Opinion
B315024
04-28-2023
SUSAN DOLE McCONAGHY, Appellant, v. JOHN D. McCONAGHY, Respondent.
James L. Keane for Appellant. Klopert & Ravden, Scott M. Klopert; Benedon & Serlin, Judith E. Posner and Kian Tamaddoni Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BD008660, Anne K. Richardson, Judge.
James L. Keane for Appellant.
Klopert & Ravden, Scott M. Klopert; Benedon & Serlin, Judith E. Posner and Kian Tamaddoni Respondent.
CURREY, Acting P. J.
INTRODUCTION
Susan Doyle McConaghy challenges the trial court's order granting the request by her former spouse, John "Jack" D. McConaghy (Jack), to reduce his monthly spousal support payments from $8,000 to $2,500 in light of his retirement from law practice. She primarily argues that in rendering the order, the trial court failed to consider several factors required under Family Code section 4320, including Jack's ability to pay spousal support, her reasonable needs, and the balance of hardships between the parties. Susan therefore contends the order amounted to an abuse of discretion and must be reversed.
Because the parties share the same surname, we refer to them by their first names. No disrespect is intended.
All statutory references are to the Family Code.
For the reasons discussed below, we conclude Susan has not demonstrated an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Jack is a retired attorney, who has been practicing patent law since 1972. He and Susan were married in September 1966. They separated in April 1990, after 23 years of marriage. The judgment of dissolution entered in 1992 required Jack to pay Susan $10,000 per month in spousal support, based his income of $385,000 per year. That year, he married his current spouse, Marianna Wood McConaghy.
In 1999, the parties agreed to reduce Jack's spousal support payments from $10,000 to $8,000 per month because he was experiencing health issues, and his income had temporarily decreased to $313,000. Subsequently, in August 2004, the parties stipulated to return Jack's spousal support payments to $10,000 per month, based on his income of $345,718 in 2002 and $496,721 in 2003.
In 2012, Jack stepped down as equity partner at his law firm and started working as a salaried employee. Consequently, he filed a request to reduce spousal support. Following an evidentiary hearing, in May 2014, the trial court lowered his monthly support payments from $10,000 to $8,000. In so doing, it found his total income was $371,200 per year, consisting of: (1) $250,000 per year in employment income; (2) imputed required minimum distribution (RMD) income of $84,000 per year ($7,000 per month) from his retirement account; and (3) imputed Social Security income of $37,200 per year ($3,100 per month).
On February 23, 2021, Jack filed a request to modify the May 2014 spousal support order. He asked that, in light of his retirement, the trial court either terminate his spousal support obligation, or reduce his monthly payments from $8,000 to $2,500. In support of his request, Jack submitted a declaration with several exhibits attached thereto, as well as an income and expense declaration.
Jack's declaration set forth the following facts relevant to this appeal. He retired from law practice on February 15, 2021, at the age of 77, but "intend[ed] to work on a limited, part-time, contract basis . . . for a few clients that [he] brought to the firm and for which [he] ha[s] always been responsible." He anticipated working less than 20 hours per week, and that his "income from [his] post-retirement work w[i]ll be less than $50,000 annually after payment of bar dues and secretarial services." With respect to his income at the time, Jack stated: (1) he billed less than 80 hours in the three-month period ending in February 15, 2021; (2) he received $108,358 in employment income in 2020; (3) he was receiving $3,916 per month from Social Security; and (4) he anticipated receiving RMD income totaling $63,816 ($5,318 per month) in 2021, consisting of $11,259 ($938 per month) from a beneficiary IRA account inherited from his sister's estate and $52,564 ($4,380 per month) from his own IRA account. Based on his income and expense declaration, he also received $638 per month, on average, in investment income.
Susan filed a responsive declaration stating she did not consent to Jack's requested order. She also filed a memorandum of points and authorities, a declaration accompanied by exhibits, the declaration of Certified Public Accountant (CPA) Yelena L. Kaminsky, and an income and expense declaration.
