Opinion
Case No. 1:14-cv-159
11-05-2014
DEBRA ANN MCCLAIN, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
ORDER THAT: (1) THE ALJ'S NON-DISABILITY FINDING IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND AFFIRMED; AND (2) THIS CASE IS CLOSED
This is a Social Security disability benefits appeal. At issue is whether the administrative law judge ("ALJ") erred in finding the Plaintiff "not disabled" and therefore not entitled to supplemental security income ("SSI") and disability insurance benefits ("DIB"). (See Administrative Transcript ("Tr.") (Tr. 24-31) (ALJ's decision)).
I.
On June 3, 2010, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB and SSI, alleging disability since April 19, 2003. (Tr. 24). Plaintiff maintained that she was disabled due to migraine headaches. (Id.) These claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 62-65). Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a written request for a hearing. (Id.) Following a hearing at which Plaintiff, her attorney, and a vocational expert appeared (Tr. 39-61), the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled (Tr. 24-31). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review (Tr. 8-13), making the hearing decision the final decision of the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.955, 404.981, 416.1455, 416.1481.
Plaintiff was born on November 15, 1967 and was 42 years old on the date of her hearing. (Tr. 136). Plaintiff graduated high school (Tr. 159), but has worked only part-time, as a substitute teacher's aide, short order cook, and store clerk (Tr. 45-46, 159). Accordingly, Plaintiff has no past relevant work for purposes of assessing disability. At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff lived in a home with her husband and three children ages 14, 12, and 10. (Tr. 44).
The record shows that since her alleged disability date, Plaintiff worked part-time and earned $1,934.70 in 2006 and $196.88 in 2007. (Tr. 26).
Past relevant work experience is defined as work that the claimant has "done within the last 15 years, [that] lasted long enough for [the claimant] to learn to do it, and was substantial gainful activity." 20 C.F.R. § 416.965(a).
The ALJ's "Findings," which represent the rationale of his decision, were as follows:
1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through March 31, 2004.(Tr. 25-31).
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 19, 2003, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.972 et seq.).
3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: dysthymia disorder, panic disorder without agoraphobia, degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, status post pacemaker placement, and headaches (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).
4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).
5. The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except the claimant is able to frequently, rather than constantly, climb stairs, stoop, balance, kneel, crouch, crawl, but avoid ladders. She is capable of only occasional reaching overhead bilaterally. She is limited to only occasional exposure to loud noises and is to avoid hazards such as heights and moving parts. The claimant is capable of simple, routine tasks with only occasional changes in a routine work setting.
6. The claimant has no past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).
7. The claimant was born on November 15, 1967 and was 35 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset date (20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963).
8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).
9. Transferability of job skills is not an issue because the claimant does not have past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1568 and 416.968).
10. Considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)).
11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from April 19, 2003, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).
In sum, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not under a disability as defined by the Social Security Regulations, and was therefore not entitled to SSI or DIB. (Tr. 31).
On appeal, Plaintiff argues that: (1) the ALJ erred in failing to consider whether her headaches met or equaled a listed impairment; (2) the ALJ erred in failing to adopt or reject specific functional limitations described by Dr. Nutter and Dr. Firmin; and (3) the ALJ erred in failing to perform any analysis of the credibility of her subjective complaints. The Court will address each error in turn.
II.
The Court's inquiry on appeal is to determine whether the ALJ's non-disability finding is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). In performing this review, the Court considers the record as a whole. Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 1978). If substantial evidence supports the ALJ's denial of benefits, that finding must be affirmed, even if substantial evidence also exists in the record upon which the ALJ could have found plaintiff disabled. As the Sixth Circuit has explained:
The Commissioner's findings are not subject to reversal merely because substantial evidence exists in the record to support a different conclusion. The substantial evidence standard presupposes that there is a "zone of choice" within which the Commissioner may proceed without interference from the courts. If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court must affirm.Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994).
The claimant bears the ultimate burden to prove by sufficient evidence that she is entitled to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a). That is, she must present sufficient evidence to show that, during the relevant time period, she suffered an impairment, or combination of impairments, expected to last at least twelve months, that left her unable to perform any job in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
A.
