Opinion
Case No. 99-7079
August 15, 2000
OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING
CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Sharon McCaffery, proceeding pro se, commenced this action on February 22, 1999 against Defendants St. Joseph Mercy Hospital ("St. Joseph") and the Pittsfield Police Department ("PPD"). In her two-paragraph complaint, Plaintiff alleges that an emergency physician at St. Joseph provided negligent care on September 9, 1998, and that, in an apparently related incident, PPD police officers threw her to the floor and injured her. Plaintiff further alleges that, as a result of Defendants' conduct, she sustained spinal, arm, and hand injuries, and she seeks an award of $500,000 in damages from each Defendant. Although the basis for federal court jurisdiction is not at all clear on the face of the initial complaint, Plaintiffs subsequent filings, including an amended complaint filed on May 28, 1999, suggest that her claims against PPD, and perhaps both Defendants, rest in part on alleged violations of the U.S. Constitution which are actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
By motion filed on September 2, 1999, PPD now seeks the dismissal of Plaintiffs claims against it or, alternatively, an award of summary judgment in its favor on those claims. Similarly. by motion filed on September 29, 1999, St. Joseph requests that summary judgment be entered in its favor on Plaintiffs claims against the hospital. For her part, Plaintiff filed papers on October 14, 1999 and on November 19, 1999, asserting that she is entitled to summary judgment in her favor. Plaintiff also filed a response on October 1, 1999 addressing an affidavit submitted by PPD in support of its motion.
Having reviewed the motions and other materials submitted by the parties, as well as the record as a whole, the Court finds that oral argument is not necessary, and that it is appropriate to decide the parties' motions "on the briefs." See Local Rule 7.1(e)(2), U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Michigan. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that both Defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
As noted earlier, Plaintiffs complaint includes only the most cursory of allegations regarding the factual basis for her claims. However, further details have emerged from Plaintiffs subsequent filings, her deposition, and affidavits submitted in support of the parties' motions.
At the time of the incidents alleged in her complaint, Plaintiff was a fifty-five year-old former nurse. She last worked as a temporary nurse at the University of Michigan Hospital for approximately six weeks in the summer of 1997. According to Plaintiff, she ceased working at this job as a result of "posttraumatic stress" following the shooting death of a doctor at the hospital. (PPD Motion, Ex. A, Plaintiff Dep. at 10.) She then began collecting Social Security disability benefits for a mental condition, posttraumatic stress syndrome. (Id. at 15-16.) Plaintiff testified that the psychologist who evaluated her in connection with her request for Social Security benefits "stressed me out into manic behavior" during the course of the examination. (Id. at 15.)
Plaintiffs claims in this case arise from incidents that occurred at her apartment complex in Ypsilanti, Michigan on September 9, 1998. Plaintiff testified at her deposition that she called the apartment manager that afternoon to report someone breaking and entering into her apartment, and to ask that her locks be changed. (Id. at 50.) Plaintiff denied the apartment manager's report that she called several times and that she was screaming on the phone. She admitted, however, that she has a "loud thundering voice," and that she raised her voice when speaking to the apartment manager. (Id. at 52.)
The apartment manager called Defendant PPD to report a telephone threat from a resident, and Lieutenant Stephen Heller was dispatched to the scene at approximately 5:05 p.m. (PPD Motion, Ex. C, Heller Aff. at ¶ 2.) Upon his arrival, Lieutenant Heller contacted the individual on duty at the apartment complex, Kristin James, who told him that Plaintiff had called several times and had commented that she was going to get a gun. (Id. at ¶ 3.) Lieutenant Heller then went to Plaintiffs apartment and knocked on the door.
Upon opening the door to her apartment, Plaintiff allegedly stated that the "little fucking nigger kids" were coming into her apartment and taking her orange juice and hiding her glasses. (Id. at ¶ 5; see also PPD Motion, Ex. B, police report.) Plaintiff, however, denies making this statement. (Plaintiffs Dep. at 51, 58.) Instead, she testified:
Q: When you opened the door and observed a police officer standing there in uniform, did the officer say anything to you?
A: He said, "What's going on here?"
Q: And what did you reply?
