Opinion
14-P-1130
06-03-2015
EDWARD MCCORMACK v. COLONEL, DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE & others.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff, Edward McCormack, appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court affirming an order issued by the colonel of the Department of State Police (department) denying McCormack's claim of injury. He contends that the decision of the Superior Court judge applied the incorrect standard of review and was not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
1. Statement of facts. In July, 2002, McCormack sustained a work-related back injury during a practical skills training exercise at the police academy. Subsequently, McCormack filed a claim of injury with the department's board on claims (board). The claim was approved on July 9, 2002. In April, 2005, the board approved a second claim of injury for McCormack related to his 2002 back injury.
In June, 2008, McCormack filed a third claim of injury related to his 2002 back injury. The board denied this claim and found that McCormack had fully recovered from his 2002 back injury. McCormack appealed pursuant to G. L. c. 22C, § 43, and following a hearing, the colonel upheld the board's denial of McCormack's claim. In February, 2009, McCormack petitioned the Superior Court for judicial review pursuant to G. L. c. 22C, § 43, and G. L. c. 30A, §§ 11 and 14. The judge ultimately denied McCormack's claims and entered judgment for the defendants.
2. Discussion. McCormack contends that the judge erred when he determined that G. L. c. 22C, § 43, and not G. L. c. 30A, § 14, provided the relevant standard of review. Even if we were to agree, however, reading the judge's decision as a whole, we conclude that this alleged error was inconsequential as the judge ultimately correctly determined that "under either the Section 43 arbitrary and capricious . . . standard or the substantial evidence standard of c. 30A, the administrative record here satisfies the defendants' burden."
3. Substantial evidence. A finding is based on substantial evidence if a reasonable mind might accept the evidence as adequate to support a conclusion. G. L. c. 30A, § 1(6). Here, the colonel's denial of McCormack's third claim of injury was supported by substantial evidence. See Cobble v. Commissioner of the Dept. of Social Servs., 430 Mass. 385, 391 (1999); Bickford v. Colonel, Dept. of State Police, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 209, 212-213 (2010).
McCormack alleged that he had suffered a reoccurrence of the 2002 work-related back injury because he was continuing to take medication to alleviate his pain. State police surgeon Dr. Brian Morris conducted an independent medical examination on McCormack in 2007 and reported that McCormack's continued use of medication was not due to the 2002 back injury, but an onset of opiate addiction. McCormack did not offer any evidence to the contrary and admitted to the board that he had become dependent on pain medication. Thus, a reasonable mind could accept the evidence as adequate support for the conclusion that McCormack did not suffer a reoccurrence, and therefore the colonel was warranted in denying McCormack's claim. See Hanover Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 443 Mass. 47, 50 (2004) ("We may not replace the [agency's] choice between two conflicting views").
McCormack also challenges the judge's dismissal of his claim for declaratory relief. Deciding as we do, we need not reach this issue.
4. Conclusion. For the reasons articulated above, we affirm the judgment.
So ordered.
By the Court (Kantrowitz, Kafker & Hanlon, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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Clerk Entered: June 3, 2015.