Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Monterey County Super. Ct. No. M83263
RUSHING, P.J.
I. Statement of the Case
Officer Stephen McMahon of the City of Monterey Police Department (Department) sought a writ of mandate or permanent injunction preventing the City of Monterey, the City Manager, Fred Meurer, and the Chief of Police, Carlo Cudio, from taking disciplinary action against him. After a hearing, the court denied the petition, and Officer McMahon now appeals from that order. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1); Wong v. Ohlone College (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1382, fn.3.) He claims court erred in denying the petition, arguing that the disciplinary action against him was time barred under the one-year statute of limitations set forth in section 3304, subdivision (d) of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA). (Gov. Code, § 3304(d).
Government Code section 3304, subdivision (d) provides, in relevant part, “[N]o punitive action, nor denial of promotion on grounds other than merit, shall be undertaken for any act, omission, or other allegation of misconduct if the investigation of the allegation is not completed within one year of the public agency’s discovery by a person authorized to initiate an investigation of the allegation of an act, omission, or other misconduct.”
We disagree and affirm the order.
II. Facts and Procedural Background
On December 12, 1996, Starr Mooren (Starr) was murdered. Initially, Officer McMahon was the lead detective, and Lieutenant Leslie Sonne assisted him. During the initial investigation, Jodi Mooren (Mooren), the victim’s sister, was considered a primary source of information. According to Lieutenant Sonne, “get[ting] close to the family” and keeping people on their side was how the Department worked. After the murder, Ms. Mooren was extremely emotional and distraught and needed to be reassured that the investigation was proceeding, and both Officer McMahon and Lieutenant Sonne established friendly relationships with her. In particular, Officer McMahon empathized and comforted her, which created a “close friendship bond.”
By the spring of 1997, Ms. Mooren had moved to Las Vegas, and Lieutenant Sonne had taken over the investigation from Officer McMahon, who became a School Resource Officer. Lieutenant Sonne called Ms. Mooren regularly about the ongoing investigation, asking her about possible leads, answering her questions, and seeing how she and her children were doing. As a result, their friendship grew. Officer McMahon also called and e-mailed Ms. Mooren, and as time passed, their conversations expanded to include other aspects of their lives unrelated to the investigation. As a result, their trust and friendship also grew.
In 2001, Ms. Mooren told Officer McMahon that her husband Willy Tyquiengco (Tyquiengco) did not come home the night that Starr was murdered. Officer McMahon relayed this information to Lieutenant Sonne, who, along with Sergeant Bill Clark, decided to go to Las Vegas and arrest him. They asked Officer McMahon to accompany them because they knew the arrest would be traumatic for Ms. Mooren, felt an obligation to support her, and thought Ms. Mooren’s trust in Officer McMahon would make it easier for him be the one to tell her about the arrest and help her deal with it.
Immediately after the arrest, Officer McMahon went to Ms. Mooren and told her. She became hysterical and angry, and he stayed with her for the next two hours, by which time, he too was stressed and emotional. Lieutenant Sonne said that both she and Officer McMahon may have hugged Ms. Mooren before leaving her. Although Sergeant Clark thought that Officer McMahon may have gotten too emotionally involved, Lieutenant Sonne disagreed given the intense human drama and time he had spent with Ms. Mooren.
After returning to Monterey, both Officer McMahon and Lieutenant Sonne stayed in touch with Ms. Mooren, and Officer McMahon provided Lieutenant Sonne with supplemental reports about this contact and attaching e-mails that he had sent to her. One e-mail, written shortly after the arrest and which Officer McMahon had read to Lieutenant Sonne before sending, reflected “a great deal of emotion” between them over Mr. Tyquiengco’s arrest, and Officer McMahon closed by saying, “ ‘Love to you and the kids, Steve.’ ” Lieutenant Sonne did not consider the e-mail to be inappropriate given the fact that it had been an emotionally intense experience, Ms. Mooren’s life was “in shambles,” and Officer McMahon was at the time living with his girlfriend.
