Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-CV-5742
May 20, 2002
MEMORANDUM/ORDER
Presently before the Court are Defendant Christopher DiPasquale's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Motion for Summary Judgment of all other Defendants, and Plaintiff's Joint Response. For the following reasons, the motions will be granted.
Defendant Christopher DiPasquale's Motion for Summary Judgment will be referred to as "DiPasquale's Motion" and abbreviated as "DiPasquale Mot." The Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of all other Defendants will be referred to as "Defendants' Motion" and abbreviated as "Dfdts.' Mot." Also, the decedent's name has been spelled alternatively as "Donte Dawson" and "Donta Dawson" in the papers submitted to the Court. Because "Donta" appears more often, I will utilize this spelling when referring to the decedent, unless directly quoting from a passage in which the alternative spelling is used, in which case I will use the spelling that appears in the quote.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Early in the morning of October 1, 1998, Philadelphia Police Officer Christopher DiPasquale shot and killed Donta Dawson, tragically ending a ill-fated confrontation that began when officers pulled aside Mr. Dawson's stopped vehicle to render assistance, and which deteriorated into an armed stand-off precipitated by Police Officer Kirk Dodd's mistaken belief that Mr. Dawson was in possession of and attempting to hide a handgun. Plaintiff Bobby McCurdy ("Plaintiff"), the father of the decedent, seeks recovery for a violation of his own constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
Approximately six months after the shooting, Cynthia Dawson, mother of the decedent and administratrix of the Estate, brought suit against the same Defendants named in the instant suit. See Dawson v. Dodd, Civ. A. 99-2644, 1999 WL 410366 (E.D.Pa. June 17, 1999). In her civil action, Ms. Dawson set forth claims for violation of her constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, violation of the decedent's civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and claims pursuant to the Pennsylvania Wrongful Death and Survival Acts.
On August 10, 1999, Defendants settled all claims brought by Ms. Dawson for the sum of $712,500.00. This Court approved the settlement, but denied Ms. Dawson's motion to determine distribution between Donta Dawson's potential heirs, without prejudice to the filing of an application to an appropriate state court for approval of the distribution. See Dawson v. Dodd, Civ. A. No. 99-2644 (E.D.Pa.) (Docket # 12). Ms. Dawson filed a state court action seeking distribution of the monies, and commenced abandonment proceedings against Plaintiff in an attempt to stop Plaintiff from sharing in the settlement. Plaintiff, the biological father of the victim, filed an objection to the proposed distribution of funds from the settlement for the Estate on September 20, 1999. The dispute over the settlement funds was ultimately resolved in the Orphans' Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, No. 1438 of 1999.
Before the Orphans' Court litigation was settled, Plaintiff commenced the instant action in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, on October, 26, 1999. Defendants, upon unanimous consent, removed the action to this Court, citing this Court's original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. On February 28, 2000, I dismissed Counts I — III of Plaintiff's Complaint, which sought recovery for violation of his son's constitutional rights and ordered discovery to begin on the alleged violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights, which constituted Count IV of the Complaint. See McCurdy v. Dodd, Civ. A. No. 99-5742, 2000 WL 250223 at *2 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 28, 2000).
During the pendency of the instant action, Plaintiff and Ms. Dawson reached a settlement of the state court action. The settlement, approved by the Orphans' Court
July 11, 2000, gave Plaintiff approximately $123,154.00, which was one-half of the proceeds of the remainder of the Estate under the Wrongful Death claim, brought by Cynthia Dawson in Dawson v. Dodd, Civ. A. No. 99-2644 (E.D.Pa.).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendants move pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To be successful, Defendants must prove that, in considering the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, . . . there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the [Defendants are] entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue is "material" if the dispute may affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law and is "genuine" if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). If, in response to a properly supported motion for summary judgment, an adverse party merely rests upon the allegations or denials in their pleading, and fails to set forth specific, properly supported facts, summary judgment may be entered against her. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Of course, a court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom judgment is sought. See American Flint Glass Workers, AFL-CIO v. Beaumont Glass Company, 62 F.3d 574, 578 (3d Cir. 1995). The substantive law controlling the case will determine those facts that are material for the purpose of summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
III. DISCUSSION
In Dawson v. Dodd, Civ. A. No. 99-2644 (E.D.Pa.), Ms. Cynthia Dawson brought a number of claims, both on behalf of herself and as administratrix of the Estate of Donta Dawson. The Sixth Count of her Complaint contained the Wrongful Death Action, which Ms. Dawson brought as administratrix of the Estate pursuant to the Pennsylvania Wrongful Death Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8301, and Pa.R.Civ.P. 2202(a). (See DiPasquale Mot. Exh. A. ¶¶ 94-97.) Specifically, Ms. Dawson claimed that:
42 Pa.C.S. § 8301 reads as follows:
(a) General rule. — An action may be brought, under procedures prescribed by general rules, to recover damages for the death of an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect or unlawful violence or negligence of another if no recovery for the same damages claimed in the wrongful death action was obtained by the injured individual during his lifetime and any prior actions for the same injuries are consolidated with the wrongful death claim so as to avoid a duplicate recovery.
