Opinion
SC-2023-0408
08-11-2023
Jerry K. McCullough v. Windyke Country Club, Inc., d/b/a LawnMan
Appeal from Limestone Circuit Court (CV-22-51)
SHAW, JUSTICE
Jerry K. McCullough, the plaintiff below in this contract dispute, appeals pro se from a judgment entered in favor of Windyke Country Club, Inc., d/b/a LawnMan ("LawnMan"), the defendant below. We transfer the appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals.
Facts and Procedural History
McCullough, acting pro se, filed a complaint in the Limestone District Court seeking to recover damages from LawnMan. As ultimately amended, McCullough's complaint alleged that he had hired LawnMan, a Tennessee-based lawn-care company, to service his lawn. According to McCullough, when he complained about LawnMan's performance, LawnMan canceled the parties' agreement without addressing McCullough's complaints. McCullough requested, among other things, that the district court either direct LawnMan to address all of McCullough's complaints or require it to pay $1,287 to the replacement lawn-care company, "Superior Services," that McCullough had hired to complete the lawn-care services for which he had originally contracted with LawnMan.
LawnMan answered, denying responsibility. Thereafter, the action proceeded to a trial. Upon the conclusion of that trial, the district court entered a judgment in favor of LawnMan.
McCullough appealed that judgment to the Limestone Circuit Court. He subsequently filed a motion requesting that the circuit court add as additional defendants certain agents and employees of LawnMan, as well as Superior Services and certain of its employees. He also sought punitive damages.
LawnMan filed a motion seeking to enforce a settlement agreement that purportedly had been reached between McCullough and LawnMan's counsel. The motion explained that, after the district court had entered its judgment, McCullough and LawnMan's counsel exchanged email correspondence. McCullough had apparently initiated another action in Morgan County against LawnMan, LawnMan's counsel, and "various other people and businesses." McCullough had also threatened to initiate more lawsuits. LawnMan's counsel sent to McCullough a settlement offer of $500 and a draft release that, if agreed upon, would release all claims by McCullough against LawnMan and its agents and employees. McCullough, it was asserted, agreed to the settlement terms. The parties were to meet to exchange the settlement funds for the executed release, but, before that could occur, McCullough refused to follow through.
LawnMan attached to its motion numerous materials, including, among other things, the release prepared by LawnMan's counsel for McCullough's execution, as well as copies of the parties' email correspondence discussing the settlement agreement. LawnMan requested that the circuit court enforce the agreement, require McCullough to produce the executed release in exchange for the agreed settlement amount, and dismiss the action with prejudice.
In a subsequent response opposing LawnMan's motion, McCullough moved to enforce an alternate settlement agreement he proposed and asked that LawnMan's motion be denied "on the basis that a final agreement was never reached." According to McCullough, after receiving the release from LawnMan's counsel, he consulted an attorney who advised him "not to sign [the] one-sided agreement." McCullough accordingly requested that the circuit court order LawnMan to execute a substitute release he provided and to pay to him $936, calculated as including the following: "Settlement amount $500, appeal costs $381, certified mail costs of $55."
Thereafter, McCullough, on the ground that "an amicable resolution of all claims ha[d] been reached," moved to withdraw his pending request to add Superior Services and certain of its employees to the action. The circuit court granted that motion. He also filed a motion seeking a summary judgment in his favor as to all the claims in his complaint.
The circuit court set LawnMan's motion for an evidentiary hearing. During that hearing, the circuit court received evidence and heard testimony. The parties also filed posthearing submissions.
On January 30, 2023, the circuit court entered an order rejecting McCullough's arguments and concluding that the settlement agreement first proposed by LawnMan was due to be enforced. The circuit court therefore granted LawnMan's motion to enforce that agreement and directed that McCullough execute the prepared release within 42 days. It also entered a judgment in favor of McCullough in the amount of $500, stating: "Judgment is entered in favor of [McCullough] and against [LawnMan] in the amount of $500.00. Costs taxed as paid." Because the judgment resolved all remaining claims as to all remaining parties, it is a final judgment. See Cox v. Parrish, 292 So.3d 312, 315 (Ala. 2019) ("A judgment is generally not final unless it disposes of all claims as to all parties.").
Although McCullough had filed a motion requesting to add certain agents and employees of LawnMan as defendants, the circuit court never granted that motion, and the record does not reflect that those agents and employees were served with process. Thus, they were never added as parties to this action for purposes of determining whether the circuit court's judgment is final. See Ex parte Harrington, 289 So.3d 1232, 1237 n.5 (Ala. 2019) ("A judgment that disposes of fewer than all the defendants is final when the defendants as to whom there has been no judgment have not yet been served with notice."), and GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Curtis, 279 So.3d 1171, 1175-76 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018).
McCullough filed a motion to vacate the judgment, which the circuit court denied. He appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, which transferred the appeal to this Court for lack of jurisdiction.
Discussion
After a review of the record, we hold that proper jurisdiction of this appeal lies with the Court of Civil Appeals. "'[J]urisdictional matters are of such magnitude that we take notice of them at any time and do so even ex mero motu.' Nunn v. Baker, 518 So.2d 711, 712 (Ala. 1987)." Thomas v. Merritt, 167 So.3d 283, 289 (Ala. 2013).
Section 12-3-10, Ala. Code 1975, provides for the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Civil Appeals:
"The Court of Civil Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction of all civil cases where the amount involved, exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed
$50,000, all appeals from administrative agencies other than the Alabama Public Service Commission, all appeals in workers' compensation cases, all appeals in domestic relations cases, including annulment, divorce, adoption, and child custody cases and all extraordinary writs arising from appeals in said cases."(Emphasis added.) That Code section further describes "the amount involved" as follows:
"Where there is a recovery in the court below of any amount other than costs, the amount of such recovery shall be deemed to be the amount involved; otherwise, the amount claimed shall be deemed to be the amount involved; except, that in actions of detinue the alternate value of the property as found by the court or jury shall be deemed to be the amount involved."(Emphasis added.)
The underlying action is a "civil case" and there was a "recovery" in the circuit court below of an "amount": McCullough was awarded a judgment in the amount of $500. That recovery is thus "deemed to be the amount involved." Because "the amount involved ... does not exceed $50,000," the Court of Civil Appeals has "exclusive appellate jurisdiction." The fact that the circuit court in its judgment also enforced a settlement agreement, which relief prior caselaw has deemed "injunctive in nature," Kappa Sigma Fraternity v. Price-Williams, 40 So.3d 683, 690 (Ala. 2009), does not alter the analysis: the judgment provided a $500 recovery, thus establishing an "amount involved" not exceeding $50,000. Therefore, we transfer this case to the Court of Civil Appeals.
APPEAL TRANSFERRED.
Parker, C.J., and Bryan, Mendheim, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.