Opinion
No. 111,304.
2014-10-10
Ronald McCOY, Appellant, v. Amber ATWELL, Appellee.
Appeal from Lyon District Court; Merlin G. Wheeler, Judge.Blake A. Shuart, of Hutton & Hutton Law Firm, L.L.C., of Wichita, for appellant.Michael J. Button, of Wallace, Saunders, Austin, Brown, & Enochs, Chtd, of Overland Park, for appellee.
Appeal from Lyon District Court; Merlin G. Wheeler, Judge.
Blake A. Shuart, of Hutton & Hutton Law Firm, L.L.C., of Wichita, for appellant. Michael J. Button, of Wallace, Saunders, Austin, Brown, & Enochs, Chtd, of Overland Park, for appellee.
Before BRUNS, P.J., PIERRON and POWELL, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Ronald McCoy was injured after he wrecked his motorcycle. He brought this action against Amber Atwell, claiming that she operated her car in a negligent manner and caused him to wreck. Atwell denied that she was negligent and claimed that McCoy's own negligence caused the motorcycle accident. At trial, the issue of comparative fault was submitted to the jury. After considering the evidence, however, the jury found neither party to be at fault. On appeal, McCoy contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying his posttrial motion for a new trial. Because we find no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
Facts
At approximately 1 p.m. on March 5, 2011, McCoy was driving his motorcycle southbound on Merchant Street in Emporia. It was a clear, sunny day, and McCoy was traveling at approximately the posted 30–mile–per–hour speed limit. As McCoy approached Highland Street, he noticed a white Ford Taurus—which was driven by Atwell—stopped at a stop sign. McCoy believed the car was starting to pull out onto Merchant—which did not have a stop sign or other traffic control device—and applied his brakes. When he did so, the motorcycle tipped over and skidded across the pavement before coming to a stop.
Fortunately, the motorcycle and the car never made contact. In fact, the evidence is disputed regarding whether Atwell's car ever actually entered Merchant Street. Although McCoy claimed that the car was sitting in the middle of Merchant Street blocking traffic following the accident, it was sitting on Highland Street when police arrived. Moreover, Atwell and her sister—who was a passenger in her vehicle—both said that the car had not been moved prior to the police arriving at the scene. In addition, both Atwell and her sister told police that the car never went onto Merchant Street and that it never pulled into the path of McCoy's motorcycle.
On June 8, 2012, McCoy filed a negligence action against Atwell seeking damages for personal injuries he allegedly suffered during the motorcycle accident. In response, Atwell denied that she was at fault and sought to compare the fault of McCoy. Ultimately, the case proceeded to a 3–day jury trial, which commenced on October 7, 2013. Although many of the basic facts were undisputed, the evidence was conflicting on the questions of negligence and causation. After considering the evidence presented by the parties, the jury found neither party to be at fault.
A journal entry of judgment was filed on October 25, 2013, and McCoy filed a motion for a new trial on November 20, 2013. The district court held a hearing on the motion for a new trial on January 15, 2014. After analyzing the evidence, the district court denied the motion, finding:
“ ‘I think the evidence is such that when you consider it and the inferences that you can draw from it as a whole, the jury very well could have concluded that the defendant's acts did not cause or contribute to the accident because there was no contact between the two vehicles.’ They could very well have accepted pretty much the testimony of the plaintiff in this case that, for whatever reason in his attempt to avoid striking the defendant's car, he lost control of the rear of the motorcycle and, simply, it slid out from underneath him ... with no contact between the two vehicles, that was not necessarily either parties' fault. And under those circumstances, I don't think that without simply me substituting my decision for that of the jury, which I'm not allowed to do, can I conclude that this jury's verdict was not supported in some respect by the evidence.”
On January 23, 2014, the district court entered a journal entry incorporating its ruling as set forth on the record. Thereafter, McCoy timely appealed to this court.
Analysis
On appeal, McCoy contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. It is within the discretion of the district court to grant or deny a new trial under K.S.A.2013 Supp. 60–259(a). City of Mission Hills v. Sexton, 284 Kan. 414, 421, 160 P.3d 812 (2007). Accordingly, we will not disturb a ruling on a motion for a new trial except upon a showing of abuse of discretion, which occurs when judicial action was (1) arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) based on an error of law; or (3) based on an error of fact. Miller v. Johnson, 295 Kan. 636, 684–85, 289 P.3d 1098 (2012).
