Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. RIC393105. Douglas E. Weathers, Judge. Affirmed.
A. Benjamin Getchell; and Mitchell S. Wagner for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, Charles A. Bird and Ronald D. Getchey for Defendants and Appellants.
OPINION
MILLER, J.
This opinion addresses an appeal and a cross-appeal; this opinion constitutes this court’s second time addressing this matter. Don McCasland, Jr. (McCasland) and Dale Dembrow (Dembrow) sued Chemicon International, Inc. (Chemicon), Keiko Beckman (Beckman), and various other parties for (1) breach of contract; (2) intentional interference with a contract; (3) negligent interference with prospective economic advantage; (4) declaratory relief; and (5) transfer in fraud of creditors. After a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of McCasland and Dembrow. The trial court awarded McCasland and Dembrow a portion of their claimed damages and $2,734,081 in attorneys’ fees. In the previous appeal, Chemicon and the Beckman contended that the trial court erred in (1) interpreting portions of the contract, and (2) awarding attorneys’ fees. This court reversed the award of attorneys’ fees, and directed the trial court to conduct a new hearing concerning the amount of attorneys’ fees that should be awarded. In all other respects, this court affirmed the judgment.
The prior appeal is McCasland et al. v. Beckman et al. (case No. E041105) January 10, 2008 [non-published opinion].)
After the appeal, the trial court awarded McCasland and Dembrow $959,925 in attorneys’ fees and interest. On appeal, McCasland and Dembrow contend that the trial court erred in its award of attorneys’ fees by (1) disregarding the legal principles applicable to an award of enhanced “lodestar” fees; (2) disregarding the factors cited in this court’s previous opinion; and (3) making findings that were contrary to undisputed evidence. On cross-appeal, Chemicon and Beckman contend that the trial court erred by awarding (1) interest from the date of judgment on the attorneys’ fee award, and (2) the entire amount of appellate attorneys’ fees requested by McCasland and Dembrow. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. CONTRACTS
Beckman and her now deceased husband, David Beckman (collectively “the Beckmans”), started Chemicon in 1981. The Beckmans were the sole shareholders of Chemicon. McCasland and Dembrow were hired by Chemicon in 1989. In 1991, Dembrow signed a bonus agreement providing that if Chemicon were sold, then Dembrow would receive a bonus equal to two percent of the net sales price. In 1992, McCasland signed a bonus agreement in which McCasland was promised eight percent of the net sales price of Chemicon.
B. SALE AND FALCON COMPANIES
In January 2003, the Beckmans transferred their shares of Chemicon into the Beckman Family Trust; the shares were subsequently transferred to Falcon International Investment Holdings, LLC (Falcon International). Falcon International was a Delaware entity that was formed in December 2002. David Beckman was the settlor of the Falcon Charitable Trust; the Falcon Charitable Trust appeared to be the sole member of Falcon International.
In February 2003, Serologicals Research Products, Inc. (Serologicals) and Falcon International agreed that Serologicals would purchase all of the Chemicon stock, debt-free, for $80,975,000. Serologicals purchased Chemicon, as well as Chemicon Europe, Ltd., a limited liability company organized under the laws of England and Wales.
In March 2003, Falcon International entered into an agreement with Falcon Investment Fund Limited (Falcon Investment Fund), a Cayman Islands company. The agreement reflected that Falcon International would transfer the cash from the sale of Chemicon stock, as well as all of its rights and obligations, to Falcon Investment Fund-the Cayman Islands company.
C. LAWSUIT
In McCasland and Dembrow’s third amended complaint, filed in May 2003, they alleged that the Beckmans and Chemicon breached their contracts/bonus agreements by failing to pay McCasland and Dembrow their respective percentages of the Chemicon sale monies. McCasland and Dembrow argued that their percentage of the Chemicon sale monies should be calculated before the settling of Chemicon’s $17,000,000 debt. Further, McCasland and Dembrow asserted that the sale of Chemicon Europe should be included in their percentage of the Chemicon sale. Additionally, McCasland and Dembrow asserted that their payments were due in 2003, at the time of the sale, rather than 2013 when the Beckmans began receiving their annuity payments from Falcon. McCasland asserted that he was entitled to $7,600,000. Dembrow alleged that he was entitled to $1,900,000.
