreclosed in federal habeas corpus proceedings. McKay v. Collins, 12 F.3d at 68-69; Morlett v. Lynaugh, 851 F.2d at 1523; Alexander v. McCotter, 775 F.2d 595, 599 (5th Cir. 1985).
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is the highest court in the state which has jurisdiction to review a petitioner's conviction. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 4.04 § 2 (West 1999). The record reflects that, in his state habeas application, McWilliams raised a claim that he was wrongfully convicted pursuant to an allegation made in Court that was not charged in the indictment on count 5. Ex parte McWilliams, App No. 50,041-01 p. 8. The Court of Criminal Appeals denied the application without written order, thereby, rejecting his claim. By refusing to grant habeas relief, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals necessarily, though not expressly, held that the trial court had jurisdiction and that McWilliams' indictment was sufficient for that purpose. See Alexander v. McCotter, 775 F.2d at 599; Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 702 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1986).
In his 6th ground for relief, Petitioner argues that the original outcry witness was substituted with an improper witness at trial. Specifically. Petitioner claims that the victim's mother was the original outcry witness but that the victim's step-grandmother served as the outcry witness at trial. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann art. 38.072 (West 1999). McWilliams argues that this was prejudicial because he and the step-grandmother had experienced numerous confrontations in the past. He also claims that this resulted in the denial of his right to confront the original outcry witness at trial. See Petition, "Argument of Facts" at p. 2.
The Second Court of Appeals review this claim and found that, by failing to object to the step-grandmother's testimony when it was offered at trial, McWilliams had waived the complaint on appeal. McWilliams v. State, No. 2-99-200-CR slip op. at pp. 7-9 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. ref'd). In Dowthitt v. Johnson, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage ofjustice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). The state procedural rule at issue in this instance is adequate because it has been "strictly or regularly followed." Amos v. Scott, 61 F.3d 333, 339 (5th Cir. 1995). "This Circuit has held that the Texas contemporaneous objection rule is strictly or regularly applied evenhandedly to the vast majority of similar claims, and is therefore an adequate procedural bar." Corwin v. Johnson, 150 F.3d 467, 473 (5th Cir. 1998).Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 752 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 915, 121 S.Ct. 1250 (2001). In relying on the contemporaneous objection rule to find that McWilliams waived any complaint about the step-grandmother's testimony, the Second Court of Appeals explicitly relied on a procedural bar as to this claim. McWilliams makes no claim of cause for the default or actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law and he presents no argument that this Court's failure to consider this ground for relief will result in a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this ground.
In ground for relief number 7, Petitioner states that he was precluded from presenting favorable evidence at trial because the prosecution stated it was irrelevant. Petition, "Argument of Facts" at p. 2. McWilliams states that the defense was in possession of evidence which would have discounted the victim's allegations and demonstrated that he was the true victim in his case. He claims that this evidence consisted of information showing that the victim had made prior unfounded accusations which had been disputed by a medical doctor or expert. See Petition, Final Argument with Citings at p. 6-7. He claims that, when the prosecution did not allow the evidence to be admitted at trial, it denied him a defense to the charges. Id.
Errors of state law, including evidentiary errors, are not cognizable in habeas proceedings as such. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 479-80 (1991). A state court's evidentiary ruling presents a cognizable habeas claim only where it runs afoul of a specific constitutional right or it renders the trial fundamentally unfair. Pemberton v. Collins, 991 F.2d 1218, 1226 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Johnson v. Blackburn, 778 F.2d 1044, 1050 (5th Cir. 1985)), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1025, 114 S.Ct. 637 (1993). Fundamental unfairness may occur where certain testimony, erroneously admitted, plays a crucial, critical and highly significant role in the trial. Jernigan v. Collins, 980 F.2d 292, 298 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 978, 113 S.Ct. 2977 (1993).
In the instant case, Petitioner has not specifically identified the exculpatory evidence which he claims was not admitted at trial and he has not shown how the trial court's ruling as to the admissibility of the unidentified evidence ran afoul of some constitutional right or rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. Moreover, he has failed to demonstrate that the state habeas court's rejection of this claim was in any way unreasonable. "Although pro se habeas petitions must be construed liberally, `mere conclusory allegations on a critical issue are insufficient to raise a constitutional issue." Koch v. Puckett, 907 F.2d 524, 530 (5th cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Woods, 870 F.2d 285, 288 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1989)). McWilliams' allegation is conclusory in nature and, as such, is insufficient to state a ground for habeas relief.
In his ground for relief number 8, Petitioner argues that his confession, which was admitted into evidence at trial, was involuntary. McWilliams claims that police officers took advantage of his intoxicated state and promised "help" for him and his family.
