Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 08-1347
07-28-2017
RALPH WILLIAM MCCLAIN, JR. Plaintiff, pro se v. C.O. GOLDEN, et al., Defendants
MEMORANDUM OPINION
INTRODUCTION
Before this Court is the motion to dismiss, filed by Defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6), [ECF 40], which seeks the dismissal of the civil rights claims asserted against them in an amended complaint filed by Plaintiff Ralph William McClain, Jr. ("Plaintiff"), who is proceeding pro se. In their motion to dismiss, Defendants contend that Plaintiff's civil rights claims are time-barred. Plaintiff has not responded to the motion to dismiss, and the time for doing so has passed. Defendants have briefed the issues raised and the motion is ripe for disposition. For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted, in part, and denied, in part.
The party defendants are: Anton Golden ("Officer Golden") and Keith Westober ("Officer Westober") (collectively, "Original Defendants"); and Jennifer Daneker ("Daneker"), Sylvia Pallot ("Pallot"), Hugh Owens ("Owens"), Julia Kneauer ("Kneauer"), David Diguglielmo ("Superintendent Diguglielmo"), and Wendy Shaylor (identified by Plaintiff as "Wendy Moyer") ("Moyer") (collectively, "New Defendants"). The named defendants will be collectively referred to as "Defendants." Although Plaintiff's amended complaint also names as defendants "Lt. John Doe" and "P.A. Mac," they have not been fully identified or served in this matter, and thus, are not party to the underlying motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
On March 20, 2008, Plaintiff filed an original complaint against Officers Golden and Westober only, asserting, inter alia, claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983") for Eighth Amendment violations due to cruel and unusual punishment and Fourteenth Amendment due process violations. [ECF 1]. Plaintiff also asserted state law claims for assault and battery. [Id.]. All of Plaintiff's claims are premised on an alleged assault Plaintiff suffered on January 10, 2006, while in prison, at the hands of Officers Golden and Westober.
On July 29, 2008, the Honorable Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter, to whom this matter was originally assigned, placed the action in civil suspense because Officer Golden was on active military duty. [ECF 12]. On February 12, 2009, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint, [ECF 16], which Judge Buckwalter denied because the matter was in civil suspense. [ECF 17]. Of note, the proposed amended complaint that was attached to Plaintiff's motion included new claims against additional parties not included in the original complaint.
The proposed amended complaint of 2009, [ECF 16-1], and the amended complaint filed March 7, 2017, [ECF 33], are identical in content, though Plaintiff included exhibits with his February 2, 2009 proposed amended complaint that were not included with the March 7, 2017 amended complaint.
On January 25, 2016, this matter was reassigned to the undersigned, [ECF 20], and on February 18, 2016, was removed from civil suspense. [ECF 22]. On February 2, 2017, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint. [ECF 27]. Plaintiff's motion was granted on March 7, 2017, [ECF 32], and the amended complaint was duly docketed. [ECF 33]. The amended complaint, like the one attached to Plaintiff's original motion for leave to amend, reasserted the claims against Original Defendants, and added new civil rights claims against additional individuals, i.e., New Defendants. [ECF 33]. The claims against New Defendants were premised on alleged violations of Plaintiff's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights for failure to provide medical assistance and failure to process his administrative grievances. [Id.]. As noted, Defendants have moved to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims.
In their motion, Defendants assert that the matter "sat in a procedural limbo." As set forth herein, however, the matter was stayed for more than seven years, on Defendants' own motion because Officer Golden was on active military duty.
When ruling on Defendants' motion to dismiss, this Court must accept as true all factual allegations in the amended complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Fowler v UMPC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Because the motion to dismiss the claims against New Defendants is primarily premised upon their argument that the claims asserted against them are time-barred and do not relate back to the original claims asserted against Original Defendants, as required by Rule 15, the facts averred in both complaints are summarized below.