A: I said, "Somebody came in — I had a suspected B E. Of course there's no evidence of entry, they had the keys obviously and I said I won't — I wouldn't answer the phone back to her [ i.e., the apartment manager]. In fact, I was going to leave my apartment. I was upset. Usually when I'm upset I take a ride, I cool down. I don't need some police officers coming into my house and beating me up, end of case.
Q: So you told this to the police officer while he was standing there at the door?
A: Yes, I told him I wanted to go and he wouldn't let me go.
Q: You wanted to go where?
A: For a ride to relax.
Q: So you tried to leave and he prevented you from leaving?
A: He told me I had to stay there, yeah.
Q: And you said he came in your apartment then after you had this conversation?
A: Yeah, he walked right in.
(Plaintiffs Dep. at 55-56.)
Lieutenant Heller then entered Plaintiffs apartment. Lieutenant Heller stated, both in his affidavit and his police report, that Plaintiff exhibited strange behavior such as screaming, jumping up and down, and making sexual comments, (PPD Motion, Ex. B; Heller Aff. at ¶ 6), at which point the officer called for a second unit and an ambulance. Plaintiff testified that Lieutenant Heller then began searching her residence, inquired about some medication in her medicine cabinet, and looked through her wallet. (Plaintiffs Dep. at 56-57.) Plaintiff told the officer that she had called because there had been someone in her apartment. (Id. at 57.) She also admitted to telling him that "if I had to, I would buy a gun, I would put it in my house as self-defense and if somebody entered my apartment, . . . I would defend myself with it." (Id. at 58.) She further testified that she might have said that she would "shoot the next one that comes in." (Id. at 58-59.)
Lieutenant Heller's backup, Officer Schick, then arrived at Plaintiffs residence. (Heller Aff. at ¶ 8.) At roughly the same time, Plaintiff testified that she went into the kitchen to do her dishes, approximately six feet from where Lieutenant Heller was standing in Plaintiffs living room. (Plaintiffs Dep. at 66.) Plaintiff then picked up a sharp "paring knife" and turned toward the police officers. (Id. at 67-68.) According to Lieutenant Heller, Plaintiff began to approach the officers with the knife in her hand. (Heller Aff. at ¶ 8.) At this point, the officers ordered Plaintiff to drop the knife, and she threw the knife on the floor. (Plaintiffs Dep. at 68, 71; Heller Aff. at ¶¶ 9-10.)
Plaintiff testified that the second officer then came toward her, grabbed her with a hand on each shoulder, twisted her around, and allegedly "threw me on the floor." (Plaintiffs Dep. at 71-72.) Lieutenant Heller's affidavit, however, states that he and Officer Schick each took one of Plaintiffs arms, and that they forced her to the ground only after she began to resist. (Heller Aff. at ¶ 10.) According to Plaintiff, her body hit the ground chest-first, with the officer's hands remaining on her shoulders throughout, and her glasses fell off and were bent as she was forced to the floor. (Plaintiffs Dep. at 72-73, 75.) The officer then put a knee on Plaintiffs back, pulled her arms behind her, handcuffed her, and placed her in a chair. (Plaintiffs Dep. at 73-74.) Plaintiff testified that the officers never kicked, punched, or hit her. (Id.)
Lieutenant Heller states in his affidavit that Officer Schick repaired the glasses by replacing a lens that had popped out. (Heller Aff. at ¶ 12.)
Huron Valley Ambulance then arrived, in response to Lieutenant Heller's call. The officers walked Plaintiff to the ambulance and removed the handcuffs, and the EMS personnel placed her in a four-point restraint. (Id. at 77.) Plaintiff testified that she felt that the hand restraints were placed on her too tightly, and that both of her wrists were injured as a result. (Id. at 115.) Plaintiff was transported to Defendant St. Joseph Mercy Hospital, and was placed in leather restraints by hospital personnel. (Id. at 78, 117.) Again, Plaintiff testified that these restraints were too tight, and that she was placed in an improper, twisted position that injured her left arm. (Id. at 101-02, 119-20.)
Lieutenant Heller also prepared a "Petition/Application for Hospitalization," stating his belief that Plaintiff was mentally ill, that she was a threat to injure herself or others, and that her judgment was sufficiently impaired that she did not understand the need for treatment. (PPD Motion, Ex. F.) As discussed below, three mental health professionals as St. Joseph's Hospital subsequently concurred in Lieutenant Heller's opinion.
