Opinion
C. A. 9:21-01927-RBH-MHC
07-26-2022
Jeanette Louise McManus, Plaintiff, v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry United States Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the final decision of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security (the Commissioner) denying her claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social Security Act. This case was referred to the undersigned for a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a) (D.S.C.). Having carefully considered the parties' submissions and the applicable law, the undersigned recommends that the Commissioner's decision be reversed and remanded for further findings for the reasons that follow.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
Plaintiff applied for DIB on July 18, 2018, alleging disability beginning May 25, 2018. R.pp. 15, 210-211. Plaintiff's claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration, and Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an ALJ. R.pp. 15, 78, 105, 117-118. A telephonic hearing, at which Plaintiff and a vocational expert testified, was held on December 3, 2020. R.pp. 30-50. The ALJ thereafter denied Plaintiff's claims in a decision issued on February 25, 2021, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled from May 25, 2018 (the alleged onset date), through the date of the decision. R.pp. 15-24.
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on May 3, 2021, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner for purposes of judicial review. R.pp. 1-6. Thereafter, Plaintiff brought this action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's decision.
Because this Court writes primarily for the parties who are familiar with the facts, the undersigned dispenses with a lengthy recitation of the medical history from the relevant period. To the extent specific records or information are relevant to or at issue in this case, they are addressed within the Discussion section below.
B. ALJ's Decision
The ALJ found, in pertinent part:
1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2022.
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 25, 2018, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.).
3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: diabetes mellitus, obesity, asthma, rheumatoid arthritis, fibromyalgia, degenerative disc disease, and osteoarthritis (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).
4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).
5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the [ALJ] finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) ... but she cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; she must avoid working at unprotected heights; and she must avoid concentrated exposure to smoke, fumes, odors, dust, gases, and poor ventilation.
6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565).
7. The claimant was born on .and was 51 years old, which is defined as an individual closely approaching advanced age, on the alleged disability onset date (20 CFR 404.1563).
8. The claimant has at least a high school education (20 CFR 404.1564).
9. Transferability of job skills is not an issue in this case because the claimant's past relevant work is unskilled (20 CFR 404.1568).
10. Considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569 and 404.1569(a)).
R.pp. 17-24.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Scope of Review
Jurisdiction of this Court is pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court's scope of review is limited to (1) whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, and (2) whether the ultimate conclusions reached by the Commissioner are legally correct under controlling law. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Walls v. Barnhart, 296 F.3d 287, 290 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990)). Accordingly, a reviewing court must uphold the final decision when “an ALJ has applied correct legal standards and the ALJ's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.” Brown v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 873 F.3d 251, 267 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Substantial evidence” is an evidentiary standard that is not high: it is “more than a mere scintilla” and means only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). A reviewing court does not reweigh conflicts in evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012). “Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [ALJ].” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, this limited review does not mean the findings of an ALJ are to be mechanically accepted, as the “statutorily granted review contemplates more than an uncritical rubber stamping of the administrative action.” Howard v. Saul, 408 F.Supp.3d 721, 725-26 (D.S.C. 2019) (quoting Flack v. Cohen, 413 F.2d 278, 279 (4th Cir. 1969)).
B. Social Security Disability Evaluation Process
To be considered “disabled” within the meaning of the Social Security Act, a claimant must show that she has an impairment or combination of impairments which prevent her from engaging in all substantial gainful activity for which she is qualified by her age, education, experience, and functional capacity, and which has lasted or could reasonably be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423. The Social Security Administration established a five-step sequential procedure in order to evaluate whether an individual is disabled for purposes of receiving DIB. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634-35 (4th Cir. 2015) (outlining the questions asked in the five-step procedure). The burden rests with the claimant to make the necessary showings at each of the first four steps to prove disability. Mascio, 780 F.3d at 634-35. If the claimant fails to carry her burden, she is found not disabled. Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 861 (4th Cir. 2017). If the claimant is successful at each of the first four steps, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Id.
At the first step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged disability onset date. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has an impairment or combination of impairments that meet the regulations' severity and duration requirements. Id. § 404.1520(c). At step three, the ALJ considers whether the severe impairment meets the criteria of an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P (the “Listings”) or is equal to a listed impairment. If so, the claimant is automatically eligible for benefits; if not, before moving on to step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC). Id. § 404.1520(d), (e); Lewis, 858 F.3d at 861.
