Opinion
2:23-cv-04239-SAL-MGB
10-25-2023
Tyrone Deon Mazyck, Plaintiff, v. Michael Nelson; George R. Vantine, Jr.; Director, Al Cannon Detention Center; and Scarlett Wilson, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Tyrone Deon Mazyck (“Plaintiff”), a state pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights. (See Dkt. No. 1.) Under Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review this case and submit findings and recommendations to the assigned United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was arrested on May 18, 2021, for accessory after the fact to a murder that occurred outside of the Charleston Inn and Suites several weeks prior.(Dkt. No. 1 at 8.) According to Plaintiff, he “was inside of a hotel room and could not see what was going on outside of that room when [the victim] was shot.” (Id.) After the shooting, Plaintiff apparently “took the gun from the principal” to put it away; however, he maintains that he was “unaware of the situation that just took place” and did not know “the facts about the murder” until his attorney “showed [him] the video” later. (Id. at 8-9.) Since his arrest, Plaintiff has been detained at the Al Cannon Detention Center (“Al Cannon”) pending trial before the Charleston County Court of General Sessions. Plaintiff now brings the instant civil Complaint challenging his ongoing criminal proceedings pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The undersigned takes judicial notice of the records filed in Plaintiff's underlying state criminal proceedings. See https://www.sccourts.org/casesearch/ (limiting search to Charleston County, Indictment No. 2022-GS-10-00456) (last visited October 25, 2023); see also Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) (explaining that a federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records of other courts); Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-cv-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2009) (noting that the court may also take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government websites).
First, the Complaint suggests that Defendant George R. Vantine, Jr., a detective with the North Charleston Police Department, “took false information to the judge to obtain [the] arrest warrant” against Plaintiff. (Id. at 5.) More specifically, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Vantine purposefully “left out key points” from his warrant affidavit, including that Plaintiff “was inside Room 421 at the time [the] principal commit[ted] the murder . . . [and] couldn't have seen what had taken place.” (Id. at 5-6.) The Complaint states that at the time the judge issued the arrest warrant, he or she was unaware that the hotel had video footage verifying that Plaintiff was not outside when the murder occurred. (Id. at 10.)
Next, the Complaint asserts that Plaintiff's initial criminal defense attorney, Defendant Michael Nelson, improperly waived the right to a preliminary hearing without Plaintiff's permission and possibly refused to file a motion for a speedy trial on Plaintiff's behalf. (Id. at 5, 7, 9-10.) The Complaint also alleges that Defendant Nelson allowed the State to “move forward with [the] indictment” without attempting to present a “meaningful defense.” (Id. at 5, 7, 9.) To that end, Plaintiff further claims that Defendant Scarlett Wilson, the Ninth Circuit Solicitor, allowed her office to omit from the indictment the fact that Plaintiff was inside a hotel room when the murder took place, leading the grand jury “to believe [he] was out there when [the] victim was shot.”(Id. at 6, 9.)
For reference, the grand jury returned a true bill on indictment on March 15, 2022. See https://www.sccourts.org/casesearch/.
Finally, the Complaint contends that Defendant Wilson has been “illegally holding” Plaintiff at Al Cannon since his arrest to use him as a witness against his co-defendants at trial. (Id. at 6.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant Wilson interviewed him in May 2023 “to go over the facts” of the murder and “made it seem as if [Plaintiff] would be let go, but that day never came.” (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff asserts that he is now being detained at Al Cannon “against his will” and argues that the “director” of the detention center (the fourth defendant named in this case), “should be contacting the courts to let them know people are being held in his jail against [their] constitutional rights....” (Id. at 6.) Based on the above, Plaintiff claims that Defendants are violating his constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at 4, 6.) The Complaint seeks the “dismissal” of Plaintiff's pending criminal charge “with prejudice” and “$1,100 per day spent in the detention center.” (Id. at 11.) This is the extent of Plaintiff's Complaint.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also id. § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Wellerv. Dep'tof Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 39091 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”). The Fourth Circuit has explained that “though pro se litigants cannot, of course, be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1985).
DISCUSSION
A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim to relief under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). In the instant case, the Complaint raises potential violations of Plaintiff's rights under the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.(Dkt. No. 1 at 4, 10.) For the reasons stated below, however, Plaintiff's claims do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation and are therefore subject to summary dismissal under § 1983.
