Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-378, SECTION "K" (1)
February 27, 2004
MINUTE ENTRY
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc 13) brought by defendants Richard Stalder and Elizabeth Stogner and a Reply (Rec, Doc. 19) filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(a) submitted by plaintiff Donald McGee. Having reviewed the pleadings, memoranda, and relevant law, the Court GRANTS defendants' motion for reasons stated below.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff originally filed suit against defendants and others, including former Judge Sharon K. Hunter, on February 7, 2003 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1988 and the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, alleging that defendants and others violated his constitutional rights by falsely and wrongfully keeping him imprisoned, making a wrongful seizure of his person, and thus depriving plaintiff of liberty without due process of law. In Count I of plaintiff's Complaint plaintiff sues defendants in their individual capacities, alleging that each of these acts were done by defendants under color of law and the authority of their respective positions, and thus in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Count II, plaintiff sues defendants in their official capacities, alleging violations of Louisiana law pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 2315. Plaintiff seeks money damages and attorney's fees. At all times relevant to this action, defendant Richard Stalder was Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections and defendant Elizabeth Stogner was Judicial Administrator for the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans.
Plaintiff was incarcerated as a result of a criminal conviction obtained against him by the state of Louisiana on September 8, 1997, and plaintiff was sentenced in February, 1998. Due to a failed attempt to procure a trial transcript, Plaintiffs conviction was reversed on appeal by the Louisiana Fourth Circuit on July 26, 2000, and plaintiff's case was remanded back to district court for further proceedings. At no time after July 26, 2000, up until plaintiff's release on March 13, 2002, did plaintiff receive an opportunity for bail, nor was he timely re-tried within the one-year limit provided for by law. See La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 582. Upon expiration of the one-year period, plaintiff filed a motion in criminal court to quash the bill of information against him. Inaction from the district court led plaintiff to file a petition for writ of review with the Fourth Circuit which was granted on August 30, 2001. Plaintiff, however, remained in jail until March 13, 2002 when the District Attorney for the Parish of Orleans released plaintiff pursuant to an entry of nolle prosequi. On April 15, 2003, plaintiff filed an amended Complaint, suing defendants and others both individually and in their official capacities. Defendants Stalder and Stogner now move for dismissal of plaintiffs § 1983 claims against them, arguing that they are both entitled to qualified immunity under the law. Alternatively, defendants Stalder and Stogner ask the Court to order plaintiff to file a more detailed Rule 7(a) reply under the heightened pleading standard applicable when suing a public official in their individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as outlined in Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc). Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition, Rec. Doc. 14, to the instant motion on July l, 2003, arguing that (1) plaintiffs complaint is sufficient under Schultea such that a more detailed Complaint is unnecessary; (2) given the facts of plaintiff's claim as alleged, defendants are not entitled to a defense of qualified immunity; and (3) there exist sufficient facts alleged in plaintiff's complaint to show the requisite causal connection between the defendants and plaintiffs alleged constitutional violations such that dismissal is premature and discovery should be allowed.
On August 19, 2003, this Court ordered that plaintiff file a Rule 7(a) Reply addressing defendants' qualified immunity defense by September 2, 2003, pursuant to Shultea. Plaintiff complied with that Order, filing his Rule 7(a) Shultea Reply on the date ordered. The Court took defendants' Motion to Dismiss under submission on September 10, 2003.
II. LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is to be evaluated only on the pleadings; however a complaint sought to be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) may generally be amended to cure its deficiencies. Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1986). In testing the sufficiency of a § 1983 complaint, at issue here, the complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief. Watts v. Graves, 720 F.2d 1416, 1418-19 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1981)). However, conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent a motion to dismiss. Hingle v. Hebert, No. 99-1123, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7054 at *4 (E.D.La. May 16, 2000).
Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person withing the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
B. Official vs. Individual Capacity Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Eleventh Amendment
Although plaintiff sued the defendants in multiple capacities, the Court notes that the complaint and amended complaint fail to delineate what activities by the defendants were carried out in which different capacity. To eliminate confusion the Court has analyzed, based on the record before it, whether the federal claims as currently alleged can go forward against the defendants. To aid in this exercise a brief review over the relevant law is necessary. Because suits against state officials in their official capacity are essentially suits against the State, Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985), and States are not "persons" under the statutory language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a state official sued in their official capacity is also not a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dept, of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). Therefore a state official cannot be sued in their official capacity under § 1983. Will, 491 U.S. at 71.