The RFC is “the most the claimant can still do despite physical and mental limitations that affect her ability to work.”Mascio, 780 F.3d at 635 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
At step four, the ALJ determines whether, despite the severe impairment, the claimant retains the RFC to perform her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e), (f). If the ALJ finds the claimant capable of performing her past relevant work, she is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(f). If the requirements to perform the claimant's past relevant work exceed her RFC, then the ALJ goes on to the final step.
At step five, the burden of proof shifts to the Social Security Administration to show that the claimant can perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and RFC. Id. § 404.1520(g);Mascio, 780 F.3d at 634-35. Typically, the Commissioner offers this evidence through the testimony of a vocational expert answering hypotheticals that incorporate the claimant's limitations. Mascio, 780 F.3d at 635. “If the Commissioner meets her burden, the ALJ finds the claimant not disabled and denies the application for benefits.” Id.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ violated Fourth Circuit law by evaluating her severe fibromyalgia pursuant to an erroneous legal standard, failed to account for her severe arthritis and osteoarthritis in the RFC finding, erred in finding that her carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS) was not severe, and ignored evidence from treating rheumatologist Dr. Wendy Lee. She also argues that the ALJ committed reversible error because the adjudicatory process was unconstitutional.
Plaintiff contends that a statutory restriction on removing the Commissioner is unconstitutional (because it violates the separation of powers) such that the presiding Commissioner at the time of the decision in this case was unconstitutionally appointed and had no constitutional authority to issue the regulations promulgated during that time.
After careful review and consideration of the record and the arguments presented, for the reasons set forth below, the undersigned finds that it is unclear from the decision whether the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff's fibromyalgia, thereby requiring reversal of the decision with remand for further consideration.
A. Fibromyalgia
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by not citing SSR 12-2p and by failing to analyze her fibromyalgia in accordance with this Ruling. She also argues that the ALJ's decision is in violation of Fourth Circuit law as articulated in Arakas v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 983 F.3d 83, 96 (4th Cir. 2020) because the ALJ discredited her subjective complaints regarding fibromyalgia based on a lack of objective evidence substantiating them.
1. Assessing RFC
In determining a claimant's RFC, an ALJ must “consider all of the claimant's ‘physical and mental impairments, severe and otherwise, and determine, on a function-by-function basis, how they affect [the claimant's] ability to work.'” Thomas v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 307, 311 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 188 (4th Cir. 2016)). “‘Only after such a function-by-function analysis may an ALJ express RFC in terms of the exertional levels of work' of which he believes the claimant to be capable.” Dowling v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 986 F.3d 377, 387 (4th Cir. 2021) (citing SSR 96-8p) (quoting Monroe, 826 F.3d at 179) (emphasis added). Moreover, every conclusion reached by an ALJ when evaluating a claimant's RFC must be accompanied by “a narrative discussion describing [ ] the evidence” that supports it. Id. (quoting Thomas, 916 F.3d at 311) (alteration in original); see Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686, 694 (4th Cir. 2018) (explaining that “the ALJ must both identify evidence that supports his conclusion and build an accurate and logical bridge from that evidence to his conclusion”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). Thus, “a proper RFC analysis has three components: (1) evidence, (2) logical explanation, and (3) conclusion.” Thomas, 916 F.3d at 311.
2. Evaluating Subjective Statements
A claimant's statements are among the evidence the ALJ must consider and reconcile with her RFC assessment. “[A]n ALJ follows a two-step analysis when considering a claimant's subjective statements about impairments and symptoms.” Lewis, 858 F.3d 858, 865-66 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(b)-(c), 416.929(b)-(c)). “First, the ALJ looks for objective medical evidence showing a condition that could reasonably produce the alleged symptoms.” Id. at 866 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(b), 416.929(b)). The ALJ proceeds to the second step only if the claimant's impairments could reasonably produce the symptoms she alleges. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1) .