(b) Beneficiaries. — Except as provided in subsection (d), the right of action created by this section shall exist only for the benefit of the spouse, children or parents of the deceased, whether or not citizens or residents of this Commonwealth or elsewhere. The damages recovered shall be distributed to the beneficiaries in the proportion they would take the personal estate of the decedent in the case of intestacy and without liability to creditors of the deceased person under the statutes of this Commonwealth.
(c) Special damages. — In an action brought under subsection (a), the plaintiff shall be entitled to recover, in addition to other damages, damages for reasonable hospital, nursing, medical, funeral expenses and expenses of administration necessitated by reason of injuries causing death.
(d) Action by personal representative. — If no person is eligible to recover damages under subsection (b), the personal representative of the deceased may bring an action to recover damages for reasonable hospital, nursing, medical, funeral expenses and expenses of administration necessitated by reason of injuries causing death.
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2202(a), titled PARTIES ENTITLED TO BRING ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH, reads as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in clause (b) of this rule, an action for wrongful death shall be brought only by the personal representative of the decedent for the benefit of those persons entitled by law to recover damages for such wrongful death.
• As a direct and proximate result of the defendants' wrongful conduct, those entitled to recover under the wrongful death act suffered and the defendants are liable for the following damages.
Funeral expenses for the decedent and all medical bills; Expenses for administration related to the decedent's injuries; Deprivation and injury as a result of the loss of the support, comfort, counsel, aid, association, care and services of the decedent; Such other damages as are permissible in a wrongful death action.
(See DiPasquale Mot. Exh. A. ¶ 97.) Ms. Dawson settled all claims brought in Dawson v. Dodd, Civ. A. No. 99-2644 (E.D.Pa.), against all Defendants for $712,500.00, in exchange for a General Release executed August 9, 1999. (See Dfdts.' Mot. Exh. B.) I then approved Ms. Dawson's petition for leave to settle that action, but denied Ms. Dawson's motion to determine distribution between Donta Dawson's potential heirs. See Dawson v. Dodd, Civ. A. No. 99-2644 (E.D.Pa.) (Docket # 12). As noted earlier, Ms. Dawson then brought abandonment proceedings in state court against Plaintiff, to which Plaintiff objected. Ultimately, the state court action was settled, the settlement was approved by the state court, and the action was dismissed. (See DiPasquale Mot. Exh. F.) In the Decree announcing the resolution of the state court action, it was stated that:
Plaintiff argues that "this Court has already addressed the issue of whether the general release executed by Cynthia Dawson on her own behalf in settlement of her constitutional claims, and on behalf of the Estate of Donte Dawson covered and released plaintiff/father's constitutional claims, in its ruling on defendants' 12(b)(6) motion." (See Pltf.'s Resp. at 14.) Plaintiff is partially correct, as a careful review of the relevant dates will reflect. The subject ruling denying Defendants' 12(b)(6) motion was issued February 28, 2000. The Plaintiff then settled the state court action with Ms. Dawson on July 11, 2000. (See DiPasquale Mot. Exh. G.) The issue at the time the subject ruling was signed was whether Plaintiff had a right to any recovery from Defendants, considering the fact that Defendants had settled with Ms. Dawson. Clearly, Ms. Dawson could not sign away any rights which Plaintiff had, without Plaintiff's approval or consent. However, the issue now is whether Plaintiff's settlement with Ms. Dawson — a settlement which took place nearly five months after the subject Order — extinguished the claims in the instant action. The timing of these events clearly distinguishes any determination made in the subject ruling, because, at that time, Plaintiff had not received anything from anyone in compensation of any claims he may have had arising out of his son's death. Therefore, the Court's present conclusion that Plaintiff is barred by his acceptance of money generated by operation of Ms. Dawson's settlement is not foreclosed by this Court's earlier conclusion that Plaintiff's rights were not subsumed by Ms. Dawson's settlement, because at the time of the earlier ruling, Plaintiff had not joined in any settlement or received any monies.
• The balance of funds on hand [, approximately $ 246,308.00,] to be awarded to the Wrongful Death claim on behalf of the Estate of Donte Dawson are to be distributed pursuant to statute. No funds are allocated to the Survivor action of the decedent inasmuch as [decedent] was rendered unconscious instantaneously and remained unconscious until pronounced dead.
(See DiPasquale Mot. Exh. F.) In accordance with the Decree, Plaintiff executed a release for the benefit of Ms. Dawson, in which it was agreed that the "balance of [the Estate in the approximate amount of $ 246,308.00] shall be allocated to the wrongful death claim and distributed to beneficiaries Bobby McCurdy and Cynthia Dawson, in equal shares, pursuant to the Intestacy Laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania." (See DiPasquale Mot. Exh. G.) Following the path of this money, Plaintiff therefore received approximately $ 123,564.00 as his share of the Wrongful Death Action brought by Ms. Dawson in the initial lawsuit, which was supported by the aforementioned allegations set forth in Paragraph 97 of Ms. Dawson's action.