Dr. K. Neacy, M.D., evaluated Plaintiff at about 8:00 p.m. on the night of her admission to the hospital, September 9, 1998, and concluded that Plaintiff was mentally ill and should remain hospitalized for psychiatric treatment. (PPD Motion, Ex. D, Clinical Certificate of Dr. Neacy.) More specifically, Dr. Neacy diagnosed Plaintiff as suffering from agitation and paranoid delusions, and found that she was likely to injure herself. (Id.) The following day, Dr. Robert Zimmerman, a psychiatrist, examined Plaintiff and also found her to be mentally ill and in need of further hospitalization. (PPD Motion, Ex. E, Clinical Certificate of Dr. Zimmerman.) Dr. Zimmerman diagnosed Plaintiff as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, and identified a possibility that Plaintiff might "act on her threats" and injure others. (Id.) Dr. Zimmerman's report further notes that Plaintiff did not deny threatening police officers with a knife, but instead attempted to minimize this threat. (Id.) Finally, Linda L. Brough, a social worker and mental health specialist, prepared a report on the night of Plaintiffs admission to the hospital, observing that Plaintiff was "having paranoid delusions," was "very agitated," and was "unable to appropriately manage her own behavior," and recommending that Plaintiff be transferred to the psychiatric unit of the hospital for further evaluation. (PPD Motion, Ex. G.) Plaintiff remained at St. Joseph for seven days.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Standards Governing Defendants' Motions
In their present motions, Defendants seeks summary judgment in their favor pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Under this Rule, summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
Both Defendants also argue, in the alternative, that Plaintiffs claims should be dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. However, because matters outside the pleadings have been presented for the Court's consideration, the Court elects to treat Defendants' motions as brought under Rule 56.
Three 1986 Supreme Court cases — Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)— ushered in a "new era" in the federal courts' review of motions for summary judgment. These cases, in the aggregate, lowered the movant's burden in seeking summary judgment. As stated inCelotex:
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof.Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
After reviewing the above trilogy of cases, the Sixth Circuit adopted a series of principles governing motions for summary judgment. These principles include:
* The movant must meet the initial burden of showing "the absence of a genuine issue of material fact" as to an essential element of the non-movant's case. This burden may be met by pointing out to the court that the respondent, having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no evidence to support an essential element of his or her case.
* The respondent cannot rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact, but must "present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment."
* The trial court no longer has the duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.
* The trial court has more discretion than in the "old era" in evaluating the respondent's evidence. The respondent must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Further, "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find" for the respondent, the motion should be granted. The trial court has at least some discretion to determine whether the respondent's claim is plausible.Street v. J.C. Bradford Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Nernberg v. Pearce, 35 F.3d 247, 249 (6th Cir. 1994). The Court will apply these standards in resolving Defendants' motions for summary judgment.
As noted earlier, Plaintiff has filed various papers inviting the Court to enter summary judgment in her favor. These filings, however, fail to satisfy (or even address) the summary judgment standards set forth above. In particular, Plaintiff has not shown that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on her claims against either Defendant. Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking summary judgment in her favor, the Court denies this request.
B. Defendant St. Joseph's Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs claims against Defendant St. Joseph can best be construed as complaining of improper medical treatment and care upon Plaintiffs admission to the hospital on September 9, 1998. In its motion for summary judgment, St. Joseph argues that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy a number of threshold requirements that must be met in order to pursue a claim under Michigan medical malpractice law. The Court agrees.
A person wishing to commence a medical malpractice suit under Michigan law must first provide written notice to the allegedly negligent health professional or health facility at least 182 days before filing a complaint. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2912b(1). This "notice of intent" must set forth:
(a) The factual basis for the claim.
(b) The applicable standard of practice or care alleged by the claimant.
(c) The manner in which it is claimed that the applicable standard of practice or care was breached by the health professional or health facility.
(d) The alleged action that should have been taken to achieve compliance with the alleged standard of practice or care.
(e) The manner in which it is alleged the breach of the standard of practice or care was the proximate cause of the injury claimed in the notice.
(f) The names of all health professionals and health facilities the claimant is notifying under this section in relation to the claim.
Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2912b(4). Plaintiff never provided St. Joseph with this notice, nor any other sort of written statement setting forth the information called for under the Michigan statute. Instead, she simply brought this action. Thus, under Michigan law, her malpractice claim against St. Joseph is subject to dismissal without prejudice. See Dorris v. Detroit Osteopathic Hosp. Corp., 460 Mich. 26, 594 N.W.2d 455, 466 (1999).
Plaintiff apparently did write a letter to St. Joseph on December 29, 1998, alleging that she had suffered injuries as a result of the treatment she received in the hospital's emergency room. This letter, however, does not provide all of the types of information called for under Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2912b(4). Moreover, even construing this letter as the requisite notice of intent, Plaintiff did not wait the required 182 days before bringing this action.
Next, Michigan law requires that a plaintiff in a medical malpractice suit must file an "affidavit of merit" with her complaint. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2912d(1). This affidavit must be "signed by a health professional" who "meets the requirements for an expert witness" under Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2169, and must "certify that the health professional has reviewed the notice and all medical records supplied to him or her by the plaintiffs attorney concerning the allegations contained in the notice." Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2912d(1). This affidavit also must set forth:
(a) The applicable standard of practice or care.
(b) The health professional's opinion that the applicable standard of practice or care was breached by the health professional or health facility receiving the notice.
(c) The actions that should have been taken or omitted by the health professional or health facility in order to have complied with the applicable standard of practice or care.
(d) The manner in which the breach of the standard of practice or care was the proximate cause of the injury alleged in the notice.
Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2912d(1). Again, Plaintiff failed to file any such "affidavit of merit" or its functional equivalent with her complaint. The appropriate sanction for this failure to comply with Michigan law is dismissal without prejudice of Plaintiffs medical malpractice claim against St. Joseph. Dorris, 594 N.W.2d at 466.
To be sure, when she was alerted to this defect, Plaintiff attempted to comply with the Michigan statute by filing an "amendment of complaint" on May 25, 1999, accompanied by a conclusory one-page "affidavit of merit" signed only by herself. This affidavit, however, is inadequate in a number of respects. First, it provides none of the information required under Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2912d(1), such as the applicable standard of care, the actions that St. Joseph personnel should have taken or omitted in order to comply with the applicable standard of care, or the manner in which an alleged breach of the relevant standard of care was the proximate cause of Plaintiffs injuries.
Plaintiff did not seek leave to file this amended complaint.
Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to establish that she is a "health professional who... meets the requirements for an expert witness" under Michigan medical malpractice law. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2912d(1). A plaintiff in a medical malpractice action must identify such a health professional for two purposes: (1) to provide the requisite "affidavit of merit" under § 600.2912d(1); and (2) to provide expert testimony as to the standard of care owed to the plaintiff and the nature of the alleged breach of this standard, see Locke v. Pachtman, 446 Mich. 216, 521 N.W.2d 786, 790 (1994);Robinson v. Henry Ford Health Sys., 892 F. Supp. 176, 181-82 (E.D. Mich. 1994), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1156 (1996). In her "affidavit of merit," and in a subsequent motion brought on August 2, 1999 requesting that she be qualified as an expert witness, Plaintiff proposes to fill the role of "health professional" herself, and to provide expert testimony on her own behalf.
A Michigan statute expressly sets forth the requirements for an individual to give expert testimony concerning the appropriate standard of practice or care in a medical malpractice action. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2169. As noted earlier, this same statute governs the determination whether an individual is a "health professional" who may submit an "affidavit of merit" in support of a medical malpractice suit. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2912d(1). Under this statute, an expert must be "licensed as a health professional in this state or another state," and also must satisfy a number of other requirements, including having "devoted a majority of his or her professional time" in the year preceding the date of the alleged malpractice to either "active clinical practice" or the "[i]nstruction of students in an accredited health professional school or accredited residency or clinical research program." Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2169(1).
The Court notes that it is not entirely certain whether the Michigan statutory requirements of a "notice of intent," a 182-day waiting period, and an "affidavit of merit" are applicable where a plaintiff brings a state-law medical malpractice claim in federal court. This inquiry turns upon the substantive/procedural distinction addressed in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and its progeny.