Susan's declaration set forth the following facts relevant to this appeal. At the age of 74, she "ha[d] very serious health issues that make it impossible for [her] to work and also add significantly to [her] monthly living expenses." With respect to her health problems, Susan stated she has "serious back issues" requiring her "to spend almost all day of every day lying down with [her] feet and knees up[.]" She also has "a brain injury that has impaired [her] ability to function normally over the past several years[.]" Specifically, she has "balance issues[ ]" and "frequently experience[s] mental confusion[,]" which has led to migraines in the past. Given these issues, Susan "live[s] in a full service building because [she] need[s] a lot of help."
While Susan's declaration states she relies on the building's valet service to find her car in the garage, she does not identify what other services, if any, her "full service building" provides to assist her in meeting her needs. Nor could we locate any other evidence in the record shedding light on the matter.
With respect to her finances, Susan's income and expense declaration reflects she has approximately $720,000 in assets, comprised of $38,800 in cash, $662,033 in liquid investments, and $20,000 in real and personal property. In addition to spousal support from Jack, she receives $1,176 per month from Social Security and $130 per month in investment income. Susan estimated her monthly expenses total approximately $13,100, which includes, among other things, $6,300 for rent; $1,550 for healthcare costs not covered by insurance; $1,000 for groceries and household supplies; $500 for eating out/food delivery; and $833 for her grandson's school tuition.
Subsequently, Jack filed a reply declaration, an updated income and expense declaration, and a memorandum of points and authorities.
In his reply declaration, Jack stated he was working parttime for about seven hours per week on continuing matters for existing clients. He "anticipate[d] that the stream of [his postretirement] work will dissipate over time and . . . fully expect[ed] to be largely out of legal work within one year." He related his employment income in April 2021 was $5,529, and that in the preceding six months, his average monthly employment income was $5,646. His updated income and expense declaration reflected he also received an average of $3,883 per month in Social Security payments and $730 per month in investment income. Ultimately, Jack estimated his total post-retirement income was approximately $177,144 per year ($14,762 per month).
Jack's reply declaration also discussed his health issues. He stated he "suffer[s] from progressive peripheral neuropathy[,]" a condition which precludes him from "feel[ing] [his] feet and hands[ ]" and has "progressed to the point that [he] can no longer write legibly." Jack stated he "also ha[s] suffered falls leading to emergency room visits and two brain surgeries to remove concussive hematomas." Further, he "ha[s] atrial fibrillation which can lead with age to strokes."
Lastly, Jack's reply declaration explained that "from 2016 to 2020, [he] did not have enough income to pay Susan spousal support and attorneys['] fees." Consequently, over that four-year time period, Marianna, his current spouse, "loaned [him] $224,000 . . . from her inherited separate holdings so that [he] could pay Susan." Specifically, Marianna loaned the following amounts to Jack: $30,000 in 2016; $30,000 in 2017; $44,500 in 2018; $60,000 in 2019; and $60,000 in 2020.
A hearing on Jack's request to modify spousal support took place on May 14, 2021. After receiving evidence and arguments, the trial court declined to terminate his support obligation. It did, however, grant his request to reduce his monthly support payments from $8,000 to $2,500.
On May 19, 2021, Susan filed a request for a statement of decision pursuant to section 3654 and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1590. Subsequently, on June 8, 2021, the trial court denied her request as untimely under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1590(n).
DISCUSSION
I. Governing Legal Principles and Standard of Review
"A prerequisite to modification or termination of spousal support is a material change of circumstances. [Citation.] '"Change of circumstances" means a reduction or increase in the supporting spouse's ability to pay and/or an increase or decrease in the supported spouse's needs. It includes all factors affecting need and the ability to pay.'" (In re Marriage of Shimkus (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1272-1273.)
"'The trial court has broad discretion to decide whether to modify a spousal support order. [Citation.]' [Citation.] In exercising that discretion, the court must consider the required factors set out in section 4320." (In re Marriage of Shimkus, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1273, fn. omitted.) The statutory factors relevant to this appeal include: "[t]he ability of the supporting party to pay spousal support, taking into account the supporting party's earning capacity, earned and unearned income, assets, and standard of living[ ]" (§ 4320, subd. (c)); "[t]he needs of each party based on the standard of living established during the marriage[ ]" (id., subd. (d)); "[t]he obligations and assets, including the separate property, of each party[ ]" (id., subd. (e)); "[t]he duration of the marriage[ ]" (id., subd. (f)); "[t]he age and health of the parties[ ]" (id., subd. (h)); "[t]he balance of the hardships to each party[ ]" (id., subd. (k)); "[t]he goal that the supported party shall be self-supporting within a reasonable period of time[ ]" (id., subd. (1)); and "[a]ny other factors the court determines are just and equitable[ ]" (id., subd. (n)).