The Beckmans and Chemicon contended that the bonus contracts were never meant to include the sale of Chemicon Europe, rather, they were limited to the sale of the American Chemicon entity. Further, the Beckmans and Chemicon argued that McCasland’s and Dembrow’s payments should be calculated after deducting the $17,000,000 Chemicon debt. The Beckmans and Chemicon asserted that McCasland was entitled to $4,881,882, and that Dembrow was entitled to $1,220,470.
The trial court concluded that McCasland’s and Dembrow’s payments should not include the sale of Chemicon Europe. Additionally, the trial court found that McCasland’s and Dembrow’s payments should be calculated before deducting the $17,000,000 Chemicon debt. The trial court also held that McCasland’s and Dembrow’s right to payment accrued in May 2003. This court concluded that the trial court correctly interpreted McCasland’s and Dembrow’s contracts.
D. ATTORNEYS’ FEES-ORIGINAL MOTION
At the trial court, prior to the first appeal, the Beckmans and Chemicon argued that there was no prevailing party on the contract claims, and therefore, each party should bear their own fees and costs with respect to the contract claims. The Beckmans and Chemicon further argued that they prevailed on McCasland’s and Dembrow’s claim for transfer in fraud of creditors, because McCasland and Dembrow dismissed the claim after opening statements, and therefore the Beckmans and Chemicon should be awarded attorneys’ fees for that claim.
McCasland and Dembrow asserted that they should be deemed the prevailing parties because they “prevailed on the two biggest issues, ” which were (1) McCasland’s and Dembrow’s rights to payments accrued in 2003, not 2013; and (2) Chemicon was not relieved from paying the bonuses and accrued interest.
The trial court determined that McCasland and Dembrow were the prevailing parties, based upon (1) Chemicon’s failure to offer payment of the bonuses before May 2003, and (2) the Vice President of Serologicals letter reflecting that the Beckmans were responsible for the bonus payment. The trial court ordered that McCasland and Dembrow recover their attorneys’ fees, and that the amount of fees be determined by an appropriate motion. This court determined that the trial court did not err by finding that McCasland and Dembrow were the prevailing parties.
McCasland and Dembrow filed a motion for attorneys’ fees. McCasland and Dembrow asserted that their attorneys spent a total of 3, 838.1 hours working on the case, at an hourly rate of $250, which totaled $959,525. McCasland and Dembrow asserted that the hours resulted from (1) working on Chemicon and the Beckmans’ affirmative defense that the bonus payments were not due until 2013, when the annuity payments began; (2) sorting through the various Falcon entities; (3) Chemicon and the Beckmans allegedly concealing information and witnesses; (4) the Beckmans’ harassing depositions; (5) Chemicon’s and the Beckmans’ failure to inform McCasland and Dembrow that they were willing to waive a jury-forcing McCasland and Dembrow to prepare for a jury trial; (6) McCasland and Dembrow being represented by two sole practitioners, without support staff, while Chemicon and the Beckmans were represented by large law firms; (7) the novelty of the issues involved, in particular the issue involving the bonuses being paid in 2013, rather than 2003; (8) the attorneys’ being precluded from working on other cases, due to the large amount of time consumed by the instant case; and (9) the risk of losing the case, since it was taken on a contingent fee basis.
McCasland and Dembrow further asserted that they agreed to pay their attorneys 25 percent of the bonus payments they received just prior to trial, and 30 percent of the additional (unpaid) bonus monies awarded by the trial court. As a result of the agreement, McCasland paid his attorney $840,470 prior to trial, and owed $1,346,653 in additional fees based upon the award made by the trial court. Dembrow paid his attorney $210,118 prior to trial, and owed $336,843 in additional fees. McCasland and Dembrow argued that they should be awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of 25 percent of the bonus payments they received just prior to trial, and 30 percent of the additional (unpaid) bonus monies awarded by the trial court. Essentially, McCasland and Dembrow argued for a 2.8 multiplier to be applied to their fee award, which would equal the exact amount of fees owed pursuant to the contingency fee agreements.
Chemicon and the Beckmans argued that the motion for attorneys’ fees was erroneous because it included fees incurred in relation to McCasland’s and Dembrow’s failed tort claims. Further, Chemicon and the Beckmans argued that there was no basis for applying a multiplier to the award of attorneys’ fees, because (1) there was little contingent risk in the case, due to the issues involving the timing of payments and exact amount of payments, and (2) it was McCasland’s and Dembrow’s poor decision to hire attorneys on a contingent basis in a contract case. Chemicon and the Beckmans argued that it would be improper to award McCasland and Dembrow their actual contingent fees, rather than reasonable hourly fees.