The relevant facts averred in Plaintiff's original one-page complaint, [ECF 1], are summarized as follows:
At all relevant times, Plaintiff was an individual incarcerated at Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at Graterford ("SCI Graterford"). Officer Golden allegedly used his nightstick to beat Plaintiff's arms while Officer Westober held Plaintiff‘s arms outside his "feed box." (Compl. ¶1). Plaintiff posed no threat to Officer Golden when Officer Golden allegedly beat him with his "night stick." (Id. ¶2).
Notably, Plaintiff did not aver in his original complaint when the alleged incident occurred, nor did he allege any facts with respect to the administrative exhaustion of his claims.
The relevant facts averred in Plaintiff's seventeen-page amended complaint, [ECF 33], are summarized as follows:
Facts Pertaining to Excessive Force Claims
Against Original Defendants
On the morning of January 10, 2006, Plaintiff was in his cell while Officer Golden served the prisoners breakfast. (Am. Compl. ¶¶4-11). Officer Golden left open the box slot through which breakfast is delivered to Plaintiff in his cell, and Plaintiff stuck his right arm out through it. (Id. ¶¶11-13). Plaintiff refused to remove his arm from the box slot after being instructed to do so multiple times by Officer Golden. (Id. at ¶¶13-14). Officer Golden went to get a "billy club" and help from Officer Westober. (Id. at ¶¶15-18). Officer Westober tried to talk Plaintiff into removing his arm from the slot to no avail. (Id. at ¶¶19-20). Officer Golden armed himself with the "billy club," while Officer Westober grabbed Plaintiff's
arm. (Id. at ¶¶21-22). Officer Golden began to beat Plaintiff's arm while Officer Westober held it in position. (Id. at ¶¶23-25). Plaintiff managed to free his right arm and remove it from the slot, but then introduced his left arm in an attempt to keep the box slot open. (Id. at ¶¶26-30). Officer Golden struck Plaintiff's left arm three times before Plaintiff removed his arm from the slot. (Id. at ¶¶31-32).
Plaintiff contends that the Prison Administration's Use of Force Guidelines provide that this type of force is not to be used unless there is "a threat of serious harm from the inmate," and that there was no such threat, as he was locked in a cell. (Id. at ¶¶35-36).
Facts Pertaining to Claims Against New Defendants
Plaintiff identified New Defendants as: medical services physician assistant Mac ("P.A. Mac"), unit manager Pallot, Superintendent Diguglielmo, Healthcare Administrator Kneauer, security officer Lieutenant Owens, correction superintendent's assistant Danaker, and Grievance Coordinator Moyer (Id.). Plaintiff alleges generally that: P.A. Mac, Pallot, Owens, and Kneauer neglected to treat Plaintiff for his injuries and failed to provide proper medical treatment; Superintendent Diguglielmo failed to have Plaintiff treated for injuries suffered at SCI Graterford; Danaker failed to respond to Plaintiff's complaints of abuse; and Moyer failed to file Plaintiff's grievances in a timely manner and/or failed to respond to them. (Id. at Statement of Claims ¶¶1-30).
Plaintiff further contends that he was denied medical treatment, starting on the day of the incident, despite his complaint of "not being able to move his fingers and that [his] hand was broken." (Id. at ¶¶39-40). On the day of the assault, Plaintiff submitted a "medical sick call slip" and gave it to the night nurse. In the medical sick call slip, Plaintiff indicated that he had "lumps and bruises" and needed an x-ray. (Id. at ¶41). After submitting three or four sick call slips, Plaintiff wrote request slips to Kneauer, the Health Care Administrator. (Id. at ¶42). Plaintiff also alleges that Pallot,
the head administrator for Plaintiff's cellblock, neglected to have Plaintiff medically treated for his injuries. (Am. Compl. at Statement of Claims ¶10).
Plaintiff alleges that on January 20, 2006, he spoke to P.A. Mac about his need for medical treatment, and that P.A. Mac told Plaintiff that he would order some pain medications and arrange for x-rays. (Id. at ¶¶43-45). However, Plaintiff contends that he never received any pain medication or x-rays. (Id. at ¶¶46-47).
