Opinion
May 8, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Kramer, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
In December 1985, the plaintiffs and the defendants entered into a contract in which the defendants agreed to purchase the shares in a cooperative owned by the plaintiffs. Although they executed the agreement, the defendants never made the required down payment. On or about December 30, 1985, the defendants informed the plaintiffs that they were cancelling the contract. On December 13, 1991, the plaintiffs commenced the present action in which they sought damages for breach of contract. Subsequently, the defendants moved, inter alia, to dismiss the complaint as time-barred pursuant to UCC 2-725 (1). The Supreme Court granted the motion to dismiss and we now affirm.
"A contract for the sale of a cooperative apartment, in reality a sale of securities in a cooperative corporation, is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code" (Friedman v Sommer, 63 N.Y.2d 788, 789; see also, Weiss v Karch, 62 N.Y.2d 849, 850). Thus, contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, their action for breach of contract was subject to the four-year Statute of Limitations set forth under UCC 2-725 (1) and not the six-year Statute of Limitations contained at CPLR 213 (2) (see generally, ALH Prop. Ten v 306-100th St. Owners Corp., 191 A.D.2d 1; Silverman v Alcoa Plaza Assocs., 37 A.D.2d 166). Accordingly, since the plaintiffs' action was commenced more than four years after their cause of action accrued, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint as time-barred.
In light of our conclusion herein, we find it unnecessary to reach the plaintiffs' remaining contentions. Mangano, P.J., Miller, Pizzuto and Santucci, JJ., concur.