The record reflects that:
1. Physical Impairments
Plaintiff has a lengthy history of treatment for migraine headaches. She received emergency room treatment for her migraines in January and December 2006. (Tr. 456-57). An MRI of Plaintiff's cervical spine showed spondylosis, with a disc herniation at C5-C6, associated with moderate spinal canal narrowing. (Tr. 636). An MRI of the brain showed numerous white matter hypertintensities (WMH) bilaterally. (Tr. 266).
The Court notes that despite Plaintiff's April 19, 2003 disability onset date, her medical records only date back to 2006.
"WMHs are common, albeit mild, in middle adult life. They are associated with physical disability, possibly through reduced speed, fine motor coordination, and muscular strength. They are also related to slowed information processing speed but not other cognitive functions." P.S. Sachdev, et al., "White Matter Hyperintensities Are Related to Physical Disability and Poor Motor Function," Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery & Psychiatry, 2005, http://jnnp.bmj.com/content/76/3/362.full.
In August 2008, Pramit Bhasin, a treating neurologist, reported that Plaintiff was having daily headaches, despite taking Frova. (Tr. 265). Dr. Bhasin changed Plaintiff's migraine medication to Depakote. (Id.) Although Plaintiff reported some relief with pain medications, she was continuing to have headaches at least every other day. (Tr. 262).
Frova is a migraine headache treatment medication prescribed to help relieve the pain and symptoms of migraines.
In November 2009, Plaintiff again required emergency room treatment for a migraine and neck pain. (Tr. 453-54). A follow-up MRI continued to show degenerative changes, "predominantly at C5/C6 where there is a disc bulge." (Tr. 569).
Plaintiff reported gradual worsening of her headaches in June 2010. (Tr. 306). Plaintiff received Toradol and Phenergan injections for her headaches. (Tr. 307, 311, 352).
In August 2010, Plaintiff underwent a consultative examination with Stephen Nutter, M.D. (Tr. 329-37). Based on his examination findings, which included limited lumbar range of motion and grip strength, Dr. Nutter concluded that Plaintiff would have mildly to moderately limited ability to bend, stoop, lift, walk, crawl, squat, carry, travel, push, and pull. (Tr. 331, 332).
As of October 2010, Plaintiff continued to have headaches "every other day or so." (Tr. 363). She continued receiving injections for her migraines. (Tr. 524).
In March 2011, Plaintiff had reduced cervical range of motion "due to pain and stiffness." (Tr. 517). A DEXA bone density scan showed low bone density. (Tr. 580).
Plaintiff once again required emergency room treatment for a migraine headache in April 2011. (Tr. 528-36). A follow up cervical CT myelogram showed moderate to large central disc herniation, worse at the C4-C5 level, resulting in moderate central canal stenosis. (Tr. 586). Plaintiff continued to have decreased range of motion and tenderness of her cervical spine on April 20, 2011. (Tr. 708). Due to the "amount of cervical stenosis," Plaintiff was not considered a good candidate for physical therapy. (Tr. 714). Her treating medical provider expected radicular complaints based on Plaintiff's test results. (Id.)
Plaintiff continued to have headaches at least every other day in April 2011. (Tr. 512). She had decreased strength in her arms, with decreased cervical range of motion. (Tr. 514). Bernard Clark, M.D., recommended anterior cervical spinal surgery. (Tr. 677-78).
In December 2011, Plaintiff was examined by Ann Pakalnis, M.D., of the OSU Headache Clinic. (Tr. 430-32). Dr. Pakalnis diagnosed chronic migraines with probable medication overuse. (Tr. 431). Plaintiff was to discontinue using pain medications for eight weeks, taking only Vistaril for her headaches. (Tr. 486). Plaintiff reported that she was unable to follow through with the doctor's request due to the debilitating nature of her headaches, but she did decrease her pain medications significantly. (Id.)
Plaintiff received emergency room care for a migraine on December 25, 2011. (Tr. 439-42). She was treated with a Toradol injection. (Tr. 441).
