Opinion
Civil 6:23-CV-00028-ADA-JCM
07-01-2024
COURTNEY McCOLLUM, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF KILLEEN, TEXAS, et al, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
JEFFREY C. MANSKE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
TO: THE HONORABLE ALAN D ALBRIGHT,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), and Rules 1(f) and 4(b) of Appendix C of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Local Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges. Before the Court are Defendant the City of Killeen's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 10), Defendant Joshua Plowick's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 12), Defendant Franklin Melendez's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 14), Defendant Edward Urena's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 16), and the attendant responses and replies thereto. For the following reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS Defendants' Motions be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Truman McCollum Jr. sued Defendants City of Killeen, Edward Urena, Joshua Plowick, and Franklin Melendez on January 13, 2023, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff's claims stem from being tased six times by the Defendants after he had a seizure.
On January 16, 2021, Truman McCollum Jr. was sitting in his car in a Killeen Burger King drive thru when he had a seizure and crashed into the car in front of him. Pl.'s Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 4. Defendants Edward Urena, Joshua Plowick, and Franklin Melendez, as well as other officers, were dispatched to the scene at approximately 5:00pm. Id. 4-5. After the officers and other emergency officials arrived, Killeen FIRE-EMS put Plaintiff onto a stretcher and into an ambulance. Id. McCollum was not handcuffed or restrained besides being strapped onto the stretcher Id. at 6. After being placed in the ambulance, McCollum regained consciousness and asked where he was. Id. McCollum then attempted to stand up, and the Defendants tried to keep him on the gurney. Id. at 7. When McCollum continued to attempt to stand up, Melendez requested that Urena use his taser on McCollum. Id. While McCollum was still on the gurney, Urena tased him in his lower back causing him to fall off the gurney onto the floor of the ambulance. Id. at 7-8. Urena ordered McCollum to show him his hands. Id. at 9. Defendants then grabbed McCollum, sat him upright, and Urena tased McCollum a second time. Id. Melendez and Plowick restrained McCollum's arms and Urena then tased McCollum a third and fourth time. Id. at 10-11. During these events, McCollum screamed and asked the officers to stop. Id. While McCollum was still restrained, Urena tased him a fifth time in McCollum's buttocks. Id. at 12. Plowick and Melendez handcuffed McCollum and Urena tased him a sixth time. Id. Defendants and another officer then removed McCollum from the ambulance and took him to a police car. Id. at 15.
After the incident, Urena laughed about tasing Melendez six times with other officers. Id. at 17. Plowick and Urena then discussed what to charge McCollum with and Urena suggested resisting arrest. Id. at 18. Plowick responded and said, “The only issue I see with charging him with resisting is . . . how are you gonna articulate he's coherent enough to understand you're the police? . . . 'Cause he's not.” Id. The sergeant at the scene then replied, “So, this is what I'm trying to say: What criminal offense do we have to arrest him? Because obviously, he's already gone. So, what criminal offense do we have? ‘Cause we didn't come out here . . . we came out here for an accident, correct?” Id.
After being taken into custody, McCollum was charged with resisting arrest and, after testing positive for methamphetamine, he was also charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI). Plowick Mot. at 2. While in custody, jailers took ten photos of McCollum that show cuts and bruises all over his body that he claims Urena, Plowick, and Melendez caused. Pl.'s Compl. at 22-23.
