Opinion
No. SC12–1761.
2013-05-28
Meryl S. McDONALD, Appellant(s) v. STATE of Florida, Appellee(s).
Meryl S. McDonald, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the summary denial of his successive motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. We have jurisdiction. Seeart. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. This Court affirmed his conviction and sentence of death on direct appeal in McDonald v. State, 743 So.2d 501, 507 (Fla.1999). The denial of postconviction relief was affirmed and habeas relief was denied in McDonald v. State, 952 So.2d 484, 498 (Fla.2006). This Court also denied McDonald's pro se motion for habeas corpus in McDonald v. McNeil, 991 So.2d 387 (Fla.2008) (table).
McDonald filed the present successive postconviction motion pro se, with appointment of standby counsel, raising numerous claims. The circuit court denied the claims as procedurally barred and untimely under the rule. McDonald was provided appellate counsel and this appeal ensued, raising claims under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
McDonald claims that the State failed to disclose an FBI report concerning analysis of DNA on a sweatshirt found in a motel room occupied by McDonald and his co-defendant, Robert Gordon. McDonald contends the report proves that the State's DNA expert who testified at trial gave false testimony that the DNA in a bloodstain on the sweatshirt matched the DNA of the victim. McDonald also claims that testimony accepted into evidence during McDonald's 2001 initial postconviction hearing proves that the State's DNA analyst falsely testified at trial that he personally performed the DNA testing. These are the same claims raised and rejected by this Court in Gordon v. State, 97 So.3d 823, 2012 WL 2684516, *1–2 (Fla. July 3, 2012) (table).
The circuit court concluded, based on the files and records before the court, McDonald's successive motion filed more than one year after he discovered or could have discovered with due diligence the facts upon which his claims relied was untimely under the rule. See Byrd v. State, 14 So.3d 921, 924 (Fla.2009) (“Claims of newly discovered evidence must be brought within a year of the date the evidence was or could have been discovered through due diligence .”) (citing Glock v. Moore, 776 So.2d 243, 251 (Fla.2001)). We agree that the record supports this finding. All the evidence upon which McDonald relies was known to him or his counsel, or was discoverable by due diligence, in 2002 or earlier. We also conclude that even if his claims were not procedurally barred under the rule, the claims are conclusively refuted by the record and without merit. The preliminary FBI report cited by McDonald, even if not disclosed to him until after his trial, does not establish that the FBI agent who testified as to the DNA match lied at trial. Instead, the report states that the processing was not complete as of that date. In addition, the testimony of the DNA expert admitted at the evidentiary hearing in his first postconviction proceeding fails to establish that the State's expert DNA witness who testified at trial lied about personally performing the analysis. Moreover, the defense expert agreed that the analysis correctly matched the bloodstain to the victim.
Accordingly, the trial court's denial of postconviction relief on all claims is hereby affirmed.