Plaintiff also suffered from cardiac symptoms. In March 2008, Holter monitoring showed frequent Premature Atrial Contractions ("PACs"). (Tr. 619). She had a pacemaker implanted in December 2008, due to episodes of brachycardia and associated dizziness. (Tr. 549-50). Plaintiff was unable to have an MRI due to her pacemaker. (Tr. 430).
2. Mental Impairments
Plaintiff has also suffered from mental impairments. In July 2009, she was taking Celexa for depression, which was "helping only minimally." (Tr. 281). As of December 2009, she needed an increased dosage of Celexa and reported increased anxiety, as well. (Tr. 285).
On July 30, 2010, Plaintiff underwent a consultative psychological evaluation with Michael W. Firmin, Ph.D. (Tr. 271-77). Dr. Firmin noted that Plaintiff's "thought processes were characterized by pessimism" and that her facial expressions were "sad and nervous." (Tr. 272). On testing, she showed below average abstraction ability and deficits in double-digit addition and subtraction. (Tr. 273). She was able to recall only three out of six words immediately and two out of six words after a delay. (Id.) Dr. Firmin estimated Plaintiff's intellectual ability was "below average." (Id.) Dr. Firmin diagnosed a dysthymic disorder and opined that Plaintiff had a mildly impaired ability to understand, remember, and follow even simple instructions and maintain attention, concentration, persistence, and pace to perform even routine tasks. (Tr. 275). Dr. Firmin opined that Plaintiff had a mildly limited ability to withstand the stress and pressures of day-to-day work and maintaining attention, concentration, persistence, and pace would be "stressful." (Tr. 276).
Dysthymic disorder is a mild but long term form of depression. With dysthymia comes a loss in interest in normal daily activities, feeling hopeless, lack of productivity, low self-esteem, and an overall feeling of inadequacy.
In September 2010, Plaintiff reported experiencing fatigue, despite sleeping twelve or more hours per day. (Tr. 359). She had a lack of interest in usual activities, changes in appetite, and a decreased libido. (Id.) In November 2010, Plaintiff was noted to be "slowed," with a depressed mood. (Tr. 357).
Plaintiff sought psychological treatment from John McHenry, Psy.D., in November 2010. (Tr. 410-14). Dr. McHenry diagnosed a major depressive disorder and an anxiety disorder and assessed a GAF score of 45. (Tr. 425).
The Global Assessment of Functioning ("GAF") is a numeric scale (1 through 100) used by mental health clinicians and physicians to rate subjectively the social, occupational, and psychological functioning of adults. A score of 41-50 indicates serious symptoms or any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning.
In February 2011, Plaintiff underwent a second consultative evaluation with Dr. Firmin. (Tr. 386-92). Dr. Firmin diagnosed dysthymic disorder and panic disorder and assessed a GAF score of 61. (Tr. 390). Dr. Firmin described mildly impaired ability to understand, remember, and follow even simple instructions (Tr. 390) and maintain attention, concentration, persistence, and pace to perform routine tasks (Tr. 391). Additionally, Plaintiff would have a mildly limited ability to tolerate the stress of day-to-day work (Id.) and would find maintaining attention, concentration, persistence, and pace to perform tasks "stressful" (Tr. 392).
A GAF score of 61-70 indicates some mild symptoms or some difficulty in social, occupation, or school functioning, but generally functioning pretty well with some meaningful interpersonal relationships.
Buspar was "not very effective against panic attacks," and Plaintiff continued to report depression and fatigue in July 2011. (Tr. 522).
In March 2012, Plaintiff's primary care physician noted that her mood was "out of character," with more anxiety and depression than usual. (Tr. 483). Plaintiff followed up at an emergency room and was admitted for two days, due to depression and suicidal ideation. (Tr. 460). She was given a GAF score of 40 at intake and 50 upon discharge. (Tr. 460, 466).
A GAF score of 31-40 indicates some impairment in reality testing or communication or major impairment in several areas, such as work or school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or mood.
B.
First, Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ erred in failing to consider whether her well documented migraine headaches met or equaled a listed impairment.