After Defendants filed their Motions to Dismiss, the Court ordered the parties to issue a joint status report of the status of McCollum's underlying criminal charges. ECF No. 22. In their status report, the parties informed the Court that there was no probable cause for the underlying arrests of McCollum. ECF No. 23. McCollum later supplemented the status report to inform the Court that the State of Texas appealed the finding of no probable cause. ECF No. 24. The Court stayed the case pending the resolution of the underlying criminal charges. ECF No. 25. Plaintiff Courtney McCollum subsequently filed a notice of death for Truman McCollum and was substituted as Plaintiff. ECF No. 26; Text Order substituting Courtney McCollum as Plaintiff. The parties issued a joint status report indicating their agreement that the state criminal case is moot and that the stay should be lifted. ECF No. 28. The Court lifted the stay and now considers the pending Motions to Dismiss. ECF No. 29.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Upon motion or sua sponte, a court may dismiss an action that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); Carroll v. Fort James Corp., 470 F.3d 1171, 1177 (5th Cir. 2006). To survive Rule 8, a nonmovant must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “The court's task is to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a legally cognizable claim that is plausible, not to evaluate the plaintiff's likelihood of success.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010). The court begins by identifying which allegations are well-pleaded facts and which are legal conclusions or elemental recitations, accepting as true the former and rejecting the latter. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A court need not blindly accept every allegation of fact; properly pleaded allegations of fact amount to more than just conclusory allegations or legal conclusions “masquerading as factual conclusions.” Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002). The court then determines whether the accepted allegations state a plausible claim to relief. Id. at 379.
“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “The court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the [nonmovant].” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the [nonmovant] pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the [movant] is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard . . . asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. For purposes of Rule 12(b)(6), “pleadings” include the complaint, its attachments, and documents referred to in the complaint and central to a plaintiff's claims. Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-499 (5th Cir. 2000).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Defendants' arguments that McCollum's claims are barred under Heck are moot.
The Defendants all argue that McCollum's claim for excessive force is barred by the underlying criminal charges against him. Killeen Mot. Dismiss at 10-11; Melendez Mot. Dismiss at 10; Urena Mot. Dismiss at 1-4; Plowick Mot. Dismiss at 8. In the joint status report submitted by all Defendants, the parties agree that the “passing of Mr. McCollum has rendered the state criminal case moot.” Joint Status Report (ECF No. 28) at 1.
Under Heck v Humphrey, a plaintiff who has been convicted of a crime cannot recover damages for an alleged violation of his constitutional rights if that violation came from the same facts that as the charge of his conviction, unless he proves “that his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). When the plaintiff's claim is an excessive force claim, determining whether the claim is barred by Heck, “is analytical and fact-intensive, requiring us to focus on whether success on the excessive force claim requires negation of an element of the criminal offense or proof of a fact that is inherently inconsistent with one underlying the criminal conviction.” Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 497 (5th Cir. 2008).
Here, McCollum is deceased and was never convicted of the underlying charges. The parties agree that the criminal charges are moot. Joint Status Report (ECF No. 28). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims are not Heck barred and Defendants' Motions to Dismiss on those grounds should be denied.
B. Plaintiff has alleged a plausible Fourth Amendment Claim against Defendants Plowick and Melendez
Plaintiff sues Defendants Urena, Melendez, and Plowick for violations of McCollum's Fourth Amendment rights. Pl.'s Compl. at 19-26. Plaintiff alleges one specific constitutional violation: excessive force. Defendants Plowick and Melendez argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege that McCollum's rights were violated by them. Plowick Mot. at 4; Melendez Mot. at 4.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, under color of law, causes another to be deprived of a federally protected constitutional right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Two allegations are required to state a claim under § 1983. “First, the plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right. Second, he must allege that the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law.” Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980); Manax v. McNamara, 842 F.2d 808, 812 (5th Cir. 1988).
To plead a claim of excessive force, a plaintiff must establish (1) an injury (2) resulting from excessive force, and (3) that excessive force was clearly unreasonable. See Smith v. Heap, 31 F.4th 905, 912 (5th Cir. 2022). With respect to the injury, the courts do not require that it be significant, but it must be “more than de minimus.” Hanks v. Rogers, 853 F.3d 738, 744 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Harper v. Harris County, Tex., 21 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir. 1994)).
The unreasonableness of the force is viewed “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). Specifically, courts should consider “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. Moreover, in § 1983 claims, the defendants' actions must be considered individually, not as a collective, to determine if each defendant deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right. Meadours v. Ermel, 483 F.3d 417, 421-22 (5th Cir. 2007). “When the defense of qualified immunity is raised in a motion to dismiss, the complaint is subject to a heightened pleading requirement, which requires ‘claims of specific conduct and actions giving rise to a constitutional violation.'” Cunningham v. City of Balch Springs, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80145, Civ. No. 3:14-CV-59-L, at *22 (N.D. Tex. June 19, 2015) (citing Baker v Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1996)).