A couple of years later, in May 2003, Ms. Mooren called Deputy District Attorney (DDA) Ed Hazel, the lead prosecutor in the Starr murder case, and said that her boyfriend, Cade, might call him and claim that she and Officer McMahon had an “inappropriate relationship.” She explained that she and Officer McMahon had e-mailed each other, and although nothing had ever happened between them, her boyfriend thought so. DDA Hazel directed Mark Puskaric, an investigator for the District Attorney’s Office, to interview Ms. Mooren and Officer McMahon to see whether there was some sort of relationship and whether there were any other e-mails besides those that Officer McMahon had previously given to Lieutenant Sonne.
DDA Hazel also told Lieutenant Sonne about Ms. Mooren’s call and Investigator Puskaric’s interviews. Because the matter had personnel implications, Lieutenant Sonne referred DDA Hazel to Deputy Police Chief Tim Shelby and then personally advised Deputy Chief Shelby about Ms. Mooren’s call and the interviews. She told him that she did not consider Officer McMahon’s friendship with Ms. Mooren to be inappropriate, had no knowledge of anything like that, and opined that Ms. Mooren’s boyfriend simply failed to understand the types of relationships that build up during an investigation. Given Lieutenant Sonne’s report and because there had been no allegation of misconduct and because it is not unusual for a person to complain about an officer’s conduct toward a spouse or significant other, Deputy Chief Shelby considered it unnecessary to initiate a formal investigation by the Department. He was satisfied to let DDA Hazel proceed first and later determine whether a formal investigation was necessary. He then relayed information about the matter to the Chief Cudio.
DDA Hazel also asked Sergeant Clark whether he knew about any “sexual” type relationship between Officer McMahon and Ms. Mooren. Sergeant Clark knew that they had stayed in touch after the arrest but was unaware of any inappropriate conduct.
Investigator Puskaric interviewed Ms. Mooren on May 9, 2003. She said that she and Officer McMahon became friends during the investigation and stayed friends after she moved to Las Vegas. They e-mailed each other, and she sometimes told him about her family problems. This continued even after Mr. Tyquiengco’s arrest. She said that at one point, they wondered about “what would happen if they were to get together.” The subject was dropped and forgotten, and nothing ever developed or happened between them, and they were just good friends. However, she said that her boyfriend had seen some e-mails and got upset and jealous, and they argued because she thought he might do something to jeopardize the investigation. When asked about additional e-mails, Ms. Mooren said that her computer had crashed, and she lost them all. She said that because of time and distance, she and Officer McMahon’s friendship had ebbed.
On May 12, 2003, Investigator Puskaric interviewed Officer McMahon. He had known Officer McMahon for several years, did not suspect any deception, and considered Officer McMahon to be a truthful person. Officer McMahon said he began e-mailing Ms. Mooren after she moved to Las Vegas. At first they talked about the investigation, but as time passed, she would talk about her life, her children, and other things, and they became closer friends. Officer McMahon said he did not send her any romantic e-mails, but at one point, she brought up the subject of “getting together,” “ ‘What... if we got together,’ ” and they speculated about it. However, nothing came of it, and they were never romantically or physically intimate with each other. Officer McMahon said that at the time of those e-mails, he was already involved with another woman. Officer McMahon said there had been other e-mails, but he had not saved.
After his interviews, Investigator Puskaric reported to DDA Hazel that there were no additional e-mails, and as far as he could tell, there had been no inappropriate relationship, and there was no other information that DDA Hazel should know about. Later, DDA Hazel spoke to Officer McMahon himself. He knew that Officer McMahon and Ms. Mooren had developed a friendship during the investigation of the case, and when he asked Officer McMahon about the nature of this relationship, it was obvious what DDA Hazel wanted to know. Officer McMahon reiterated that nothing inappropriate had taken place, and there were no other e-mails he needed to know about. Because he had known Officer McMahon for years and had no reason to suspect that he was lying or concealing information, DDA Hazel concluded that notwithstanding the e-mails concerning speculation about the future, there was no evidence of an inappropriate relationship. DDA Hazel considered the matter closed.
