Opinion
CIVIL 5:22-cv-90-DCB-LGI
04-29-2024
CHEVELLE MCALISTER, #123411 PLAINTIFF v. MANAGEMENT AND TRAINING CORPORATION, DARREL VANNOY, BIANCA REECE, SA'MYNI BELL, JANAIYA BOLDEN, and M. SCHOETTMER DEFENDANTS
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
LAKEYSHA GREER ISAAC, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case is before the Court on Defendants Management and Training Corporation, Darrel Vannoy, Bianca Reece, Sa'Myni Bell, and Janaiya Bolden's Motion [37] for Summary Judgment. Having considered the parties' submissions and the applicable law, the undersigned recommends that the Motion [37] be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff Chevelle McAlister (“Plaintiff”) is a post-conviction inmate incarcerated by the Mississippi Department of Corrections (“MDOC”). Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), and he brings this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl. [1] at 1; Order [5]. The named Defendants are Management and Training Corporation, Warden Darrel Vannoy, Sergeant Bianca Reece, Officer Sa'Myni Bell, Officer Janaiya Bolden, and Major M. Schoettmer.
Plaintiff complains about the conditions of his prior confinement at the Wilkinson County Correctional Facility (“WCCF”) in Woodville, Mississippi. WCCF is a privately-operated prison facility that is presently operated by Management and Training Corporation (“MTC”). On October 18, 2023, the undersigned conducted a screening hearing wherein Plaintiff clarified and amended his claims by his sworn testimony. See Omnibus Hearing Transcript [28]; Attach. [37-3]. Plaintiff's allegations are summarized below.
Plaintiff claims that on July 25, 2022, in the dayroom at WCCF, fellow inmate Daniel Hatten grabbed a mop stick and began hitting Plaintiff in the face. Plaintiff testified that he used a shank (prison-made knife) to stab Hatten in self-defense. Plaintiff testified that Hatten's custodial designation was close-custody which means Hatten should not have been able to leave his cell and enter the dayroom when Plaintiff, a medium security inmate, was in the dayroom. Plaintiff claims that allowing offenders with these differing custody levels in the dayroom at the same time violated MDOC policy and caused this physical altercation to occur.
Plaintiff describes Hatten as “high” “on drugs” at the time. [28] at 21. Plaintiff testified that he knew Hatten from an earlier incarceration but had not spoken to him in three or four years prior to this incident. Plaintiff describes the following verbal exchange with Hatten occurring five to six minutes prior to the physical altercation:
he was telling Sergeant Reece, well, these guys doing this, and these guys doing that [sic]. And I was telling Sergeant Reece - - I said, Sergeant Reece, well, you know, them guys on drugs you know [sic]. And he got mad. He said, well, you know, you a snitch [sic]. Why [are] you telling the police this and that? He didn't know that they [were] fixing to open the doors up and let him out....
And he called me a snitch, you know, You a snitch. You know, you need to quit talking like that. If the door was open, I would do this. I would do that. Not knowing that the door was fixing to open.[28] at 21-22. Plaintiff testified that five or six minutes later, Hatten exited his cell and walked downstairs where Plaintiff was located, stopping by the shower area to retrieve a mop stick, and began hitting Plaintiff. According to Plaintiff, he stabbed Hatten in self-defense.
Plaintiff testified that five to seven minutes elapsed before Sgt. Reece intervened and stopped the altercation. During this time, Plaintiff believes Officer Bell called for help and he is “pretty sure” that a “code black” was called indicating that somebody has been stabbed and initiating a response within the facility for security officers to break up an altercation. [28] at 24. Plaintiff explained that when Sgt. Reece said, “Y'all stop” that both him and Hatten stopped fighting without any physical intervention by Reece. [28] at 25.
Plaintiff testified that as a result of this incident, he suffered an injured leg, a chipped tooth, and a cracked tooth. Plaintiff testified that he was taken to the medical department where he saw a doctor that advised him his leg was fractured. Approximately three-months after the incident, Plaintiff was moved to the South Mississippi Correctional Institution in Leakesville, Mississippi.
