Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-2020-CM
October 16, 2000
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff in this case, who appears pro se, has sued numerous defendants alleging various civil rights and state tort claims. The circumstances surrounding plaintiff's lawsuit involve plaintiff's purchase of allegedly bad gasoline on September 14, 1998 at a CITGO gas station owned by defendant Matthew Serrano. Upon pulling away from the gas pump, plaintiff's car stalled. Plaintiff returned to the CITGO gas station and demanded to see the store owner. Plaintiff was told that the owner was up the street at a Phillips 66 station, which defendant Serrano also owned. Plaintiff walked to the Phillips 66 station and confronted defendant Serrano. In the process, plaintiff also made statements to other customers regarding her purchase of allegedly bad gasoline. The police were called, and officers from the Olathe Police Department arrived. The officers arrested plaintiff, and plaintiff was charged with disorderly conduct, obstruction of justice, battery on a law enforcement officer, and fleeing arrest. This matter is before the court on defendant PDV America, Inc.'s motion to dismiss (Doc. 82).
• Standards
The court will dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim only when it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the theory of recovery that would entitle him or her to relief, see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Maher v. Durango Metals, Inc., 144 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 1998), or when an issue of law is dispositive, see Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989). The court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, see Maher, 144 F.3d at 1304, and all reasonable inferences from those facts are viewed in favor of the plaintiff, see Witt v. Roadway Express, 136 F.3d 1424, 1428 (10th Cir. 1998). The issue in resolving a motion such as this is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he or she is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
The court is mindful that plaintiff in this action appears pro se. A pro se litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally and are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). The Tenth Circuit has stated, "We believe that this rule means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so despite the plaintiff's failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements." Id. The court may not, however, assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant. See Van Deelen v. City of Eudora, Ks., 53 F. Supp.2d 1223, 1227 (D.Kan. 1999). II. Discussion
Plaintiff named PDV America, Inc. (PDVA) as a defendant in this lawsuit based on PDVA's relationship with defendant CITGO Petroleum Corporation (CITGO). The only allegation in plaintiff's amended complaint relating to PDVA states that CITGO is a subsidiary of PDVA (Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, ¶ 16). Defendant PDVA argues that it should be dismissed from this action because the court lacks personal jurisdiction.
Before a federal court can assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a federal question case, the court must determine that the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process and that an applicable statute potentially confers jurisdiction by authorizing service of process. See Peay v. Bellsouth Med. Assistance Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000). Under the due process analysis, the "constitutional touchstone" is "whether the defendant purposely established `minimum contacts' in the forum state." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewics, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). There must be some act by which the nonresident party purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). The purposeful availment requirement ensures that a defendant will not be sued in a foreign jurisdiction solely as a result of the unilateral activity of another party. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475.
In general, a holding company or parent company has a separate corporate existence and is treated separately from its subsidiary in the absence of circumstances justifying disregard of the corporate entity. See Quarles v. Fiqua Indus., Inc., 504 F.2d 1358, 1362 (10th Cir. 1974). Circumstances justify disregard of the corporate entity if separation of the two entities has not been maintained and injustice would occur to third parties if the separate entity were recognized. See id. (citing Garden City Co. v. Burden, 186 F.2d 651 (10th Cir. 1951)). Thus, if a subsidiary corporation transacts business in the forum state acting as the mere alter ego of the parent corporation, the court may consider the subsidiary's relationship to the forum state to establish jurisdiction over the parent corporation. See Cotracom Commodity Trading AG v. Seaboard Corp., 94 F. Supp.2d 1189, 1195 (D.Kan. 2000).
Plaintiff's only allegation concerning PDVA is that CITGO is a subsidiary of PDVA. Plaintiff is correct in that PDVA is a holding company which owns 100% of CITGO's stock. PDVA, however, submitted a declaration signed by its corporate secretary Jose Moreno, wherein Mr. Moreno declares that PDVA and CITGO are two separate corporations formed under Delaware law. The declaration further states that PDVA has never exercised control over CITGO beyond its function of sole stockholder; that CITGO at all times has been adequately capitalized; that PDVA and CITGO maintain separate books of accounts and other corporate records; that PDVA and CITGO have their own boards of directors and hold their own directors' meetings separate and apart from each other; and that the two companies have observed all of the corporate formalities called for by the corporation laws of the State of Delaware. Plaintiff does not dispute these declarations. Accordingly, the court finds that personal jurisdiction over PDVA is not present based on the bare assertion that CITGO is a subsidiary of PDVA. CITGO and PDVA have maintained a separate corporate existence and should be treated separately for personal jurisdiction purposes.