At the second step, the ALJ is required to “evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the claimant's symptoms to determine the extent to which they limit the claimant's ability to perform basic work activities.” Lewis, 858 F.3d at 866 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)). The ALJ must “evaluate whether the [claimant's] statements are consistent with objective medical evidence and the other evidence.” SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *6 (S.S.A. Mar. 16, 2016). “Other evidence” includes “statements from the individual, medical sources, and any other sources that might have information about the individual's symptoms, including agency personnel, as well as the factors set forth in [the] regulations.” Id. at *5; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3) (listing factors to consider, such as claimant's daily activities; the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms; medication and other treatment taken or received to relieve pain or other symptoms; any measures other than treatment an individual uses or has used to relieve pain or other symptoms; and any other factors concerning an individual's functional limitations and restrictions because of pain or other symptoms). Importantly, the ALJ is not to evaluate the claimant's symptoms “based solely on objective medical evidence unless that objective medical evidence supports a finding that the individual is disabled.” SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *4; see Arakas, 983 F.3d at 98 (“We also reiterate the long-standing law in our circuit that disability claimants are entitled to rely exclusively on subjective evidence to prove the severity, persistence, and limiting effects of their symptoms.”).
Pursuant to SSR 16-3p, the ALJ must explain which of the claimant's symptoms the ALJ found “consistent or inconsistent with the evidence in [the] record and how [the ALJ's] evaluation of the individual's symptoms led to [the ALJ's] conclusions.” 2016 WL 1119029, at *8. The ALJ must evaluate the “individual's symptoms considering all the evidence in [the] record.” Id.
3. Evaluating Fibromyalgia
The Fourth Circuit recently explained that fibromyalgia is “a disorder of unknown cause characterized by chronic widespread soft-tissue pain particularly in the neck, shoulders, back, and hips, which is aggravated by use of the affected muscles and accompanied by weakness, fatigue, and sleep disturbances.” Arakas, 983 F.3d at 91 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). SSR 12-2p governs the evaluation of fibromyalgia, and it explains that fibromyalgia is “a complex medical condition characterized primarily by widespread pain in the joints, muscles, tendons, or nearby soft tissues that has persisted for at least 3 months.” SSR 12- 2p, 2012 WL 3104869, at *2 (S.S.A. July 25, 2012). SSR 12-2p provides that fibromyalgia should be considered in the RFC based on a longitudinal record whenever possible because symptoms can wax and wane such that a person may have “bad days and good days.” Id. at *6. Courts have recognized that fibromyalgia “symptoms are entirely subjective,” and “[t]here are no laboratory tests for the presence or severity of fibromyalgia.” Arakas, 983 F.3d at 91(quoting Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 306 (7th Cir. 1996)). Moreover, physical examinations usually yield normal results such as a full range of motion, no joint swelling, normal muscle strength, and neurological reactions. Id. at 96.
4. The ALJ's Decision
In his decision, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff's representative reported Plaintiff tried to return to work but was unable to because of her diabetes, fibromyalgia, and chronic pain. R.p. 20. The ALJ then summarized Plaintiff's testimony:
The claimant testified she stopped working because swelling in her feet made it difficult to walk and back pain made it difficult to stand for 8 hours. She testified she started to drop things and became more of a hazard for herself, coworkers, and patients. She takes oxycodone 3 times a day. She takes insulin twice a day, but her blood sugar remains in the 200 to 300 range. She stated she cannot sit or stand for long periods. She testified she can stand or walk for half an hour before sitting down and that she can only lift up to 15 pounds. Her husband and 6-year-old daughter help her with the household chores. She can drive, but cannot drive long distances. She has to get out and walk around after driving for half an hour. She testified she would rather work and misses being around people, but nothing alleviates her pain.Id.
Review of the ALJ's decision reveals that he did not include any discussion of Plaintiff's testimony concerning her fibromyalgia. At the hearing, Plaintiff stated she had pain that went into other parts of her body (other than her back) because of fibromyalgia and she had knots in her muscles. R.pp. 38-39. With regard to taking Oxycodone three times a day, she explained she did that for her chronic pain issues, including fibromyalgia and rheumatoid arthritis. R.pp. 39-40. Plaintiff tried to take ketamine infusions for fibromyalgia, but the treatment caused more pain. R.p. 40. She also testified she is very forgetful at times because of her fibromyalgia and has to write things down or set a reminder on her phone. R.p. 41. Additionally, Plaintiff stated that her muscle spasms from her fibromyalgia “just come and go,” she did not “have to do anything to aggravate [the spasms],” working aggravated her muscle spasms, and she sometimes needed assistance to go up and down steps. R.p. 42.