There is no such uncertainty, however, as to the applicability of Michigan's expert qualification statute in a state-law medical malpractice action brought in federal court. Rather, under Fed.R.Evid. 601, state law governs the determination of the competency of witnesses called upon to testify regarding state-law claims or defenses. This Court and others have specifically recognized that, in accordance with Rule 601, the federal courts must apply Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2169 to evaluate the qualifications of experts in medical malpractice actions brought under Michigan law. See Robinson, 892 F. Supp. at 182; Cronkrite v. Fahrbach, 853 F. Supp. 257, 259 (W.D. Mich. 1994). Moreover, to the extent that § 600.2169 implicates theErie substantive/procedural distinction, the Michigan Supreme Court has expressly held that this statute "is an enactment of substantive law," notwithstanding the fact that it is "drafted in terms of the admission or exclusion of evidence." McDougall v. Schanz, 461 Mich. 15, 597 N.W.2d 148, 158-59 (1999). Thus, there is no question that § 600.2169 applies here.
Plaintiff has failed to establish that she possesses the necessary qualifications under the Michigan statute to offer expert testimony or to submit an "affidavit of merit." First, although she was employed in the past as a registered nurse, she has not provided evidence that she currently is licensed as a health professional. Next, because she has not worked since the summer of 1997, she cannot show that, during the year preceding St. Joseph's alleged malpractice in September of 1998, she "devoted a majority of. . . her professional time" to active clinical practice or the instruction of students. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2169(1)(b). Finally, where Plaintiff has alleged that she received negligent treatment from St. Joseph's emergency room staff, she is required under the Michigan statute to identify an expert in "the same specialty" — that is, in emergency medicine. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2169(1)(a); see also Robinson, 892 F. Supp. at 182. Plaintiff has not produced evidence of any expertise she might possess in the area of emergency medicine.
In addition, the Court notes that the Michigan statute specifically provides that it "does not limit the power of the trial court to disqualify an expert witness on grounds other than the qualifications set forth in this section." Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2169(3). Thus, while the statute does not expressly prohibit a party from testifying as a medical expert witness on her own behalf, it arguably permits a court to disallow such testimony as contrary to the purposes behind the Michigan legislature's enactment of medical malpractice reform. As the Michigan courts have recognized, the purpose of the "affidavit of merit" is to "deter frivolous medical malpractice claims," Vandenberg v. Vandenberg, 231 Mich. App. 497, 586 N.W.2d 570, 572 (1998), and the purpose of the expert qualification statute, § 600.2169, is to ensure that the courts are particularly vigilant in examining the qualifications of experts in medical malpractice suits see McDougall, 597 N.W.2d at 153 n. 9. Plainly, it runs counter to these purposes to permit a party to offer expert medical testimony on her own behalf, as this party/witness is unlikely either to opine that her own suit lacks merit, or to express disinterested, unbiased opinions as to the applicable standard of care and the defendant's alleged breach of this standard.
Consequently, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to produce a legally sufficient affidavit of merit in support of her medical malpractice claim against St. Joseph. Further, she has not identified an expert to testify on her behalf who can satisfy the requirements of Michigan medical malpractice law. It follows that St. Joseph is entitled to summary judgment in its favor on Plaintiffs claim against the hospital.
As noted earlier, dismissal without prejudice is the usual remedy when a party fails to provide the required "notice of intent" or "affidavit of merit." However, even assuming Plaintiff were to cure these defects, she still would need to identify a qualified expert to provide testimony on her behalf. Despite having been alerted to this requirement, and despite ample opportunity to conduct discovery, Plaintiff has not named an expert (other than herself) who will testify in support of her medical malpractice claim. Because "[t]he applicable standard of care is an essential element in a medical malpractice action," McDougall, 597 N.W.2d at 159, Plaintiffs lack of qualified expert testimony on this point mandates an award of summary judgment in favor of St. Joseph.
C. Defendant PPD's Motion for Summary Judgment
In its motion for dismissal or summary judgment, Defendant PPD identifies a number of technical and substantive defects in Plaintiffs claims against the police department. As discussed below, the Court finds merit in each of PPD's arguments.
First, PPD notes that Plaintiff is asserting claims against the police department, and not the Township. The Sixth Circuit has explained that "[u]nder the law of Michigan, a municipal police department is a creature of the municipality," and that "[a] suit against a city police department in Michigan is one against the city itself, because the city is the real party in interest." Haverstick Enters.. Inc. v. Financial Fed. Credit. Inc., 32 F.3d 989, 992 n. 1 (6th Cir. 1994). Thus, Plaintiff cannot pursue her claims against the police department, but must instead sue Pittsfield Township.