The trial court made the following findings and order: “The Court grants plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and awards... McCasland... $2,187,120 and... Dembrow... $546,961 in attorneys’ fees. The lawsuit was hard fought on both sides. There were numerous difficult issues. The actual contingent fee of 25% before trial and 30% on commencement of trial is less than customary percentages of 33 1/3% before trial and 40% on commencement of trial and is reasonable.” In sum, the trial court awarded McCasland and Dembrow the 2.8 multiplier.
E. PRIOR APPEAL
In the prior appeal, Chemicon and Beckman contended that the trial court erred by awarding McCasland and Dembrow the amount of fees due pursuant to the contingent fee agreements, because a contingency agreement is only one factor to be considered when awarding fees. This court noted that a variety of factors may be considered by a trial court when determining the amount of attorneys’ fees to award, such as (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (2) the skill required to properly perform the legal services; (3) the likelihood that the case precluded the attorney from accepting other employment; (4) the amount of money involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances of the case; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys who performed the work; (8) the time and labor required of the attorneys; and (9) the client’s informed consent to the fee agreement.
This court concluded that the trial court mentioned some of the relevant factors when issuing its award of attorneys’ fees; however, we were unable to “say that the mere articulation of the[] factors, without an explanation as to their relationship to the particular case at hand, is sufficient to support an award which is exactly the same as the amount calculated pursuant to the contingent fee agreement.” (Italics omitted.)
Chemicon and Beckman also argued that the trial court erred in awarding attorneys’ fees because it did not apportion the award between the contract and tort causes of action. This court pointed to the trial court’s comment that “‘the tort action was intertwined with the contract action.’” This court agreed that “‘the core issues and the evidence adduced at trial all were factually intertwined. All causes of action were to assure that plaintiffs could collect their bonuses from Chemicon, or alternatively, the Beckmans.’” (Fn. omitted.) Consequently, this court concluded that the trial court did not err by refusing to apportion the fee award.
This court’s disposition in the prior appeal read, “The cause is remanded to the trial court for a new hearing to determine, in accordance with the views expressed herein, the amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded to plaintiffs. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. Each party is to bear their own costs on appeal.”
F. ATTORNEYS FEES-POSTAPPEAL MOTION
In March 2008, McCasland and Dembrow moved for a postappeal award of attorneys’ fees, including postjudgment attorneys’ fees. In the motion, McCasland and Dembrow again argued that they were entitled to the amount of attorneys’ fees due under the contingency agreement, which amounted to a 2.8 multiplier. McCasland and Dembrow cited the same reasons as those cited in the original motion as the basis for awarding them the 2.8 multiplier. McCasland and Dembrow requested the same amount of attorneys’ fees as those previously awarded, plus interest, and appellate fees.
Chemicon and Beckman argued that McCasland and Dembrow were not entitled to a multiplier. Chemicon and Beckman asserted that this case did not pose novel or difficult questions, because the only disputes were (1) how much money were McCasland and Dembrow entitled to; and (2) when were McCasland and Dembrow entitled to their payments. Chemicon and Beckman further asserted that McCasland’s and Dembrow’s attorneys did not display any unusual skill or creativity in fighting the case, especially in light of the attorneys’ abandonment of the tort claims. Additionally, Chemicon and Beckman argued that McCasland’s and Dembrow’s attorneys did not face a risk of being unpaid because there was never a dispute that McCasland and Dembrow were entitled to bonus money-it was only disputed how much would be paid, and when it would be paid. Chemicon and Beckman further asserted that McCasland and Dembrow were not entitled to two years worth of interest on the prior fee award because this court reversed the prior award of fees. Finally, Chemicon and Beckman argued that McCasland’s and Dembrow’s request for nearly $200,000 in appellate attorneys’ fees was “preposterously high, ” and should be reduced by half.
On August 3, 2008, the trial court held a hearing on the motion for attorneys’ fees. The trial court announced that its tentative ruling was to award (1) attorneys’ fees in the amount of $959,925; (2) interest on the attorneys’ fees from the time of entry of judgment to the time of payment; and (3) appellate fees in the requested amount of $193,800. The attorneys discussed how to calculate the interest, because some monies had already been paid. The trial court asked the attorneys to discuss the matter in the hallway, and the case was placed on second call.
