Opinion
No. 39387-5-II.
Filed: May 10, 2011.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Thurston County, No. 08-2-01425-5, Gary R. Tabor, J, entered May 29, 2009.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Armstrong, J., concurred in by Quinn-Brintnall and Johanson, J J.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Commonwealth United Mortgage purchased Devon and Cynthia McKenna's property at a trustee's sale. The parties sued each other, the McKennas seeking to void the sale and Commonwealth seeking to evict the McKennas from the property. The trial court granted Commonwealth summary judgment and ordered the McKennas to vacate the property. On appeal, the McKennas argue that the trial court erred by (1) consolidating their case with Commonwealth's without notifying them; (2) refusing their request for findings of fact and conclusions of law on the order denying their motion for reconsideration; (3) hearing argument from opposing counsel without the client present, thereby violating their right to confront their accuser; and (4) granting summary judgment when Commonwealth's motion was not supported by sufficient evidence. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
FACTS
The McKennas granted Commonwealth a deed of trust to secure a loan to purchase residential property in Yelm, Washington. After the McKennas defaulted on the loan, Commonwealth purchased the property at a trustee's sale. The McKennas, through counsel, sued Commonwealth, alleging defects with the foreclosure process and seeking to void the trustee's sale. Commonwealth also sued the McKennas for unlawful detainer, seeking a writ of restitution ordering the McKennas to vacate the property. The trial court consolidated the two cases with an order prepared by the McKennas' attorney.
Commonwealth moved for summary judgment and the trial court granted the motion in part, ruling the foreclosure sale was proper. Because the McKennas' remaining claims for breach of contract and Consumer Protection Act violations concerned damages, not the right of possession, Commonwealth moved for an order requiring the McKennas to vacate the property. Following a show cause hearing, the trial court granted the relief and issued a writ of restitution. The McKennas moved for reconsideration pro se and the trial court denied their motion. The McKennas appeal pro se.
Chapter 19.86 RCW.
ANALYSIS I. Consolidation Order
The McKennas first contend that the trial court erred by consolidating their case without notifying them. Although it is unclear which party initially moved for consolidation, the McKennas' attorney prepared and presented the order. "A lawyer appears in a trial as the representative and alter ego of his client," and is presumed to act and speak on his client's behalf. State v. Peeler, 7 Wn. App. 270, 274, 499 P.2d 90 (1972); see also Clay v. Portik, 84 Wn. App. 553, 561, 929 P.2d 1132 (1997). "The attorney's knowledge is deemed to be the client's knowledge, when the attorney acts on his behalf." Haller v. Wallis, 89 Wn.2d 539, 547, 573 P.2d 1302 (1978). Because the McKennas' attorney had notice of the consolidation order, we presume that the McKennas had notice as well.
II. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
The McKennas next contend that the trial court should have entered findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting the order denying their motion for reconsideration. But a trial court is not required to make findings and conclusions when ruling on motions. CR 52(a)(5)(B). Nor is a trial court required to make findings and conclusions simply because a party has requested them. See CR 52(a)(2). Accordingly, the trial court did not err by rejecting the McKennas' request for findings and conclusions in denying their motion for reconsideration.
III. Right to Confrontation
The McKennas next contend that the trial court erred by "allowing counsel to enter and argue case without [the] client present" thus, violating their constitutional right to confront their accuser in court. Br. of Appellants at 2, 4, 6-7. The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. See, e.g., State v. Darden, 145 Wn.2d 612, 620, 41 P.3d 1189 (2002). The right does not apply, however, to civil actions. Chmela v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 88 Wn.2d 385, 392, 561 P.2d 1085 (1977). Furthermore, a trial court can hear argument from a party's authorized representative in a civil action when the party is not personally present. As discussed above, we presume that attorneys act and speak on their client's behalf, and that the attorney's knowledge is also the client's knowledge. Haller, 89 Wn.2d at 547; Clay, 84 Wn. App. at 561; Peeler, 7 Wn. App. at 274.
IV. Summary Judgment
The McKennas next contend that the trial court erred "by not dismissing [Commonwealth's] claim." Br. of Appellants at 2. They phrase the issue as: "Whether the evidence on the record from [Commonwealth's] Attorney is valid on its own merits." Br. of Appellants at 2. They then argue that statements made by Commonwealth's attorney in briefing and argument are not evidence and are insufficient to support a summary judgment. They also argue that Commonwealth failed to base its summary judgment motion on any "depositions, admissions, . . . interrogatories, or affidavits." Br. of Appellants at 7.
Thus, the McKennas appear to be arguing that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because Commonwealth submitted no evidence in support of its motion. But Commonwealth did not simply rely on statements in briefing and oral argument; it produced an affidavit from the foreclosing trustee and numerous documents related to the foreclosure process, such as the deed of trust, notice of default, notice of trustee's sale, and trustee's deed.
The McKennas also argue that the trial court improperly allowed a "third party debt collector[]" to enter evidence into the record and that such evidence is not valid on its own merits. Br. of Appellants at 4, 6. They appear to be referring to the foreclosing trustee's affidavit. An affidavit based on personal knowledge is a valid form of evidence in a summary judgment proceeding. CR 56(e). The McKennas have not established that the trial court erred by granting Commonwealth's summary judgment motion.
V. Misconduct
Finally, the McKennas allege numerous instances of judicial and attorney misconduct throughout their briefing. The McKennas do not properly assign error to any of these alleged instances of misconduct or support these allegations with meaningful legal argument, citations to relevant authority, or citations to the record. Accordingly, we decline to consider them. RAP 10.3(a)(4); Saunders v. Lloyd's of London, 113 Wn.2d 330, 345, 779 P.2d 249 (1989) (appellate court may decline to consider issues unsupported by cogent legal argument and citation to relevant authority).
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
Quinn-Brintnall, J. and Johanson, J, concur.