Opinion
Civil Action No. 1:02-CV-051-C
April 10, 2002
ORDER
On this date the Court considered the Motion to Strike and Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May be Granted and for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction filed by Bobby Don Smith, as Board President of Rule Independent School District; Rod Petty, as Vice President of School Board of Rule Independent School Disirict; Rob Kittley, as Board Member of Rule Independent School District; Kraig Kupatt, as Board Member of Rule Independent School District; Jana Manske, as Board Member of Rule Independent School District; Robert Turner, as Board Member of Rule Independent School District; Larry Lefevre, as Board Member of Rule Independent School District; and David Parr, as Superintendent of Rule Independent School District (hereinafter "Defendants") on March 13, 2002. No Response was filed by Plaintiff; John McRae. After considering all the relevant arguments, evidence, and supporting documentation filed by the parties, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff; John McRae, was hired by the Rule Independent School District to serve as principal beginning during the 2000 school year. Plaintiff signed a contract entitled "Two-year Term Contract" with Rule Independent School District On March 2, 2001, Plaintiff was notified that his contract was cancelled at the end of the school year 2001. Plaintiff was notified that his contract was cancelled because "it was in the best interest of the school district."
On February 19, 2002, Plaintiff filed suit in the 39th District Court of Haskell County, Texas. Plaintiff's petition contained complaints of breach of contract, fraud, and due process violations, On March 13, 2002, Defendants filed a Notice of Removal. On March 13, 2002, Defendants also filed a Motion to Strike and Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's claims.
II. STANDARD
Rule 12(b)(1) Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Motions filed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a party to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court to hear a case. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts. Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996).
The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction. McDaniel v. United States, 899 F. Supp. 305, 307 (E.D. Tex. 1995). Accordingly, the plaintiff' constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist. Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980).
In examining a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the district court is empowered to consider matters of fact which may be in dispute. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (1981). Ultimately, a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be granted only if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle plaintiff to relief. Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc v. City of Madison, Miss., 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998),
Rule 12(b)(6) Failure to State a Claim
Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are appropriate when a defendant attacks the complaint because it fails to state a legally cognizable claim. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). The test for determining the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) was set out by the United States Supreme Court as follows: "[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). See also, Grisham v. United States, 103 F.3d 24, 25-26 (5th Cir. 1997).
Subsumed within the rigorous standard of the Conley test is the requirement that the plaintiff's complaint be stated with enough clarity to enable a court or an opposing party to determine whether a claim is sufficiently alleged. Elliott v. Foufas, 867 F.2d 877, 880 (5th Cir. 1989). Further, "the plaintiffs complaint is to be construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff; and the allegations contained therein are to be taken as true" Oppenheimer v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 94 F.3d 189, 194 (5th Cir. 1996). This is consistent with the well-established policy that the plaintiff be given every opportunity to state a claim. Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977). In other words, a motion to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim "admits the facts alleged in the complaint, but challenges plaintiffs rights to relief based upon those facts." Tel-Phonic Serys., Inc. v. TBS Int'l Inc., 975 F.2d 1134, 1137 (5th Cir. 1992). Finally, when considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the district court must examine the complaint to determine whether the allegations provide relief on any possible theory Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1341 (5th Cir. 1994).
III. DISCUSSION
Due Process Claims
The Texas Education Code provides that "a person who is employed as a teacher by a school district for the first time, or who has not been employed by the district for two consecutive school years subsequent to August 28, 1967, shall be employed under a probationary contract." Tex. Educ. Code § 21.102(a) (Vernon 1996). The text of the statute is clear and unambiguous: because Plaintiff was employed by the school district for the first time, he can only be employed under a probationary contract. See Id. Despite the title of the employment contract, the contract Plaintiff signed was, a probationary contract; a school district cannot enter into a contract that creates a property interest greater than that allowed by law. See Montez v. South San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 1124, 1126 (5th Cir. 1987). Because Plaintiff was working under a probationary contract, there is no property interest in continued employment as a matter of law. See Carey v. Aldine Indep Sch. Dist., 996 F. Supp. 641 (SD. Tex. 1998). In addition, the contract in this case bestowed no property interest on Plaintiff other than probationary contract status. See Monte, 817 F.2d at 1126.
The Texas Education Code provides that a probationary employee may be terminated at the end of the contract period "if in the board's judgment the best interests of the district will be served by terminating the employment.," and if notice of the termination is given to the teacher "not later than the 45th day before the last day of instruction required under the contract." Tex. Educ. Code § 21.103. Plaintiff was provided this notice, Plaintiff received notice that his probationary contract would be terminated, and Plaintiff received this notice more than 45 days before the last day of instruction. Plaintiff received all the notice he was entitled to. Plaintiff's due process claims are dismissed.
Breach of Contract Claim
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants breached his two-year employment contract by terminating the contract after one year. However, as previously discussed regardless of the document's title, the contract Plaintiff signed was a probationary contract. Under Texas law, a probationary contract may not exceed one school year. Tex. Educ. Code § 21, 102(b). As such, Plaintiff's breach of contract claim is dismissed.
Fraud Claim
Plaintiff asserts a claim of fraud against Defendant Superintendent Parr. Defendant claims that this claim should be dismissed because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this claim. The Texas Education Code provides immunity for professional employees of a school district for acts that are incident to or within the scope of duties of the employee's position that involve the exercise of judgment or discretion. Tex. Educ. Code § 22.051(a). Defendant Superintendent Parr's conduct is protected by this immunity. Additionally, Texas law provides immunity for school employees for tort claims including intentional torts. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code § 101.51(a); Jones v. Houston Indep. Sch Dist., 979 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, Plaintiff's fraud claim is dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
After considering all the relevant arguments, evidence, and supporting documentation, this Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Strike and Motions to Dismiss.