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McDicken v. McDicken

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Mar 4, 1985
109 A.D.2d 734 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)

Opinion

March 4, 1985

Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Vitale, J.).


Judgment modified, on the law and the facts, by (1) deleting therefrom (a) the fifth and sixth decretal paragraphs which granted defendant sole and exclusive title to and ownership of the shares of MHE Products Corporation and two Jaguars, (b) so much of the fourth decretal paragraph awarding plaintiff exclusive occupancy of the marital domicile as awarded such occupancy "until such time as this Court shall otherwise order" and (c) so much of the third decretal paragraph as ordered defendant to pay $200 per week to plaintiff as maintenance, and (2) adding provisions (a) that the Jaguars and defendant's interest in MHE are marital property subject to equitable distribution and (b) that plaintiff's exclusive occupancy of the marital domicile is to end when the parties' youngest child reaches 21 years of age or is otherwise emancipated, at which time the home is to be sold and the proceeds divided equally between the parties. As so modified, judgment affirmed, insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements, and matter remitted to Special Term for further proceedings in accordance herewith. In the interim, defendant shall pay $200 to plaintiff as maintenance, and shall pay the carrying charges on the marital dwelling, exclusive of telephone charges.

Special Term erred when it stated that the two Jaguar automobiles and defendant's share of a business started by him and two other partners were not subject to equitable distribution. Inasmuch as the Jaguars were purchased and the business was started while the parties were married and prior to the commencement of this action, the Jaguars and defendant's interest in the business constitute marital property subject to equitable distribution ( see, Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [1] [c]; Litman v. Litman, 93 A.D.2d 695, affd 61 N.Y.2d 918; Reiner v. Reiner, 100 A.D.2d 872). That plaintiff made only minimal contributions to the business and the restoration of the Jaguars is irrelevant to the question of whether they are marital property ( see, Nehorayoff v. Nehorayoff, 108 Misc.2d 311). Under the circumstances, plaintiff wife was entitled to a share of those assets.

This court has the authority to determine whether marital property shall be distributed or a distributive award shall be made in lieu of, or to supplement, facilitate or effectuate a distribution of marital property ( Kobylack v. Kobylack, 62 N.Y.2d 399; Majauskas v. Majauskas, 61 N.Y.2d 481). As actual division of the business and the Jaguars would be impractical, Special Term should have made a distributive award to plaintiff ( Litman v Litman, supra). We are not in a position to make the award because insufficient evidence was adduced at trial concerning the value of the Jaguars and defendant's share of the business. In order to properly determine the value of these assets, it is necessary to remit the matter to Special Term ( see, Rubin v Rubin, 105 A.D.2d 736). After arriving at an accurate valuation of these marital assets, Special Term should make findings of fact in accordance with the factors enumerated in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (5) (d), determine plaintiff's equitable share of the value of the Jaguars and defendant's business, and effectuate a distribution thereof. Since that distribution may affect plaintiff's future income, Special Term should take it into account in fixing the amount of maintenance.

Upon remittitur, Special Term, in its discretion, may wish to make an award to plaintiff for the purpose of retaining an expert to assist her in ascertaining the value of her interest in the Jaguars and defendant's share of the business ( see, D'Amato v D'Amato, 96 A.D.2d 849).

Special Term abused its discretion when it ordered that plaintiff is to have exclusive occupancy of the marital domicile until "such time as this Court shall otherwise order". We modify the judgment and grant plaintiff possession of the marital premises until the parties' youngest child is 21 or otherwise emancipated ( see, Troiano v. Troiano, 87 A.D.2d 588). At that time, exclusive possession should end and the house should be sold and the proceeds divided.

At trial, defendant submitted a list of items which he claimed were his personal property which had been left in the marital domicile. Special Term erroneously failed to make a determination regarding the ownership of these items. Upon remittitur, Special Term should make such a determination.

We have examined the other contentions of the parties and find them to be without merit. Lazer, J.P., Mangano, Bracken and Niehoff, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

McDicken v. McDicken

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Mar 4, 1985
109 A.D.2d 734 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)
Case details for

McDicken v. McDicken

Case Details

Full title:EDITH S. McDICKEN, Appellant-Respondent, v. ANDREW G. McDICKEN…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

Date published: Mar 4, 1985

Citations

109 A.D.2d 734 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)

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