Facts Pertaining to Plaintiff's Grievance for Excessive Force Claim
On January 10, 2006, Plaintiff wrote and sent an Incident of Abuse Statement to Superintendent Diguglielmo and Danaker regarding the alleged assault. (Id. at ¶¶48,50; Am. Compl. Exs. at p. 20). On January 30, 2016, Plaintiff received a response from Superintendent Diguglielmo, indicating that Owens told Superintendent Diguglielmo that Plaintiff had refused to speak to "internal security," which was investigating the incident. (Am. Compl. ¶49; Am. Compl. Exs. at p. 20). After receiving Superintendent Diguglielmo's response, Plaintiff sent a copy of the Incident of Abuse Statement to Owens and "told him that [he] never refused to speak to internal security." (Am. Compl. ¶51). Owens never responded. (Id. at ¶52). Plaintiff asserts that, despite filing grievances and "filling out" incident reports, no one ever investigated the incident. (Id. at ¶¶53-54).
On January 20, 2006, Plaintiff submitted a grievance for the assault, with a copy of the incident report, to Grievance Coordinator Moyer. (Id. at ¶55; Am. Compl. Exs. at p. 22). Moyer allegedly failed to file Plaintiff's grievance. (Am. Compl. ¶56). Plaintiff continued to submit grievance paperwork to Moyer, but Moyer ignored it. (Id. at ¶57; Am. Compl. Exs. at p. 27). Plaintiff alleges that Danaker also ignored the grievances and failed to respond to his complaints of abuse. (Am. Compl. at Statement of Claims ¶24). Plaintiff sent a grievance to Danaker's office on February 11, 2006, which was received on February 15, 2006, advising that if Plaintiff did not receive a response by February 17, 2006, he would be submitting his "second appeal to [S]uperintendent Diguglielmo." (Am. Compl. Exs. at p. 28).
Plaintiff eventually submitted appeals of his abuse grievances to the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Headquarters in Camphill, all of which were denied. (Am. Compl. ¶¶58-59).
Facts Pertaining to Plaintiff's Grievances for Medical Care Claims
Plaintiff filed grievances for his alleged denial of medical treatment. (Id. ¶¶61-64; ECF 16 Exs. at p. 5). CHCA Myron Stonsishofski ("Stonsishofski") replied to the first grievance on February 15, 2006. (Am.
Compl. ¶¶62,64; ECF 16 Exs. at p. 15). In his response, Stonsishofski indicated that Plaintiff had been seen twice by medical staff for sick calls in January 2006. (Am. Compl. ¶¶62, 64; ECF 16 Exs. at p. 15). Plaintiff denies that doctors saw him during that time. (Am. Compl. ¶66). Plaintiff submitted a second medical grievance on February 27, 2006, narrating his previous grievance, as well as Stonsishofski's response. (Am. Compl. Exs. at p. 31). Moyer denied the grievance because it was a duplicate of a grievance previously responded to on February 17, 2006. (ECF 16 Exs. at p. 17).
Facts Pertaining to Plaintiff's Administrative Appeals of Grievances
On June 20, 2006, Plaintiff appealed his grievances to Superintendent Diguglielmo. (Am. Compl. Exs. at p. 32). Moyer, responded to Plaintiff's appeal on June 29, 2006, by way of a letter that read:
Your general appeal to grievances filed in January and February of this year was forwarded to me.
I have researched the copies you forwarded and placed numbers on them. I'm also sending you copies of the responses or rejections for each.
However, you cannot appeal the grievance responses that you claim you never saw. Secondly, if you did not receive any correspondence regarding the grievances, you should have inquired about them before now. At this point, any appeal would be considered untimely.
(ECF 16 Exs. at p. 18).