"'In making its spousal support order, the trial court possesses broad discretion so as to fairly exercise the weighing process contemplated by section 4320, with the goal of accomplishing substantial justice for the parties in the case before it.' [Citation.] In balancing the applicable statutory factors, the trial court has discretion to determine the appropriate weight to accord to each. [Citation.] But 'the court may not be arbitrary; it must exercise its discretion along legal lines, taking into consideration the applicable circumstances of the parties set forth in [the statute], especially reasonable needs and their financial abilities.' [Citation.] Furthermore, the court does not have discretion to ignore any relevant circumstance enumerated in the statute. To the contrary, the trial judge must both recognize and apply each applicable statutory factor in setting spousal support. [Citations.] Failure to do so is reversible error." (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 304, italics omitted.) In so doing, however, the trial court is not required to "expressly identify each factor and set forth in writing or on the record how it has weighed each of them." (In re Marriage of Diamond (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 595, 602.)
"The modification of a spousal support order is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. In exercising its discretion, the trial court must follow established legal principles and base its findings on substantial evidence. If the trial court conforms to these requirements its order will be upheld whether or not the appellate court agrees with it or would make the same order if it were a trial court." (In re Marriage of Schmir (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 43, 47, fn. omitted.) "An abuse of discretion occurs '"when it can be said that no judge reasonably could have made the same order."'" (In re Marriage of Grimes &Mou (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 406, 424.)
II. Analysis
As a preliminary matter, we note Susan does not dispute that she failed to timely request a statement of decision, which would have "provide[d] the factual and legal basis for the trial court's decision as to each of the principal controverted issues." (In re Marriage of McHugh (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1248.) "A party's failure to request a statement of decision when one is available has two consequences. First, the party [forfeits] any objection to the trial court's failure to make all findings necessary to support its decision. Second, the appellate court applies the doctrine of implied findings and presumes the trial court made all necessary findings supported by substantial evidence." (Acquire II, Ltd. v. Colton Real Estate Group (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 959, 970 (Acquire); see also In re Marriage of McHugh, supra, at p. 1248 [applying doctrine of implied findings on appeal from order modifying child support obligation].) With these principles in mind, we address Susan's challenges to the trial court's order.
A. The trial court did not apply an "'enough is enough' standard" to reduce spousal support.
Susan contends the trial court improperly applied an undefined "'[e]nough is enough[ ]' standard" in rendering the modified support order. (Bolded text and capitalization omitted.) Although not entirely clear, she appears to argue that the court's comments at the May 2021 hearing reflect it granted Jack's request for relief based primarily on the "the duration of [his] support obligation[,]" instead of a proper analysis of the section 4320 factors. Jack responds that rather than "reveal[ing] application of an amorphous 'enough is enough' standard[,]" the trial court's remarks demonstrate it "gave due consideration to the relevant factors under section 4320[ ]" in reducing his monthly spousal support payments. As discussed below, we agree with Jack.
In granting Jack's request to modify the prior support order, the trial court stated:
"[T]he court does find that there's been a change of circumstances. There has been a retirement. The court is considering relevant factors in [section] 4320, and it's a long-term marriage. And [Jack] has been paying [spousal support] for now 29 years.
"Clearly the health of the parties is not very good. Particularly [Susan's] . . . capacity to work and her earnings, there really is no showing about that. At the same time, the court must consider the change in [Jack's] income.
"And I am considering his assets, but even with that, I think that a change has been shown. A decrease is appropriate. The court will grant a request to [reduce Jack's monthly spousal support obligation to] $2,500. And I know that that is hardship on [Susan], but I do feel that [Jack] has been paying for a very long time and simply I don't believe that it's sustainable by requiring him to take out some money from his retirement accounts.
"He may, in fact, end up living longer than the, you know, life expectancy, and I don't think that . . . is appropriate in this case. I am concerned that the expenses of [Susan] seem unsustainable even if [she receives] $8,000 per month.
"She's spending way more than that, and I don't believe that it's fair to [require Jack] to continue to pay funds that are clearly in excess of her . . . reasonable expenses.