After other matters were heard, the trial court again held the hearing on the motion for attorneys’ fees. The trial attorneys informed the trial court that it would be “delighted to know that [they] went through the calculations, checked and double checked[, and they were] all in absolute agreement.” The trial attorneys submitted a typewritten proposed order that included many cross-outs and handwritten inserts. The trial court read the proposed order, including the handwritten revisions, into the record, and made it the order of the court.
The court read the order as follows, “All counsel have reached an agreement in this case. As to the final order regarding fees, etc., the Court, having considered [p]laintiff[s’] motion for attorney[s’] fees on remand from the [C]ourt of [A]ppeal and for postjudgment attorney[s’] fees, all the papers in support thereof, [d]efendant[s’] opposition to [p]laintiff[s’] motion and all its supporting papers, the entire record in this action and the argument of counsel... [¶]... [¶]... number one, [p]laintiffs are awarded attorney[s’] fees in the amount of $959,925, which is their request[ed lodestar] amount for attorney[s’] fees up to the time of judgment. Two, [p]laintiff[s’] request for... enhancement of the [lodestar] figure is denied. Although [plaintiffs’ trial counsel] represent[ed] them on a contingency fee agreement, there was slight risk that the attorneys would not be well and fairly compensated given the facts of this case. The Court does not find this matter to be novel or of unusual difficulty, and it does not strengthen the enforcement of constitutional rights or promote... any particular public policy. Plaintiff[s’] request for interest on attorney[s’] fees is granted in the amount of $265,387. Number four, [p]laintiffs are awarded $193,800 for attorney[s’] fees on appeal plus interest in the amount of $25,913.... [¶]... [¶]... Number five, thus effective August 3, 2009, the total amount unpaid and owing is $265,387 interest on the principal amount of fees[, ]... $193,800 for appellate attorneys’ fees[, ] plus $25,913 interest on those fees[, ] for a total amount of $485,100. Is that consistent with the agreement that has been reached between all counsel in this matter?”
McCasland’s and Dembrow’s attorney responded, “Yeah, your Honor. And to be clear, it’s not an agreement. It’s just-we’ve gone and done the calculations and agreed on the calculations based on this court’s [tentative] order.” Chemicon and Beckman’s attorney concurred that it was only an agreement on calculations. The trial court found that McCasland’s and Dembrow’s attorney’s description of the agreement was more accurate than the trial court’s description.
DISCUSSION
A. MCCASLAND’S AND DEMBROW’S APPEAL
1. THOROUGHNESS OF THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING
McCasland and Dembrow contend that the trial court erred by not fully explaining how it reached its ruling concerning attorneys’ fees. For example, the trial court found that the case was not novel or unusually difficult; McCasland and Dembrow assert that the trial court erred by not explaining why the case was not unusually difficult. We disagree.
We review a trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees for an abuse of discretion. (In re Vitamin Cases (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1051-1052.)
A trial court is not required to provide an explanation of its decision on a motion for attorneys’ fees. (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 65; see also Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140.) Consequently, we conclude that the trial court did not err by not providing a more thorough explanation of its reasoning.
To the extent that McCasland and Dembrow are asserting that the trial court contradicted our prior disposition, we disagree with such an argument.
On remand, the trial court’s authority to act is limited by the orders of the appellate court. (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 701.)
In our prior opinion we wrote, “While the court did mention some of the factors which trial courts are instructed to consider in determining the reasonableness of a fee award, ... we cannot say that the mere articulation of these factors, without an explanation as to their relationship to the particular case at hand, is sufficient to support an award which is exactly the same as the amount calculated pursuant to the contingent fee agreement.” (Italics omitted.) Our disposition instructed the trial court to conduct “a new hearing to determine, in accordance with the views expressed herein, the amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded to plaintiffs.” (Fn. omitted.)
Since the trial court did not award the amount of the fees set forth in the contingency agreement, a lengthy analysis was not required. The trial court’s decision not to award the multiplier meant that the court only needed to determine if (1) the hours expended by the attorneys were reasonable, and (2) if the attorneys’ hourly rates were reasonable; then the court needed to multiply the hours expended by the hourly rate. (See PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 [formula for determining the lodestar amount].) In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not disregard this court’s orders by not giving a lengthy explanation of its reasoning, because it did not award the 2.8 multiplier.
2. TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS
McCasland and Dembrow contend that the trial court erred because its findings were contrary to the evidence. For example, the trial court found that McCasland’s and Dembrow’s case was not unusually difficult. McCasland and Dembrow contend that the trial court’s finding is erroneous because undisputed evidence shows that the case was unusually difficult. We disagree.
“‘“[T]he primary method for establishing the amount of ‘reasonable’ attorney fees is the lodestar method. The lodestar (or touchstone) is produced by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by counsel by a reasonable hourly rate. Once the court has fixed the lodestar, it may increase or decrease that amount by applying a positive or negative ‘multiplier’ to take into account a variety of other factors, including the quality of the representation, the novelty and complexity of the issues, the results obtained, and the contingent risk presented.” [Citation.] “The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.” [Citation.]’” (In re Vitamin Cases, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1052.)
We apply the abuse of discretion standard when reviewing the trial court’s ruling on McCasland’s and Dembrow’s motion for attorneys’ fees. (In re Vitamin Cases, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1051-1052.) We examine each of the trial court’s reasons for its ruling, in turn, to determine whether there are rational bases to support the trial court’s conclusions. (Ludgate Ins. Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 592, 612 [describing the abuse of discretion standard of review].)
a. Risk
The first reason for the trial court denying McCasland’s and Dembrow’s request for a multiplier was that “there was slight risk that the attorneys would not be well and fairly compensated given the facts of this case.”
In Chemicon’s and the Beckmans’ opening statements at trial, they argued, “Mr. McCasland got a check for-he got paid by Chemicon $3,361,000, and Mr. Dembrow got [a] payment of $940,000 and change, and that represented on the one hand eight percent of the $39 million and thereabouts that Mr. Beckman got, and two percent on the other hand that was paid. [¶] They also know that they’re entitled to their additional share of that $19 million [held in escrow] once the debts are exhausted, or the claims against it are exhausted, or all those things happen, and when that money becomes available, they’ll get those payments as well.”
Based upon the foregoing, there was no dispute that McCasland and Dembrow were entitled to millions of dollars. Rather, the disputes centered upon exactly how many millions of dollars were owed, and when the payments needed to be made. Consequently, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude that McCasland’s and Dembrow’s attorneys faced only a slight risk of not being well and fairly compensated, because there was no dispute that McCasland and Dembrow were entitled to millions of dollars.
McCasland and Dembrow contend that the trial court erred by finding that their attorneys only faced a slight risk of not being well compensated because (1) they were hired on a contingent fee basis; (2) Chemicon and the Beckmans “denied owing the bonuses in their answer, cross-complaint, and motions for summary judgment/adjudication, at trial and on appeal”; (3) a portion of the money from the sale of stock was moved offshore.
First, Chemicon’s and the Beckmans’ position that they did not owe McCasland and Dembrow any money was unreasonable, in light of the written bonus agreements; Chemicon and the Beckmans abandoned this position by the time of trial. Given that the position was unreasonable, Chemicon and the Beckmans were unlikely to prevail on such a theory, and therefore, the trial court could rationally conclude that McCasland and Dembrow faced little risk from the argument that no money was owed. Further, the trial court could reasonably conclude that there was little risk presented by the contingency agreement, since Chemicon and/or the Beckmans clearly owed some money to McCasland and Dembrow. Second, $19,000,000 was held in an escrow account in the United States for the purpose of settling claims against Chemicon. Consequently, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude that the money moved offshore created little risk of McCasland’s and Dembrow’s attorneys not being paid. In sum, we find McCasland’s and Dembrow’s arguments unpersuasive.
b. Novel or Unusually Difficult
The second reason cited by the trial court for not applying a multiplier was that the case was not novel or unusually difficult.
McCasland and Dembrow argued that Chemicon breached the contracts/bonus agreements, and that the Beckmans intentionally interfered with the contracts/bonus agreements. In the breach of contract claim, McCasland and Dembrow asserted that Chemicon failed to pay them as required. In the interference claim, McCasland and Dembrow alleged that the Beckmans caused Chemicon to not pay McCasland and Dembrow. The foregoing causes of action involve well-settled law. (See Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1367 [elements of breach of contract]; see also Mintz v. Blue Cross of California (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1594, 1603 [elements of intentional interference with a contract].) Additionally, the fact pattern involved in the lawsuit is not bizarre or usual. The various Falcon companies may have complicated the matter; however, sorting through the Falcon entities would have required more hours, but they did not create a novel or unusually difficult issue. Consequently, we conclude that the trial court reasonably found that the matter was not novel or unusually difficult.