Lieutenant Sonne learned that DDA Hazel had found no evidence of misconduct that might affect the murder trial or require further investigation. She then reported this to Deputy Chief Shelby.
A couple of years later, June 2005, Mr. Tyquiengco’s defense team renewed a previous request for all e-mails between Officer McMahon and Ms. Mooren. The court told defense counsel to interview both Officer McMahon and Lieutenant Sonne about the existence of any additional, undisclosed e-mails. The day before the interview, Officer McMahon called DDA Hazel and revealed that there may have been some e-mails of a “sexual nature,” but he denied that anything had ever happened between him and Ms. Mooren. The next day, defense counsel asked Officer McMahon whether he and Ms. Mooren had had a romantic relationship. He said no. Concerned about what the defense might know, DDA Hazel told Officer McMahon to prepare a memo fully describing his relationship with Ms. Mooren.
In the memo, Officer McMahon said that he liked Ms. Mooren from the beginning, and they developed a good friendship during the investigation that grew after she moved to Las Vegas. Their bond got stronger when Mr. Tyquiengco was arrested, and they continued to communicate after he returned to Monterey. She asked his advice about personal subjects, and he helped her deal with things unrelated to the investigation. After a while, they talked about what the future might be like when the trial was over and imagined getting together. Officer McMahon said he never considered his relationship with Ms. Mooren “ ‘romantic,’ ” and though they may have exchanged e-mails of a “ ‘sexual nature,’ ” they never had sex. After a while, they each pursued separate romantic relationships, and their musing about the future and communication tapered off and finally stopped completely. He explained that he had previously declined to mention the nature of their relationship because he did not think it was “relevant.”
On August 22, 2005, during Ms. Tyquiengco’s trial but outside the presence of the jury, Ms. Mooren testified that she and Officer McMahon developed a relationship during the investigation. After the shared trauma of Mr. Tyquiengco’s arrest in 2001, their conversations became emotionally intimate and sexual in nature, and they entertained the thought of getting together as a couple. Later, in February 2002, when she visited Monterey, they French kissed on three separate occasions, even though Officer McMahon was involved with another woman. At that time, Officer McMahon told her that they needed to wait until after the trial to pursue their relationship. However, Ms. Mooren returned to Las Vegas, their relationship waned, and she became involved with another man. Although they continued to communicate, it was just as friends.
Ms. Mooren then testified before the jury that during the months after Mr. Tyquiengco’s arrest, she and Officer McMahon became emotionally intimate. She said that he provided much needed support. They both would say that they loved the other in a way that meant more than as just a friend. She further admitted that when previously asked, she had denied that she and Officer McMahon had been physically intimate. She said she did not reveal that they had kissed until the trial.
In November 2005, the jury acquitted Tyquiengco. In December 2005, Ms. Mooren filed a formal complaint against Officer McMahon, alleging that he had engaged in unprofessional and inappropriate sexual conduct toward her during the investigation of her sister’s murder. In January 2006, Sergeant Ralph Tognetti of the Monterey Police Department notified Officer McMahon in writing that he was the subject of an investigation. Thereafter, the investigation commenced.
It is not clear from the record what effect, if any, Mooren’s testimony and information about her relationship with Officer McMahon had on the verdict.
In March 2006, Officer McMahon discussed the investigation with Lieutenant Phil Penko of the Monterey Police Department, who had known Officer McMahon for his entire career and considered him a “dear friend.” Officer McMahon said he was under great stress and feared losing his job. Lieutenant Penko tried to calm him by reminding him that even if the Department decided to take disciplinary action, he could appeal. Lieutenant Penko opined that if he were in the same position, he would “fight it all the way.” Lieutenant Penko also mentioned the one-year statute of limitations applicable to disciplinary actions and asked Officer McMahon how long the Department had known about the alleged misconduct. According to Officer McMahon, however, Lieutenant Penko said, “ ‘Look you need to fight this all the way, because they’ve known about this for years.’ ”
In May 2006, the Department notified Officer McMahon of its intent to take disciplinary action. After a hearing in November 2006, the Department terminated his employment. Officer McMahon appealed to Monterey City Manager, who upheld the action. In January 2007, he appealed to the Monterey City Council. In February 2007, he filed the instant petition to bar the disciplinary action. Before a hearing on the petition, the City Council affirmed the termination.