On July 24, 2006, Plaintiff again attempted to appeal his grievances by writing a letter to Superintendent Diguglielmo, in which he indicated that he "encountered difficulties in [his] pursuit to have this grievance resolved," because he had not obtained file numbers and "was notified of the fact that this grievance was rejected several months late." (Am. Compl. Exs. at p. 34-35). On August 16, 2006, Plaintiff filed another appeal to Superintendent Diguglielmo, again explaining his untimeliness to appeal, and adding that he was involuntarily committed to the Mental Health Unit of the prison and "unable to attend to [his] paperwork." (Id. at p. 36). Superintendent Diguglielmo responded on August 23, 2006, upholding the rejection of the grievances because Plaintiff had not followed the proper procedures and had been untimely. (ECF 16 Exs. at p. 20).
On August 26, 2006, Plaintiff appealed Superintendent Digulielmo's decision to Chief Grievance Officer Sharon M. Burks ("Burks"). (Am.
Compl Ex. at p. 37-39). Burks responded on September 12, 2006, rejecting the appeal. (ECF 16 Exs. at p. 22). The rejection letter read as follows:
Your Request for appeal to final review of the above noted grievance(s) is hereby acknowledged.
In accordance with the provisions of DC-ADM 804, as amended effective January 3, 2005, I have reviewed the entire record of this grievance. Under the date of June 29, 2006, Superintendent Diguglielmo dismissed your appeal from initial review as untimely. Consequently, you failed to complete the appeal to the superintendent as required, pursuant to DC-ADM 804. Accordingly, your appeal to final review cannot be accepted.
For the above stated reason, your appeal to final review is dismissed.
(Id.)
The headings contained in this summary of the amended complaint are included for the purpose of clarity, but are not included in Plaintiff's amended complaint.
As a general rule, when ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court may consider only the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters of public record. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Industries, Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). However, as an exception to this rule, a court may also consider a "document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint," without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). Consistent with this exception, the Third Circuit has held that a court may consider indisputably authentic documents "related to [a prisoner plaintiff's] grievances" when determining the extent of a prisoner's administrative exhaustion. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2004). Here, Plaintiff has attached to his amended complaint, as well as to his initial, unfiled amended complaint, documents that are integral to or explicitly relied upon in his amended complaint and which relate to Plaintiff's administrative exhaustion of his claims. This Court has considered these documents in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.
As noted supra, P.A. Mac has yet to be identified and/or served in this matter.
LEGAL STANDARD
When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a court "must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 572 (2007). "[A] complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations." Id. at 545. However, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to entitle it to relief. Id. This "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. "[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In order to avoid dismissal, the complaint must "set out 'sufficient factual matter' to show that the claim is facially plausible." Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. The facts alleged by the plaintiff must "nudge [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547. "In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to 'show' such an entitlement with its facts." Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211. If the facts pled are not enough to allow a court to infer more than a mere possibility of the misconduct alleged, the complaint "has alleged but not show[n] that the pleader is entitled to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Though pro se filings "must be held to less stringent standards," these filings must contain "sufficient factual matter[,] accepted as true[,] to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Fantone v. Latini, 780 F.3d 184, 193 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) and Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
DISCUSSION
As noted, Plaintiff's § 1983 claims are premised upon alleged Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations committed by Defendants. The claims asserted against Original Defendants in the initial complaint were premised upon an alleged assault of Plaintiff on January 10, 2006, and nothing more. Plaintiff's amended complaint repeats these claims against Original Defendants, but includes additional civil rights claims against New Defendants premised on their refusal to provide Plaintiff with medical treatment for his injuries and to process his filed grievances. Defendants move to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims on the basis that: (1) the claims are time-barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations, and/or (2) the claims against New Defendants are time-barred because these claims do not relate back to the original complaint, as required by Rule 15. These contentions will be addressed separately.