Plaintiff seeks to hold Warden Vannoy and Major Schoettmer liable because one of them either approved or issued the directive for close-custody inmates to be released into the dayroom with medium security inmates present. Plaintiff testified that Officer Bell, Officer Bolden, and Sgt. Reece were on the zone when this happened, and they should have known this incident would occur by allowing the two different custody level inmates on the zone at the same time.
Plaintiff testified that the “main reason why” he is suing MTC is because MDOC policy does not allow close-custody (C custody) inmates mixed with medium custody inmates “because if you do that,” an “incident like this” will occur and MTC “got it wrong.” [28] at 11-12. As additional reasoning for why he brings this suit, Plaintiff testified that during a prior incarceration in 2012, he was stabbed by a different inmate at WCCF, and regretfully, he chose not to sue when released from prison shortly thereafter.
After the Omnibus Hearing, Defendants MTC, Vannoy, Reece, Bell, and Bolden filed a Motion [29] for Partial Summary Judgment, arguing Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his available administrative remedies prior to filing this lawsuit as to any denial of medical care claims. Plaintiff did not respond. On January 12, 2024, the Court entered an Order [33] adopting the undersigned's Report & Recommendation [32] granting Defendants' Motion [29] for Partial Summary Judgment. At that time, Plaintiff's denial of medical care claims were dismissed without prejudice.
On March 6, 2024, Defendants MTC, Vannoy, Reece, Bell, and Bolden filed a Motion [37] for Summary Judgment arguing Plaintiff fails to establish a cognizable constitutional claim thereby entitling them to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff has not filed a response and the time for doing so has passed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). If the movant satisfies his initial obligation of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the “burden shifts to the nonmovant to set forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.” Hart v. Hairston, 343 F.3d 762, 764 (5th Cir. 2003).
“A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). All facts and inferences are construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, see Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2010), “but conclusional allegations and unsubstantiated assertions may not be relied on as evidence by the nonmoving party.” Carnaby v. City of Houston, 636 F.3d 183, 187 (5th Cir. 2011).
When a plaintiff files a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he must show that a defendant's conduct (1) deprived him of rights, privileges, or immunities guaranteed by the United States Constitution or the laws of the United States; and that (2) the alleged conduct was committed by an individual acting under the color of state law. See Bryant v. Military Dep't of the State of Miss., 597 F.3d 678, 686 (5th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff's failure to protect claims arise under the Eighth Amendment which requires prison officials to protect inmates from “violence at the hands of other inmates.” Adames v. Perez, 331 F.3d 508, 512 (5th Cir. 2003).
To succeed on a failure to protect claim, Plaintiff is “required to show that he was ‘incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm and that the prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to [his] safety.'” Williams v. Martin, 570 Fed.Appx. 361, 365 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 524 (5th Cir. 2004)).
A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows of an “excessive risk to inmate health or safety” and disregards that risk. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)....[A] prison official “knows of” an excessive risk only if (1) he is aware of facts from which he could infer “that a substantial risk of serious harm exists” and (2) he in fact “draw[s] the inference.” Id. In other words, in order to be deliberately indifferent, a prison official must be subjectively aware of the risk.Adames, 331 F.3d at 512. Deliberate indifference “cannot be inferred merely from a negligent or even a grossly negligent response to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001). “Actions and decisions by officials that are merely inept, erroneous, ineffective, or negligent do not amount to deliberate indifference. . .”. Estate of Davis ex. rel. McCully v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). It is “an extremely high standard to meet.” Domino v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001).
C. Arguments of the Parties
The moving Defendants claim there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to Plaintiff's remaining claims of failure to protect and MTC's failure to supervise or train their employees. In support of their Motion [37], Defendants submit a copy of the Omnibus Hearing Transcript [37-3], an Affidavit of Warden Vannoy [37-1], a copy of MDOC Standard Operating Procedure No. 22-01-01 [37-2], and a copy of Plaintiff's medical records, see Attach. [39].