At the hearing on the petition, Officer McMahon claimed that the Department had known or should have known about the alleged misconduct in May 2003, but did nothing about it. Thus, he argued that the commencement of disciplinary action in 2006 was untimely, and the action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations. (Gov. Code, § 3304, subd. (d).)
The court rejected this claim and denied the petition. It found that Mooren’s initial heads-up call to Deputy District Attorney DDA Hazel in May 2003 was insufficient to trigger a duty to initiate a formal investigation. “Based on [Ms.] Mooren’s and [Officer] McMahon’s statement to [DDA Hazel] that nothing was going on between them, the fact that Ms. Mooren’s boyfriend never did call to lodge a complaint, and that [the Department was] already aware that [Officer] McMahon and [Ms.] Mooren had a close friendship, [the Department] reasonably determined that no Internal Affairs investigation was necessary.” The court further found that “[Officer] McMahon’s untruthfulness largely contributed to [the Department’s] decision not to pursue an investigation into his alleged misconduct.”
III. Standard of Review
“When a law enforcement agency investigates alleged misconduct by an officer employee, the procedural protections in [POBRA] balance the public interest in maintaining the efficiency and integrity of the police force with the police officer's interest in receiving fair treatment. [Citation.] The section 3304, subdivision (d) limitations provision promotes both policies. By encouraging prompt investigation of allegations of officer misconduct, it promotes the public interest in maintaining the efficiency and integrity of the police force. [Citation.] It promotes the police officer’s interest in receiving fair treatment by requiring the diligent prosecution of known claims so that police officers receive prompt notice of claims against them, can prepare a fair defense on the merits, and can marshal the facts while memories and evidence are fresh. [Citations.]” (Jackson v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 899, 909 (Jackson).)
“Discipline imposed on city employees affects their fundamental vested right in employment. [Citations.] When an administrative decision substantially affects a fundamental vested right, the trial court uses an independent judgment standard of review, examines the administrative record for errors of law, and exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence. The appellate court must sustain the trial court’s factual findings if substantial evidence supports them. [Citation.] This court’s review must resolve all conflicts in the evidence and must draw inferences in support of the judgment.” (Jackson, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 902.) Moreover, “we defer to the trier of fact on issues of credibility. [Citation.]” (Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 959, 968.) On the other hand, we independently determine questions of law where the facts are undisputed. (Evans v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 398, 407.)
“The date upon which an administrative agency discovers misconduct is a question of fact, as is the reasonable diligence with which the person authorized to initiate an investigation into misconduct acted. [Citation.]” (Haney v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1, 8 (Haney).)
IV. Discussion
Officer McMahon contends that the trial court’s decision is “against the weight of the evidence” and therefore constitutes a “gross judicial error” that compels reversal. However, this contention misconstrues the applicable standard of review. When the trial court reviews the disciplinary action, it reweighs the evidence, exercises independent judgment, and will find an abuse of discretion if the agency’s decision is “ ‘ “contrary to the weight of the evidence.” ’ [Citations.]” (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817; Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 32; Kazensky v. City of Merced (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 44, 52.)
However, on appeal from the trial court’s determination, we do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment on factual issues. Rather, we simply determine whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence—i.e., evidence “ ‘of ponderable legal significance,’ ” which is reasonable in nature, credible and of solid value. (Kuhn v. Department of General Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627, 1633.) Thus, where the findings are supported by substantial evidence, it is irrelevant whether, in our view, they appear to be against the weight of the evidence presented. (LT-WR, L.L.C. v. California Coastal Com’n (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 770, 795.)
