Opinion
April 24, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Roncallo, J.).
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof which denied that branch of the motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against Pall Corporation, and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion, dismissing the complaint insofar as it is asserted against Pall Corporation, and severing the action against the remaining defendants; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The defendants' submission of evidence of the plaintiff's fraud acquired after her discharge from employment does not entitle them to judgment as a matter of law (see, Reinach v Wisehart, 209 A.D.2d 332). Rather, after-acquired evidence is relevant to a determination of damages and what other remedies to impose, if and when a violation by the employer is found (see, McKennon v Nashville Banner Publ. Co., 513 US ___, 115 S Ct 879; Moodie v Federal Reserve Bank, 831 F. Supp. 333, 336).
However, the order appealed from must be modified, and the complaint dismissed insofar as it is asserted against Pall Corporation, because the plaintiff failed to set forth sufficient facts to warrant piercing the corporate veil of Pall Corporation (see, Pebble Cove Homeowners' Assn. v Fidelity N.Y. FSB, 153 A.D.2d 843). Moreover, the record is devoid of any indication that the plaintiff undertook discovery on this issue, although the defense that Pall Corporation was not a proper party to the action was asserted over two years before the defendants brought their motion for summary judgment. Thus, additional time for discovery is not warranted (see, Monteleone v Incorporated Vil. of Floral Park, 123 A.D.2d 312, 314). Sullivan, J.P., O'Brien, Ritter and Goldstein, JJ., concur.