Although Plaintiff's Complaint also cites the Eighth Amendment (Dkt. No. 1 at 4, 10), the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment applies only to persons convicted of criminal offenses. See Bell v. Wofish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979). “[T]the State does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law. Where the State seeks to impose punishment without such an adjudication, the pertinent constitutional guarantee is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977); see also Young v. City of Mt. Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575 (4th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the protections afforded convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment extend to pretrial detainees through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Thus, as a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff's claims fall under the purview of the Fourteenth, rather than the Eighth, Amendment. Similarly, while the Complaint also references the Fifth Amendment, which prohibits the federal government from depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” U.S. Const. amend. V, such principles apply to state pretrial detainees by way of the Fourteenth Amendment. Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 174 n.15 (4th Cir. 2018); see also Garrett v. Sheeley, No. 3:19-cv-185, 2023 WL 4844051, at *2 (N.D. W.Va. Feb. 6, 2023) (“The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause applies to the federal government, while the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause applies to state and local governments.”). Accordingly, assuming Plaintiff cites the Fifth Amendment in relation to his due process rights, which appears to be the case, such claims are likewise brought pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.
I. Claims for Injunctive Relief
As an initial matter, Plaintiff's constitutional claims are barred under the Younger abstention doctrine. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held that federal courts should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances. See id. at 43-44; see also Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). Specifically, the Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm 'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm 'n v. Garden State Bar Ass 'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
In the instant case, the first criterion is met because Plaintiff's criminal proceedings are clearly ongoing. The second criterion is also met, as the Supreme Court has explained that “States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). Finally, the third criterion is satisfied because Plaintiff can address his claims in his pending criminal proceedings. Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 904 (noting that “ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights”) (referencing Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)). Because Plaintiff's case meets all three criteria for abstention under Younger, federal relief is available under § 1983 only if “special circumstances” justify the provision of federal review. Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224-26 (5th Cir. 1987).
Plaintiff's Complaint does not reflect the type of extreme misconduct or extraordinary circumstances that would warrant federal interference in a pending state criminal case. While “special circumstances” lacks any precise, technical meaning, courts have essentially looked to whether procedures exist which would protect a plaintiff's constitutional rights without pretrial intervention; thus, where a threat to the plaintiff's rights may be remedied by an assertion of an appropriate defense in state court, no special circumstance is shown. See Askins v. Dir. of Florence Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 9:20-cv-2846-DCC-MHC, 2020 WL 7001015, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 3, 2020) (referencing Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 449 (3d Cir. 1975)), adopted, 2020 WL 6110960 (D.S.C. Oct. 16, 2020). Further, where the right may be adequately preserved by orderly post-trial relief, special circumstances are likewise nonexistent. Id.; see also Victoria v. Bodiford, No. 8:21-cv-1836-JMC, 2021 WL 3726707, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 20, 2021) (“If Petitioner has the opportunity to raise his constitutional arguments within the state court proceedings and appeal adverse determinations within the state court system, this court is bound by Younger to abstain from granting Petitioner the relief he requests.”).
Here, Plaintiff has defense counsel and can raise his concerns regarding his arrest, indictment, and/or ongoing detention in the underlying criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Yerby v. Summerville Police Dep't, No. 2:22-cv-4175-BHH-MGB, 2023 WL 2666648, at *4 (D.S.C. Feb. 27, 2023) (dismissing claim pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine because plaintiff could raise his contentions regarding his arrest and the accuracy of related police reports before state court handling his criminal proceedings), adopted, 2023 WL 2666582 (D.S.C. Mar. 28, 2023); Bailey v. Marsh, No. 5:09-cv-180-F, 2009 WL 1705610, at *3 (E.D. N.C. June 11, 2009) (finding that plaintiff was not foreclosed from raising claims in state criminal case regarding state officials' purported perjury in obtaining warrant that led to arrest). Because Plaintiff can pursue his constitutional claims in state court, he cannot demonstrate “special circumstances,” or show that he has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied his requested relief. The undersigned therefore finds that Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief are precluded by the Younger abstention doctrine at this time.
To be sure, Plaintiff's specific request for injunctive relief-the dismissal of his criminal charge and, implicitly, his release from custody-is unavailable under § 1983 in any event. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (stating that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983”); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973) (explaining a challenge to the duration of confinement is within the core of habeas corpus). Accordingly, Plaintiff's Complaint does not state an actionable claim to injunctive relief under § 1983.