After discussing some of the medical evidence of record (R.pp. 20-21), the ALJ found that claimant's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause “some” of the alleged symptoms (R.p. 21), but he did not identify which symptoms. He then concluded that Plaintiff's “statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision.” R.p. 21. The ALJ then wrote:
As for the claimant's statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms, the claimant has several impairments that cause pain, however, her alleged limitations are inconsistent with her treating provider's objective findings on routine exam. The claimant consistently is noted to have a normal gait and full strength in all her extremities. (Exhibits 12F, 13F, 14F, and 15F) The claimant has degenerative joint disease and rheumatoid arthritis, but her treatment regimen appears effective, as her rheumatologist has noted normal range of motion and no significant joint swelling or effusions in the most recent exam. (Exhibit 12F) The claimant's diabetes is uncontrolled, but she has not been fully compliant with her treatment regimen. Despite non-compliance, she has not required any urgent or emergent care. (Exhibit 14F) The claimant's activities of daily living of light housekeeping, driving, and ability to lift her 22[-]pound grandchild are also inconsistent with the claimant's alleged limitations.
R.p. 22.
The ALJ failed to cite to SSR 12-2 in his decision, which the Commissioner contends is harmless because there is no requirement that the ALJ make explicit mention of the regulation, if the decision complies with the regulations. The Commissioner also asserts that the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff's subjective complaints in accordance with the applicable regulations and caselaw.
Here, it is unclear that the ALJ followed SSR 12-2p by considering fibromyalgia at all steps of the sequential evaluation process. Although the ALJ considered fibromyalgia at step two by finding it to be a severe impairment, R.p. 18, it cannot be determined that he properly considered Plaintiff's fibromyalgia at the subsequent steps.
The ALJ explained why he found that Plaintiff's alleged limitations as to her degenerative joint disease, rheumatoid arthritis, and diabetes were not entirely consistent with the medical and other evidence (R.p. 22), but he provided no explanation as to why he found that Plaintiff's subjective complaints, including pain, about her fibromyalgia were not consistent with the evidence. And, as noted above, the ALJ did not discuss any of Plaintiff's testimony concerning her fibromyalgia. Thus, it cannot be determined from the decision that the ALJ specifically analyzed Plaintiff's subjective complaints of fibromyalgia.
The Commissioner may be arguing that the ALJ's general statement that “her alleged limitations are inconsistent with her treating provider's' objective findings on routine exam” or his discussion of the Plaintiff's other impairments indicates that he analyzed Plaintiff's subjective complaints about her fibromyalgia. However, even if it can be said that this constitutes an analysis of Plaintiff's fibromyalgia complaints, the ALJ appears to have improperly relied on objective evidence to discount Plaintiff's subjective fibromyalgia complaints in violation of Arakas.
The Commissioner asserts that because Plaintiff suffered from various conditions (including degenerative joint disease, obesity, diabetes, osteoarthritis, and rheumatoid arthritis) with symptoms that overlapped with her fibromyalgia symptoms, the ALJ did not err by noting objective testing performed by Plaintiff's treating providers as part of her medical history.Additionally, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ did not rely solely on objective medical evidence, but also considered the effectiveness of her treatment regimen in controlling her pain, her ability to perform activities of daily living, and her partial noncompliance with her diabetes treatment. However, this argument fails because it cannot be discerned that the ALJ considered evidence other than objective medical evidence in discounting Plaintiff's subjective complaints concerning her fibromyalgia. Similarly, although the court in Arakas recognized the ALJ considered other evidence, including the claimant's activities of daily living, it concluded he “‘effectively required' objective evidence by placing undue emphasis on Arakas's normal clinical and laboratory results.'” Arakas, 983 F.3d at 97 (citing Green-Younger, 335 F.3d at 108). The court further wrote: “Thus, while the ALJ may have considered other evidence, his opinion indicates that the lack of objective medical evidence was his chief, if not definitive, reason for discounting Arakas's complaints.” Id. (citing Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 248 (6th Cir. 2007)) (noting that “the nature of fibromyalgia itself renders ... overemphasis on objective findings inappropriate”). The court joined the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth circuits in holding that “ALJs may not rely on objective medical evidence (or the lack thereof)- even as just one of multiple factors-to discount a claimant's subjective complaints regarding symptoms of fibromyalgia or some other disease that does not produce such evidence.” Id.