McCasland and Dembrow assert that this matter “was far from a garden variety breach of contract case” due to (1) discovery battles to pierce the “myriad” of corporate entities; (2) tracing money offshore; (3) obtaining a preliminary injunction to secure money from being sent offshore; (4) traveling out-of-state for a deposition; (5) opposing summary judgment motions; (5) a month-long trial; and (6) two sole practitioners opposing large law firms. We appreciate that there were many motions, discovery issues, and legal battles presented as part of this case; however, those matters go to the hours expended, not the difficulty or novelty of the issues presented. (Northwest Energetic Services, LLC v. California Franchise Tax Bd. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 841, 880.)
McCasland and Dembrow contend that Judge Weathers erred by substituting his judgment for Judge Kaiser’s judgment when he found that the matter was neither novel nor unusually difficult. A reversal places the parties in the same position as if the cause had not been tried, with the exception that the opinion of the appellate court must be followed as far as it is applicable. (Gapusan v. Jay (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 734, 743.)
This court reversed Judge Kaiser’s judgment concerning attorneys’ fees, and directed the trial court to conduct a new hearing in accordance with the views expressed in our opinion. Our opinion expressed that an award of attorneys’ fees that exactly equaled the amount of the contingency fee agreement appeared to be unreasonable based upon our review of the record, and that the trial court’s ruling, which lacked details, was not helpful in determining exactly how it concluded that McCasland and Dembrow should be awarded the 2.8 multiplier. In other words, there was nothing in our opinion barring Judge Weathers from making new findings. Consequently, we are not persuaded that Judge Weathers erred.
c. Constitutional Rights and Public Policy
The trial court’s third reason for denying a multiplier was that the case did not strengthen the enforcement of constitutional rights or promote any particular public policy.
“‘The purpose of a fee enhancement, or so-called multiplier, for contingent risk is to bring the financial incentives for attorneys enforcing important constitutional rights... into line with incentives they have to undertake claims for which they are paid on a fee-for-services basis.’ [Citation.]” (Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1399.)
As set forth ante, this case involved relatively straightforward claims of breach of contract and intentional interference with a contract. Nothing in the record indicates that the case addressed constitutional issues or matters of public policy. Consequently, the trial court’s finding was reasonable.
McCasland and Dembrow contend that the trial court erred because its finding was irrelevant, in that McCasland and Dembrow never asserted that the matter concerned constitutional rights or public policy. McCasland and Dembrow assert that the trial court based its denial of the multiplier on an irrelevant finding, and therefore, the decision should be reversed. Contrary to McCasland’s and Dembrow’s position, one of the factors considered by trial courts when awarding or denying a multiplier is the substantial benefit that the case confers on the public, such as preserving constitutional rights. (See Northwest Energetic Services, LLC v. California Franchise Tax Bd., supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 880.) Consequently, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred by considering whether the case benefitted the public, because this is a factor that has been considered by other courts when determining whether to enhance the lodestar amount. In sum, we are not persuaded by McCasland’s and Dembrow’s argument.
d. Conclusion
In sum, the record supports the trial court’s ruling. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court’s ruling was rational, and that it does not constitute an abuse of discretion.
3. INITIAL FEE AWARD
We now address the arguments raised by Chemicon and Beckman in their respondent’s brief. Chemicon and Beckman contend that McCasland and Dembrow have argued the following: the trial court erred by making new findings and changing the amount of the multiplier, because this court only directed the trial court to amplify its reasoning, not to conduct a new hearing. Chemicon and Beckman assert that the trial court correctly held a new hearing, because this court “directed a new hearing, not new findings.”
We have not interpreted McCasland’s and Dembrow’s appellate arguments as asserting that the trial court erred by conducting a new hearing. Rather, it appears that McCasland and Dembrow have asserted that Judge Weathers was in a poor position to know the value of the attorneys’ work in this case, since Judge Kaiser presided over the trial matters; and therefore, Judge Weathers should have deferred to Judge Kaiser’s assessment of the attorneys’ work, rather than place his own valuation on the services provided. In short, we have interpreted McCasland’s and Dembrow’s arguments differently, and therefore, do not address this matter any further.
