Opinion
CIVIL 1:19-CV-1951
09-10-2021
RALPH McCLAIN, Plaintiff, v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants.
Rambo Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge.
I. Statement of Facts and of the Case
Ralph McClain is a state inmate who filed this action against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and several correctional staff, alleging that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. According to the First Amended Complaint, McClain's claims stem from his intake at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill, where he underwent an initial evaluation, during which staff indicated he may need to be interviewed further for a risk of suicide. (Doc. 24). After further interviews with multiple prison staff, some of whom were unnamed in his initial amended complaint, McClain was placed in the Residential Treatment Unit (“RTU”) because it was determined that he was at a high risk of suicide. (Id., ¶ 16).
The amended complaint asserts that defendants Carberry, Imler, and Jenkens composed McClain's treatment team in the RTU. (Id., ¶ 19). McClain alleges that on multiple occasions, he informed these defendants that he had frequent thoughts of committing suicide. (Id., ¶ 20). Notwithstanding these admissions of suicidal thoughts, on December 13, 2018, McClain was then moved out of the RTU and placed on B Block. (Id., ¶ 21). The complaint states that the RTU cells were specially designed without bars or hooks to keep inmates from attempting suicide. (Id., ¶ 23). That same day, McClain attempted to take his life by hanging himself from the bars of his cell in B Block. (Id., ¶ 22). The complaint asserts that following this suicide attempt, Defendant Carberry apologized to McClain, stating that he didn't think McClain was actually going to attempt suicide. (Id., ¶ 25).
It is on the basis of these averments that McClain brought this civil rights action, asserting violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and naming the DOC, Carberry, Imler, and Jenkens as defendants. After removing the case to federal court, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. (Doc. 5). The motion was denied with respect to the civil rights claims against the individual defendants and granted with respect to the § 1983 claim against the DOC. (Docs. 14, 15). McClain then filed another amended complaint (Doc. 24), naming only Carberry, Imler, and Jenkens as defendants. The defendants again moved to dismiss the complaint, but this motion was denied. (Docs. 35, 38).
Following several months of discovery, McClain has now filed a motion to further amend his complaint to add several new defendants and new claims. (Doc. 43). McClain's latest proposed amended complaint adds the DOC, the Residential Treatment Unit Psychiatry Review Team (“PRT”), Mr. Plotica, Dr. Mushtag, Danielle Tedesco, Ms. Wilson, Ms. Searer, Ms. Striker, and two John Doe defendants. (Doc. 43-2). In addition, this amended complaint asserts new Eighth Amendment claims, a First Amendment retaliation claim, a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and state law negligence claims. McClain asserts that he learned of several additional defendants and claims from the defendants' responses to his discovery requests.
For their part, the defendants assert that this motion to amend is untimely and that any amendment at this time would unfairly prejudice the defendants. Given the liberal standards that govern amendment of pleadings, we disagree, and for the following reasons, we will recommend that the plaintiff's motion to amend be granted in part and denied in part, in that the plaintiff should not be permitted to pursue a First Amendment retaliation claim, but he should be permitted to add the remaining additional claims and defendants.
II. Discussion
A. Motion to Amend - Standard of Review
Motions to amend are governed by Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil procedure, which provides as follows:
(a) Amendments Before Trial.
(1) Amending as a Matter of Course. A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within:
(A) 21 days after serving it, or
(B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.
(2) Other Amendments. In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.
As the text of this rule implies, decisions regarding motions to amend or supplement pleadings rest in the sound discretion of the district court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. See e.g., Bjorgung v. Whitetail Resort, LP, 550 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2008); Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n., 252 F.3d 267 (3d Cir. 2001). That discretion, however, is governed by certain basic principles, principles that are embodied in Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, “[l]eave to amend must generally be granted unless equitable considerations render it otherwise unjust.” Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 204 (3d Cir. 2006). Further:
The liberality of Rule 15(a) counsels in favor of amendment even when a party has been less than perfect in the preparation and presentation of a case. See Foman, 371 U.S. at 182, 83 S.Ct. 227; Boileau v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 730 F.2d 929, 938-39 (3d Cir. 1984). It allows for misunderstandings and good-faith lapses in judgment, so long as the party thereafter acts reasonably and diligently.Arthur, 434 F.3d at 206.