"So I understand that it's going to be a change, and I simply feel that balancing the equities here [sic]. We're not talking about, you know, a recent separation. We are talking about quite a substantial period of time having gone by and [Susan] is obligated to manage her funds in a reasonable [manner] and in a manner that will enable her to continue to live. And that [Jack] can die at some point in time, and she's going to have to face that."
Based on the comments above, the trial court began its analysis by recognizing it was required to apply the factors set forth in section 4320. It then explained its consideration of the following factors on the record: the earning capacity of each party, including the lack of evidence on Susan's ability to work or earn income (§ 4320, subd. (a)); the duration of the marriage (id., subd. (f)); the health and age of the parties (id., subd. (h)); Jack's ability to pay spousal support, taking into account his income and assets (id., subds. (c) &(e)); the balance of hardships to each party (id., subd. (k)); and the goal that Susan be self-supporting within a reasonable period of time (id., subd. (1)).
As Susan observes, the trial court also noted that, as of the May 2021 hearing, Jack had been paying spousal support for 29 years, which was, in its view, "a very long time[.]" However, she does not argue or otherwise suggest the trial court could not consider the duration of his support obligation under section 4320, subdivision (n), which is a "'catch-all [provision] clarifying the court's authority to consider any other circumstances, although not expressly codified," in determining spousal support. (Hogoboom and King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2022) ¶ 6:927.) Nor does Susan cite-and we could not locate-any authority establishing the trial court abused its discretion by considering the parties' spousal support history alongside other section 4320 factors in deciding whether and how to modify the prior support order.
We acknowledge Susan cites In re Marriage of Morrison (1978) 20 Cal.3d 437 (Morrison) in support of her argument. That case, however, does not assist her in showing reversible error. There, our Supreme Court addressed "the guidelines to be followed by a trial court in determining whether or not to retain jurisdiction to extend a spousal support order." (Morrison, supra, at p. 442.) After observing "[t]he courts of appeal [were] in disagreement" on the issue (ibid.), summarizing the existing caselaw (id. at pp. 442-445), and analyzing the relevant legislative history (id. at pp. 446-452), the Supreme Court held: "A trial court should not terminate jurisdiction to extend a future support order after a lengthy marriage, unless the record clearly indicates that the supported spouse will be able to adequately meet his or her financial needs at the time selected for termination of jurisdiction." (Id. at p. 453.)
The Morrison court then recognized that under its holding, some spousal support orders may last for extended periods of time. (Morrison, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 453.) On this point, the Supreme Court explained: "In some cases the supported spouse may never be able to adequately provide for his or her needs. A wife who has spent her married years as a homemaker and mother may, despite her best efforts, find it impossible to reenter the job market. In such a case 'the husband simply has to face up to the fact that his support responsibilities are going to be of extended duration-perhaps for life. This has nothing to do with feminism, sexism, male chauvinism .... It is ordinary common sense, basic decency and simple justice.' [Citation.] The same will, of course, be expected of a wife in those cases in which a husband has devoted his time to maintaining the home and raising the children while the wife has pursued a career outside the home." (Ibid.)
In short, the Morrison court settled a split in authority on the principles that courts should following in deciding whether to retain jurisdiction "to extend a future support order after a lengthy marriage[.]" (Morrison, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 453.) It did not-as Susan appears to contend-hold or otherwise suggest that courts may not consider a spouse's history of paying support alongside other section 4320 factors in deciding whether and/or how to modify an existing support order. (See id. at pp. 452-454.)
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we conclude the record does not establish the trial court erroneously applied an "enough is enough" standard, or any other incorrect legal standard, in reducing Jack's spousal support obligation. Susan therefore has not shown an abuse of discretion on that basis.
B. The trial court considered the relevant factors set forth in section 4320.
Susan contends the trial court failed to conduct a proper section 4320 analysis because the record reflects it did not apply three of the required factors. Specifically, she asserts the court did not consider: (1) the balance of hardships to each party (§ 4320, subd. (k)); (2) Jack's ability to pay spousal support (id., subd. (c)); and (3) her need for support (id., subd. (d)). We consider her arguments on each factor below.