Plaintiff has adequately pled an excessive force claim against Defendant Plowick and Melendez. Plaintiff has alleged that McCollum suffered physical and mental injuries after Plowick, Melendez, and Urena restrained and tased McCollum in the ambulance. Pl.'s Compl. at 7-14, 26. Plaintiff's complaint includes photos and descriptions of McCollum's injuries resulting from the incident. Id. at 22-23. Plaintiff further alleges that these injuries were a result of excessive restraint and that the injuries were not present before the incident. Id. 21, 24, 26.
Plaintiff alleges instances of excessive force. Plaintiff alleges McCollum was forced back onto the gurney when he tried to get up. Id. at 7. Plaintiff then alleges that Urena tased McCollum six times. Id. at 7-13. Plaintiff also alleges that while McCollum was being tased, Melendez and Plowick yanked McCollum as he struggled to get up from the ambulance floor after falling. Id. at 9. Plaintiff also alleges that Melendez and Plowick restrained McCollum's arms while Urena tased him. Id. at 10-11. Plaintiff also includes photos of the interaction with police captured from Urena's bodycam. Id. at 8-14. Plaintiff's Complaint makes it more than plausible that Defendants used excessive force.
Plaintiff also adequately alleges that the excessive force was unreasonable in the eyes of a reasonable officer on the scene. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). Plaintiff specifies multiple actions by Plowick and Melendez that are plausibly unreasonable. Plaintiff alleges McCollum displayed no signs of aggression but was forced down onto the gurney by Plowick and Melendez. Pl.'s Compl. at 7. Plaintiff also alleges that Plowick and Melendez restrained McCollum's arms while Defendant Urena tased McCollum while he was not resisting. Id. at 10. Plaintiff further alleges that McCollum gave officers no reason to suspect he posed a danger to them, making the force unreasonable in the eyes of a reasonable officer. Id. at 21. Plaintiff includes a quote from Defendant Plowick where he says, “How are you gonna articulate he's coherent enough to understand you're the police?... 'Cause he's not.” Id. 18. It is plausible to conclude that a reasonable officer on the scene would find this force excessive.
Plowick and Melendez both argue that they had probable cause to make an arrest and that therefore, their force was reasonable under the circumstances. Plowick Mot. at 5-6; Melendez Mot. at 6. They also argue that McCollum's actions gave them reason to believe he was going to engage them, or otherwise resist them in some way. Plowick Mot. at 6; Melendez Mot. at 6. This argument is unpersuasive at the pleading stage because this Court must only determine whether the Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim and is “not to evaluate the plaintiff's likelihood of success.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P., 594 F.3d at 387.
Based on the four corners of the pleading, Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim of excessive force against Defendants Plowick and Melendez. Plaintiff alleges injuries through photos and descriptions in her pleading and alleges that those injuries are significant. Plaintiff has also alleged that the injuries resulted from force that was clearly excessive by describing the interaction he had with the Defendants. Lastly, Plaintiff has alleged that the excessive force was clearly unreasonable through her description of McCollum's interaction with Defendants. Clearly, Plaintiff has alleged a plausible claim of a constitutional violation.
C. Qualified Immunity
Defendants Plowick and Melendez argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Plowick Mot. at 6; Melendez Mot. at 7. Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability for claims under federal law unless their conduct “violates a clearly established constitutional right.” Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 623 (5th Cir. 2003). Qualified immunity balances “the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Because qualified immunity shields “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,” the Fifth Circuit considers qualified immunity the norm and admonishes courts to deny a defendant immunity only in rare circumstances. Romero v. City of Grapevine, 888 F.3d 170, 176 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Courts use a two-prong analysis to determine whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity. Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d 444, 451 (5th Cir. 2019). A plaintiff must show (1) the official violated a constitutional right; and (2) the constitutional right was “clearly established” at the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct. Reed v. Taylor, 923 F.3d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 2019). The Supreme Court held in Pearson that “the judges of the district courts . . . should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. Although qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, the plaintiff bears the burden to rebut the defense and assert facts to satisfy both prongs of the analysis. Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2008). If a plaintiff fails to establish either prong, the public official is immune from suit. Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, 500 F.3d 401, 407 (5th Cir. 2007).