Interestingly, Mr. Moreno also declares that PDVA has no contacts with Kansas and that PDVA neither directs any commercial activity toward Kansas nor owns any assets in Kansas. In response, plaintiff asserts that PDVA has purchased two pipelines, one of which is called the Williams Pipeline and crosses Miami County, Kansas. Plaintiff also alleges that PDVA owns a refinery that connects to the Williams Pipeline. Plaintiff later states in her response that "the heavy crude that was then refined into gasoline and transported north to Olathe South Citgo where Plaintiff purchased it, was in their [PDVA's] control." The court is unclear as to whether plaintiff is alleging that PDVA actually refined and transported the allegedly tainted gasoline. Moreover, the maps of the oil pipelines which plaintiff provided offer no assistance to the court in deciphering plaintiff's argument. In any event, the court finds that, even if plaintiff could prove a set of facts showing that PDVA refined and transported the allegedly tainted gasoline, personal jurisdiction over PDVA in these circumstances is still lacking.
General jurisdiction lies when the defendant's contacts with the forum state are so "continuous and systematic" that the state may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant, even if the suit is unrelated to the defendant's contacts with the state. See Trierweiler v. Croxten and Trench Holding Corp., 90 F.3d 1523, 1533 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-416 (1984)). In this case, the alleged ownership of a pipeline that crosses the State of Kansas does not amount to continuous and systematic activity necessary to justify a finding of general jurisdiction. See Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. at 415-416.
On the other hand, specific jurisdiction lies where a defendant has purposefully directed its activities at residents of the forum and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities. See Kuenzle v. HTM Sport-Und Freizeitgerate AG, 102 F.3d 453, 455-56 (10th Cir. 1996). Thus, under World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980), personal jurisdiction may be present where a corporation delivers its products into the "stream of commerce" with the expectation that those products will be purchased by consumers in the forum state. As many courts have recognized, the stream of commerce rationale developed as a means for consumers injured by defective products to acquire jurisdiction over the manufactures in products liability actions. See Cunningham v. Subaru of America, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 132, 135 (D.Kan. 1986) (quoting Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. Costruzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta, 553 F. Supp. 328, 332 (E.D.Pa. 1982) (quoting DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, 654 F.2d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 1981))); see also Pacific Atl. Trading Co. v. M/V Main Express, 758 F.2d 1325, 1330 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1985); Nelson v. Park Indus., Inc., 717 F.2d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1024 (1984).
The jurisdictional analysis in a specific jurisdiction case must focus on the particular dispute giving rise to the litigation. Indeed, PDVA is not required to litigate all disputes in Kansas simply because it may be required to litigate some disputes here. As such, it is the contacts that relate to the subject matter of the litigation that determine whether minimum contacts exist.
This case is not a products liability action. Rather, this litigation arose out of plaintiff's arrest and the subsequent prosecution of her criminal case. Plaintiff's claims are limited to allegations that her federal civil rights were violated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985, the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, that her state civil rights were violated under Section 15 of the Bill of Rights to the Constitution of the State of Kansas, and that the defendants are liable for state tort claims of false arrest, assault and battery, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and the tort of outrage. None of these claims involves the purchase of tainted gasoline allegedly refined and transported by PDVA. As such, the court cannot conclude that plaintiff's litigation results from alleged injuries that arose out of or related to PDVA's activities in Kansas.
It appears beyond a doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of her theory that defendant PDVA is subject to the jurisdiction of this court in this case. The exercise of jurisdiction over PDVA does not comport with due process. Accordingly, defendant PDVA's motion to dismiss is granted.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant PDVA's motion to dismiss (Doc. 82) is granted. Defendant PDV America, Inc. is hereby dismissed from this cause of action.