II. Claims for Damages
With respect to Plaintiff's request for damages, Younger and its progeny generally require courts to stay, rather than abstain and dismiss, suits for monetary relief where the same issues are pending before a state court. Stewart v. Beaufort Cty., 481 F.Supp.2d 483, 494-96 (D.S.C. 2007); see also Suggs v. Brannon, 804 F.2d 274, 280 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting that “a federal court is not precluded, in the exercise of its discretion, from staying proceedings in the action before it pending a decision by the state court, with a view to avoiding wasteful duplication of judicial resources and having the benefit of the state court's views”) (internal citations omitted). This approach “ensures that a federal plaintiff who is unable to pursue damages in the parallel state proceedings can return to federal court and reassert his claim for damages without being time-barred.” Stewart, 481 F.Supp.2d at 494 (referencing Carroll v. City of Mount Clemens, 139 F.3d 1072, 1076 (6th Cir. 1998)). Nonetheless, dismissal is still “appropriate when a plaintiff's damages are ‘plainly barred' for other reasons,” as is the case here. Pilgrim v. Delaney, No. 7:20-cv-2325-DCC, 2021 WL 274301, at *1 (D.S.C. Jan. 27, 2021) (referencing Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 248-50 (4th Cir. 2006)).
A. Defendant Vantine
Turning first to the allegations against Defendant Vantine, the Complaint states that the officer provided misleading information in his application for an arrest warrant against Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5, 10.) Accordingly, the undersigned construes Plaintiff's allegations as raising a claim for unreasonable seizure without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Miller v. Prince George's Cnty., 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Unquestionably, the Fourth Amendment prohibits law enforcement officers from making unreasonable seizures, and seizure of an individual effected without probable cause is unreasonable.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Fourth Amendment provides,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.U.S. Const., amend. IV.
To demonstrate that an officer seized an individual pursuant to an arrest warrant without probable cause, a plaintiff must show that the officer “deliberately or with a reckless disregard for the truth made material false statements in his affidavit or omitted from that affidavit material facts with the intent to make, or with reckless disregard of whether they thereby made, the affidavit misleading.” See id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Notably, “the false statements or omissions must be material, that is, necessary to the neutral and disinterested magistrate's finding of probable cause.” See Dunbar v. Biedlingmaier, No. 8:20-cv-738-DKC, 2022 WL 814293, at *6-7 (D. Md. Mar. 17, 2022) (referencing Miller, 475 F.3d at 628); see also Wolfe v. City of N. Charleston, No. 2:19-cv-902-RMG-MHC, 2021 WL 4055138, at *6 (D.S.C. July 30, 2021) (“With regard to alleged omissions from an affidavit, a plaintiff must establish that the officer failed to inform the magistrate of facts that the officer knew would negate a finding of probable cause.”), adopted, 2021 WL 3629901 (D.S.C. Aug. 17, 2021), aff'd, No. 21-7335, 2022 WL 2752362 (4th Cir. July 14, 2022).
Here, the Complaint suggests that Defendant Vantine, in procuring the arrest warrant for Plaintiff, intentionally failed to inform the issuing judge that Plaintiff had been inside a hotel room at the time of the shooting, such that he “couldn't have seen what had taken place.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 5-6, 10.) However, Plaintiff was arrested as an accessory after the fact, which requires only that (1) a felony was completed; (2) the accused had knowledge that the principal committed the felony; and (3) the accused harbored and/or assisted the principal felon. State v. Blakely, 402 S.C. 650, 656 (Ct. App. 2013). In other words, Plaintiff did not need to be physically present during the murder in order to be arrested and charged as an accessory to the crime. Consequently, Plaintiff's location in the hotel room was not material to the finding of probable cause for his arrest warrant and, in turn, Defendant Vantine did not violate the Fourth Amendment insofar as he omitted such information from his affidavit. See Wilkes v. Young, 28 F.3d 1362, 1365 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation because the material falsely represented in warrant affidavit “was altogether unnecessary to the magistrate's finding of probable cause”). Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim against Defendant Vantine is therefore subject to summary dismissal.
