Opinion
No. 2019-C-01949
02-26-2020
Richard MCDONALD v. CITY OF BASTROP
PER CURIAM
No evidence as to why the City failed to pay the judgment rendered in favor of the applicant was introduced by the defense in this case. Based on a thorough analysis of intent, the length of time that had passed, and the fact that the City had received at least two reminders from the applicant's attorney, the Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ) found that the City willfully refused to pay the judgment at issue. Although the record fully supports this conclusion, the court of appeal found manifestly erroneous the WCJ's finding of a willful refusal to pay. Specifically, although the appellate court acknowledged that the City refused to pay the judgment even after its receipt of at least two reminders, the court nevertheless found that the failure to pay was a result of the City's "gross negligence," as opposed to its willful refusal.
A finding that an employer willfully refused to pay is one of fact to be reviewed under the manifest error standard of review. Eglin v. United Gas Pipeline , 1995-721 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1/24/96), 670 So.2d 250. Under that standard, the reviewing court must determine whether the inferences and conclusions were reasonable in light of the record. If so, the court may not reverse, even if convinced that it would have weighed the evidence differently. Stobart v. State through Dept. of Transp. and Development , 617 So.2d 880, 882–83 (La. 1993). As previously noted, the defense introduced no evidence at the hearing. Rather, presumably based solely on the argument of counsel, the court of appeal found that the City's "immediate" payment of the judgment upon the applicant's filing of the motion to accelerate benefits evidenced that the failure to pay merely resulted from "gross negligence," and not willful refusal. However, this precise argument was squarely rejected in Lytell v. Strickland Transp. Co., Inc. , 373 So.2d 138 (La. 1979) :
The statutory penalty was not intended to permit an employer who has previously willfully refused to pay compensation awarded by an executory judgment, despite demand, for at least six successive weeks so to escape the penalty's application. To so excuse the employer's willful failure to pay a disabled employee weekly compensation previously ordered by an executory judgment would [be] contrary to the statutory intention of providing a substantial penalty for such conduct [and] merely permit a recalcitrant employer periodically to withhold payment of weekly compensation until a penalty-rule was filed, and then escape the intended penalty by bringing compensation up to date each time a rule to invoke the penalty is filed by the unpaid disabled workman. Lytell v. Strickland Transp. Co., Inc. , 373 So.2d at 144.
As such, the court of appeal erred in reversing the judgment of the WCJ. The ruling of the court of appeal is therefore reversed, and the judgment of the WCJ is reinstated.