When a party challenges a jury verdict for insufficiency of evidence or as being contrary to the evidence, it is not the function of this court to weigh the evidence or pass on the credibility of the witnesses. If the evidence, when considered in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, supports the verdict, we have been instructed not to intervene. Unruh v. Purina Mills, 289 Kan. 1185, 1195, 221 P.3d 1130 (2009). Likewise, “[s]pecial findings by a jury are to be construed liberally on appeal and interpreted in light of the testimony to ascertain their intended meaning.” 289 Kan. at 1196–97, 221 P.3d 1130.
“When a verdict is challenged for insufficiency of evidence or as being contrary to the evidence, it is not the function of the appellate court to weigh the evidence or pass on the credibility of the witnesses. If the evidence, with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, when considered in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, supports the verdict, it will not be disturbed on appeal.” Wolfe Electric, Inc. v. Duckworth, 293 Kan. 375, Syl. ¶ 12, 266 P.3d 516 (2011).
Here, McCoy argues that the jury's verdict was contrary to the evidence because neither party presented evidence showing that no one was at fault. McCoy recognizes that we are not to reweigh the evidence. Rather, he suggests that the evidence does not support the jury's findings. McCoy points out that each party made a claim of fault against the other in this case and this case does not involve an unforeseeable event.
The jury instructions listed the parties' claims as follows:
“[McCoy] claims that he was injured due to [Atwell's] fault in the following respects:
“1. Failing to keep a proper lookout; and,
“2. Failing to yield the right of way.
“[McCoy] has the burden to prove that his claims are more probably true than not true.
“It is not necessary that each of you agree upon a specific claim.
“[Atwell] denies that she was at fault, that her fault proximately caused the injuries and damages alleged by [McCoy], and that [McCoy] was injured or damaged to the extent claimed.
“[Atwell] claims [McCoy] was at fault in the following respects:
“3. Failure to keep a proper lookout; and
“2. Failure to keep proper control of his motorcycle so as to slow, stop, or turn aside to avoid the accident.
“[Atwell] has the burden to prove that her claims are more probably true than not true,
“It is not necessary that each of you agree upon a specific claim,” (Emphasis added.)
Additionally, the jury instructions correctly stated: “A party is at fault when he or she is negligent and that negligence caused or contributed to the event which brought about the claim(s) for damages.” (Emphasis added.) The instructions also correctly defined “negligence” as: “the lack of reasonable care. It is the failure of a person to do something that a reasonable person would do, or it is doing something that a reasonable person would not do, under the same circumstances.”
Hence, to conclude that one or both of the parties were at fault in this case, the jury was required to make two findings—a finding of negligence and a finding that the negligence caused or contributed to the accident or resulting injuries. Our review of the record reveals that both parties claimed that they were not negligent and that they did not cause the accident. Atwell and her sister testified that Atwell stopped at the stop sign and, although she started to pull forward, she never pulled out onto Merchant Street. Similarly, McCoy testified that he reacted in order to avoid a more serious accident.
Based on the conflicting evidence presented at trial, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have found both Atwell and McCoy's version of the events to be credible and concluded that neither party was actually negligent. And, without a finding of negligence, there can be no finding of fault. Furthermore, as Atwell points out, it is also possible based on the conflicting evidence that the jury simply determined neither party met his or her burden to prove the other party was at fault.
It is also important to note that the verdict form presented to the jury in this case specifically allowed for the finding that neither party was at fault. For whatever reason, McCoy did not object to the verdict form or otherwise argue that the jury instructions were erroneous because they allowed for the jury to find neither party at fault. In fact, on appeal McCoy continues to state that he has “no quarrel” with the jury instructions that were given.
Both parties cite Stremel v. Sterling, 1 Kan.App.2d 310, 564 P.2d 559 (1977), which involved a traffic accident between two vehicles that occurred during a snowstorm. While Atwell contends that Stremel supports a jury's right to find that neither party is at fault in a negligence case, McCoy contends that Stremel is distinguishable because the accident occurred during a “windy, snowy day and visibility was considerably reduced.” Further, McCoy argues that unlike in the present case, the jury in Stremel had evidence on which to rely to find no fault. Although the facts of Stremel are distinguishable from those in this case, the decision stands for the proposition that difficult questions of fact should normally be decided by juries. 1 Kan.App.2d at 314, 564 P.2d 559 (“This case was custom-made for a jury, and the jury reached its conclusion .”); see Deal v. Bowman, 286 Kan. 853, 857–58, 188 P.3d 941 (2008).
Accordingly, we will not disturb a jury's verdict if there is at least some evidence to support it. This is true regardless of whether we agree with the verdict reached or whether there is contrary evidence that—if believed by the jury—might have supported a different verdict. Here, we find that there is evidence in the record upon which a reasonable jury could conclude that neither party was legally at fault. We, therefore, conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying McCoy's motion for a new trial.
Affirmed.