4. RECORD ON APPEAL
Chemicon and Beckman contend that McCasland’s and Dembrow’s appellants’ opening brief cites to matters outside of the record. Chemicon and Beckman assert that it is improper to argue that the trial court abused its discretion based upon documents and/or evidence that were not before the court. We have concluded ante, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Consequently, we do not address this matter any further.
B. CHEMICON AND BECKMAN’S CROSS-APPEAL
1. INTEREST
Chemicon and Beckman contend that the trial court erred by awarding interest from the May 15, 2006, entry of judgment. Chemicon and Beckman contend that the interest should be recalculated with a starting date of March 19, 2008, which is the date that McCasland and Dembrow filed their postappeal motion for attorneys’ fees. We disagree.
“‘A judgment bears legal interest from the date of its entry in the trial court even though it is still subject to direct attack. [Citation.] When a judgment is modified upon appeal, whether upward or downward, the new sum draws interest from the date of entry of the original order, not from the date of the new judgment. [Citations.] On the other hand, when a judgment is reversed on appeal[, then] the new award subsequently entered by the trial court can bear interest only from the date of entry of such new judgment. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The question when interest begins depends on ‘the substance of the order’ and not ‘mere formalism.’ [Citation.] Thus, ‘a “reversal” that practically and legally is a “modification” should be treated for purposes of the accrual of interest as a modification.’ [Citation.]” (Munoz v. City of Union City (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 199, 203-204.)
Beckman and Chemicon contend that we should apply the independent standard of review when analyzing the trial court’s award of interest. Our analysis requires that we interpret our prior disposition. Our analysis does not involve disputed facts. Consequently, since this appears to be a question of law, we agree with Beckman and Chemicon that the independent standard of review should be applied when analyzing the trial court’s award of interest. (See Brown v. City of Los Angeles (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 155, 168.)
In our prior opinion we reversed the award of attorneys’ fees because we could not determine how the trial court concluded that McCasland and Dembrow were entitled to a 2.8 multiplier. In our disposition, we reversed the award of attorneys fees and directed the trial court to conduct a new hearing, in accordance with the views expressed the opinion, to redetermine “the amount of attorney[s’] fees to be awarded to plaintiffs.” (Fn. omitted.) In other words, the trial court was directed to determine the amount of fees that should be awarded McCasland and Dembrow; the trial court did not have the option of not awarding attorneys’ fees. Therefore, the reversal was, for practical purposes, a modification, in that the judgment was reversed and the trial court was directed to redetermine the amount of attorneys’ fees to be awarded. (See Snapp v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. (1964) 60 Cal.2d 816, 820 [“‘[T]he so-called “reversal” with directions was, in fact and in law, a “modification.”’”].) Since the disposition was more akin to a modification, we conclude that the trial court did not err by awarding interest from the date of the original judgment.
In a prior section of this opinion, we concluded that Judge Weathers did not err by making new findings at the motion hearing, because we reversed the ruling of the trial court that permitted the trial court to make new findings regarding how much money to award in attorneys’ fees. In this section of the opinion, we have concluded that the reversal was in practical effect a modification, because the trial court did not have the choice to not award fees, based upon our prior disposition. We do not believe that these two conclusions conflict. The trial court’s ability to make new findings regarding how much money to award in attorneys’ fees is consistent with the disposition being more akin to a modification than an unqualified reversal, because the trial court needed to make new findings in order to redetermine how much money to award in fees.
In Chemicon’s and Beckman’s cross-appellants’ opening brief, they contend that they could not have been expected to pay fees until an appropriate demand was made upon them, and they could not have tendered payment to McCasland and Dembrow until the fee issue was resolved by this court. Chemicon’s and Beckman’s arguments do not address the pertinent issue of whether this court’s prior disposition constituted (1) a modification, or (2) an unqualified reversal; therefore, we do not find their arguments persuasive.
In Chemicon’s and Beckman’s cross-appellants’ reply brief, they appear to assert that this court’s prior disposition “entirely vacated” the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees. Chemicon and Beckman do not explain how this court’s prior disposition constituted an unqualified reversal, and therefore, we find their assertion to be unpersuasive.