As to Defendants' first contention, though a statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that a defendant generally must plead in an answer, in this Circuit, a statute of limitations defense may also be raised in a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) "if the time alleged in the statement of a claim shows that the cause of action has not been brought within the statute of limitations." Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 134-35 (3d Cir. 2002)). A motion to dismiss can only be granted on the basis of a statute of limitations, however, if the statute's applicability is apparent on the face of the complaint. Robinson, 313 F.3d at 135; see also Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994); Bethel v. Jendoco Constr. Corp., 570 F.2d 1168, 1174 (3d Cir. 1978) ("If the bar is not apparent on the face of the complaint, then it may not afford the basis for a dismissal of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6)."). Because the statute of limitations argument is an affirmative defense, the burden of establishing its applicability rests upon the defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1); Bradford-White Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 872 F.2d 1153, 1161 (3d Cir. 1989).
It is well settled that the statute of limitations period for civil rights actions brought under § 1983 is the statute of limitations period for personal injury torts in the state where the alleged cause of action arose. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009); Sameric Corp. of Delaware v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998). Because the events on which Plaintiff's claims are based occurred in Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations governing personal injury claims applies. Koren v. Noonan, 586 Fed App'x 885, 889 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387 and 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5524). Under Pennsylvania law, a cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when a plaintiff is aware, or should be aware, of the existence and source of the injury. Sameric, 142 F.3d at 599. A cause of action generally accrues when the final significant event that would make the claim sustainable occurs. Ross v. Johns-Manville Corp., 766 F.2d 823, 826 (3d Cir. 1985).
However, a statute of limitations period can be tolled for statutory or equitable reasons. Schlueter v. Varner, 384 F.3d 69, 75 (3d Cir. 2004). Generally, equitable tolling is appropriate under the following exceptional circumstances: "(1) where the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff's cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff in some extraordinary way has been prevented from asserting his or her rights; or (3) where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights mistakenly in the wrong forum." New Castle Cty. v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1125-26 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1387). Courts must use equitable tolling sparingly, and must evaluate whether a plaintiff "has shown that he or she exercised reasonable diligence in investigating and bringing [the] claims." Adams v. Wenerowicz, 2013 WL 6692742, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2013) (quoting Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F.3d 157, 168 (3d Cir. 2003)). "[B]ecause exhaustion of prison administrative remedies is mandatory under the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), the statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions should be tolled while a prisoner pursues the mandated remedies." Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 157 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Pearson v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr., 775 F.3d 598, 603 (3d Cir. 2015)).
Statutory tolling, as its name suggests, provides for tolling where it is expressly provided by a statute. This Court is unaware of any such statute that would apply here.
Timeliness of Claims Against Original Defendants
Plaintiff's claims against Original Defendants are premised on the alleged assault that occurred on January 10, 2006. (Am. Compl. ¶6). In the absence of any tolling, Plaintiff was required to file his complaint no later than January 10, 2008. Plaintiff did not file his original complaint until March 20, 2008. [ECF 1]. As such, Plaintiff's original complaint appears to have been untimely filed. However, Plaintiff's amended complaint contains several contentions pertaining to his attempts to exhaust his administrative remedies, which raises the question of whether his claims might be subject to equitable tolling during some or all of the period when he pursued his administrative remedies. See Wisniewski, 857 F.3d at 157.
On the issue of tolling, Plaintiff alleges that despite filing grievances and filling out incident reports, neither the grievances nor the incident reports were "legitimately addressed." (Am. Compl. ¶57). On January 20, 2006, Plaintiff allegedly submitted a grievance on the assault, with a copy of the incident report, to the grievance coordinator, who he alleges failed to file it. (Id. at ¶55-56). Plaintiff insists that he continued to submit grievance paperwork, that was continually ignored. (Id. at ¶57). Plaintiff also alleges that the health care administrator ignored and failed to respond to the grievances, specifically the grievance filed on February 11, 2006. (Id. at ¶90). These contentions are supported by exhibits attached to Plaintiff's various court filings, which contain similar allegations regarding Defendants' failure to either respond to Plaintiff's administrative grievances or to provide Plaintiff with copies of the responses to his administrative grievances. For example, in Plaintiff's July 24, 2006 appeal to Superintendent Diguglielmo, Plaintiff claims to "have encountered unusual difficulties in [his] pursuit to have this grievance resolved." (Am. Compl. Exs. at p. 34). Plaintiff contends that he "had problems obtaining file [numbers]," and that he "was notified of the fact that [his] grievance was rejected several months late." (Id.). Plaintiff also alleges that his appeal was untimely because he was involuntarily committed to the Mental Health Unit at the prison and could not "attend to [his grievance] paperwork." (Id. at pp. 34-36). In light of these allegations, which must be construed at this stage of the proceedings in favor of Plaintiff, this Court finds that equitable tolling may apply and, therefore, it is not "apparent on the face of the complaint" that Plaintiff's claims against Original Defendants are barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss the claims against Original Defendants is denied.