It is important to note that migraine headaches are not described in the Listings. However, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have considered whether her migraine headaches equaled Listing 11.03, because it is the most closely analogous listing. See C.F.R. § 404.1526(b)(2), 416.926(b)(2). Listing 11.03 Epilepsy -- nonconvulsive epilepsy (petit mal, psychomotor, or focal) documented by detailed description of a typical seizure pattern including all associated phenomena; occurring more frequently than once weekly in spite of at least three months of prescribed treatment. With alteration of awareness of loss of consciousness and transient postictal manifestations of unconventional behavior or significant interference with activity during the day.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff's headaches were a severe impairment. (Tr. 26). However, at step three of the sequential evaluation process, he failed to consider her headaches. (Tr. 26-27). An ALJ cannot skip steps in the sequential evaluation process or fail to make necessary findings at any of these steps. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). An ALJ must also explain his findings at each step of the sequential evaluation process. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1).
While the ALJ did not discuss Plaintiff's migraine headaches at Step Three, he did discuss her symptoms and history of migraine headaches in his decision. (Tr. 27-28). The ALJ also relied on the opinions of the state agency physicians, Dr. Freihofner and Dr. Bolz, who explicitly considered the evidence regarding Plaintiff's migraine headaches in concluding that she retained an RFC to perform a range of light work . (Tr. 29, 228-45, 377-84). A reviewing physicians' opinion that a claimant's condition does not equal the requirements of a listed impairment shows that the adjudicator adequately considered medical equivalence. Curry v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 87-1779, 859 F.2d 193, at *5 (6th Cir. Aug. 28, 1988).
The residual functional capacity ("RFC") is the most an individual can still do despite limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1).
At step three, the ALJ "must compare the medical evidence with the requirements for listed impairments in considering whether the condition is equivalent in severity to the medical findings for any Listed Impairment." Reynolds v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 424 F. App'x 411, 415 (6th Cir. 2011). However, failure to provide this explanation at step three is grounds for remand only if it is not harmless - an ALJ's finding that no listing was met or equaled may be found harmless if "concrete factual and medical evidence" is "apparent in the record" such that a court can discern how the ALJ "would have" reasoned. Rabbers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 656-57 (6th Cir. 2009).
First, migraine headaches are not a listed impairment and therefore the ALJ was not required to consider it at step three. However, to the extent the ALJ should have considered it, failure to do so was harmless because the record contains "concrete factual and medical evidence" such that the Court can determine what the ALJ would have reasoned. Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err when he concluded at Step Three that Plaintiff's impairments did not meet or medically equal any listed impairment.
C.
Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to adopt or reject specific functional limitations described by Dr. Nutter, a consultative physician, and Dr. Firmin, a consultative psychologist.
Specifically, Plaintiff maintains that "[t]he RFC assessment must always consider and address medical source opinions. If the RFC assessment conflicts with an opinion from a medical source, the adjudicator must explain why the opinion was not adopted." SSR 96-8p. See also Hurst v. Sec'y of Health & Human Services, 753 F.2d 517, 519 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that articulation of the ALJ's reasons for crediting or rejecting particular sources of evidence is "absolutely essential for meaningful appellate review").
Unlike evaluating a treating physician, neither Dr. Nutter nor Dr. Firmin were treating physicians, they were both consultative physicians. Moreover, the ALJ discussed Dr. Nutter's opinion and summarized that Plaintiff was "mildly to moderate[ly] limited in performing work-related activities such as bending, stooping, lifting, walking, crawling, squatting, carrying, and traveling as well as pushing and pulling heavy objects due to neck and back pain." (Tr. 30, 332). The ALJ concluded that "the medical signs and findings in [Plaintiff's] record support the opinion given by Dr. Nutter" and therefore accorded Dr. Nutter's opinion "some weight." (Tr. 30). Plaintiff argues that this explanation is unclear and that the ALJ's findings failed to adopt all of Dr. Nutter's limitations.
The treating physician rule "requires the ALJ to generally give greater deference to the opinions of treating physicians than to the opinions of non-treating physicians." Blakley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 1999).