The moving Defendants claim Plaintiff's allegations do not demonstrate the deliberate indifference necessary to maintain a failure to protect claim under § 1983. They argue that Plaintiff produced no evidence that Defendants were aware of a known risk to Plaintiff's safety, and they disregarded that risk. Rather, the physical altercation between Hatten and Plaintiff was unexpected and responded to in a reasonable manner. The moving Defendants rely on Plaintiff's medical records to further argue that any injury Plaintiff suffered was de minimus. Defendant MTC also claims that Plaintiff fails to show deliberate indifference on its part for failure to supervise or train its employees.
For these reasons, the moving Defendants argue that summary judgment in their favor is proper. As stated above, Plaintiff has not responded to the Motion [37] for Summary Judgment and the time for doing so has expired.
D. Discussion
The undersigned considers Plaintiff's claims for failure to protect in three parts. Defendants' allegedly failed to protect Plaintiff from the attack by Hatten because: (1) their actions violated MDOC policy and procedure; (2) inmates with close-custody designations should not be permitted in the dayroom with medium custody inmates; and (3) Hatten should not have been released from his cell to the dayroom. Next, the undersigned considers Plaintiff's allegations as an attempt to hold MTC liable for a failure to supervise or train their employees.
1. Prison policy and procedures
Plaintiff's main contention, that releasing close-custody inmates into the dayroom when medium security inmates are present is a violation of MDOC policy, does not state a viable § 1983 claim.
The moving Defendants present an affidavit of Warden Vannoy along with the applicable policy covering restrictions associated with specific custodial designations. Warden Vannoy explains there is no policy preventing this situation as the policy leaves the decision regarding movement of close-custody offenders within the facility to the Warden's discretion. Warden Vannoy further explains that policy provides that “close-custody inmates' movement inside the perimeter of the housing unit may be unescorted but will be continuously monitored by correctional staff.” (Vannoy Aff. [37-1] at 2 (¶5)).
Plaintiff is mistaken as to the parameters of prison policy regarding movement of close-custody offenders. However, even if allowing prisoners with these two different security designations to be in the dayroom at the same time did violate prison policy and procedures, that alone does not establish a constitutional violation. “Violations of prison rules and regulations do not support a claim for relief under § 1983.” Harris v. Hinds Cnty., 714 Fed.Appx. 451, 452 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Hernandez v. Estelle, 788 F.2d 1154, 1158 (5th Cir. 1986)); Neal v. Wilkinson Co. Corr. Facility, No. 5:22-cv-8-DCB-LGI, ECF No. 16 at 5 (S.D.Miss. 2022) (sua sponte dismissing inmate's § 1983 claims alleging violations of prison policy as frivolous). Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Plaintiff's claims of policy and procedure violations.
2. Allowing inmates with different security designations in the dayroom at the same time
Second, Plaintiff's contention that allowing inmates with a more restrictive custody designation than his to be in the prison dayroom at the same time as him, does not automatically establish a failure to protect claim in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff presents no probative summary judgment evidence that Defendants knew of, and deliberately ignored, an excessive risk to Plaintiff's safety by allowing close-custody inmates and medium security inmates in the dayroom together.
Plaintiff states that three guards were present on the zone monitoring the situation during the release of the close-custody inmates. There is no evidence that releasing the close-custody inmates into the dayroom caused any other altercations, physical or otherwise, between inmates of the same or differing custody levels. As for the specific incident with Hatten, no other inmates participated as Plaintiff confirmed that only Hatten and himself were involved. [28] at 16. According to Plaintiff's own testimony, Officer Bell called for help and the situation was controlled within minutes. And Sgt. Reece stopped the altercation without any physical intervention but simply with the verbal command, “Y'all stop.” [28] at 25.