“Among the grounds that could justify a denial of leave to amend are ..., bad faith, dilatory motive, prejudice, and futility. ‘Futility' means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997); Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1413-14 (3d Cir. 1993)) (some quotations omitted). Moreover, a party seeking to supplement pleadings must act in a diligent fashion. Thus, for example, “[a] District Court has discretion to deny a plaintiff leave to amend where the plaintiff was put on notice as to the deficiencies in his complaint but chose not to resolve them.” Krantz v. Prudential Investments Fund Management LLC, 305 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644, 654 (3d Cir. 1998)).
Moreover, in undertaking this analysis of a motion for leave to amend a complaint “prejudice to the non-moving party is the touchstone for the denial of an amendment.” Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1414 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Cornell & Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 573 F.2d 820, 823 (3d Cir. 1978)). However, “[i]n the absence of substantial or undue prejudice, denial instead must be based on bad faith or dilatory motives, truly undue or unexplained delay, repeated failures to cure the deficiency by amendments previously allowed, or futility of amendment.” Id. Further, while the burdens of additional discovery are relevant to consideration of whether a proposed amendment results in substantial or undue prejudice, oftentimes, “[g]iven the liberal view towards amendment pleadings embodied in Rule 15, re-opening discovery, rather than forecasting claims, ... would seem to be the preferable course for addressing these claims of potential prejudice.” New Prime, Inc. v. Brandon Balchune Constr. Co., et al., 2016 WL 3742872, at *4 (M.D. Pa. July 13, 2016).
It is against these legal benchmarks that we assess McClain's motion to amend.
B. McClain's Motion to Amend Should Be Granted in Part and Denied in Part.
As we have noted, McClain's proposed amended complaint seeks to add nine new defendants and the DOC, as well as another Eighth Amendment claim, a First Amendment claim, an ADA claim, and state law negligence claims. McClain asserts that these additional defendants' names, as well as the grounds for his additional claims, were revealed to him in the defendants' discovery responses in November and December of 2020 and that he then acted promptly, filing this motion to amend in January of 2021. For their part, the defendants claim that the plaintiff's motion to amend is barred by the statute of limitations. Moreover, they assert that permitting the plaintiff to amend his complaint would prejudice the defendants.
At the outset, we conclude that the plaintiff's amended complaint is not barred by the statute of limitations. Because McClain's § 1983 claims arose in Pennsylvania, we must apply Pennsylvania's statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Pearson v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr., 775 F.3d 598, 602 (3d Cir. 2015). In Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations for personal injury claims is two years. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(7). However, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) a prisoner bringing a civil rights lawsuit must exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit. Pressley v. Huber, 562 Fed.Appx. 67, 70 (3d Cir. 2014). Thus, the Third Circuit has held that “because exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory under the [PLRA], the statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions should be tolled while a prisoner exhausts.” Pearson, 775 F.3d at 602 (quoting Pressley, 562 Fed.Appx. at 70) (internal quotations omitted).
Under the PLRA, a prisoner must pursue all avenues of relief available within a prison's grievance system before bringing a federal civil rights action concerning prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 291 (3d Cir. 2000). This “exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). The exhaustion requirement is mandatory. Williams v. Beard, 482 F.3d 637, 639 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (holding that the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA applies to grievance procedures “regardless of the relief offered through administrative procedures”); Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 67 (3d Cir. 2000) (same). Moreover, “it is beyond the power of [any] court . . . to excuse compliance with the exhaustion requirement.” Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 73 (quoting Beeson v. Fishkill Corr. Facility, 28 F.Supp.2d 884, 894-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
To exhaust administrative remedies, an inmate must comply with all applicable grievance procedures and rules. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 231 (3d Cir. 2004). The PLRA requires not only technical exhaustion of administrative remedies, but also substantial compliance with procedural requirements. Id. at 22732; see also Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 77-78. A procedural default by the prisoner bars the prisoner from bringing a claim in federal court unless equitable considerations warrant review of the claim. Spruill, 372 F.3d at 227-32; see also Camp v. Brennan, 219 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2000).
