Opinion
Civ. No. 95-1344, SECTION "N".
January 20, 2000.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are two motions: (1) defendant's Motion to Alter or to Amend Judgment Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e); and (2) defendant's Motion for Stay of Proceedings to Enforce Judgment. For the following reasons, defendants Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment is DENIED, and defendant's Motion for Stay of Proceedings to Enforce Judgment is DENIED AS MOOT.
BACKGROUND
This case came before the Court for trial by jury on November 1, 1999. After a three day trial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff, Cecil McKenzie, in the amount of $64,000.00. The Court entered Judgment on November 3, 1999, in favor of plaintiff and against defendant, Harry Lee, awarding plaintiff costs and pre-judgment interest. Now before the Court is defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, wherein defendant requests the Court reduce the amount of pre-judgment interest awarded to plaintiff.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
While it is true that pre-judgment interest is not automatic in civil rights cases, it is "an element of complete compensation" to make a plaintiff whole. Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 558, 108 S.Ct. 1965, 1971, 100 L.Ed.2d 549 (1988); see also Hale v. Fish, 899 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1990). "The essential rationale for awarding prejudgment interest is to ensure that an injured party is fully compensated for its loss." City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div., Nat'l Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189, 196, 115 S.Ct. 2091, 2096, 132 L.Ed.2d 148 (1995) (recognizing the compensatory nature of pre-judgment interest awards in cases outside the context of admiralty suits). It is not awarded as a penalty, but "is in the nature of compensation for the use of funds" which a party had during the period of litigation. Socony Mobil Oil Co. v. Texas Coastal Int'l, Inc., 559 F.2d 1008, 1014 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Chaney v. New Orleans Pub. Facility Management, Inc., 1997 WL 76768, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 10, 1997) (explaining that failure to award pre-judgment interest on a back pay award would undermine the goal of making whole victims of unlawful discrimination in light of the time value of money). The award of prejudgment interest is within the sound discretion of a district court. See Hale, 899 F.2d at 404; see also Parson v. Kaiser Alum. Chem. Corp., 727 F.2d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 1984) (awarding prejudgment interest on back pay award in the context of employment discrimination).
Here, defendant asks the Court to reduce plaintiffs award of pre-judgment interest for periods of delay in bringing this case to trial allegedly caused by plaintiff or plaintiff's counsel. Defendant asserts that the trial date was continued on three separate occasions, resulting in an "extraordinary length of proceedings" caused by plaintiff's misconduct or other delays. Specifically, defendant contends that one delay resulted from plaintiff's counsel's alleged abuse of peremptory challenges which resulted in mistrial, and two other delays resulted from plaintiff's requests due to personal situations. In addition, defendant notes that the case was initially stayed pending the outcome of criminal proceedings.
The Court disagrees with defendant's characterization that plaintiff and his lawyers created "incredible delays" in the trial of plaintiffs claims. At the outset, the Court notes that defendant consented to the initial stay of proceedings. Moreover, the record reveals that defendant personally sought and was granted a continuance on at least one occasion. Defendant also consented to each additional continuance sought by plaintiff. Plaintiff's two requests for a continuance of the trial date resulted from unforeseeable and unpreventable personal situations. The Court is also aware that defendant's and/or defense counsel's calendar, in part, prevented rescheduling the trial date without further delay. Finally, the Court recognizes that the second trial of this case resulted in a mistrial simply because the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict. This result can be attributed to neither plaintiff nor defendant. Defendant's assertions to the contrary are simply unfounded, as defendant fails to set forth facts to establish, let alone suggest misconduct or impropriety on the part of plaintiff's counsel.
One request followed the premature birth of plaintiffs child, and the second request followed a death in the family of plaintiffs counsel.
The Court finds that the delays of which defendant complains do not constitute exceptional, peculiar, or improper circumstances. Thus, finding that it is not inequitable to require defendant to pay pre-judgment interest under the circumstances surrounding the delayed trial of plaintiff's claims, the Court concludes that a reduction in the award of pre-judgment interest is not warranted. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant's Motion to Stay Proceedings to Enforce Judgment is DENIED AS MOOT.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 19th day of January, 2000.
MINUTE ENTRY DUVAL, J. DECEMBER 3, 1999.