The Orphans' Court Decree also awarded $256,000 to Ms. Dawson in settlement of her claims as filed pursuant to Dawson v. Dodd, Civ. A. No. 99-2644 (E.D.Pa.). (See DiPasquale Mot. Exh. F.) Plaintiff argues that this award compensated Ms. Dawson for the same type of damages which Plaintiff seeks in the instant action, damages for which he was not compensated by accepting money in the state court action. (See Pltf.'s Resp. at 15.) However, I conclude that Ms. Dawson's receipt of additional funds has no bearing on the instant action. This Court was not privy to the settlement negotiations between the parties to the state court action, and there is no specific legal explanation in the Orphans' Court decree detailing the reason for Ms. Dawson's additional compensation. Regardless, the issue before the Court is not whether Ms. Dawson was fairly compensated or over compensated, but, rather, whether Plaintiff is barred from pursuing a claim for loss of Familial Companionship by operation of Plaintiff's partaking in the settlement funds generated by the Wrongful Death Action.
In the instant action, Plaintiff's only remaining claim is for damages arising out of the allegedly unconstitutional deprivation of Plaintiff's liberty interest in Familial Companionship. Plaintiff alleges that he "was deprived of the care, comfort, aid, society, affection, support, companionship, services, maintenance, economic benefit, assistance and other interpersonal relationships which he would have received from his son for the remainder of his life." (See Pltf.'s Complt. ¶ 86.) A careful review of this language discloses that it is very similar — and, in places, exactly the same — as the language Ms. Dawson used in Paragraph 97 of her complaint in the initial action. It is quite clear that Plaintiff is attempting to recover, in the only extant claim he has against Defendants, for the same damages for which he was compensated by operation of his acceptance of one-half of the proceeds of the Wrongful Death Action brought by Ms. Dawson. Therefore, I conclude that Plaintiff has been fully compensated for his claim of "Loss of Familial Companionship" by partaking in those funds. Having been compensated once, he cannot be compensated again. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 122 S.Ct. 754, 766 ("As we have noted, it goes without saying that the courts can and should preclude double recovery by an individual.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The damages are the same, even though he proceeded in this action under a different legal theory. Accordingly, Defendants' motions for summary judgment will be granted, and Plaintiff's action will be dismissed.
Plaintiff argues that there can be no compensation for Familial Companionship under Pennsylvania's Wrongful Death Act, and that, therefore, he could not possibly have been compensated for damages associated with the loss of Familial Companionship by partaking in the funds generated by the Wrongful Death Action settlement. (See Pltf.'s Resp. at 9; see, also, Ehrman v. Mid-American Waste Systems of Pa. Inc., 39 Pa. D. C. 4th 235 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1998) (holding that, in a Wrongful Death Action, Plaintiff/parent can recover damages based on the loss of consortium of child); but see Estate of Mathews v. Millcreek, 45 Pa. D. C. 4th 376 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2000) (declining to follow Ehrman, and holding that a claim for parental consortium cannot be made under the Wrongful Death Act). However, it is not necessary to decide this issue in the matter sub judice. The issue in the instant case is whether a plaintiff can recover in an action upon certain allegations, after the plaintiff has accepted money generated by a settlement in a separate action, said separate action and settlement based on allegations substantially similar to the allegations plaintiff raises in his complaint. I conclude such a plaintiff cannot, and that the Plaintiff in the instant case is such a plaintiff.
Because I have concluded that Plaintiff has been fully compensated, I need not consider Defendants' other arguments. Furthermore, my conclusion is based solely on a comparison of the allegations in instant Complaint and the allegations found in Ms. Dawson's complaint, and are in no way intended to decide whether Pennsylvania's Wrongful Death statute provides the only remedy for collection of damages arising out of the unconstitutional deprivation of an individual's liberty interest in familial companionship. That particular area of the law is unsettled, and a determination on that issue is unnecessary for the resolution of the instant matter.
IV. CONCLUSION
Defendants paid and settled all claims brought by Ms. Cynthia Dawson inDawson v. Dodd, Civ. A. No. 99-2644 (E.D.Pa.), and received a release executed by Ms. Dawson in exchange for the settlement funds. These claims included the Wrongful Death Action brought by Ms. Dawson on her own behalf, on behalf of the Estate of Donta Dawson, and on behalf of all those entitled to recover under Pennsylvania's Wrongful Death Act. Plaintiff then accepted part of the funds attributed to the Wrongful Death Action, and executed a release. The claims Plaintiff pursues in the instant action for "familial companionship" are the same as the claims brought by Ms. Dawson in Dawson v. Dodd. Therefore, in partaking of those funds, Plaintiff's instant claims have been satisfied, and must be dismissed. An appropriate order follows:ORDER
AND NOW, this day of May, 2002, upon consideration of Defendant Christopher DiPasquale's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Motion for Summary Judgment of all other Defendants, and Plaintiff's Joint Response, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
Defendant Christopher DiPasquale's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED;
The Motion for Summary Judgment of all other Defendants is GRANTED;
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED in favor of all Defendants and against Plaintiff.