In determining whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s factual findings, we find guidance from Jackson, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th 899 and Haney, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th 1.
In Jackson, a police officer (Jackson) made statements to his partner (Shaw), in which he threatened to hurt other officers and harm to the police department. On March 25, 1999, Shaw told his supervisor (Widman) that Jackson was having problems. On March 26, Shaw told a fellow officer (Bengtson) that Jackson had threatened to kill officers. On March 26 or 27, Bengtson reported this to his supervisor (Sciarrillo). On April 2, 1999, Shaw also reported Jackson’s statements to Sciarrillo. On April 12, 1999, Sciarrillo advised internal affairs about the statements. On March 31, 2000, the police chief issued an administrative complaint against Jackson. (Jackson, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at pp. 902-903.) On appeal, the court concluded that the one-year statute of limitations commenced on March 26 or 27, 1999, when Bengtson told Sciarrillo about Jackson’s threats, which constituted misconduct. Therefore, the complaint filed on March 31, 2000, was untimely. (Id. at pp. 910-911.)
In Haney, four police officers held a barbeque for two hours on a naval base on May 25, 1998. They should have been on duty and later falsified their daily activity reports. On May 27, Officer Cirilo learned about some officers having a barbeque from a security guard. Cirilo told Sergeant Foreman, who was the liaison between the police department and the base. Foreman asked Cirilo to find out whether the officers were from his department and later learned that they were. Foreman considered the barbeque a breach of protocol—i.e., a failure to get his consent—but not misconduct because the officers could have been on an extended lunch break or otherwise not on duty. Cirilo tracked down the names of the officers and reported them to Foreman but did not suggest misconduct or provide information about the falsified daily activity reports. In an unrelated matter on June 29, Foreman noted irregularities in the attendance reports by two of the officers who had been at the barbeque and wondered whether they were involved in a greater pattern of misconduct. He reviewed Cirilo’s report again and then looked at the daily activity reports for the day of the barbeque. He reported his concerns to a supervisor, who ordered a preliminary investigation. On July 3, the investigating officer concluded that the officers at the barbeque did not have permission to take an extended lunch break and had failed to deduct the extended lunch from their duty reports. He recommended that charges of misconduct be filed, and on July 24, a complaint was filed. (Haney, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at pp. 3-6.)
The trial court found that the misconduct was not discovered until June 29, when Foreman observed unrelated attendance irregularities by some officers and then connected those officers and irregularities to the barbeque incident. The court further found that Foreman could not have been expected to discover the misconduct any sooner. (Haney, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 8.) On appeal, the court agreed. It noted that before June 29, Foreman reasonably suspected only a breach of protocol but did not know facts that would have constituted misconduct—i.e., an unauthorized lunch break or falsification of daily reports. (Id. at pp. 8-11.)
With these cases in mind, we turn to the facts here. Clearly, the Department knew that Officer McMahon and Ms. Mooren had become friends during the investigation, and their friendship continued after Mr. Tyquiengco’s arrest in 2001. However, that fact does not suggest misconduct because Lieutenant Sonne said it was normal for investigating officers to become friends with witnesses, and she too became friends with Ms. Mooren during the investigation and continued to communicate with her after the arrest.
In May 2003, Ms. Mooren phoned DDA Hazel and said that her boyfriend might call and complain that she and Officer McMahon had an inappropriate relationship. However, Ms. Mooren said that her boyfriend probably misunderstood some e-mails, and she denied that anything had happened. In response, DDA Hazel had Investigator Puskaric interview Ms. Mooren and Officer McMahon. Each recalled an e-mail exchange during which they wondered what would happen if they got together as a couple, but both denied that anything had ever come of it. Ms. Mooren did not suggest that Officer McMahon had acted improperly toward her, and both denied that anything inappropriate had ever taken place. Both said they were just friends, and neither had any of the other e-mails that they had sent to each other.