First, Susan argues that the trial court "fail[ed] to give due consideration to the 'balance of hardships' factor[.]" (Underlining and capitalization omitted). In support, she contends the record reflects: (1) reducing support from $8,000 to $2,500 per month will result in great hardship to her, because her health issues are worse than Jack's, and she has fewer resources to meet her expenses relating to those issues; and (2) "[t]here is no evidence that Jack will suffer immediate or near-term hardship on the scale facing Susan (if at all) if he is required to continue to make tax-deductible $8,000 monthly payments to Susan for the foreseeable future[.]"
Susan's argument is unavailing. As an initial matter, she disregards the evidence in the record supporting the trial court's implied finding that Jack has experienced, and will continue to experience, hardship if required to continue paying Susan $8,000 per month. The evidence shows that even before retirement, Jack lacked the resources to satisfy his support obligation, as he had to borrow $224,000 from Marianna between 2016 and 2020 to pay Susan the amount required under the prior order. Moreover, the record demonstrates that post-retirement, Jack's average net income after expenses is $8,621 per month ($14,762 in gross income less $6,141 in expenses). Therefore, if required to pay Susan $8,000 per month in support, Jack would only be left with $621 each month.
In addition, and more important, Susan has not shown the trial court ignored the balance of hardships factor. (See In re Marriage of Cheriton, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 304 ["the court does not have discretion to ignore any relevant circumstance enumerated in" section 4230].) Indeed, she acknowledges the trial court expressly mentioned this factor when ruling on Jack's request to modify the prior support order. Instead, Susan highlights the facts beneficial to her, and invites this court to reevaluate the evidence relating to the parties' health issues and their financial circumstances to ultimately reweigh the balance of hardships factor in her favor. This is not our function. As an appellate court, "[w]e are neither authorized nor inclined to substitute our judgment for the judgment of the trial court[ ]" (In re Marriage of Baker (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 491, 498), and our review is limited to evaluating whether Susan has shown the trial court abused its discretion by "'exceed[ing] the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered.'" (In re Marriage of Ackerman (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 191, 197.)
Next, Susan argues the record demonstrates the trial court did not consider Jack's ability to pay, as it "did not make a finding that Jack lacked the ability to continue paying the taxdeductible support of $8,000 monthly." (Bolded text and emphasis omitted.) Her argument is meritless for several reasons. At the outset, because Susan failed to timely request a statement of decision, she forfeited her assertion of error based on the trial court's "failure to make [a] finding[ ] necessary to support its decision." (Acquire, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 970.) Further, the trial court is not required to expressly address each section 4320 factor in writing or on the record. (In re Marriage of Diamond, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 602-603.) In any event, the record reflects the trial court stated it considered "the change in [Jack's] income" along with "his assets," and contains substantial evidence to support the trial court's implied finding that Jack can no longer afford to pay Susan $8,000 per month. Specifically, as discussed above, the evidence shows: (1) Jack was unable to satisfy his support obligation before retirement, as he had to borrow $224,000 from Marianna between 2016 and 2020 to pay Susan as required; and (2) post-retirement, his average net monthly income is $8,621.
Susan contends the record contains evidence to support a contrary finding on Jack's ability to pay. Specifically, she emphasizes that per the declaration of Yelena L. Kaminsky, Jack's post-retirement income was either $19,800 or $30,300 per month. It is well-settled, however, that when reviewing a finding for substantial evidence, "the test is not the presence or absence of a substantial conflict in the evidence. Rather, it is simply whether there is substantial evidence in favor of the [finding]. If this 'substantial' evidence is present, no matter how slight it may appear in comparison with the contradictory evidence, the [finding] must be upheld." (Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 631, original italics.)
Lastly, Susan contends the record reflects the trial court did not consider her needs. In so doing, she asserts it failed to make an express finding on this factor, and emphasizes that the evidence shows she will not be able to meet her needs if only allowed to collect $2,500 per month in spousal support.
We reject Susan's argument on both points. With respect to her first point, as discussed above, she forfeited any contention of error based on the trial court's failure to make all factual findings necessary to its decision. (Acquire, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 970.) And, once again, the trial court was not required to expressly address each of the applicable section 4320 factors on the record to demonstrate it did consider them. (In re Marriage of Diamond, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 602-603.)
