Opinion
No. COA22-292
12-20-2022
Thomas J. MCLEOD, Plaintiff, v. Sandra A. MCLEOD, Defendant.
¶ 1 Plaintiff Thomas J. McLeod ("Husband") and Defendant Sandra A. McLeod ("Wife") were married in 2006 and separated in 2013. After the parties separated, Husband commenced this action seeking equitable distribution of the marital estate.
¶ 2 In October 2021, after a trial on the matter, the trial court issued its order of equitable distribution. The trial court found an equal distribution to be equitable. However, the trial court determined that the nature of the marital assets and other factors did not lend itself for the marital assets to be distributed equally. Accordingly, the trial court distributed most of the assets to Husband and the remainder to Wife. Specifically, the trial court found the net value of the marital estate to be $195,521.99 and ordered certain marital assets valued at $141,300.00 be distributed to Husband and the remaining marital assets valued at $54,221.99 be distributed to Wife. To make up the inequitable distribution, the trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife a distributive award of $43,540.00 in three equal installments of $14,513.33, such that the net payment to both parties would each be $97,761.00.
¶ 3 Husband appeals from this order.
I. Analysis
¶ 4 On appeal, Husband makes one argument. Specifically, he argues the trial court erred by granting Wife a distributive award of $43,540.00, contending that the trial court incorrectly classified, valued, and distributed some of the assets. We affirm the trial court's order, concluding that Husband has failed to show reversible error.
¶ 5 We note that the order contains language which appears to be contradictory. Specifically, the trial court found that "an equal division on the marital estate is equitable" but concluded that "[a]n unequal division of the marital assets and debts is equitable." However, these provisions can be reconciled when viewing the order in its entirety. The trial court merely was stating that each party should be treated equally but that the assets could not be divided equally, necessitating the distributive award to even it out.
¶ 6 Husband contends that the trial court's handling of the marital home was erroneous. The record reflects that Wife owned the property prior to marriage, that a home was built thereon during the marriage, and that the property was encumbered by a loan in Wife's name. The trial court classified the home as separate property, but mistakenly identified "Plaintiff" (i.e., Husband) as the owner. The trial court found the home to be worth $135,000.00 with a debt of $140,000.00. Though the trial court found the home to be separate property, the trial court distributed (-$5,000.00) to Husband, apparently distributing a portion of the debt on the home to Husband. It could be argued that this "distribution" was error. Turner v. Turner , 64 N.C. App. 342, 346, 307 S.E.2d 407, 409 (1983) (the trial court does not distribute separate property). However, Husband has not shown how this error (assuming it was error) prejudiced him. If this negative $5,000 distribution to Husband had not been included in the order, the trial court would have found the value of marital assets being distributed to Husband to be $5,000.00 greater, which would have required the trial court to order a larger distributive award to Wife.
The parties stipulated that certain electrical upgrades made to the home during marriage were a marital asset to be distributed to Wife. The trial court made this distribution as agreed upon by the parties.
¶ 7 Next, Husband argues that the trial court erred by distributing a certain 2011 truck to Husband. We disagree. There was evidence that Husband continued to regularly drive and make payments on this truck. Additionally, Husband testified that he was the sole owner of this vehicle. For these reasons, the trial court did not err in its classification and distribution of this asset.
¶ 8 Husband argues that the Torino and 1951 Ford truck should not have been classified as marital property. For instance, he argues that the Torino was sold in 2013 prior to the parties’ date of separation in 2013. Wife contested this fact by presenting evidence that the vehicle was insured through 31 March 2014. Though there is evidence to the contrary, the trial court found that the car was still in Husband's possession as of the date of separation. We do not disturb this finding. See Chafin v. Chafin , 250 N.C. App. 19, 791 S.E.2d 693 (2016). Likewise, Husband contends that he had sold the 1951 Ford prior to the date of separation, testifying that he sold it sometime in 2012 or 2013, prior to the date of separation. Wife disputed this testimony. The trial court found that Husband was still in possession of the car as of the date of separation, and we likewise do not disturb that finding. Id.
¶ 9 Lastly, each party claimed that the other was in possession of the flat screen television. For this reason, the trial court placed the television in both parties’ columns with a value of $200.00 each. We construe the order as reflecting a distribution of the television to both parties.
II. Conclusion
¶ 10 Husband has failed to show that the trial court committed reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order of equitable distribution.
AFFIRMED.
Report per Rule 30(e).
Judges DIETZ and ARROWOOD concur.