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For example, Plaintiff maintains that Dr. Nutter opined that she would have "moderate limitations" with respect to bending, stooping, lifting, walking, crawling, squatting, carrying, and traveling as well as pushing and pulling heavy objects. However, Dr. Nutter opined that Plaintiff appeared to be "at least mild to moderately" impaired in these abilities. (Tr. 30, 332). Moreover, Dr. Nutter's opinion that Plaintiff was "mild to moderately" impaired did not equate to specific functional limitations. Dr. Bolz explained that Plaintiff's abilities to bend, stoop, lift, walk, crawl, squat, carry, travel, and push/pull heavy objects were at least mildly to moderately impaired due to her back and neck impairments giving "great weight" to consultative examiner Dr. Nutter's opinion in drawing this conclusion. (Tr. 383). Dr. Bolz found, in light of Plaintiff's consultative examination findings with Dr. Nutter and the other record evidence, that she: (a) could perform light exertional work; (b) could engage in frequent postural activities except climbing ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, which she could never do; (c) she could not reach overhead frequently in light of her cervical spine impairment; and (d) she should avoid moderate exposure to hazards such as machinery, heights, etc. (Tr. 378-81).
In comparing the ALJ's RFC finding to Dr. Bolz's opinions, the ALJ essentially adopted Dr. Bolz's opinion with some small variations that actually favored Plaintiff. For example, in addition to finding that Plaintiff was limited to frequent postural activities and should avoid climbing ladders, the ALJ also limited Plaintiff to frequent balancing, even though Dr. Bolz had not assigned a limitation to that activity. (Tr. 27, 379). The ALJ also limited Plaintiff to only occasional overhead reaching bilaterally, which was a more generous limitation that Dr. Bolz's finding that Plaintiff could reach overhead frequently. (Tr. 380). Additionally, the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff was limited to "only occasional exposure to loud noises" and should "avoid hazards" altogether was more generous than Dr. Bolz's finding that Plaintiff had no limits on noise exposure and should avoid moderate exposure to hazards. (Tr. 27, 281). Accordingly, the ALJ adopted most of Dr. Bolz's RFC finding, which was based on Dr. Nutter's consultative findings.
While Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not find limitations on bending or squatting, the RFC form does not use the terms "bend" or "squat," but instead evaluates stooping and crouching. (Tr. 379). Regardless, Dr. Nutter observed that Plaintiff was "able to squat without difficulty." (Tr. 331). Therefore, the ALJ did not reject or fail to address Dr. Nutter's findings in this respect.
Plaintiff also complains that the ALJ improperly weighed consultative psychologist Dr. Firmin's opinion. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ gave "some weight" to Dr. Firmin's opinion, but found Plaintiff "more limited" than Dr. Firmin did in the area of concentration, persistence, and pace, without explicitly stating that he was rejecting Dr. Firmin's limitations. (Tr. 29). However, the fact that the ALJ credited Dr. Firmin's opinion and found greater restrictions in the area of concentration, persistence, and pace, demonstrates that the ALJ did not credit Dr. Firmin's opinion with respect to the same.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ's finding that she could perform simple, routine tasks with occasional changes in a routine work setting fails to account for Dr. Firmin's finding that she had mild impairments in performing simple, routine tasks. (Tr. 27). However, the state agency psychologists gave "great weight" to Dr. Firmin's consultative examination findings, including the one at issue, yet they concluded that even in light of some mild limitations, Plaintiff had a non-severe psychological impairment that caused no mental work-related limitations. (Tr. 324, 326, 403, 405). See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c) ("If you do not have any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, we will find that you do not have a severe impairment and are, therefore, not disabled."). Plaintiff similarly argues that the ALJ failed to account for Dr. Firmin's assessment of mild limitations in tolerating stress, but again, the state agency psychologists explicitly considered Dr. Firmin's examination findings and concluded that Plaintiff had no work-related limitations. (Tr. 324, 326, 403, 405). The fact that the state agency psychologists interpreted Dr. Firmin's report and the evidence as support for no mental work-related limitations, the ALJ's finding of some limitations to simple, routine tasks, with occasional changes in a routine work environment is supported by substantial evidence.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not address or explain how he weighed her GAF scores. However, the ALJ specifically noted that Plaintiff's GAF scores ranged from 40 to 64. (Tr. 29). Moreover, there is no procedural requirement that the ALJ discuss every GAF score. Howard v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 241 (6th Cir. 2002) ("While a GAF score may be of considerable help to the ALJ in formulating the RFC, it is not essential to the RFC's accuracy. Thus, the administrative law judge's failure to reference the GAF score in the RFC, standing alone, does not make the RFC inaccurate.").
