Opinion
No. 08-16-00016-CR
02-28-2017
ANTHONY WAYNE McCLELLAND, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
Appeal from 403rd District Court of Travis County, Texas (TC # D-1-DC-15-900001) OPINION
Anthony Wayne McClelland was indicted on February 2, 2015, for the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. On November 10, 2015, Appellant filed a motion to suppress all statements made and all evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas or of the United States. The trial court did not sign an order granting or denying the motion to suppress.
On December 1, 2015, a jury found Appellant guilty of aggravated assault as alleged in the indictment. The trial court imposed a sentence of six years' imprisonment. Appellant timely filed his notice of appeal on December 15, 2015. He now raises a single issue on appeal, contending that the trial court erred in admitting the statements he made while sitting alone in the backseat of a patrol vehicle. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
On July 13, 2014, Pran Pun-Magar (Pran) and Chinta Ram Oli (Chinta) took a break from their job at a Shell gas station located in East Austin. They walked to a nearby park where they sat under a tree. Appellant approached them, grabbed the front of Chinta's shirt, brandished a knife, and pointed it at both of them. Appellant also verbally threatened the two men. Chinta and Pran had recently immigrated from Nepal to Texas and did not understand English, and only understood Appellant when he said, "f***ing Nepali." Both men were afraid Appellant intended to kill them. When Chinta and Pran tried to walk back to the gas station, Appellant approached them again, took his shirt off, and hit Chinta on the chest and kicked Pran.
Because Chinta and Pran just arrived to the United States, they were unfamiliar with the laws and regulations and were unsure of what to do after Appellant approached them in the park. With the help of a Nepalese interpreter and their immigration attorney, Chinta and Pran were able to call the police and report the assault.
On July 18, 2014, a second incident occurred. According to Chinta, who was already inside the gas station, Appellant chased Pran as he was arriving for work. Once Pran made it inside the gas station, they observed Appellant making threatening gestures, including making a gun with his hand, pretending to pull the trigger, and making a slashing motion across his neck as if his finger were a knife. Pran immediately called the police. Officers Ricardo Aguilar-Lopez and Jason Looker responded to the scene. Pran and Chinta noticed Appellant crossing a nearby street and pointed him out to the officers. The officers stopped Appellant to confirm his identity and Appellant informed them that he had been involved in an argument with Chinta and Pran earlier in the week. Chinta and Pran had approached him near the park while he was barbecuing and that while he could not understand what they were saying, he felt like he was being either harassed or that they were making sexual advances towards him based on their demeanor. During this conversation, Appellant was outside the patrol vehicle, not handcuffed, and had not yet been placed under arrest. The officers and Appellant, who voluntarily sat in the back of the patrol vehicle, then drove to the gas station where Chinta and Pran confirmed that he was the individual who had tried to assault them. Officer Aguilar-Lopez testified that when Appellant was in the back of the patrol vehicle he was detained, but he had not yet been read his Miranda warning.
During a voir dire examination of Officer Aguilar-Lopez outside the presence of the jury, the State attempted to introduce the statements Appellant made regarding the first encounter with as voluntary and noncustodial. The trial court was unsure when the officers detained Appellant, and Officer Aguilar-Lopez testified that upon the immediate encounter, Appellant was not free to leave. The trial court then reviewed the video from the patrol vehicle, which revealed that when the officers questioned Appellant regarding the first incident, Appellant responded that the two men harassed him. The trial court ruled that these statements were not voluntary because they were made in response to the officers' questions and determined that they would not be admissible at trial. The State similarly sought to introduce another statement made by Appellant while he was sitting alone in the patrol car. Contrary to its earlier ruling, the trial court ruled that this statement was voluntary and thus admissible:
Appellant suddenly yelled out, "Hey, that's him, that's both of them right there."
[Trial Court]: The part that I just saw a few minutes is going to be admitted as res gestae, voluntary. Him blurting out the identification will be admitted.
CUSTODIAL STATEMENTS
In a single issue on appeal, Appellant maintains that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the statements he made while he was in the backseat of the patrol vehicle. He insists that because he was not given his Miranda warnings, his statements were inadmissible because they were a result of custodial interrogation. The law on custodial interrogation is well-settled.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
An accused's oral statement made as a result of custodial interrogation is not admissible at trial unless the accused was warned of his rights and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived those rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 38.22 § 2(a)-(b)(West Supp. 2016). Section 5 of Article 38.22 does not preclude the admission of a statement "that is the res gestae of the arrest or of the offense, or of a statement that does not stem from custodial interrogation, or of a voluntary statement, whether or not the result of custodial interrogation . . . ." Id. § 5; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630 ("Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence," and "[v]olunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment.").
Moreover, "the special procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are required not where a suspect is simply taken into custody, but rather where a suspect is subjected to interrogation." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). "Interrogation" refers to either express questioning or to "any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Id. at 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. at 1689-90.
The defendant bears the initial burden of establishing that a statement was the product of custodial interrogation. Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 526 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). A trial judge's ultimate "custody" determination presents a mixed question of law and fact; we afford almost total deference to a trial judge's "custody" determination when the questions of historical fact turn on credibility and demeanor, and we otherwise review the determination de novo. Id. at 526-27. When a trial judge denies a motion to suppress and does not make findings of fact, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and assume the trial court made implicit findings of fact that support its ruling, as long as those findings are supported by the record. Id. at 527.
Analysis
While Officer Aguilar-Lopez's testimony is conflicting concerning whether Appellant was detained at the time in question, we are mindful that the trial judge is the exclusive judge of a witness's credibility. St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). Officer Aguilar-Lopez testified that he and Officer Looker initially approached Appellant only to confirm his identity. He emphasized that Appellant was not under arrest and was never handcuffed. He also testified that Appellant voluntarily rode in the patrol vehicle with them. Neither officer informed Appellant that he was not free to leave. Officer Aguilar-Lopez acknowledged that once he and Officer Looker approached Appellant on the street to identify him, he was detained; in other words, if he had walked away from the officers, he would not have been free to leave. Despite this testimony, there is some evidence in the record to support the trial court's determination that the statements were admissible because he was not in custody. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, and assuming the trial court made implicit findings of fact that support its ruling, the evidence supports a finding that Appellant made his statement while not in custody.
The Court of Criminal Appeals in Dancy v. State emphasized that:
Where a person voluntarily accompanies police officers, who are then only in the process of investigating a crime, to a certain location, and he knows or should know that the police officers suspect he may have committed or may be implicated in committing the crime, we are unable to hold that under the circumstances such a person is restrained of his freedom of movement. Under those circumstances, he is not in custody.728 S.W.2d 772, 778 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987).
We must assume that the trial court made implicit findings of fact that support its ruling as long as those findings are supported by the record. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000).
Even if Appellant was in custody at the time in question, his statements were still not the result of custodial interrogation. According to the patrol vehicle video, Appellant's statements were made voluntarily, and not in response to any express questioning by either officer or any words or actions they should have known were reasonable likely to elicit an incriminating response. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. at 1689-90. We overrule Appellant's sole point and affirm the judgment of the trial court. February 28, 2017
ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, Chief Justice Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Hughes, JJ.
Hughes, J., not participating (Do Not Publish)