Susan's argument on the second point fails because it is based on an incorrect premise. In deciding whether or how to modify a support order, the trial court's goal is not-as Susan appears to suggest-to ensure the supported spouse will have sufficient funds to cover all his or her expenses. Instead, the court must consider the required factors and "'fairly exercise the weighing process contemplated by section 4320, with the goal of accomplishing substantial justice for the parties in the case before it.'" (In re Marriage of Cheriton, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 304.) In so doing, it "considers the circumstances listed [in the statute] that are applicable to the case, according each its appropriate weight under the facts of the case, and issues what [it] believes to be the proper decision." (In re Marriage of Smith (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 469, 494.) This process is "rarely easy[,]" and "[d]etermining the weight to be given to each [factor] in a particular case[ ] . . . is extraordinarily difficult." (Ibid.)
Contrary to Susan's argument, the trial court's remarks at the May 2021 hearing reflect it considered her needs, and how the reduced support will impact her ability to satisfy them in her preferred manner based on her past spending behavior. On this point, it recognized the modified support order would result in hardship to Susan, and that the reduction in support to $2,500 per month was "going to be a change[ ]" for her. In granting Jack's request for relief, however, the trial court ultimately determined these considerations were outweighed by his inability to continue paying $8,000 per month, and the goal that Susan manage her current funds in a manner to become self-supporting while he is alive. The trial court was entitled to accord greater weight to the latter two factors, and did not exceed the bounds of its broad discretion in doing so. (See In re Marriage of Cheriton, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 308.)
In sum, for the reasons discussed above, we conclude the record shows the trial court considered the three section 4320 factors with which Susan takes issue. In addition, we discern no abuse of discretion in the manner the court weighed those factors. We therefore reject Susan's argument that the trial court "fail[ed] to give due consideration to the 'balance of hardships factor." We likewise reject her "principal assignment of error" that "the trial court's adoption of Jack's suggested reduction [in spousal support] to $2,500 [per month] . . . [was] arbitrary as it was not tied to the mandatory statutory factors of need and ability to pay." (Capitalization omitted.)
C. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's implied finding that Jack did not use his remarriage to artificially deflate his income.
Finally, Susan contends the modified support order should be reversed because "Jack used his remarriage to artificially reduce his claimed income available for support." In support of her argument, she cites section 4323, subdivision (b), and In re Marriage of Romero (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1436. These authorities establish that in deciding whether to modify spousal support, the trial court may not consider "[t]he income of a supporting spouse's subsequent spouse" (§ 4323, subd. (b)) or "the additional expenses resulting from the remarriage." (In re Marriage of Romero, supra, at p. 1445.) According to Susan, Jack "has used [section 4323, subdivision (b)] as both a 'sword' and a 'shield.'"
Susan's argument is far from clear. So far as we can tell, she appears to rely on the authorities above and the declaration of Yelena L. Kaminsky to contend Jack acted in bad faith when he divided a UBS retirement account in his name into two separate accounts, gave Marianna a 50% interest in one of those accounts, and excluded that account when identifying the sources of income available to pay support. We reject this argument because the record contains substantial evidence to support the trial court's implied finding that Jack did not take the action in question to shirk his support responsibilities in bad faith. Specifically, in his reply declaration, Jack explained that he and Marianna "agreed to equally divide the community property UBS rollover IRA accounts into two accounts," so he could "draw from [his] account to repay Marianna" the substantial sums she had loaned to him from her "inherited separate holdings" for purposes of paying Susan's spousal support from 2016 to 2020. In addition, on cross-examination at the evidentiary hearing, Jack testified that he "separated out" the account at issue "so that [he could] pay back some of the money [Marianna has] lent [him] from her private estate."
Susan also asserts Jack and Marianna co-own a home as community property, which "has been rented at well below market value for years to Marianna's daughter and her husband." She questions whether the trial court should have imputed to Jack additional "income . . . based on [the property's] true rental value[,]" but then concedes she "did not ask for such an imputation[ ]" in the trial court. We fail to see how her comments on this point demonstrate reversible error.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we conclude Susan has not shown the modified support order must be reversed due to any bad faith on Jack's part.
DISPOSITION
The order modifying spousal support is affirmed. Jack is awarded his costs on appeal.
We concur: COLLINS, J., DAUM, J.[*]
[*] Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6, of the California Constitution.