2. APPELLATE ATTORNEYS’ FEES
Chemicon and Beckman assert that the award of appellate attorneys’ fees “is so far out of line as to shock the conscience.” We infer that Chemicon and Beckman are contending that the trial court erred by awarding all of McCasland’s and Dembrow’s requested appellate attorneys’ fees. We disagree.
“A trial court order awarding attorneys’ fees is ‘reviewed using the abuse of discretion standard. [Citation.]’ ‘In reviewing an award of attorney fees, the amount awarded by the trial court will not be set aside absent an affirmative showing of abuse of discretion in that the award is “manifestly excessive in the circumstances.”’ An ‘order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness. [Citations.]’” (Cruz v. Ayromloo (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1274, fns. omitted.)
The trial court determines an amount to award in attorneys’ fees after considering a variety of factors, such as the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the skill required, the skill employed, the attention given, and the success or failure of the attorneys’ strategies. (Bernardi v. County of Monterey, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1395.)
The trial court awarded McCasland and Dembrow $193,800 in appellate attorneys’ fees. Attorney Mitchell S. Wagner submitted an eight-page billing statement detailing the hours he spent working on posttrial issues and appellate issues. Wagner’s bill totaled $44,730. Wagner listed his hourly rate as $300, which means he billed for 149.1 hours. Wagner’s billing statement included charges for items such as (1) reviewing a draft brief prepared by cocounsel for two and one-half hours; (2) reviewing appellants’ opening brief and notes for respondent’s brief, and making revisions, for ten and one-half hours; and (3) researching the right to attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal, and preparing an argument summary for three and one-half hours.
Attorney A.B. Getchell submitted a seven-page billing statement detailing the 497 hours he spent working on posttrial issues and appellate issues. Getchell’s billing statement includes items such as (1) work on a first draft of the respondent’s brief for seven and one-half hours; (2) legal research for four hours; and (3) work on a revised draft of the respondent’s brief for six hours. In a declaration, Getchell declared that he typically charges a contingency fee or a flat rate for his services, and therefore, he does not have an hourly rate that he charges clients. Getchell explained that he selected $300 as his hourly rate for the purposes of the attorneys’ fee award, because it matched his cocounsel’s, i.e., Wagner’s, hourly rate. Four hundred ninety-seven hours times $300 equals a total bill of $149,100. Wagner’s bill of $44,730 plus Getchell’s bill of $149,100 equals $193,830. McCasland and Dembrow did not request a lodestar multiplier for their appellate attorneys’ fees.
In McCasland’s and Dembrow’s reply to Chemicon’s and Beckman’s opposition to the postappeal motion for attorneys’ fees, McCasland and Dembrow asserted that Getchell “devoted only 280 hours to research and collaborate on Respondents’ Brief; the balance of the time was spent on other post-trial work.” Chemicon and Beckman have not asserted that the trial court should have apportioned the 497 hours, since (1) some of those hours were not spent on appellate work, and (2) the appellate hourly rate was $300, while the trial hourly rate was $250. Consequently, while we recognize that not all of the 497 hours were spent on appellate work, we do not address the matter any further, because it was not raised by the parties. (See Rossa v. D.L. Falk Const., Inc. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 438, 449 [appellate court need not address an argument not raised by the parties].)
The trial court’s award of $193,800 in appellate attorneys’ fees is supported by Wagner’s and Getchell’s billing statements and declarations. The billing statements provide detailed accounts of the attorneys’ work, and there is nothing indicating that the attorneys’ records are erroneous. (See Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396 [discussing attorney time statements].) Further, the hourly rate of $300 is not excessive. (See Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 155 [attorneys based in inland San Diego County charged hourly rates of $350, $275 and $270].) In sum, the trial court’s award of appellate fees is supported by the record and prevailing hourly rates. Consequently, the trial court’s ruling was reasonable, and does not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Chemicon and Beckman assert that they should not have to pay for McCasland’s and Dembrow’s “uneconomical choice” to employ Getchell, an allegedly inexperienced appellate practitioner, rather than an experienced practitioner who could have accomplished the appellate work in a more efficient and cost-effective manner. Chemicon’s and Beckman’s argument does not address how the trial court erred, and therefore, we find their argument unpersuasive.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.
We concur: HOLLENHORST Acting P. J., McKINSTER J.