Next, PPD points to a number of shortcomings in Plaintiffs complaint. First, the initial complaint discloses no federal claims on its face and, therefore, identifies neither a basis for federal court jurisdiction nor a legal theory of recovery against PPD. These defects, however, have been cured in Plaintiffs subsequent filings, which identify 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the federal statute giving rise to her claims against PPD. Nevertheless, in order to state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege and show (i) a deprivation of her rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (ii) that PPD acted under color of state law. See Dunn v. State of Tennessee, 697 F.2d 121, 125 (6th Cir. 1982). Neither Plaintiffs complaint nor her subsequent filings include allegations as to these essential elements of her § 1983 claim against PPD.
As PPD recognizes, however, Plaintiffs complaint and subsequent filings, when viewed in light of her deposition testimony, indicate that she is claiming a Fourth Amendment violation stemming from the alleged use of excessive force by PPD officers upon entering her apartment. Assuming, first, that Plaintiffs complaint should be construed as directed at Pittsfield Township rather than its police department or particular officers, the Township is subject to liability only if the constitutional deprivation alleged by Plaintiff is attributable to some Township custom or policy. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 817, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 2433 (1985); Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035-36 (1978). The Township cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior merely because it employs police officers who allegedly violated Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights. Monell, 436 U.S. at 69 1-92, 98 S.Ct. at 2036. Neither Plaintiffs complaint nor any evidence in the record identifies any Township custom or policy that played a role in Plaintiffs alleged injuries. Thus, to the extent that Plaintiffs complaint is construed as asserting claims against Pittsfield Township, any such claims must be dismissed.
Alternatively, if Plaintiffs complaint is viewed as directed against the two PPD officers involved in the September 9, 1998 incident, Lieutenant Heller and Officer Schick, the Court then is confronted with the question whether these officers are being sued in their official or individual capacities. Under the law of this Circuit, "absent any indication that these defendants are being sued individually, we must assume that they are being sued in their official capacities." Whittington v. Milby, 928 F.2d 188, 193 (6th Cir. 1991). Moreover, pro se plaintiffs are not relieved of the obligation to identify the capacity in which a government official is being sued:
[T]he face of a complaint must indicate whether a plaintiff seeks to recover damages from defendants directly, or to hold the state responsible for the conduct of its employees. Although modern pleading is less rigid than in an earlier day, we have not let down all pleading barriers. It is not too much to ask that if a person or entity is to be subject to suit, the person or entity should be properly named and clearly notified of the potential for payment of damages individually.Wells v. Brown. 891 F.2d 591. 593 (6th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).
In this case, Plaintiffs complaint does not name any PPD officers as parties, nor does any subsequent paper filed by Plaintiff indicate her intention to assert claims against particular officers, whether in their personal or official capacities. Accordingly, even assuming, contrary to her pleadings, that Plaintiff wishes to pursue § her 1983 claims against individuals rather than a municipal entity, the Court must view such claims as brought against the PPD officers in their official capacities. Under these circumstances, the Court's inquiry is governed by the principle that "[a]n official capacity claim filed against a public employee is equivalent to a lawsuit directed against the public entity which that agent represents." Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 355 n. 4 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105 (1985) ("As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity."). Consequently, Plaintiffs arguable claims against the officers in their official capacities are governed by the same standards set forth above regarding Plaintiffs possible claims against Pittsfield Township. As discussed earlier, such claims fail for lack of any allegations or evidence concerning a municipal custom or policy that caused Plaintiffs alleged injuries.
In sum, even overlooking the numerous and substantial defects on the face of Plaintiffs complaint, and construing Plaintiffs claims against PPD under a more lenient standard in light of her pro se status, the Court simply is unable to discern in the record any allegations or affirmative evidence upon which Plaintiff can sustain her claims. Therefore, the Court holds that PPD is entitled to summary judgment in its favor.
In light of this conclusion, the Court need not reach PPD's alternative argument that, even viewing Plaintiffs claims as brought against PPD officers in their individual capacities, the officers nonetheless would be shielded from liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Pittsfield Police Department's September 2, 1999 Motion for Dismissal and/or Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant St. Joseph Mercy Hospital's September 29, 1999 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.