As discussed above, Plaintiff has pled a plausible claim that Defendants Plowick and Melendez violated his constitutional rights. The Court must now determine whether this constitutional right is clearly established. See Reed, 923 F.3d at 414. It has been clearly established that citizens “have a constitutional right to be free from excessive force during an investigatory stop or arrest.” Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 753-54 (5th Cir. 2005). Therefore, Plaintiff's right against excessive force was clearly established at the time of Plaintiff's encounter with Defendants. Thus, Defendant Plowick's and Defendant Melendez's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's claim of excessive force should be denied.
D. Plaintiff has not Adequately Plead a Claim of Monell Liability Against the City of Killeen
The City of Killeen argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim for relief against it. Killeen Mot. at 4-10. A municipality may not face liability based on its employees' actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Instead, municipalities face § 1983 liability “when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.” Id. at 694. A municipality may be held liable under § 1983 only when the enforcement of the municipal policy or practice was the “moving force” behind the violation of the plaintiff's federally protected right. Bd. Of Cty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410-11 (1997). The plaintiff must prove three elements to establish liability against a municipality: (1) a policymaker; (2) an official policy; and (3) a violation of constitutional rights whose moving force is the municipal policy or custom. Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. The proper analysis of municipal liability under section 1983 “requires [a separation of] two different issues . . . (1) whether plaintiff's harm was caused by a constitutional violation, and (2) if so, whether the city is responsible for that violation.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992).
If the plaintiff alleges a customary city policy, they must allege persistent, often repeated, constant violations. See Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d at 581. These violations must be substantially similar to the alleged violation at issue. Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Texas, 588 F.3d 838, 850-51 (5th Cir. 2009). The Fifth Circuit has held that for there to be sufficient similarity the prior incidents must, “point to the specific violation in question” and “be fairly similar to what ultimately transpired.” Estate of Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 383 (5th Cir. 2005). Moreover, “[a] customary municipal policy cannot ordinarily be inferred from single constitutional violation.” Id. The plaintiff must show a pattern that “transcends the error made in a single case.” Id. at 582. To satisfy this is a high burden and there must be a substantial number of prior violations in a short period. E.g., Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d at 851 (holding that twenty-seven incidents of excessive force over a span of four years did not suggest a pattern that would constitute a custom of municipal policy).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Killen has a practice or custom of violations demonstrated by officers acting in the same manner under the same conditions. Pl.'s Compl. at 27. Plaintiff specifically alleges “a policy, custom, or practice of using violent, non-lethal force to seize a person, even when that person is not an imminent threat.” Id. Plaintiff does not identify where a formal policy could be located or where it comes from. This conclusory allegation fails to adequately plead this policy or custom.
Plaintiff has also failed to plead persistent repeated violations in a recent period preceding the event in question. Plaintiff cites three incidents that are factually different than the case before this Court. First, Plaintiff refers to Smith v. City of Killeen and Givonchie Evans, Civil No. 6:16-cv-00323S (W.D. Tex.). Id. In Smith, an officer used lethal force when he shot and killed a man who was “evading in a motor vehicle.” Id. This is factually different to the issue at hand as the officer in this case used lethal force to stop a man from evading arrest. In the case before the Court, officers used non-lethal force. Moreover, the alleged policy in this case involves “non-lethal force” not lethal force. Id. Thus, this is not an example of the alleged policy or custom as the officer in this example used lethal force, rather than the non-lethal force in the instant case.
Second, Plaintiff alleges, on “information and belief,” an event involving a man named Patrick Lee Warren who was shot and killed by a City of Killeen Officer on January 10, 2021. Id. at 28. Again, this example is not factually similar to the case before the Court or an event that satisfies the custom identified by Plaintiff because it involves lethal force rather than deadly force. Accordingly, this example cannot help Plaintiff establish a custom of violations.