An inmate's failure to comply with the exhaustion requirement prescribed by the PLRA is an affirmative defense, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007), and the burden of proving a failure to exhaust rests with the defendants, Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2002). The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Inmate Grievance Policy provides for a three-step process that provides inmates with a means of seeking review of problems that may arise during the course of confinement. Pursuant to DC-ADM 804, after an attempt to resolve problems informally, an inmate may submit a written grievance to the institution's Grievance Coordinator for initial review. This must occur within 15 days after the events upon which the claims are based. “The text of the grievance must be legible, understandable, and presented in a courteous manner. The inmate must include a statement of the facts relevant to the claim. The statement of facts shall include the date, approximate time and location of the event(s) that gave rise to the grievance. The inmate shall identify individuals directly involved in the event(s).” DC-ADM 804, § 1(A)(11). Although the grievance policy contains this identification requirement, the Supreme Court has observed that “nothing in the [PLRA] imposes a ‘name all defendants' requirement, ” because “the primary purpose of a grievance is to alert prison officials to a problem, not to provide personal notice to a particular official that he may be sued.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. at 217, 219 (quoting Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 522 (5th Cir. 2004)).
Within 15 days of an adverse decision by the Grievance Coordinator, an inmate may appeal to the Facility Manager of the institution. Thereafter, within 15 days of an adverse decision by the Facility Manager, the inmate may file a final appeal to the Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals. An appeal to final review cannot be completed unless an inmate complies with all established procedures. Thus, an inmate must exhaust all three levels of review and comply with all procedural requirements of the grievance review process in order to fully exhaust an issue. See Booth, 206 F.3d at 293 n.2 (outlining Pennsylvania's grievance review process); Ingram v. SCI Camp Hill, 448 Fed.Appx. 275, 279 (3d Cir. 2011) (same).
In the instant case, McClain's claims arose on or about December 13, 2018, the day he attempted suicide. However, McClain asserts that he filed a grievance related to his claims in this civil rights case and received a denial of his final appeal on June 17, 2019. Thus, the two-year limitations period would have been tolled until June 17, 2019, and McClain would then have two years from that date to file his civil rights claims. Given that this proposed amended complaint was filed on January 14, 2021, within the two-year limitations period, we conclude that these claims are timely and are not barred by the statute of limitations.
We further conclude that the defendants would not be unfairly prejudiced by the addition of new defendants and new claims. On this score, McClain endeavors to assert the following claims in his proposed amended complaint: he has added Searer, Striker, Mushtag, Wilson, Tedesco, and Plotica, who he alleges made up the review team (“PRT”), to his original Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Carberry, Jenkens, and Imler (Doc. 43-2, at 7); he asserts a negligence claim against these defendants for removing him from the RTU knowing that he posed a risk to himself (Id.); he asserts Eighth Amendment and negligence claims against two John Doe defendants-the Correctional Classifications Manager and the Deputy Superintendent for Centralized Services-alleging that they approved his move from the RTU to B Block (Id., at 8); he brings a First Amendment retaliation claim against the individual defendants, alleging that he was removed from the RTU for exercising First Amendment rights (Id.); McClain also asserts a claim under the ADA against the DOC and the Psychiatric Review Team as an entity for denying him the services in the RTU (Id., at 9); and finally, a claim against the DOC for medical negligence. (Id.)