In arguing this, the Commissioner cites to R.pp. 823, 825, 835, 842, 903, 906, 908. These are all records from Dr. Vaidya and Dr. Fayayi Mbuvah of Elite Pain Management. However, only Dr. Vaidya's records in Exhibit 12F at 2-6, which are contained at R.pp. 823-827 and Dr. Mbuvah's record at 13F, 9, which is contained at R.p. 902, are referenced by the ALJ. See R.p. 21.
Additionally, it is also unclear that the ALJ fully considered all of the medical evidence as to Plaintiff's fibromyalgia. The ALJ's entire discussion of Plaintiff's medical treatment for fibromyalgia is that consultative physician Dr. Regina Roman assessed Plaintiff with fibromyalgia at an April 2019 examination (R.pp. 20-21), treatment records from Plaintiff's rheumatologist in September 2020 indicated fibromyalgia for which Plaintiff took Cymbalta and Flexeril, and Plaintiff complained in September 2020 of all over body pain that her rheumatologist opined was from osteoarthritis as well as fibromyalgia (R.p. 21). However, the ALJ does not discuss any medical evidence from Dr. Wendy Lee at Carolina Rheumatology or refer to Exhibit 9F (R.pp. 586-782) which contains Dr. Lee's records from both the relevant and prior period. Dr. Lee treated Plaintiff on multiple occasions prior to Plaintiff's alleged onset date (the record contains notes from Dr. Lee beginning in 2011) and on five occasions during the relevant time period.
Although Plaintiff was treated by two different rheumatologists during the relevant time period, the ALJ only refers to “rheumatologist” and, although he acknowledged that Plaintiff had a history of arthritis and fibromyalgia, he only discussed one visit to rheumatologist Dr. Pinky Vaidya at McLeod Rheumatology in September 2020. R.p. 21.
Some duplicate records of visits during the relevant time period are contained in Exhibits 2F and 10F. R.pp. 430-432, 786-801. The ALJ also did not reference any of these records in the decision.
On October 18, 2018, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Lee that she was having pain all over. A bilateral tender point exam for fibromyalgia was positive and Dr. Lee wrote that Plaintiff's fibromyalgia was “stable with medications and pain.” It was noted that Plaintiff tried Gabapentin and Lyrica for fibromyalgia, but experienced side effects; she had cramps in her arms and legs at night; and Dr. Lee suggested that Plaintiff increase Ambien at night. R.pp. 605-607. On January 16, 2019, Plaintiff reported that she had stopped working and was feeling better but still reported pain, swelling. and stiffness. Bilateral tender point examination for fibromyalgia was positive. R.pp. 602-604. On April 3, July 3, and September 30, 2019, Dr. Lee also found that Plaintiff's tender point examination was positive bilaterally. R.pp. 593, 596, 600. Dr. Lee noted that Plaintiff complained of the usual fibromyalgia pain at her visit on July 3, 2019. R.p. 595. Additionally, the ALJ appears, in large part, to have relied on the opinions of the state agency physicians in making his RFC finding. However, it appears that the state agency physicians only considered evidence from one of Plaintiff's visits (October 18, 2018) to Dr. Lee during the relevant time period. See R.pp. 69, 70, 73, 82-84. Because it does not appear that the ALJ fully considered Dr. Lee's treatment notes during the relevant time period, it is unclear that the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff's fibromyalgia in discounting Plaintiff's subjective complaints and in determining Plaintiff's RFC.
On May 8, 2019, state agency physician Dr. Cynthia Heldrich opined that Plaintiff could perform light work, with limitations to occasional climbing of ladders/ropes/scaffolds and frequent climbing of ramps/stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling, and crouching. R.pp. 71-74. On September 21, 2019, state agency physician Dr. Stephen Burge also opined that Plaintiff could perform light work with the same postural limitations as found by Dr. Heldrich. R.pp. 86-89.