Another of Plaintiff's examples fails to support the alleged policy or custom because it occurred after the events in question. Plaintiff has alleged, on “information and belief” that a man in North Killeen “was shot by a stun gun” on May 10, 2022. Id. This alleged event also does not help show a custom or policy because this example happened over a year after the events before the Court. Id. Incidents occurring after the events at issue will not help show a policy or custom because there must be “prior indications” of the violations for events to amount to a custom. Peterson, 588 F.3d at 851 (emphasis added). Even ignoring the fact that this example occurred after the events that make up Plaintiff's case, there is no indication that the events in this example involved a City of Killeen officer. All that is alleged is that a man was “shot by a stun gun.” Pl.'s Compl. at 28. Thus, this example should not be considered in determining the policy or custom.
Even if the two similar incidents were enough to establish a plausible claim of a policy or custom, they occurred too long before the case before the Court to be considered. First, Plaintiff cites Civil Action No. 1:10-cv-00338 - Copeland v. City of Killeen and Adam Ortiz. Pl.'s Compl. at 27. In this case, a mother was pepper sprayed and “handled roughly” after she went to another person's home to confront them about a fight their children were in. Id. This case occurred in 2010, so this was at least ten years before the case before the Court. Ten years is not recent enough to show a pattern of a policy or custom. See Peterson, 588 F.3d at 851. Next, Plaintiff cites Civil Action No. 6:12-cv-00163 - Stanley v. City of Killeen. Pl.'s Compl. at 27. In this case, the plaintiff was attacked at Killeen City Jail after he was arrested for public intoxication. This case occurred in 2012, making it at least eight years prior to the case before Court which is not a recent enough time to be considered. See Peterson, 588 F.3d at 851. Moreover, this example also does not specify who attacked the man, so it is unclear if it even was a City of Killeen Officer who initiated the attack. Because Plaintiff has failed to allege any events that are close in time to the case before the Court, he has not pled a plausible claim that the City of Killeen has a policy or custom of using violent, non-lethal force on people who are not an imminent threat.
Plaintiff has only identified one similar incident. One isolated incident is clearly insufficient to establish a custom of constitutional violations. Even if the Court considered the incidents that occurred in 2010 and 2012, three over the course of a decade is still insufficient. Three incidents, however, are insufficient to plausibly plead a custom or policy. See Peterson, 588 F.3d at 851 (finding twenty-seven complaints of excessive force over four years did not show a pattern); Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 329 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding eleven incidents did not show a pattern of a policy or custom); Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding a dozen incidents in under three years not sufficient to constitute a custom pursuant § 1983).
To establish a failure to supervise or train claim, plaintiffs must show that: “(1) the supervisor either failed to supervise or train the subordinate official; (2) a causal link exists between the failure to train or supervise and the violation of the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the failure to train or supervise amounts to deliberate indifference.” Estate of Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff alleges that Killeen has a policy, custom, or practice “of not requiring City of Killeen police officers to undergo training to recognize the postictal state which follows seizures.” Pl.'s Compl. at 27. This statement is conclusory, and Plaintiff has not shown any examples of this policy. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to plead a failure to supervise or train claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendants City of Killeen, Urena, Plowick, and Melendez's Motions to Dismiss be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The following claims should be dismissed: any § 1983 claims brought by Plaintiff against the City of Killeen. The following claims should not be dismissed: Plaintiff's claims against Urena for excessive force; Plaintiff's claim against Melendez for excessive force; Plaintiff's claim against Plowick for excessive force.
V. OBJECTIONS
The parties may wish to file objections to this Report and Recommendation. Parties filing objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which they object. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. See Battle v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations contained in this Report within fourteen (14) days after the party is served with a copy of the Report shall bar that party from de novo review by the District Court of the proposed findings and recommendations in the Report. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-53 (1985); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Except upon grounds of plain error, failing to object shall further bar the party from appellate review of unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas, 474 U.S. at 150-53; Douglass, 79 F.3d at 1415.