Accordingly, the ALJ properly adopted and rejected specific functional limitations described by Drs. Nutter and Firmin.
D.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to perform any analysis of the credibility of her subjective complaints. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ only addressed one credibility factor - daily activities - and ignored evidence that was favorable to her, such as limitations on her daily activities caused by her headaches.
"The ALJ's assessment of credibility is entitled to great weight and deference, since he had the opportunity to observe the witness's demeanor." Infantado v. Astrue, 263 F. App'x 469, 475 (6th Cir. 2008). This deference extends to an ALJ's credibility determinations "with respect to [a claimant's] subjective complaints of pain." Allen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 561, F. 3d 646, 652 (6th Cir. 2009). Despite this deference, "an ALJ's assessment of a claimant's credibility must be supported by substantial evidence." Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997).
In addition to Plaintiff's daily activities, the ALJ also considered the objective medical findings, determining that they revealed "some limitations, but not to the extent alleged" by Plaintiff. (Tr. 30). Throughout the decision the ALJ discussed the objective medical results including her cervical spine imaging results (Tr. 28), her unremarkable EEG findings (Tr. 28), and Dr. Nutter's observation of normal neurological examination findings (Tr. 28, 332). Accordingly, it was appropriate for the ALJ to conclude that "[t]he credibility of [Plaintiff's] allegations" were "weakened by objective medical evidence." (Tr. 30). See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)2), 416.929(c)(2) (objective medical evidence is a "useful indicator" that should be considered in decision-making).
Additionally, the ALJ explained in his credibility finding that "[t]reatment notes in the record do not sustain [Plaintiff's] allegations of disabling pain." (Tr. 30). For example, Plaintiff's migraines showed "fair improvement" with Depakote, Fioricet, and Topamax. (Tr. 363). Although Plaintiff alleged several months later that Fioricet did not help (Tr. 522), she expressed that other medications did help - Treximet (Tr. 512), Toradol and Imitres (Tr. 441, 505, 516), and Topamax (Tr. 499). Ultimately, as the ALJ discussed, headache specialist Dr. Pakalnis's diagnostic impression was "chronic migraine with probable medication overuse" with a recommendation to "discontinue all anlgesics and triptans for at least eight weeks." (Tr. 28, 431).
Records also note that Plaintiff only did physical theory for one week, but quit because she did not perceive a difference. (Tr. 673-76). She was also given the option to have cervical spine surgery, but wanted to "think about it." (Tr. 28, 676-78). Moreover, the ALJ is not required to discuss or credit all of Plaintiff's allegations. Kornecky v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 167 F. App'x 496, 507-08 (6th Cir. 2006) (the ALJ must consider a variety of factors, but is not required to devote written attention to each piece of evidence he considers).
The ALJ also considered that Plaintiff reported that she took care of her three children, helped them with their homework, prepared meals, performed household chores, drove, went out alone, went shopping, watched television, read, attended church weekly, and had no problems with personal care. (Tr. 30, 167-70). Additionally, in a questionnaire she completed for Dr. Firmin, Plaintiff stated that she could pay bills independently, play games or cards, follow instructions, drive herself independently, follow directions to assemble simple things, and remember to take her medications. (Tr. 30, 273-76, 386, 389-92). Plaintiff also reported being able to read daily mail and magazines, keep track of when her favorite television shows aired, pay bills, keep a calendar for appointments, prepare non-microwave meals, keep in touch with family and friends, attend her children's' school and sport events, clean the house, do laundry, and wash dishes. (Tr. 274-75, 389-90).
Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ's credibility assessment is supported by substantial evidence and is entitled to deference.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's assignments of error are unavailing. The ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and is affirmed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the decision of the Commissioner, that Debra McClain was not entitled to supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits is found SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, and AFFIRMED. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly, whereupon this case is CLOSED in this Court. Date: 11/5/14
s/ Timothy S. Black
Timothy S. Black
United States District Judge