Without further explanation from the ALJ regarding how he reconciled any inconsistencies in the record and reached his conclusions, the Court is unable to conduct meaningful appellate review of the ALJ's decision, such that remand is warranted. See Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700 (3rd Cir. 1981) (listing cases remanded because of failure to provide explanation or reason for rejecting or not addressing relevant probative evidence). While the ALJ may ultimately determine that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform substantial gainful activity during the relevant time period, in order for this Court to uphold such a decision as supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ must properly consider and evaluate the evidence and explain his rationale for reaching the decision sufficient to build “an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusions[.]” Monroe, 826 F.3d at 189 (internal quotation marks omitted); Bray v. Commissioner of Social Security Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Long-standing principles of administrative law require us to review the ALJ's decision based on the reasoning and factual findings offered by the ALJ - not post hoc rationalizations that attempt to intuit what the adjudicator may have been thinking.”). Thus, the undersigned recommends that this action be reversed and remanded to the Commissioner to consider Plaintiff's fibromyalgia, including her subjective complaints, pursuant to SSR 12-2p in light of all the evidence and applicable law.
B. Remaining Allegations of Error
In light of the recommendation to remand for further consideration pursuant to SSR 12-2p, the undersigned declines to address the remaining claims of error, as they may be rendered moot on remand. See Boone v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 203, 211 n.19 (3d Cir. 2003) (remanding on other grounds and declining to address claimant's additional arguments). However, as part of the overall reconsideration of this claim upon remand, the ALJ should consider Plaintiff's remaining allegations of error. See Hancock v. Barnhart, 206 F.Supp.2d 757, 763 n.3 (W.D. Va. 2002) (noting the ALJ's prior decision has no preclusive effect, as it is vacated and the new hearing is conducted de novo).
C. Remand Versus Award of Benefits
Plaintiff requests that this action be remanded to the Commissioner for an award of benefits. “Whether to reverse and remand for an award of benefit or remand for a new hearing rests within the sound discretion of the district court.” Smith v. Astrue, No. 10-66-HMH-JRM, 2011 WL 846833, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 7, 2011) (citing Edwards v. Bowen, 672 F.Supp. 230, 237 (E.D. N.C. 1987)); see also Evans v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 1012, 1015 (4th Cir. 1984). When “[o]n the state of the record, [plaintiff's] entitlement to benefits is wholly established,” reversal for award of benefits rather than remand is appropriate. Crider v. Harris, 624 F.2d 15, 17 (4th Cir. 1980).
“The Fourth Circuit has explained that outright reversal-without remand for further consideration-is appropriate under sentence four ‘where the record does not contain substantial evidence to support a decision denying coverage under the correct legal standard and when reopening the record for more evidence would serve no purpose'” and “where a claimant has presented clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to benefits.” Goodwine v. Colvin, No. 3:12-2107-DCN, 2014 WL 692913, at *8 (D.S.C. Feb. 21, 2014) (citing Breeden v. Weinberger, 493 F.2d 1002, 1012 (4th Cir. 1974)); Veeney ex rel. Strother v. Sullivan, 973 F.2d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 1992). An award of benefits is appropriate when “a remand would only delay the receipt of benefits while serving no useful purpose, or a substantial amount of time has already been consumed.” Davis v. Astrue, C/A No. 07-1621-JFA, 2008 WL 1826493, at *5 (D.S.C. Apr. 23, 2008) (citing Parsons v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1334, 1341 (8th Cir. 1984)); Tennant v. Schweiker, 682 F.2d 707, 710 (8th Cir. 1982). “On the other hand, remand is appropriate ‘where additional administrative proceedings could remedy defects....'” Id. (quoting Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 763 (9th Cir. 1989)). Remand, rather than reversal, is required, however, when the ALJ fails to explain his reasoning and there is ambivalence in the medical record, precluding a court from “meaningful review.” Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288, 296 (4th Cir. 2013). Pursuant to the above standards, remand for further proceedings, rather than outright remand, is appropriate as there is not clear and convincing evidence that Plaintiff is entitled to benefits and additional proceedings may remedy defects in this case.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is RECOMMENDED that the decision of the Commissioner be REVERSED and REMANDED pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative review.
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).