This Court, however, expresses no opinion as to whether Plaintiff's underlying claims against Original Defendants will prevail, or whether any defenses, including the statute of limitations, will prove to be dispositive at later stages of this litigation.
Timeliness of Claims Against New Defendants
Though this Court is unable to conclude at this stage of the proceedings that the claims against Original Defendants are time-barred, the statute of limitations analysis as to New Defendants requires additional consideration. As set forth above, Plaintiff's claims against New Defendants are premised on their alleged failure to provide Plaintiff medical care and the failure to properly address his grievances, acts that occurred after the January 10, 2006 assault. These claims, like the claims against Original Defendants, are subject to the two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff, however, did not assert these claims against New Defendants until he filed his amended complaint on March 7, 2017, more than eleven years after the occurrence of the events on which these claims are based. Therefore, in the absence of any applicable tolling and/or application of "relation back" under Rule 15, these claims are time-barred.
As set forth above, in light of the allegations in Plaintiff's amended complaint and the facts gleaned from the exhibits attached to Plaintiff's filings, which are construed in Plaintiff's favor, Plaintiff might be entitled to equitable tolling of his claims until September 12, 2006, when the highest level of administrative appeal issued its final decision denying Plaintiff's appeals of all of his underlying administrative grievances. Under a liberal construction of Plaintiff's administrative grievance proceedings, Plaintiff's claims against New Defendants would ordinarily be time-barred unless filed by September 12, 2008. As noted, Plaintiff did not assert any claims against New Defendants until the amended complaint was filed on March 7, 2017. Therefore, these new claims are time-barred unless they "relate back" to the date of the filing of the claims asserted against Original Defendants in Plaintiff's original complaint.
It should be noted that this Court is not deciding here that Plaintiff's claims are subject to equitable tolling. Rather, for purposes of Defendants' motion to dismiss, this Court is giving Plaintiff the benefit of a liberal construction of Plaintiff's administrative grievance proceedings without determining whether Plaintiff properly exhausted his administrative remedies, or whether he is entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations for that entire period of time.
As noted above, this case was placed in civil suspense between July 31, 2008, and February 18, 2016. Plaintiff's initial motion for leave to amend the complaint was filed on February 2, 2009, while the action was in civil suspense. However, a stay does not toll the statute of limitations as to new defendants unless a defendant's actions prevented plaintiff from discovering he has a cause of action. See Feld Entm't Inc. v. Am. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 873 F. Supp. 2d 288, 310 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Ainbinder v. Kelleher, 1997 WL 420279, at *4, *7 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 1997) (Sotomayor, J.), aff'd 152 F.3d 917 (2d Cir. 1998)).
Here, the stay of this matter provides no basis for equitable tolling with respect to Plaintiff's claims against New Defendants, because Plaintiff was free to either commence a new action against New Defendants, or move this Court to lift the stay in regard to those claims. Plaintiff was required to do so, however, no later than September 12, 2008. Because the stay of this matter did not affect Plaintiff's right to raise his claims against New Defendants in a new matter, or in this matter, Plaintiff cannot blame the stay for his failure to do so and is not entitled to equitable tolling during the stay period. Cf., Ainbinder, 1997 WL 420279, at *7.