Investigator Puskaric, who knew Officer McMahon, had no factual basis to think that Officer McMahon was lying, and after speaking to Officer McMahon himself, neither did DDA Hazel. Moreover, Ms. Mooren’s boyfriend never called to allege misconduct. Thus, because Officer McMahon was a well-respected veteran officer, whose credibility the Department had no reason to suspect, Lieutenant Sonne, DDA Hazel, and Deputy Chief Shelby accepted Officer McMahon’s statements. Finding no evidence suggesting misconduct, they considered further investigation unnecessary.
Later, however, in June 2005, during the trial, Ms. Mooren indicated for the first time and contrary to her prior statements that the relationship between her and Officer McMahon might have been romantic or sexual in nature. At that time, Officer McMahon denied that the relationship had been romantic, but he admitted for the first time that some of his e-mails might have been sexual in nature. Ms. Mooren then revealed for the first time that she and Officer McMahon had French kissed each other on three occasions; and at trial, she said that after Mr. Tyquiengco’s arrest, she and Officer McMahon became emotionally intimate in a way that meant more than just being friends. She also admitted that she had not revealed the kissing or extent of their relationship until trial.
Unlike the threats by a police officer in Jackson, which constituted actual misconduct, Ms. Mooren’s call to DDA Hazel in 2003 and Investigator Puskaric’s subsequent investigation did not reveal, or suggest, any actual misconduct. Thus, the evidence summarized above supports the trial court’s finding that in 2003, the Department neither knew nor reasonably should have known that Officer McMahon had engaged in an inappropriate relationship. This is especially so because both Ms. Mooren and Officer McMahon denied any impropriety and concealed relevant information. Under the circumstances, it was reasonable for DDA Hazel, Lieutenant Sonne, and Deputy Chief Shelby to believe Officer McMahon, given his position and credibility within the Department. (See South v. Wishard (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 276, 287 [“One to whom representations of fact are made and who believes them has a right to rely upon them. If they are such as to reasonably prevent him from making an investigation his failure to investigate is excusable”].) Indeed, after Investigator Puskarik’s and DDA Hazel’s interviews with Officer McMahon and Ms. Mooren, it would have been pure speculation to suspect misconduct. Thus, the evidence also supports the court’s finding that Officer McMahon’s efforts to conceal the true nature of his relationship significantly contributed to the Department’s decision not to pursue further investigation.
In addition, the evidence supports the court’s implicit finding that the Department did not learn of that misconduct until later in 2005, when, contrary to their previous statements, Ms. Mooren and Officer McMahon revealed that they had engaged in inappropriate romantic physical conduct. In this regard, the case is more like Haney. There, police suspected that the officers’ barbeque had breached protocol. However, because such a breach was not actionable misconduct, and the one-year statute of limitations did not commence at that time; rather it commenced later, when, after receiving additional information, police connected the barbeque to other unrelated and subsequent misconduct. Like the barbeque in Haney, Ms. Mooren’s call to DDA Hazel caused an initial investigation but did not reveal any actual misconduct, not even a breach of protocol; rather, the one-year statute did not commence until later, when Ms. Mooren revealed information that she and Officer McMahon had previously concealed.
Officer McMahon claims that it was unreasonable for DDA Hazel or the Department to believe that there was nothing going on between Ms. Mooren and Officer McMahon after Ms. Mooren said her boyfriend might call to complain and admitted that she and Officer McMahon had discussed a possible future together. As he see it, “Two people do not usually discuss their future together if they are not in a relationship and contemplating spending the rest of their lives together.” Thus, according to Officer McMahon, the failure to investigate “defies logic.” Indeed, he asserts that Lieutenant Penko advised him to fight the charges of misconduct because the Department had known about it for years and done nothing.