However, personal-capacity suits which seek to impose individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken under color of state law are admissible under § 1983. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). Through enactment of § 1983, Congress sought to "give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official's abuse of his position." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961). Thus state officials can be sued in their individual capacities and be held personally liable under § 1983 if it can be shown that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right. Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25-31. Officials sued in their personal capacities, unlike those sued in official capacities, may assert personal immunity defenses such as objectively reasonable reliance on existing law or, as in the instant case, qualified immunity. Id. at 25.
When enacting § 1983, Congress did not, however, intend to violate the Eleventh Amendment and override state immunity. Id. at 30. While the Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court "by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury," Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663(1974), it "provides no shield for a state official confronted by a claim that he had deprived another of a federal right under the color of state law." Hafer, 502 U.S. at 30 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237 (1974); see also Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The Eleventh Amendment erects no barrier against suits to impose "individual and personal liability" on state officials under § 1983. Hafer, 502 U.S. at 30.
Upon review, plaintiffs first amended complaint reveals that defendants are being sued in their individual capacities under § 1983, and as such, under Ex parte Young, the Court finds no Eleventh Amendment bar as to plaintiff's claims. However, as stated above, when sued individually under § 1983, defendants are entitled to assert certain affirmative defenses, including qualified immunity. It is on this basis that defendants now move for dismissal of plaintiff's § 1983 claims against them and which the Court now considers.
C. Qualified Immunity as to plaintiff's Federal Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Pursuant to Fifth Circuit jurisprudence, because defendants base their motion on the defense of qualified immunity, this Court allowed plaintiff McGee an opportunity to file a Rule 7(a) reply to the defendants' assertion. See Reyes v. Sazan, 168 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that district court's failure to require a Rule 7 reply to a defense of qualified immunity was an abuse of discretion thereby vacating district court's grant of qualified immunity to arresting officers); see also Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Mahrous v. O'Brien, No. 97-1294, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5201 at *2-3 (E.D.La. Apr. 8, 1998). Public officials performing discretionary functions are generally shielded from suit unless it is shown by specific allegations that the officials violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which reasonable individuals would be aware. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 800; Shultea, 47 F.3d at 1431; Mahrous, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5201 at *3. Thus in order to survive a qualified immunity defense the plaintiff must allege particularized facts that support his allegations. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that when a defendant asserts qualified immunity, a plaintiff must respond by pleading "specific conduct and action giving rise to a constitutional violation") (emphasis added). While the Court must hold plaintiff to this heightened pleading standard, the Court does not require plaintiff to have anticipated this defense when drafting his original or even amended complaint (as was done in this case). Rather a separate pleading procedure has been developed, wherein plaintiff is first required to file a short and plain statement of his complaint which relies on more than mere conclusions and then, subject to the district court's discretion, file a reply specifically responding to the defendants' assertions of qualified immunity. Mahrous, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5201 at *4-6. In the instant case, the Court has previously ordered plaintiff to file such a reply and he has complied.
Prior to filing his Shultea reply, plaintiff contended that he has sufficiently articulated his factual allegations in his complaint, amended complaint, and memorandum in opposition to defendants motion to dismiss. The Court disagrees. In fact, contrary to plaintiff's assertions that his complaint is "clearly adequate" and sets forth in "extensive detail" the factual basis for his claims under § 1983 and Louisiana law (see Rec. Doc. 17, p. 3), the Court notes that plaintiff's amended complaint barely alleges a claim against defendants Stalder and Stogner at all. Furthermore, plaintiff's Shultea Reply is not sufficient to defeat defendants' motion to dismiss.