Plaintiff's generalized fear that close-custody inmates might cause harm if they are allowed in the dayroom at the same time as medium security inmates is not sufficient to put Defendants on notice of an excessive risk to Plaintiff's safety. “Without any evidence that the practice of [allowing close-custody inmates and medium security inmates in the dayroom at the same time] subjects Plaintiff to a substantial risk of harm, the Court will not second guess the decision of [prison] officials to do so.” Humphrey v. South Mississippi Correctional Institution, No. 1:15-cv-424-JCG, 2017 WL 706082, at * 5 (S.D.Miss. 2017) (granting summary judgment on prisoner's failure to protect claims under § 1983), aff'd, 777 Fed.Appx. 767 (5th Cir. 2019). Construing the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff does not show that Defendants disregarded a known excessive risk to Plaintiff's safety by allowing inmates with differing security classifications in the dayroom at the same time.
3. Allowing inmate Hatten in the dayroom with Plaintiff
Third, Plaintiff fails to present evidence that Defendants knew releasing Hatten out of his cell to the dayroom area posed a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff and they disregarded that risk.
Plaintiff testified that he knew Hatten from an earlier period of incarceration, and-other than immediately prior to the attack-he had not spoken to Hatten in “three or four years.” [28] at 17. Plaintiff testified that he was not having any problems or issues with Hatten prior to the incident and he “felt like [Hatten] was on drugs or something that made him react the way he reacted.” [28] at 17.
Plaintiff further testified that he had not requested any type of “red tag” or “keep separate” from Hatten via prison procedures or verbally to any prison official. [28] at 23. Nor did Plaintiff testify that when the verbal exchange with Hatten occurred that he expressed any type of fear of harm or need for protection to the security personnel present. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that Defendants “had the requisite knowledge that a substantial risk of serious harm existed prior to the incident” as necessary to show deliberate indifference. Hill v. Thomas, 326 Fed.Appx. 736, 737 (5th Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of prisoner's § 1983 suit alleging prison officials failed to protect her from assault by another prisoner).
Plaintiff's testimony shows that Plaintiff shared his belief that Hatten was high on drugs and then Hatten called Plaintiff a snitch and within minutes the attack ensued. This was a spontaneous interaction as opposed to a known excessive risk to Plaintiff's safety. See, e.g., Longoria v. Texas, 473 F.3d 586, 594 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding, in part, that officer did not have “any knowledge of a substantial threat to [prisoner's] safety” when he escorted unwilling prisoner “from his cell while [prisoner] was warning that the inmates in the shower wanted to kill him”). Plaintiff's claims fall short of meeting the demanding standards of deliberate indifference. See id. (finding because officers did not have “any knowledge of a substantial threat to [the prisoner-plaintiff's] safety,” that “as a matter of law [the officers] did not act with deliberate indifference”); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (finding not every injury “by one prisoner at the hands of another . . . translates into constitutional liability for prison officials”); Adames, 331 F.3d at 512 (“Prison officials are not . . . expected to prevent all inmate-on- inmate violence”). Plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to his failure to protect claims.
4. Failure to supervise or train employees
Finally, to hold MTC liable for failure to supervise or train their employees, Plaintiff must show-in part-that their “failure to train or supervise amounts to deliberate indifference.” Goodman v. Harris Cnty., 571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted) (explaining that since plaintiff failed to show deliberate indifference, there was no need to discuss the “remaining prongs of supervisory liability”). To show deliberate indifference in this context, Plaintiff must demonstrate either (1) a “pattern of violations and that the inadequacy of supervision is obvious and likely to result in a constitutional violation” or (2) that a “supervisory official implements a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights.” Jones v. King, No. 5:13-cv-82-MTP, 2014 WL 4964310, at *3 (S.D.Miss. 2014) (citations omitted).
The only allegations Plaintiff puts forth to hold MTC liable for failure to supervise or train is his testimony that prior to this 2022 altercation with Hatten, he was stabbed by a different inmate at the same prison facility in 2012, and that it is “dangerous in Wilkinson County.” [28] at 24. A stabbing by a different inmate during a prior incarceration, ten-years earlier, albeit at the same prison facility, is too remote to show a pattern of violations. See, e.g., Edwards v. Oliver, No. 3:17-cv-1208, 2021 WL 6884649, at *11 (N.D. Tex. 2021), report and recommendation adopted by 2022 WL 447085, at *1 (N.D. Tex. 2022) (finding “evidence of a single incident four years before the incident giving rise to this lawsuit is insufficient to demonstrate a pattern” for a finding of deliberate indifference). Instead, Plaintiff's testimony establishes the attack by Hatten was isolated and unexpected.