Rule 15(c) governs the relation back of amendments. Under Rule 15(c), in order for claims against a newly named defendant to relate back to an original pleading, a plaintiff must establish three prerequisites:
The relevant portion of Rule 15(c) provides as follows:
An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when: (C) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment: (i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and (ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1)(C).
(1) the claims in the amended complaint must arise out of the same occurrences set forth in the original complaint, (2) the party to be brought in by amendment must have received notice of the action within 120 days of its institution, and (3) the party to be brought in by amendment must have known, or should have known, that the action
would have been brought against the party but for a mistake concerning its identity.Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 203 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)); see also Godfrey v. Upland Borough, 2017 WL 1196634, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2017). Rule 15(c) requires "a common core of operative facts in the two pleadings." Anderson v. Blondex Intern., Inc. 552 F. App'x 153, 157 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Bensel v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 387 F.3d 298, 310 (3d Cir. 2004)). As such, new claims and/or allegations "relate back if they 'restate the original claim with greater particularity or amplify the factual circumstances surrounding the pertinent conduct, transaction or occurrence in the preceding pleading.'" Id. (quoting Bensel, 387 F.3d at 310).
Here, the allegations in Plaintiff's amended complaint pertaining to his claims against New Defendants do not "relate back" to the original complaint. Clearly, Plaintiff's original complaint only included averments pertaining to the alleged assault by Original Defendants, Officers Golden and Westober. The original complaint is completely silent with respect to any medical treatment, or lack thereof, rendered to Plaintiff, any administrative grievances, or any unlawful acts, omissions, or conduct by New Defendants. Indeed, the substance of Plaintiff's original complaint consisted of a mere six sentences, none of which have any connection to the allegations against New Defendants which were asserted for the first time in the amended complaint. Plaintiff's amended complaint adds new claims against additional new parties, i.e., New Defendants, premised on new theories of liability, arising out of a new set of facts. These allegations do not merely "amplify" the original excessive force allegations against Original Defendants, but, rather, assert entirely new claims against individuals who were not alleged to have participated in the assault underlying the claims in the original complaint.
Under these factual contentions, this Court finds that the claims asserted against New Defendants in the amended complaint do not "relate back" to the original complaint. Therefore, because Plaintiff's amended complaint was filed in 2017, long after the expiration of the statute of limitations, the claims against New Defendants are time-barred and, therefore, dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss as it relates to Plaintiff's claims against New Defendants, Jennifer Daneker, Sylvia Pallot, Hugh Owens, Julia Kneauer, David Diguglielmo, and Wendy Shaylor, is granted, and these claims are dismissed as time-barred. As to Plaintiff's claims against Original Defendants, Officers Golden and Westober, the motion to dismiss is denied. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion follows. NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, J.
As noted supra, Plaintiff has also asserted civil rights claims against Defendant P.A. Mac, who has never been fully identified or served. However, because the claims against P.A. Mac are premised upon the same factual allegations as those against New Defendants, and similarly, were not asserted until Plaintiff filed his untimely amended complaint, Plaintiff's claims against P.A. Mac are dismissed as time-barred. See Coulter v. Unknown Prob. Officer, 562 F. App'x 87, 89 (3d Cir. 2014) (affirming district court's sua sponte dismissal of non-moving defendant where the grounds raised by the moving defendants were common to all defendants and the plaintiff had an opportunity to respond to the moving defendants' arguments); Thomas v. Warren, 2016 WL 7217207, at *6 n.2 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2016) (dismissing identical claims against unserved defendants "because the [c]ourt has dismissed all federal claims against the [m]oving [d]efendants based on Plaintiff's failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted."); Houseknecht v. Brulo, 2012 WL 5864378, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2012) (dismissing claims against unserved defendants because the basis for dismissal of claims against the moving defendants "would similarly bar plaintiff's claims against the 'unserved' defendants."), adopted, 2012 WL 5862738 (M.D. Pa. 2012).