"[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [prohibits] states from securing criminal convictions through the use of involuntary confessions resulting from coercive police conduct." Self v. Collins, 973 F.2d 1198, 1205 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109, 106 S.Ct. 445, 449 (1985)), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 996, 113 S.Ct. 1631 (1993). To establish that a confession was involuntary, a criminal defendant "must demonstrate that [the confession] resulted from coercive police conduct and that there was a link between the coercive conduct of the police and his confession." United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 461 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163-65, 107 S.Ct. 515, 519-21 (1986)). "A confession is voluntary if, under the totality of the circumstances, the statement is the product of the accused's free and rational choice." United States v. Broussard, 80 F.3d 1025, 1033 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 906, 117 S.Ct. 264 (1996). The Fifth Circuit "has held that trickery or deceit is only prohibited to the extent that it deprives the defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them." United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d at 461 (citing Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 588, 596 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) and Self v. Collins, 973 F.2d 1198, 1205 (5th Cir. 1992)). "Neither mere emotionalism and confusion, nor mere trickery will alone necessarily invalidate a confession." Self v. Collins, 973 F.2d at 1205.
Petitioner's claim of involuntary confession was the subject of a pre-trial hearing in his criminal case. SF Vol. 2 pp. 17-220. After hearing the testimony and viewing the videotape of McWilliams' interview with police officers during which he made his confession, the trial court judge found that police did not use coercive tactics or place McWilliams in fear, that no physical force was used, that the officers were pleasant toward McWilliams and provided him with coffee and cigarettes upon request, that officers did not use angry voices or otherwise intimidate McWilliams, that the surroundings were non-intimidating and appropriate for an interrogation, that Miranda warnings were given on multiple occasions, that McWilliams never indicated that he wanted an attorney or that he wanted to stop the interrogation. SF Vol. 2 pp. 216-219. The judge further found that, when officers mentioned scientific evidence and a colposcope, McWilliams was "savvy enough" to make a distinction between the existence of evidence of penetration of the victim and evidence showing that he was the perpetrator. Id. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the trial court judge found that McWilliams' confession was voluntary and as such, admissible at trial. Id. McWilliams has made no attempt to rebut the trial court's findings of fact with regard to the voluntariness of his confession. Accordingly, such findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
On direct appeal, McWilliams again raised the issue of involuntary confession. In affirming the trial court's judgment, the 2nd Court of Appeals found that the police officers did not make promises of any benefits to McWilliams in exchange for his confession and that the evidence of record supported the trial court's finding of voluntariness. McWilliams v. State, No. 2-99-200-CR slip op. at pp. 2-5 (Tex.App.-Forth Worth 2000, pet. ref'd). McWilliams then raised the issue in his petition for discretionary review which was refused by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
Upon review of the record in this case, it is clear that the state courts' rulings on the voluntariness of McWilliams' confession did not involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law and did not result in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Therefore, McWilliams is not entitled to relief on this ground.
The Court further notes that McWilliams' claim that he was intoxicated during the interrogation was not raise in the trial court, on direct appeal, in his petition for discretionary review or in his state habeas application. Because he failed to develop facts underlying his claim of intoxication as the basis for his alleged involuntary confession, he is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this ground in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Moreover, the claim is procedurally barred.
The court notes that one arresting officer testified that, at the time of the interrogation, McWilliams did not appear to be intoxicated or under the influence of marijuana, cocaine or any other drug and that he appeared to understand everything. SF Vol. 2p. 22. In his ruling, after review of the interrogation videotape, the trial court judge made no mention of McWilliams appearing to be intoxicated or in any way incapacitated. SF Vol. 2 pp. 216-219.
Finally, in ground for relief number 8, McWilliams claims that his confession was improperly admitted into evidence at trial. This claim is based upon McWilliams' claim that the confession was involuntary, As discussed above, the confession was deemed voluntary by the state court and, as such, was properly admitted into evidence.
Moreover, as a general rule, state court evidentiary rulings are a basis for habeas relief only where they render the entire trial fundamentally unfair. Mullen v. Blackburn, 808 F.2d 1143, 1145 (5th Cir. 1987). A review of the testimony from Petitioner's pre-trial hearing reveals that McWilliams had the opportunity, through counsel, to examine witnesses and to present his arguments in favor of suppressing his confession. The record demonstrates that Petitioner's statements to police officers during the interrogation were voluntary and not coerced. SF Vol. 2 pp. 17-220; McWilliams v. State, No. 2-99-200-CR slip op. at pp. 2-5 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. ref'd). Petitioner had an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the suppression issue in state court. Thus, the admission of Petitioner's confession did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. Especially in light of the substantial amount of additional evidence against him. See SF Vols. 4-7.
McWilliams has failed to show that the decisions of the Texas state courts denying him relief from his conviction were contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or that the decisions were based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.
The Clerk of Court shall transmit a true copy of this Order to Petitioner and to Counsel for Respondent.
SO ORDERED.