While we acknowledge that “prejudice to the non-moving party is the touchstone for the denial of an amendment, ” Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1414 (3d Cir. 1993), we also concede that “[g]iven the liberal view towards amendment pleadings embodied in Rule 15, re-opening discovery, rather than forecasting claims, ... would seem to be the preferable course for addressing these claims of potential prejudice.” New Prime, Inc., 2016 WL 3742872, at *4. In the instant case, all of the allegations in McClain's various complaints stem out of the same nucleus of operative facts-his removal from the RTU to general population, after which he attempted suicide. The only claim that may require some limited, additional discovery is the plaintiff's ADA claim. In addition, the plaintiff asserts that he only learned of the additional defendants' names through the defendants' discovery responses in November and December of 2020. Indeed, the plaintiff's first amended complaint contains allegations that he met and was interviewed by several unnamed correctional or medical personnel at SCI Camp Hill, and the proposed amended complaint names those individuals. Thus, we conclude that the potential prejudice which would flow from this final amendment of McClain's complaint is not so compelling that it overcomes the proposition that “[l]eave to amend must generally be granted unless equitable considerations render it otherwise unjust.” Arthur, 434 F.3d at 204.
However, we further conclude that the plaintiff should not be permitted to bring a First Amendment retaliation claim against these individual defendants. As we have noted, a court may deny leave to amend if leave to amend would be futile. Shane, 213 F.3d at 115. By defining futility for purposes of a motion to amend as failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, Rule 15 mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not “assume that a ... plaintiff can prove facts that the ... plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do.” Id. at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
In this case, McClain premises his retaliation claim on his alleged protected speech, which appears to amount to sexually explicit comments and sexual harassment and unwanted advances directed at staff in the RTU. (Doc. 44, at 4). On this score, we recognize that the Third Circuit has drawn a distinction between speech that “advocat[es] violence that is not imminent and unlikely to occur” and “speech that constitutes a ‘true threat.'” United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 154 (3d Cir. 2009). However, we also recognize an undeniable truth to this aspect of McClain's First Amendment claim. At bottom, McClain concedes that he made inappropriate sexual advances toward staff. (Doc. 44, at 5). This, in turn, presents a fatal challenge to McClain's assertion that he engaged in protected speech.
We are compelled to note that this is not the first occasion in which McClain has invited the courts to find that he has a constitutional right to search for love in the prison. Quite the contrary, in 2012 McClain, who was then using the name Capachino Capone, filed a motion for preliminary injunction which:
[D]emand[ed] that this court provide him with “reasonable accommodations for plaintiff to engage in sacred coital Royal Majestic rituals with plaintiff's Royal Majestic harem consorts, physically, spiritually and psychicly [sic], ” [which] we construe[d] . . . as a request for contact visitation with a broad class of person described by McClain as “plaintiffs sacred and Majestic harem and/or earth bound celestial goddesses and/or priestessesque [sic] women with divine and/or saintly qualities.”McClain v. Walsh, No. 1:12-CV-265, 2012 WL 5398604, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:12-CV-265, 2012 WL 5395823 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2012). The court denied this request in 2012, and we recommend that the court decline McClain's current invitation to confer a constitutional right upon this prisoner to sexually harass staff and invite them to commit criminal acts.
It is well settled that “‘speech integral to criminal conduct' is not protected by the First Amendment.” Yoast v. Pottstown Borough, 437 F.Supp.3d 403, 419 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012)). On this score, McClain's attempts to solicit sexual contact with prison staff can be categorized as nothing other than “speech integral to criminal conduct.” Pennsylvania law prohibits an employee of a correctional facility from engaging in sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, or indecent contact with an inmate. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3124.2(a). Further, Pennsylvania law prohibits individuals from soliciting others to commit a crime. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 902(a). McClain's sexual advances toward staff at SCI Camp Hill can be categorized as soliciting these staff members to commit a crime by engaging in criminal acts of sexual intercourse or indecent contact with him. This plainly is not speech that is protected by the First Amendment, and thus cannot form the basis of McClain's retaliation claim. Therefore, McClain's motion to amend should be denied as to any First Amendment retaliation claim, and he should not be permitted to assert a retaliation claim against the individual defendants.
Accordingly, taking all of these factors into consideration, in the exercise of the court's discretion, it is recommended that the motion to amend, with the exception of the First Amendment retaliation claim, be granted but that no additional leave to amend be afforded to the plaintiff in this case.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT the plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint (Doc. 43) be DENIED as to the addition of a First Amendment retaliation claim, but GRANTED as to the additional defendants and Eighth Amendment, ADA, and state law claims.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in
28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 10th day of September 2021.