We consider it ironic that to avoid further investigation, Officer McMahon lied about his inappropriate relationship with Ms. Mooren and concealed important information about his e-mails; and now to avoid being fired for that misconduct, he complains that he was successful and blames Lieutenant Sonne, Investigator Puskaric, DDA Hazel, Deputy Chief Shelby, and Chief Cudio for trusting and believing him. In essence Officer McMahon urges us to draw an inference from circumstantial evidence that is inconsistent with the court’s implicit finding that, under the circumstances, it was reasonable for authorities to believe him and Ms. Mooren. As noted, however, the standard of review on appeal requires that we accept the trial court’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the judgment. In our view, the record supports the court’s finding, and the circumstantial evidence does not establish, as a matter of law, that in 2003, it was unreasonable for authorities to believe Officer McMaon’s and Ms. Mooren’s description of their relationship and conclude that there had been no misconduct.
Moreover, Officer McMahon’s reliance on Lieutenant Penko’s statement is misplaced. Lieutenant Penko did not admit to saying that the Department had known about Officer McMahon’s alleged misconduct or inappropriate relationship for years. Rather, he said that he mentioned the statute of limitations to Officer McMahon and then asked him how long the Department had known about the alleged misconduct. The trial court implicitly resolved this conflict concerning what Lieutenant Penko said against defendant, and we accept the trial court’s determinations of credibility.
Officer McMahon suggests that the initial interviews of Officer McMahon and Ms. Mooren by Investigator Puskaric were purposefully limited and failed to ask the sort of direct questions that would have clearly revealed the inappropriate nature of their relationship. He further claims that the Department purposefully delayed investigating more deeply until after the trial to avoid jeopardizing the verdict.
When Investigator Puskaric interviewed Officer McMahon and Ms. Mooren, there had been no allegation of misconduct, and the Department was aware that both he and Lieutenant Sonne had developed friendships with Ms. Mooren. Moreover, both Officer McMahon and Ms. Mooren volunteered information that they had speculated about the future. And Officer McMahon had submitted a proposed e-mail to Lieutenant Sonne before sending it to Ms. Mooren. Under the circumstances, it was reasonable for Investigator Puskaric to avoid an adversarial and accusatory approach during the interviews. Rather, he reasonably asked Officer McMahon and Ms. Mooren to describe their relationship and inquired about the existence of other e-mails. That he did not explicitly ask them if they had been romantic or physical toward each other does not establish Investigator Puskaric purposefully avoided uncovering the truth or was negligent in failing to do so.
Furthermore, given Officer McMahon’s and Ms. Mooren’s description of their relationship, responses to the questions Investigator Puskaric did ask, and denials of any inappropriate relationship, and their concealment of information to the contrary, we consider it unlikely that they would have answered more pointed questions any differently.
We also disagree that the investigation was delayed or otherwise put on hold until after the verdict. After Investigator Puskaric’s and DDA Hazel’s interviews, there was no factual basis for any further investigation and the matter was put to rest. Only after Ms. Mooren and Officer McMahon revealed additional information that they had previously concealed did authorities have grounds to reopen a matter that had been closed.
Officer McMahon argues that the court erred in basing its decision solely on the declaration of Lieutenant Sonne. First, the court did not state or suggest that it relied exclusively on Lieutenant Sonne’s declaration and testimony. Nor does the record suggest that it did so. On the contrary, the court’s decision is supported by statements from Lieutenant Sonne, Investigator Puskaric, DDA Hazel, Ms. Mooren, and Officer McMahon himself.
In any event, even if the court had relied exclusively on Lieutenant Sonne’s statements, we would find no error. “Except where additional evidence is required by statute, the direct evidence of one witness who is entitled to full credit is sufficient for proof of any fact.” (Evid. Code, § 411; Duncan v. Departmnet of Personnel Admin. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1174, fn. 6.) Officer McMahon cites no statute suggesting that additional direct evidence from another witness besides Lieutenant Sonne was required at the hearing on his petition.
In sum, we find the trial court’s decision to be supported by substantial evidence, and Officer McMahon does not convince us that, as a matter of law, in 2003, the Department knew or should have known that he had engaged in misconduct and should have initiated its disciplinary action against him within the next year.
V. Disposition
The order denying Officer McMahon’s petition is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: PREMO, J., ELIA, J.
All further unspecified statutory references are to the Government Code.