To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to allege that his location in the hotel room was material because it somehow disproved that he had knowledge of the shooting, his argument is not only flawed, but also a matter to be raised in his criminal proceedings. Indeed, probable cause requires less than the evidence necessary to convict. See McDuffie v. City of Charleston Police Dep't, No. 2:21-cv-3641-RMG-MHC, 2023 WL 6643351, at *12 (D.S.C. Aug. 28, 2023), adopted, 2023 WL 6157341 (D.S.C. Sept. 21, 2023); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972) (explaining that probable cause does not require “the same type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would be needed to support a conviction”). Here, the facts-as the Complaint presents them-are that Plaintiff was at the location of the shooting (the Charleston Inn & Suites) when it occurred and apparently took the gun from the principal “to put it up” after the crime was committed. (Dkt. No. 1 at 8-9.) In short, Plaintiff did not need to physically witness the shooting to have had knowledge of what happened, nor did the warrant affidavit need to allege such. Accordingly, this argument is equally unpersuasive for purposes of a Fourth Amendment violation.
B. Defendant Nelson
Next, the Complaint challenges Defendant Nelson's legal representation as Plaintiff's former defense attorney in the criminal proceedings pending before the Charleston County Court of Common Pleas. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5, 7, 9-10.) As stated above, however, § 1983 requires that the alleged constitutional violation be committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West, 487 U.S. at 48. Purely private conduct, no matter how wrongful, does not constitute state action under § 1983. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) (explaining that to qualify as state action, the conduct in question “must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible,” and “the party charged with the [conduct] must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor”).
An attorney-whether privately retained, court-appointed, or a public defender-does not act under color of state law “when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318, 325 (1981) (explaining that a “defense lawyer characteristically opposes the designated representatives of the State”); see also Marcantoni v. Bealefeld, 734 Fed.Appx. 198, 199 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting that “private attorneys do not act under color of state law and a § 1983 suit may not be maintained against an attorney based on his representation”). Because the Complaint challenges Defendant Nelson's conduct in his capacity as Plaintiff's former defense attorney, the pleading fails to establish the requisite state action for purposes of § 1983 and Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Nelson are therefore subject to summary dismissal.
C. Defendant Wilson
Turning to Plaintiff's allegations against Defendant Wilson, the Ninth Circuit Solicitor, the law is well-established that prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from personal liability under § 1983 for alleged civil rights violations committed in the course of “activities intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); Dababnah v. Keller-Burnside, 208 F.3d 467, 468 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Nero v. Mosby, 890 F.3d 106, 117 (4th Cir. 2018) (explaining that “[w]ithout immunity from suit, this threat of retaliatory litigation would predispose prosecutors to bring charges based not on merit but on the social or political capital of prospective defendants”).
In South Carolina, regional prosecutors are called Solicitors and Assistant Solicitors. See S.C. Code §§ 1-7 310, 320.
The allegations against Defendant Wilson ultimately boil down to her decision to proceed with criminal charges against Plaintiff and her presentation of what the Complaint deems was a “misleading” indictment to the grand jury. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 6, 9-10.) As stated above, Defendant Wilson has immunity for her alleged involvement in Plaintiff's criminal proceedings and, thus, Plaintiff's claims against her are subject to summary dismissal under the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity. See, e.g., Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 340-43 (2009) (noting that absolute immunity applies when a prosecutor prepares to initiate a judicial proceeding); Nero, 890 F.3d at 123-24 (applying prosecutorial immunity where state's attorney “either instructed a major in sheriff's department to file false charges against officers or erroneously advised major that probable cause supported charges against officers”).
The undersigned also notes that, to the extent Plaintiff is more so challenging Defendant Wilson's actions in her supervisory role at the Solicitor's Office, the doctrines of vicarious liability and respondeat superior generally are not applicable in § 1983 actions. See Polk Cnty., 454 U.S. at 325 (noting that “Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability”); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”).
D. Director at Al Cannon Detention Center
The Complaint's final cause of action is against the “director” at Al Cannon Detention Center, who Plaintiff suggests should have notified the court system of his ongoing “unconstitutional” detention. (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) Plaintiff's argument, however, is premised on the flawed assumption that the director is somehow obligated to monitor each detainee's respective legal proceedings and lobby for their release when appropriate. There is simply no basis in law or fact for Plaintiff's contention. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's allegations against the director of Al Cannon are frivolous and, as such, must be summarily dismissed. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324-25, 327-28 (explaining that a claim based on a “meritless legal theory” or “baseless” factual contentions, such as “fantastic or delusional” scenarios, may be dismissed sua sponte at any time under § 1915(e)(2)(B)).
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the undersigned is of the opinion that Plaintiff cannot cure the defects identified above by amending his Complaint. See Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392 of United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 10 F.3d 1064 (4th Cir. 1993). The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that the Court decline to give Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint and DISMISS this action against Defendants without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).