It is well settled that the qualified immunity analysis entails a two-step process. First, a court must determine whether plaintiff has alleged the violation of a constitutional right. Second, if the plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation, the court must decide if the conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law at the time the challenged conduct occurred. Causey v. Parish of Tangipahoa, 167 F. Supp.2d 898, 908. In his complaint, plaintiff alleges violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Eight, and Fourteenth Amendments in that defendants conspired with former Judge Sharon K. Hunter, a co-defendant, to falsely and wrongly imprison plaintiff, wrongfully seize his person, fail to set his bail, and deprive him of his liberty without due process of law.
Despite these allegations, the particularized details of defendants Stalder and Stogner's specific conduct in regards to plaintiff's travails are woefully absent from the complaint and Shultea Reply. Nowhere in plaintiff's Complaint or in his Rule 7(a) Reply does he allege personal interactions with defendants Stalder and Stogner; nowhere in plaintiff's Complaint or Shultea Reply does he allege that somehow, defendant Stalder, as Secretary of the entire Louisiana Department of Corrections and defendant Stogner, as Judicial Administrator for the Criminal District Court of Orleans Parish, were charged with the authority to set bail for plaintiff and failed to do so; nowhere does plaintiff allege defendants could have released him from prison personally and failed to so; and nowhere does plaintiff allege defendants had anything at all to do with plaintiff's arrest and or prosecution of his case. Defendants Stalder and Stogner are, quite simply, state administrators. State administrators, whether acting personally or officially, have no power to arrest, prosecute, set bail, imprison, or much less free, any prisoner. There is no law vesting them with the authority to do so and plaintiff has presented no evidence to the contrary.
Furthermore, as to the contention weaving through plaintiff's brief that defendants are also somehow responsible for their inactions on plaintiff's behalf, based on plaintiff's own Complaint this Court finds that defendants (or at least their departments) actually did act on plaintiff's behalf when it was within the scope of their respective authority to do so. plaintiff's Complaint states that on March 6, 2002 the District Attorney for the Parish of Orleans entered a nolle prosequi on the charges against plaintiff. Thereafter, on March 13, 2002, a mere seven days later, plaintiff was released from prison. Clearly plaintiff's release had much to do with the execution of the normal policies and procedures of both the Louisiana Department of Corrections and the administrative functions of the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court, and clearly these policies and procedures were followed and acted on by the defendants and their departments in plaintiff's case. Thus, even though plaintiff, by alleging violations of clearly delineated constitutional rights, satisfies the first prong needed to defeat the qualified immunity doctrine, the defendants would nevertheless be entitled to qualified immunity under the second prong because plaintiff's Complaint does not reflect that either defendant acted objectively unreasonably in fulfilling their specific duties as to plaintiff's case.
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges specific facts detailing plaintiff's personal experience only-it offers no detail for the claim that it was defendants Stalder and Stogner who actually were responsible. plaintiff's sole allegations in his Complaint against defendants can be found in paragraphs 15 and 16 of plaintiff's First Supplemental and Amended Complaint-namely that defendants were repeatedly notified to free plaintiff and took no action. Rec. Doc.3, ¶ 15-16. McGee's sole allegations against defendants Stalder and Stogner listed in his Shultea reply can be found in paragraphs 15(b), 15(c), 18(a), and 18(b), where plaintiff alleges that defendants Stalder and Stogner, as department secretary and administrator, respectively, were responsible for establishing policies that resulted in the violation of plaintiff s constitutional rights. Such allegations are not specific enough to support, a finding that defendants themselves acted unreasonably towards plaintiff. McGee's claims that defendants Stalder and Stogner are liable for the actions/inactions of their employees are incorrect. The Supreme Court has specifically banned § 1983 claims against government administrators premised on the theory of respondeat superior. Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 660, 691 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036 (1978). Without specific allegations of unreasonable acts committed by defendants Stalder and Stogner, plaintiff's claims cannot persist.
Because plaintiff has failed to support his claim with sufficient precision and factual specificity to state a cognizable claim alleging the illegality of the defendants' individual conduct at the time of the alleged acts, the Court must dismiss his claims on the basis of qualified immunity. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc 13) brought by defendants Richard Stalder and Elizabeth Stogner is hereby GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that final judgement dismissing defendants Stalder and Stogner be entered pursuant to rule 54(b).