At his hearing, Plaintiff mentions the 2012 stabbing as part of the reason he decided to bring this suit, essentially voicing regret over his decision to not sue after the 2012 incident. See [28] at 10-11. When asked about carrying a shank on his person in the prison facility, Plaintiff responded, in part, with “[i]t's dangerous in Wilkinson County.” [28] at 24. It does not appear that Plaintiff makes either of these assertions in an effort to show a pattern, but the undersigned construes the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the non-moving party.
The undersigned recognizes there is a “single incident exception” to the pattern requirement but finds the “extremely narrow” exception inapplicable here as it is “generally reserved for those cases in which the government actor was provided no training whatsoever.” Edwards v. City of Balch Springs, Tex., 70 F.4th 302, 312-13 (5th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Further, as to any policy allegations, Plaintiff's claims rest on his mistaken belief that prison policy was not followed, not that the policy itself is a repudiation of any constitutional rights. There is no argument that the applicable policy “itself . . . affirmatively allows or compels unconstitutional conduct.” Edwards v. City of Balch Springs, Tex., 70 F.4th 302, 309 (5th Cir. 2023) (finding summary judgment was properly granted because City's use-of-force policies were facially constitutional and Plaintiff failed to establish deliberate indifference as necessary to succeed on his § 1983 claims for failure to train, supervise, and discipline police officers). Plaintiff's assertions, viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, do not amount to deliberate indifference on behalf of MTC. Without evidence of deliberate indifference, Plaintiff's claims fail as a matter of law.
E. Conclusion
The moving Defendants submit competent summary judgment evidence demonstrating that Defendants did not fail to protect Plaintiff from a known excessive risk to Plaintiff's safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff may not rely on conclusional allegations and unsubstantiated assertions to defeat summary judgment as to any separate claims against MTC for failure to supervise or train their employees. Because Plaintiff fails to come forward with specific facts showing there is a genuine dispute as to his remaining § 1983 claims, summary judgment is proper.
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the moving Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be granted, and this case be dismissed with prejudice.
The record shows that Defendant Schoettmer was served with process, but he has not filed an Answer or otherwise appeared in this case. See Summons Returned Executed [19]. A defendant who was served but has not appeared can benefit from the defenses raised by other defendants who have appeared. See Gonzales v. Reilley, No. 22-40195, 2023 WL 7443213, *4 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 768 (5th Cir. 2001) and McCarty v. Zapata Cnty., 243 Fed.Appx. 792, 794 (5th Cir. 2007) for the proposition that a non-appearing party who has been served with summons may benefit from the appearing defendant's favorable summary judgment motion). Therefore, Defendant Schoettmer may benefit from the moving Defendants' Motion [37] for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's remaining § 1983 claims should be dismissed with prejudice as to all Defendants. See, e.g., Patel v. Haro, 470 Fed.Appx. 240, 245 (5th Cir. 2012) (affirming district court's decision allowing a non-appearing defendant “to benefit from the favorable disposition of the appearing defendants' summary judgment motion”).
III. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated, the undersigned recommends that Defendants MTC, Vannoy, Reece, Bell, and Bolden's Motion [37] for Summary Judgment be GRANTED and Plaintiff's remaining 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims be dismissed WITH PREJUDICE.
IV. NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
In accordance with the Rules of this Court, any party may serve and file written objections to the recommendations, with a copy to the United States District Judge, the Magistrate Judge, and the opposing party, within fourteen days after being served a copy of this recommendation. Failure to timely file written objections to proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained within this report and recommendation will bar that party from attacking on appeal unobjected to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court, except on the grounds of plain error. See 28 U.S.C. § 636; Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Alexander v. Verizon Wireless Services, L.L.C., 875 F.3d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 2017).